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If on the other hand I tell you that to let no day 
pass without discussing goodness and all the other 
subjects about which you hear me talking and 
examining both nyself and others is really the very 
best thing that a man can do, and that life without 
this sort of examination is not worth living, you 
will be even less inclined to believe me. Nevertheless 
that is how it is, gentlemen, as I maintain; though 
it is not easy to convince you of it. 
- Plato 'The Apology' 
Anybody can make a mistake, and the more he thinks 
about a thing, the more mistakes he's bound to make. 
- The Good Soldier Schweik 
That one person can increase another's understanding 
of something by way of symbolic communication seems an 
uncontentious claim. More contentious is the claim that 
much epistemology and philosophy of language~ wh~lst 
giving us formal expositions of the tr~th crlterla for 
'X knows that S' or the syntactic structure of language, 
fails to cast much light on the process of knowing, on 
what being an 'understanoer' consists in. 
I begin my thesis by looking at language acquisition, 
rejecting behaviourist/physicalist accounts and concluding 
that we nust talk about the conceptual develop~ent of 
the pre-linguistic child (involving coming to pick out 
and attach si~nificance to certain classes of objects 
of experience) if lanb~aGe acquisition is to be shown 
to be a possibility. ?ail~re to divorce concept possession 
from the possession of sophisticated linguistic skills, 
I arbUe, makes languaee acquisition inexplicable. I 
accept that language frequently plays an important part 
in establishing interpersonal agreement in conceptual 
frameworks/ways of looking, but not that talk of concept 
possession in the absence of linguistic skills is empty. 
This leads on to the problem of meaning and I adopt 
a 'speech acts' approach to this on the grounds that a 
Davidsonian theory of meaning cannot claim to explain 
how linguistic signs are significant for us unless 
backed up by behaviourist/physicalist claims of the sort 
Quine makes and which I reject. I look at the meaning 
of symbols in terms of the significance it has by virtue 
of agreement (within a form of life) on the appropriate-
ness of their inscriptions for performing certain speech 
acts in certain contexts. 
I next move on to an account of uncerstanding, analysed 
in terms of the possession of a conceptual framework 
appropriate for the object of understanding. I reject 
both relativist and strongly absolutist accounts of this 
'appropriate' ccncluding that we can only support a claim 
that 'this' or 'that' ways of looking captures 'these' 
aspects of the world if theory has implications, directly 
or indirectly, for our handling of relevant aspects of 
the world. Utility is not written into understanding 
itself, rather it appears as the criterion by which we 
can support the claim that a particular 'story' about 
the world captures the way things are to some extent as 
opposed to being mere phantasy. In the course of this 
discussion I distinguish a number of problem domains in 
which specialists have found it appropriate to make 
different metaphysical assumptions about the phenomena 
with which we are dealing. 
The thesis concludes by relating the issues discussed 
to both curriculum design and the problems of teaching. 
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(i) 
Introduction. 
When a teacher teaches he often produces vocal 
noises and makes little 'squiggles' on a blackboard 
or on paper. Such activities are aimed at producing 
some effect in his audience, his pupils. This is a 
crude description, embodying many unexamined pre-
suppOSitions, of something done by everyone who teaches. 
It raises, crudely, a number of basic problems. These are:-
(i) The status of the pupil (and the teacher) i.e, 
the question of what sort of description we 
should see the pupil under. 
(ii) The status of the 'noises' and 'squiggles' 
made by the teacher - are they stimuli which 
achieve their effect via mechanistic causality 
or are they conventionally defined 'speech acts' 
or what? 
(iii) The specification, in the light of the discussion 
of (i) and (i1) and of other relevant issues, of 
the 'effect' a teacher's activities should be 
aimed at achievine. 
Various solutions to these problems have been offered 
which carry very different implications for teachers' 
activities and attitudes. A behaviourist 'solution' to 
the first implies that we should reeard our pupils as 
responding organisms and suggests that the central 
element in any teacher's job is that of behaviour 
modification. The teacher, on this view, must first 
decide on what overt behaviour he wants his pupils to 
produce (which can be anything from good manners to the 
ability to balance chemical equations) and then must 
plan schedules of reinforcement i.e. provide stimuli 
of a sort that will operantly condition his pupils so 
that they will produce the relevant behaviour in appropriat~ 
contexts. The behaviourist approach is highly suspect 
and is generally taken to rest on an incoherent theoretical 
basis. The central problem with such accounts seems to be 
(ii) 
that in the absence of reference to the 'responding 
organism's' inner states the notions of stimuli and 
response become fatally problematic. 
This fact, however, doesn't deter some philosophers 
from adopting a behaviourist approach. Quine, for example, 
regards a behaviourist position as tenable given the 
added assumption that the responding organism is to be 
regarded as a stimulus-response 'machine'. For Quine 
the stimulus-response link is one of mechanistic cause 
and effect, the precise description of the mechanisms 
involved being a job for physiologists. In his article 
'Mind and Verbal Dispositions' (in 'f-Tind and Language 
ed:Guttenplan) he writes (P,87): 
"In all we may distinguish three levels of 
purported explanation, three degrees of depth: 
the mental, the behavioural, and the physiological. 
The mental is the most superficial of these, 
scarcely deserving the name of explanation, The 
physiological is the deepest and most ambitious, 
and it is the place for causal explanations. 
The behavioural level, in between, is what we 
must settle for in our descriptions of language, 
in our formulations of language rules, and in 
our explanations of semantical terms." 
So Quine's solutions to my three problems are (crudely):-
(i) Pupils are conditionable physiological mechanisms. 
(ii) Linguistic utterances are causally effective stimuli 
(in the same sense of 'cause l used by physicists). 
(iii) The effect of a teacher's utterances (etc.) should 
be to condition his pupil into 'correct' modes of 
behaviour. 
There are those, however, (and I am with them) who 
regard this sort of physicalist reductionism as highly 
suspect. If physics, dealing with phenomena of the same 
general type as a moving billiard ball causing a stationQry 
one to move by striking it, has no use for mentalistic 
concepts Such as consciousness, intention etc., then all 
is well and good. But to assume that there is nothing 
about human beings that requires us to be described as 
(iii) 
conscious agents seems unjustified especially given 
the fact that the physiological account which should 
(if Quine and other physicalists are right) replace 
our mentalistic accounts of people simply doesn't exist. 
It seems to me, and to many others, that people 
are conscious, at least in the sense of being percep-
tually aware of an external reality as opposed to 
neurological impulses, are agents and do have complex 
mental lives at both the cognitive and affective levels. 
Quine's faith that one day a physiolo~ical account 
will replace such mentalistic talk is, as thin~stand, 
nothing more than faith and as such his reductionist 
programme is not at all compelling. If we take mentalistic 
talk as meaningful in more than a poetic or mythological 
way (which is how Dennet characterises it in his book 
'Content and Consciousness~ we must reject Quine's 
solutions to my basic problems and approach our pupils 
not as 'conditionable physiological mechanisms' but as 
conscious agents who need to be helped to understand 
the world better in order to act on it more efficiently. 
Such an approach, which I adopt in this thesis, leads 
away from seeing linguistic utterances as causally 
effective (mechanistic sense) stimuli and towards looking 
at language in terms of speech acts, utterances gaining 
their appropriateness for doing 'this' in 'this' context 
through interpersonal agreement within a form of life. 
This approach, found most notably in the work of Austin 
and Searle and the later work of Wittgenstein is not 
without its opponents. The work of DaVidson and his 
followers, designed to give the meaning of statements 
in terms of a meta-linguistic description (in purely 
extensional terms) of their truth conditions attempts 
to discard any reference to utterer's intent. This move 
opposes the 'speech acts' approach in which an utterer's 
intent is seen as central to the meaning of his utterance. 
It might be the case that the apparent opposition 
here is illusory, the result of an ambiguity in the 
notion of a theory of meaning. A Davidsonian theory, it 
(iv) 
might be suggested, is concerned with exhibiting the 
meaning of statements in natural languages unambiguously 
by translating them into a rigorously defined meta-
language. The 'speech acts' approach, on the other 
hand, might be said to be more concerned with explaining 
the role of language in life, with explaining our 
ability to understand one anothers' linguistic utterances. 
It remains the case, however that the Davidsonian 
approach has been claimed to be an explanation of our 
linguistic abilities. 
Davidson himself currently seems rather reluctant 
to make this claim but Quine, as we have seen, makes it 
on the basis of the further claim that our (behavioural) 
tendency to produce linguistic utterances which accord, 
or which will be shown to accord, with a Davidsonian 
theory constitutes knowledge of such a theory, any 
further explanation of our possession of such 'knowledge' 
being a matter for physiological description of the 
rele~nt brain circuitry. 
Again here we have an issue of educational importance 
for the adoption of a Davidsonian position on language 
seems to reduce any talk of concept possession to talk 
of linguistic dispositions. The implication of this is 
that a child who cannot explain what he should know 
or uncerstand (assuming that other factors like nervousness 
etc. are absent] simply doesn't know or understand it. 
Against this we can point out people whose success in 
some endeavour, for instance, interpreting Beethoven 
on the piano, demonstrates their understanding whilst 
what they say about what they do is just too vague to 
give anyone an idea of how it's done. We can also point 
out those individuals who talk well but seem practically 
useless. Such considerations must, I suggest, lead us to 
regard any attempt to analyse understanding in terms 
only of linguistic dispositions as woefully inadequate. 
My third basic problem leads to two areas of debate. 
(v) 
The first is the characterisation of understanding, 
the second is the question of whether or nor the 
fundamental aim of education should be that of 
propagating understanding or whether other aims should 
be given priority. 
The debate on understanding comes down to the familiar 
argument between relativists and absolutists (though 
this distinction is not entirely clear, there are many 
shades of opinion between the extremes). The older view 
is that of the absolutists who claim that true under-
standing is of 'things-in-themselves', an absolutely 
true grasp of how things are in an independent (of us) 
uniVerse. The problems here are well known. We normally 
make knowledge claims like, "It's raining outside," or, 
"The earth is one planet amongst many," on the basis of 
evidence which falls far short of giving us absolute 
certainty. Thus Plato was led to conclude that true 
knowledge is of a transcendental 'world' of forms, not 
of the world of everyday experience. The central problem 
for absolutists is that of showing how we can have any 
knowledge at all, which comes down to specifying criteria 
for absolute truth, criteria which, when fulfilled, 
guarantee that we have absolutely certain knowledge. 
This just hasn't been done and since the sciences seem 
to provide us with accounts of the world which, though 
not incorrigible, seem properly describable as knowledge, 
many people have come to regard absolutism as uncompelling. 
The (extreme) relativists, seeing the difficulty of 
demonstrating that any statement is true of the world, 
have tended to say that truth is a semantic property of 
sentences. Under such a view, and I must stress that I 
am constructing an extreme version of the relativist 
thesis, the truth of statements is determined not by 
reference to the nature of the world, but by interpersonally 
arrived at convention within a form of life. This makes 
truth a cultural variable which is the weakness of the 
relativist position. 
(vi) 
If our understanding is of a world independent 
of us, then understanding that world must be a matter 
of seeing (to some degree, though not necessarily 
completely) how things are in it. So if I understand 
the nature of soil and climate in terms of their 
suitability for growing various crops, that under-
standing should, it seems reasonable to assert, issue 
in my possessing the ability to choose crops for a 
particular location which will grow there successfully. 
If this condition was not fulfilled, and if I had a 
gr'eat knowledge of something called agricultural theory, 
then we would surely say that either I had not adequately 
understood the theory (if others who knew the theory 
could choose appropriate crops for different farming 
conditions) or else that the theory I had learned was 
inadequate, did not provide the information which would 
have given me the appropriate understanding. The point 
is that understanding is always of something and the 
question of whether I understand that thing is, in 
cases where the object of understanding is not entirely 
defined by convention, to do with my seeing how it is, 
not merely with the question of whether what I say 
about it is appraised as true within my home culture. 
Relativism makes truth entirely a matter of interpersonal 
agreement, it misses out reference to the nature of the 
object of understanding and our grasp of that nature. 
This debate between absolutism and relativism is 
still very much alive in the philosophy of science, 
the best known names being those of Feyerabend (relativism) 
and Popper (a modified absolutism which concedes the 
impossibility of demonstrating absolute truth but claims 
that we can nevertheless represent changes in paradigm in 
the sciences as getting closer and closer to how things 
really are). Work on the nature of paradigms and of the 
1\ 
role of problems in the evolution of the sciences seems 
to offer a way of compar.~ively evaluating different 
paradigms, of giving rational criteria for deciding 
which of two paradigms gives us the best model of relevQnt 
aspects of the world. Focussing on problems and on the 
(vii) 
different sorts of problems which specialist enquiry 
has separated out gives a way, I believe, of 
distinguishing different problem domains, domains in 
which researchers have found it appropriate to make 
different metaphysical assumptions about the nature 
of the phenomena they have attempted to explain. 
The importance for education of elucidating the 
relations between the world, human interests and human 
understanding is crucial. An extreme absolutist would 
have to assert that calls for what is taught in schools 
to be socially or economically relevant are to be 
heeded only insofar as the inculcation of true under-
standing is not frustrated by heeding them. This has 
the virtue of asserting the importance of understanding, 
but the absolutists have a tendency to emphasise pure 
knowledge as opposed to practical skills and this 
tendency seems unjustifiable given the weakness of the 
absolutist position. The relativists, on the other hand, 
seem to leave understanding out of this story to a large 
extent and seem to equate education with learning to 
say what 'one' normally says when confronted with 
situations of 'this' sort within 'this' form of life. 
Insofar as many aspects of the world we live in and have 
to deal with in life are socially invariant relativism 
seems to give an inadequate characterisation of what 
education is about. 
This brings us to the last question arising from my 
third problem - what should the 'effect' be that teachers 
attempt to achieve with respect to their pupils. An 
absolutist answer seems to be something like, "An under-
standing of how things really are, sub speci~ aeternitatis,~ 
but since we have no criteria for absolute truth we 
simply don't know what to teach in order to achieve this 
so it's a poor answer. A relativist reply would seem to 
come down to something like "The pupil must be socialised 
into the ways of looking/language games operant in his 
own culture," but this seems inadequate as surely we don't 
1 
(viii) 
want pupils merely to fit in with the beliefs generally 
held within their home culture, surely we want them to 
examine their beliefs critically against their 
experiences of the world. A more balanced view seems to 
be that pupils should be taught the best theoretical 
perspectives we have (and which it is possible to teach) 
on various important aspects of the world. This gives 
priority to the propagation of the best understanding 
we have whilst allowing that the importance of different 
areas of knowledge/modes of understanding is to be 
established not transcendentally but through their 
relations with human life and (hence) the social 
context in which the education takes place. 
In this thesis there is much discussion of general 
philosophical problems which have implications for 
wider issues than the educational. I make no excuse 
for this, many of the central problems of education 
are restricted versions of more general problems. If 
we are to solve the problems of education by doing 
philosophy of education we cannot duck these problems, 
to do this would simply be to abrogate our responsibility, 
to fail to engage properly with the task we have taken 
on. I trust my efforts here will, if not solve my three 
basic problems. indicate a fruitful approach to them. 
1 
The Pre-linguistic Child - Initial Discussion • 
• 
In their monograph, 'The development in social 
attachments in infancy,' (Monographs of the Society for 
Research in Child Development vol.29 Xo.23 pub. 1964) 
Schaffer and Emerson carried out a follow up survey on 
sixty carefully selected children from the Glasgow area. 
The children came from a variety of home backgrounds, 
lived at home with their parents, were born full term 
(ie. not premature births), showed no signs of 
congenital abnormality, had no illnesses or periods of 
hospitalisation prior to the study's com~encement and 
were, according to standard tests, normally developed . 
for their age (one child beine disqualified 
retrospectively from the study group on failing to reach 
the pre-decided standards on the tests). The infants were 
tested in their own homes and the study com~enced when 
the children were at ages varying from 5 to 25 weeks. 
A variety of tests were used in sequence to investigate 
three things: (1) attachment to specific persons, 
(ii) attachment to the mother and (iii) fear of strangers. 
I will not go into details of experimental procedure 
as I do not want to make use of the detailed findings 
of Schaffer and Emerson's work. The following table 
gives the number of children who showed signs of being 
attached to specific persons, being attached to their 
mothers and fearing strangers at the indicated stages 
of the study. 
Age in Weeks. 
21-24 
25-28 
29-32 
33-36 
37-40 
41-44 
45-48 
49-52 
53-78 
2 
attachment to 
specific persons. mothers. 
4 3 
15 13 
17 18 
7 18 
7 8 
4 4 
3 3 
1 1 
2 2 
fear of strangers 
o 
10 
15 
19 
7 
4 
2 
o 
3 
These figures show that the vast majority of the 
children were assessed as exhibiting the attachments and 
aversion being investigated by the end of their first 
year of life, with over half of them reaching this stage 
by the thirty-sixth week after birth. 
From the philosophical point of view such findings 
are questionable in one very important way. The problem 
is that of justifying a description of the behaviour of 
pre-linguistic children in such terms as, 'being attached 
to their mothers' (attached in an emotional sense) or, 
'being afraid of strangers.' In the case of attachment 
Schaffer and Emerson overcame this problem by defining 
it operationally as " ••• the tendency of the young to seek 
the proximity of certain other members of the species." 
Their procedure for ascribing fear of strangers seems 
to suggest that it too was defined operationally as a 
tend&ncy to exhibit aversion behaviour on the approach 
of someone (ie. either Schaffer or E~erson) the child 
didn't know (who had minimal contact with the child). Such 
moves don't get rid of of philosophical problems of 
course. The problems of how we should cr.aracterise the 
behaviour of young children, what sort of concepts we can 
properly use in describing such behaviour, is philosophical. 
And it is this problem th~t this first part of my thesis 
is designed to deal with. 
But Schaffer and Emerson's work does show one thing 
beyond question: that pre-linguistic children do come to 
3 
react to the actions of those people with whom they have 
had close contact, particularly their mothers, in a way 
that is demonstrably different to the way they react to 
the actions of people with whom they have had very little 
contact. By the end of the thirty-sixth week forty four 
of the children in the sixty strong study group were 
showing signs of distress when the researcher 
approached them (even though the researcher attempted to 
talk and smile in a reassuring manner) and offered to 
pick the child up (ie, hands held out). This is the only 
fact I wish to draw from this research: that pre-
linguistic children do come to react differently to 
different people. More precisely, I am interested in the 
fact that children react in a special way towards their 
mothers. As Schaffer and Emerson put it (in their 
introduction) 
"It is well established that, from about the second 
or third month on, an infant will behave differently with 
his mother as comp8red to strangers. He may smile and 
vocalize at her more readily, he may visually follow her 
more than he would other people, and he is likely to quieten 
sooner when picked up by her after crying. Perceptual 
discrimination has thus taken place: the infant is now 
able to recognise his mother." 
My task is to look into the question of how it is 
possible for a pre-linguistic child to react in one way 
to its mother (someone it knows) and in a different way 
to someone it has never met before. It seems clear to me 
that this could not happen unless the child can recognise 
its mother as an object with special significance. I say 
this so as not to ascribe too great a conceptual repertoire 
to the child. If the child did not recognise familiar 
objects then there could be no reason for it to react 
differently to two different people. Each time its mother 
approached her child she would constitute, for the child, 
a new object of experience, an object with exactly the 
same status as a stranger. But the child does react in a 
special way to its mothers proximity, and it seems to me 
4 
that this fact presupposes that the child recognises its 
mother. 
The difficulty which some philosophers have in 
accepting an account of this sort that I have given here 
arises, I believe, from their own reliance on a mode of 
conceptual analysis that makes everything language 
depend~t. Such a philosopher would insist that 
recognition involves recognising as something, and 
would want to kr.ow what it is that a baby recognises its 
mother as, implicitly expecting a reply in terms of a 
linguistic description which, by definition, the 
pre-linguistic child could not give. Yly contention is that 
such philosophers are restinG thFir case on an account 
which makes concepts wholly language dependent, a move 
which puts the acquisition of language outside of their 
conceptual schema. Under such a way of thinking anything 
that occurs independ~ntly of language use can only be a 
matter of mechanistic reaction to stimuli. Thus, from this 
point of view, I am safe for as long as I talk about the 
pre-linguistic child's discriminatory reactions, but in 
trouble as soon as I talk about such reactions as 
presupposing the ability to recognise what is familiar, 
what has been come across before. 
I think that the source of this disquiet is 
Wittgenstein's dictum (or the dictum often ascribed to 
Wittgenstein. I don't want to get bog[ed ~own in the 
morass of exegesis that surrounds Philosophical 
Investigations and his other writings) that, in principle, 
any judgement stands in need of support via public 
criteria. As the use of public criteria is often seen as 
involving the use of language, this dictum is taken to say 
in effect, that it is empty to talk of judgements being 
made in the absence of language. But it seems to me that 
to accept this pOint is to make language acquisition an 
almost magical event. The pre-linguistic child can only 
react to stimuli, the language user can make judgements, 
5 
the transition from one state to the other under this view 
Oecome& a change in logical status. I cannot see how this 
can be the case, indeed I wish most strongly to argue 
that it cannot be the case. 
Urmson. in his paper 'Recognition,' (Proc. Aristotelian 
Soc. 1955-6) carries out a conceptual analysis of 
recognition that makes a case for the thesis that 
recognition is very language dependent. But even he has 
doubts about denying that pre-linguistic children can 
recognise their mothers. He makes the point that although 
we can recognise someone by their characteristics we 
don't normally do this, which is to say that although I 
know that R.T., one of my pupils, has certain 
characteristics, I don't ever go through a check list 
before I say, "Hello, Rosalin" to her in the morning. He 
further makes the point that recalling an earlier meeting 
is no part of recognition, it is no contradiction to say 
on seeing someone, "I know him, but I don't know where 
from." Urmson writes, "A very small child may recognise 
its ~other as an individual (though not as a mother). It 
will be put off or deceived by no substitute." At the end 
of his paper he writes, "I have argued that to recognise as 
an X involves following logical rules determining what is 
an X; to recognise something as an individual is 
certainly a sophisticated and difficult case of 
recognising as an X and is not pre-verbal. But that does 
not prevent recognition of an individual from being 
pre-verbal." This rather paradoxical assertion is, I suggest 
symptomatic of the plight of the language bound conceptual 
analyst. It is a plight which arises from seeing concepts 
as wholly linguistic entities and it results in 
making pre-linguistic recognition a seemingly self 
contradictory notion. 
To get away from these difficulties I will simply 
observe that even to react in a special way to a 
particular individual, its mother, a pre-linguistic 
child's perception of the world must be organised to quite 
6 
a high degree. To react to the appearance of any object 
in its visual field it must be able to distinguish 
object from ground. Or at least it must be able to 
distinguish between ground and ground-plus-object. This 
is not an important qualification, all that is important 
is that the child must be able to distinguish between 
various features of what he perceives and direct his 
attention to something newly arrived in his field of 
vision. 
Further, there must be some reason why a baby reacts 
to the appearance of a particular otject in a special 
way, it may be that it associates 'this' object, its mother, 
with the satisfaction of hunGer, or with warmth. But to do 
this the baby must associate in some way the object with 
the events involving that object. In the same way, in order 
to begin to attach significance to the noises which are 
, 
its mother~ linguistic utterances the baby must somehow 
link its aural and visual sensations, otherwise there would 
be no reason for it to begin to make language like noises. 
Unless the child begins to associate the sound its mother 
makes when she says, "Teddy" with the object she 
introduces into its field of vision, there is no reason 
why it should ever learn to use the word 'Teddy' in 
reference to its teddy bear. Thus the facts about the 
child's reactions at the pre-linguistic level and the 
facts about the way children begin to learn to use 
language presupposes a great deal about the pre-linguistic 
child's perceptual organisation, whether or not we allow 
talk of such children recognising their mothers. And I 
think that this fact is what will finally show that the 
language-bound notion of concepts and concept application, 
that is, (intentionally or not) a part of Wittgenstein's 
legacy, to be incorrect. 
In talking of perception and recognition here I am 
using these words in a mentalistic sense. My wish is to 
argue that the pre-linguistic reactions to environment 
7 
must be characterised in terms that make it logically 
necessary to talk about pre-linguistic concepts. But 
against such a view are those who take a behaviourist 
stand on the question of how to characterise human 
behaviour. And also against any attempt to argue that 
mentalistic concepts are in any way necessary for an 
adequate characterisation of human activity are those who 
take a mechanistic view of mind. Thus, before I go on 
with my discussion of the pre-linguistic child I must loo~ 
at the objections raised by the mechanistlc/behaviourist 
school of thought. 
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Stimulus/Response Explanations. (of the reactions of the 
pre-linguistic child.) 
In the previous section I claimed that the facts about 
the ways in which pre-linguistic children react to their 
environment presupposes a certain amount of perceptual 
organisation. In opposition to this some philosophers 
and psychologists would claim that there was nothing 
involved in the ways a child reacts to its environment 
that requires us to talk about anything more than 
stmulus/response mechanisms. I think that such an assertion 
is wrong. The whole point of my wanting to use the notion 
of recognition in my account of the pre-linguistic 
child is that recognition implies awareness and 
accordance with a logically arbitrary system of 
classification. And classification of things in 
accordance with logically arbitrary principles is precisely 
what I take to be meant by concept application. Now there 
are those who would claim that I am wrong about this, and 
it is clear that I will have to argue against them later. 
But the claim that I must first discuss is that there is 
no need to talk in terms of a pre-linguistic child 
recognising anything at all, that all the pre-linguistic 
child's reactions can be explained mechanistically in 
terms of a stimulus response model. 
The proponent of the stimulus/response model here must 
be saying that the pre-linguistic child's behaviour is 
caused by its sensory input in a mechanistic way. In 
other words that a particular sort of excitation of the 
sense organs is processed in a particular way by the 
child's neuro-circuitry and results in the production of 
certain movements by the child's body. I, on the other 
hand, want to say that such an account will not do what it 
is supposed to do, that the child's ability to react in a 
special way to particular objects cannot be explained 
without saying that the child recognises its mother (say). 
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Recognition, in the way I use the word, is opposed to a 
stimulus/response account precisely because it involves 
classification of different objects of which we are 
perceptually aware as instances of the same thing or of 
members of the same class of things (the recognition of an 
individual can be reearded as the recognition of a thing 
as a member of a class which has only one member). This 
classification is of 'things' (in a neutral sense) of 
which we are perceptually aware and this is what sugeests 
that recognition, in this sense, is not explicable in 
terms of a stimulus/response model. The purpose of this 
section and the next section (on mechanism) is to establish 
that the modes of description being discussed are 
inadequate for the characterisation of hu~an activity, 
either that of language users or that of pre-linguistic 
children. My basic case will be that an explanation of 
human behaviour in terms of reflexes different [rom the 
knee-jerk reflex only in complexity, not in kind, is 
incomplete. In other words I will claim that there is an 
element in recognition which the approaches under discussion 
fail to account for and that this element is present in 
the case of the pre-linguistic child as much as in that 
of the language user. Initially, however, my argument 
will be against the behaviourist view that we can ignore 
any 'inner' component in human behaviour and can get an 
adequate characterisation of that behaviour from a 
straightforward stimulus/response model. 
The first problem for the stimulus/response model is 
the difficulty of specifying the stimulus. If the 
stimulus is taken to be something in the world, for instance 
a black triangle outlined on a white tackground, then it 
is a matter of fact that the stimulation of the sense 
organs (the eye in this case) will vary depending upon 
the angle from which the figure is viewed, upon its 
distance from the viewer and upon the lighting in which 
it is viewed. Thus, on this account of what the stimulus 
is, the mechanistically causal effect of the stimulus 
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upon the nervous system of the stimulee can vary very 
widely. If, for instance, a rat was operantly 
conditioned to react in a certain way to circles but not 
to straight lines and then it was presented with a disc 
first face-on and then edge-on, under this definition 
of a stimulus it would first respond and then fail to 
respond to the same stimulus. 
There is also the problem that nothing 'in the world' 
is a stimulus until after some organism (human, rat) has 
reacted to it. The behaviourist sees the organism react, 
assumes that the reaction was caused (in some unspecified 
sense) by a stimulus and then specifies the stimulus. The 
model, in practice, doesn't seem to be one which specifies 
what behaviour will result from an organism's exposure to 
a particular stimulus. Instead behaviourism seems to be 
about what sort of stimulus must have caused the 
behaviour. This appears to be the result of the fact that 
the stimulus/response link is established statistically 
rather than by constant conjunction. This is to say that, 
in the case of many sorts of stimulus, the thing that 
normally acts as a stimulus doesn't always do so. Well 
fed rats, for example, tend to go to sleep even if a 
buzzer signifying the availablity of food does keep on 
sounding, and this means that the buzzer no loneer acts as 
a stimulus for the feeding response. If a stimulus is that 
which causes a response the behaviourist's flashing 
lights and buzzers are things which sometimes act as a 
stimuli and sometimes don't. Behavioural psychology is 
left in a state where it can make grandiose statements 
about relationships between stimuli and responses, can 
say what sort of things can be used as a stimuli, but can 
say nothing at all about why a certain thing will sometimes 
act as a stimulus and sometimes won't. Thus the idea that 
a stimulus is a 'thing-in-the-world' seems to generate 
a number of embarrassing problems. 
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On the other hand it seems odd to say that the 
stimulus is in the sense organ, or that the stimulus is 
the initial stimulation, is the initial neuro-electrical 
'burst' caused by the impinging of the world upon the 
organism's sense organs. In some cases we might overcome 
this oddness. For instance we could say of the knee-jerk 
reflex that the stimulus is any event that causes certain 
specifiable neurological events in certain nerves and 
that the response is the knee-jerk. And in this case we 
probably could get an adequate specification of 
those initial neurological events. But in the case of 
operant conditioning which is the supposedly stimulus/ 
response model that is often offered as a way of 
explaining animal behaviour, this initial stimulation 
cannot be specified at all. Going back to my example of a 
rat that reacts in a particular way to circles, but not 
to straight lines. Such rats will react to circles of 
various sizes and colours, viewed under quite varied 
conditions. The point here is that the rat will react 
to a circle even though the neuro-electrical activity 
caused by the image of the circle formed on its retina 
will vary from trial to trial. And even more surprising 
results occur in operant conditioning experiments. In his 
book, "The Physical Background of Perception," Adrian writes 
"A rat, or a man for that matter, can be trained 
to recognise triangles or triangularity. After learning 
that it will be rewarded with food if it jumps towards a 
white card with a black triangle on it, it will adopt 
a hopeful attitude to a white triangle on a black ground 
and will jumps towards it rather than a square or a circle, 
and the triangle may be large or small, filled in or in 
outline, with its apex pointing upwards or downwards." 
I cannot put too much weight on this example as 
Adrian doesn't give full details of his experimental 
procedures. Thus it remains an open question whether or 
not his rats learned not to jump at a particular square 
and a particular circle. If Adrian did vary his circles 
and squares in the same wqy that he varied his triangles 
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then his result shows that an amazing variety of different 
stimulations of the retina served as the same stimulus. 
But even if lack of detail makes Adrian unreliable the 
fact remains that even as small a change as the rat 
altering the orientation of its head would alter the 
position of the image on the retina and hence the initial 
stimulation of the optic nerve. Thus, even when a rat is 
'reacting' to a particular 'stimulus' in several trials 
by, say, depressing a lever, the initial stimulation 
that is supposed to cause its behaviour (in a mechanistic 
sense) will not remain constant, this much is empirical 
fact attested to by a great many physiolo~ists. 
This sort of argument is familiar to philosophers of 
perception. It is a physiological version of the 
argument from illusion, the argument fundamental to 
traditional sense data theories. The basic argument is to 
observe that although we talk about seeing the same 
physical object on different occasions it is the case 
that the object rarely presents an identical appearance 
to us on different occasions. I, for i~stance, will 
quite happily identfy my motor cycle from a wide variety 
of angles and distances and in greatly varying light 
conditions. The difficulty here is the question of how I 
can identify greatly differing appearances as being 
appearances of the same thing. Behaviourist psychologists 
have insurmountable difficulties in trying to specify 
what this sort of 'sameness' consists in as long as they 
refuse to talk in terms of some 'inner' criterion of 
sameness. Behaviourism stands in need of a theory which 
explains the making of 'sameness' judgements, whether the 
explanation is given in mechanistic or mentalistic terms. 
In a subsequent section I will be dealing with the 
problem posed by the argument from illusion. 
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At this point it is necessary to introduce a new 
notion into the proceedings, that of stimulus 
generalisation. I will begin with a very simple illustration 
of what this is. Shenger-Krestovnikova, a pupil of Pavlov's, 
trained dogs to salivate on seeing a circle drawn on a 
card. She found that these dogs would also salivate upon 
seeing an ellipse. She then continued to present circles 
to the dogs immediately before feeding them whilst 
presenting ellipses without reinforcement. The dogs 
stopped salivating when ellipses of a certain eccentricity 
were presented, but would salivate with ellipses that 
were more nearly circular. This sugsests that what is 
happening during conditioning is that the animal being 
conditioned is coming to respond to a range of 
stimulation. As the stimulation gets nearer to the 
'central area' of stimulation caused in initial 
conditioning the response is stronger, but the animal 
comes to respond also to similar sorts of stimulation. 
Thus the stimulus/response link is not between a 
particular stimulus and response but between a range of 
stimulation and a range of responses, the nearer the 
stimulation to the centre of the conditioned range, the 
stronger the response. This explanation seems pla~sible 
in the case of classical conditioning which deals in the-
sorts of stimulii and responses that might well be 
specifiable in such terms. But the behaviourists, in their 
operant conditioning experiments, manage to train 
experimental animals to discriminate between classes of 
stimuli which appear to be distinguishable not in terms 
of the sort of excitation of the nervous system they cause 
(which is the requirement for a mechanistic stimulus/ 
response model), but rather in terms of logically 
arbitrary categories of things in the world. 
On page 175 of his book, "Introduction to Modern 
Behaviourism," Howard Rachlin describes an experiment: 
(SD denotes the stimulus that is reinforced, S~denotes 
the stimulus that is not reinforced.) 
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nAs an illustration of the complex discriminations 
that are possible, consider the following experiment with 
pigeons. Thousands of photographs were taken of vehicles 
of various kinds. The pictures were then sorted into two 
groups, those that contained trucks or parts of trucks, 
and those that contained only cars. The pictures were shown 
in random order to the pigeons, but the same picture was 
never shown twice to the same pigeon. While the pictures 
were being shown, the pigeons could peck a key. Occasionally 
a peck would produce some food, but most of the time pecks 
had no effect. The critical point of the experiment was that 
for somepigeons pecks were reinforced only if the picture 
contained a truck or part of a truck. For other pigeons, 
pecks were only reinforced when the picture contained 
cars or parts of cars. In other words, for the first. 
group of pigeons, trucks were "SD"S and cars were "S "s; 
for the other group, conditions were reversed. As far as 
the experimenters could tell, there was no other difference 
between the two groups of photographs other than the 
cars-versus-trucks distinction. The two groups of 
photographs were equally light, equally colourful, and 
equally complex. Yet, within a few weeks of daily exposure 
to the photographs, the pigeons came to peck rapidly when 
exposed to a picture containing a truck (if that was the 
So) or a car (if that was the SO) and slowly or not at all 
when the picture contained the SA vehicle. How was this 
discrimination made? Possibly each pigeon had its own 
strategy. Perhaps some counted the axles on the vehicles. 
Perhaps some recognised the distinctive hoods or fenders of 
trucks or simply discriminated the size of the vehicle. 
(Although this could be a simple size discrimination, 
since some vehicles were close and some far away. It 
would have to be based on the relative size of the vehicle 
compared to its surroundings.) The complexity of the 
discrimination can be appreciated when we realise that 
with all out modern technology, we are now only on the 
threshold of our ability to build machines to make 
equivalent discriminations." 
Rachlin's account suggests that there is no way the 
two sets of stimuli (the photographs) could be distinguished 
in terms of their having different effects on the pigeons' 
sense organs in a mechanistic sense. There is not even 
much plausibility in talking about two ranges of 
stimulation having distinct central areas but overlapping 
at the fringes. The only distinction possible, by his own 
declaration, was between pictures with cars and pictures 
of trucks. That is to say between pictures with features 
of one kind and those with features of a different ~ind. And 
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to talk of kinds is to talk of classes of things and in the 
case of cars and trucks, it is, I suggest, necessary to 
talk of classification according with logically arbitrary 
principles. In other words we cannot here specify the 
difference between the pictures except to say that they 
were pictures of different things. And once we have said 
that we have moved away from a stimulus/response explanation. 
For in talking about behaviour being mechanistically caused 
by the effects of a state of affairs on an organisms 
nervous system we forfeit the right to distinguish 
between those states of affairs except in terms of their 
effects on the nervous system. Thus Rachlin's experiment 
in presenting us with pigeons making a discrimination 
that cannot be talked about except in terms of discriminatin~ 
between objects of different kinds, kinds that are 
distinct only in under certain logically arbitrary principles 
of classification, has given us a counter example to the 
claim that what goes on in operant conditioning 
experiments can be descriced in terms of a mechanistic 
stimulus/response model. 
What Rachlin's pigeons did was to acquire the ability 
to classify objects of perception in terms of logically 
arbitrary rules, they acquired concepts that enabled them 
to distinguish between photographs-with-cars and 
photographs-with-trucks. This is not to say that they 
acquired our concepts of cars and trucks, but rather that 
they acquired some concept that enabled them to act in a 
discriminatory manner. Perhaps they acquired the concepts 
of thing -that-when-pecked-brings-food and thing -that-
when-pecked-doesn't-bring-food. But this is no more than 
speculation. To attempt to express a pigeons ways of 
classifying the world in language is to make the mistake 
of ascribing human or near human concepts to pigeons. This 
is inadmissable, pigeons don't use language and so we 
can't discover anything about their 'world view' beyond 
what we can deduce from our knowledge of what they can learn 
to do. The central point is that a stimulus/response 
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story seems unable to come to grips with what the pigeons 
were doing, the specification of SO and S4 in stimulus/' 
response terms seems impossible. The importance of this 
is that if we can't give a specification of the 
stimulation caused (in mechanistic terms) by the photographs 
that will enable us (again mechanistically) to explain 
how the pigeons discriminatory responses occur, then we 
must talk about the pigeons being able to discriminate 
between objects of perception, being able to recognise 
truck-photographs as being different from car-photographs. 
Now at this point a modern mechanist would probably 
accept that I have a case against behaviourist psychology. 
He would accept that what I have said shows the behaviourist 
attempt to specify stimuli as objects presented to an 
organism is misguided. He would further admit that, at that 
present time, the specification of the sort of stimulation 
(or afferent effect to adopt neurological terminology) 
that results in a brain producing a certain type of efferent 
effect, and hence the body responding in a certain way, 
is not possible. And such a mechanist would therefore say 
that, Given the present state of human knowledge, we 
must explain results like Rachlins in terms of 
recognition of objects of certain sorts and might even 
allow me to go on to talk in terms of concept application. 
But behind this acquiescence would lie a conviction that 
use of such mentalistic concepts is a second best mode ot 
explanation, a vague way of coming to grips with the facts 
about the behaviour of human beings and other organisms. 
A modern mechanist's main claim would be that I have shown 
nothing more than that our knowledge of the brain is not 
sufficient for us to be able to give adequate mechanistiC 
explanations of a great deal of animal behaviour. But he 
would point out that nothing I have said shows t~at the 
mechanistic project of wanting to explain all animal 
behaviour in purely extensional (as opposed to intentional) 
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terms is, in principle, misguided. The mechanist would 
maintain his faith that one day the problems which remain 
for the brain physiologists will be overcome. 
He would claim that the logically arbitrary principles 
accorded withm recognition were nothing more than the 
ways in which very sophisticated brain circuitry processes 
afferent impulses to produce efferent impulses. And if he 
was right about this, then he would be able to concede 
that we need to talk in terms of the pre-linguistic child 
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recognising its mother without admitting that this leads 
us to talk in terms of perception of a sort that involves 
concept application (in a mentalistic sense of the word 
concept). In other words, a mechanist would be able to say 
that, given the right sort of advances in the field of 
brain physiology, it would be possible to give 
mechanistic accounts of what we mean by apparently 
mentalistic concepts. This would show that there is 
nothing in the mentalistic way of characterising mind 
that is not merely a shorthand way of talking about 
mechanistic processes. 
I happen to believe that, in the case of human beings 
at least, the mechanistic account must, of logical 
necessity, give an incomplete picture of the way things are. 
in my next section I will look at one particular 
attempt to uphold mechanism. I will try to show its 
incompleteness and will then go on to argue that this 
shows that we must use mentalistic concepts in the 
explanation of the behaviour of language users. I will then 
argue that if this is so it must be proper to use mentalist1~ 
concepts in talking about pre-linguistic children. 
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The Incompleteness of Mechanistic Accounts. 
Dennet (in'Content and Consciousness') builds up an. 
account in physiological terms that seems to deal even 
with verbal behaviour in terms of brain activity. Events 
in the world impinge on the sense organs which produce 
neuro-electrical impulses. These impulses are processed 
through brain circuitry (as well as by the circuitry of 
the peripheral nervous system) and then are 'shunted off' 
into areas of brain and nervous system where they cause 
muscle contractions and hence physical movements, including 
those movements involved in the production of speech. 
Dennet's account is very sophisticated, he describes how, 
through continued use, nerve synapses grow closer together, 
reducing electrical resistance and hence building up new 
'circuits.' Speech results when impulses reach the brain's 
speech centre in a way different in degree rather than kind 
from the way the knee-jerk reflex works. The difference 
being in the complexity of the impulses and of the circuitry 
involved. None of this seems objectionable to me, I find 
it very reasonable to sugeest that much of the fine motor 
control involved in speech, movements of which we are not, 
and in some cases cannot (as a matter of fact), be aware, 
are caused by impulses generated in the brain. But the part 
of Dennet's thesis I cannot accept is his attempt to show 
that awareness is also a function of brain activity. 
In brief, Dennet says that around the speech centre 
of the brain there is (speaking hypothetically) an 
awareness line. Once a neuro-electrical impulse crosses 
the awareness line we become aware of it. If the impulse 
is of the right sort its impinging on the speech centre 
causes the bodily motions that produce speech. If not, 
then we remain aware of that impulse and that is what it is 
to experience. Thought, under Dennet's model, is best 
1, 
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thought of as almost.but-not-quite-speech. At this point 
in reading Dennet's book I found myself wanting to know 
how he could deal with the fact that our experiences are 
of things in the world, of people, of chairs and tables, 
of sea breezes and rain, and not of neuro-electrical 
impulses. He himself forsaw that his readers would want an 
explanation of this, but seemed curiously unable to offer 
one. 
Bet the stage for the entrance of my In order to 
assertion that 
must 
a mechanistic model of mind as brain activity 
fail to deal with the fact that the 
content of our 
rather than of 
Dennet's book. 
• 
experience consists of things in the world 
neuro.electrical impulses, I will quote from 
First, on page 74 he writes, 
"In the brain, discrimination of afferents according 
to their significance just is the production of 
efferent effects in differential response to afferents, 
and hence it does not make sense to suppose that 
prior to the production of an efferent effect or 
structure the brain has discriminated its efferent ~ 
anything at all." 
On this point i agree with Dennet. Viewing the brain as a 
complex machine, in terms of neurological circuitry, cuts 
out any opportunity to talk of judgements being made. In 
the same way it is not properly admissible to talk in 
terms of a computer working out a problem. A computer 
programme merely operates switches (in a digital computer) 
which lead to modifications being made to input voltages. 
At the output stage the modified electrical impulses cause 
certain characters to be exhibited (typed, displayed on a 
cathode ray tube etc.). But all Dennet has said so far is 
that in talking about anything in mechanistic terms we 
rule out the possibilty of talking about it in the 
intentional mode. In effect we make a decision not to use 
the intentional mode of speech in characterising 
whatever we are discussing. 
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Before going on it might be a good idea to give an 
outline of the intentional/extensional distinction which 1; 
is very important to the discussion in this section. 
The notion of exten'sionality is best defined exclusively. 
An extensional phrase is one which is not intentional. 
Intentionality has its roots in medieval philosophy, but 
the modern usage stems from Brentano's 'Psychologie, , 
(1874) where an intentional object was taken to be an 
object of thought. Intentional obejects, in Brentano'e 
useage, have intentional existence, ie. existence in 
thought. This notion of 'existence in thought' was later 
abused by Mei~ong when he talked about intentional objects 
not as either being or not being, but as having 'beyond 
being.' 
In order to avoid such difficulties, later writers have 
taken intentionality as involving mental events being 
directed upon an object. And more recently this has been 
developed into the idea that an intentional sentence (or 
verb) is one whose meaning involves the direction of the 
mind upon an object. There are problems in giving general 
criteria for the identification of intentional sentences 
but I have no need, and no space, to go into them here. 
Three types of intentional sentence have been identified 
which are:-
(1) Those in which the object many not (in fact) exi~t 
or else could not (in principle exist). "I dream 
of unicorns," 1s an example of the former type and 
"It is useless to search for the largest prime 
number," 1s of the latter type. 
(2) Those in which the object is indeterminate and in 
relation to which the notion of further specifying 
the object is inappropriate. "I am dying for a cup 
of tea," is an example of such a sentence. 
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(3) Those sentences where the substitution of a true 
description of whatever is referred to by the 
(grammatical) object for the object would alter 
the sentence's truth value. Such a sentence is, 
"Oedipus wished to kill X," which is true when 
"the haughty stranger who barred his way," is 
substituted for X, but false when X is replaced 
by "his father." 
An intentional sentence, then, is one in which a 
reference to a directedness of mind is implicit whereas 
an extensional sentence carries no such implications. In 
"Content and Consciousness," Dennet is involved in trying 
to give an account of mind entirely in extensional terms, 
that is, without using a mode of language which sugeests 
that there is a directedness about mind. In other words 
Dennet does not want to ascribe anything uniquely mental 
to human beings. He wants to insist that there is nothing 
about us that makes talk of mental agency necessary. 
On page 89 Dennet takes up his point of page 74 by 
saying that there may be some systems that will be 
amenable to description in exteneional terms, but which, 
" •• are such that they can be intelligibly described at 
this time, within our present conceptual scheme, only in the 
Intentional mode." He point out that many phenomena that 
once were characterised intentionally are now characterised 
exten~onally, an example would be lightening which we 
no longer explain as being caused by angry gods. He also 
points out that we often extend the intentional mode to 
cover systems that we know can be fully characterised 
extentionally. We do, for instance, talk about computers 
working out problems and of cars, ships etc. having 
personalities. This latter point is, I suggest, not very 
important, it only indicates that fact that metaphor is 
a strong element in ordinary language, the intentional 
mode is not properly applicable to mechanical systems, 
which is what makes its application to such systems 
metaphorical. 
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Dennet's main contention here, I think, is that the 
intentional mode of characterising a system is a vague 
way of coming to grips with the world, a way that is useful 
in the absence of an adequate extensional characterisation 
of that system. But all Dennet is doing here is 
expressing his faith that use of the extensional mode is 
~ way of understanding any system. What he doesn't do 
is attempt to show that the intentional mode adds nothing 
to an extensional characterisation. Indeed he rejects 
reductionism of the sort that says any intentional 
statement can be rendered completely in terms of 
extensional statements. He concludes at one point that 
attempts to discover the language of the brain, to discover 
the content of experience by deciphering the neuro-
electrical brain state of a particular brain at a 
particular time must be doomed to failure. I was left unsure 
whether he thought this failure would be due to logical 
impossibility ot to unsurmountable empirical difficulties, 
although I suspect the latter. 
This is the main problem for mechanistic accounts of 
mind, they have to deal with the intentional mode of 
language, the mode that enables us to talk in terms of 
experience having content. And apart from making 
insinuations about the relationship between the intentional 
mode of speaking and the 'mythical' ways of characterising 
systems, which he judges to be inferior to the scientific 
ways of understanding (I think), Dennet has not managed 
to get rid of intentionality. He says (P.131), "Events 
with content just arrive at the awareness line ••• " but has 
a whole chapter entitled, "The Ascription of Content." 
In this chapter he ends up by saying (if I understood 
correctly) that we are using the 'personal story' when we 
are talking of the content of experience, whereas when 
speaking of the brain in extensional terms we are 
involved in giving the 'sub-personal story.' These two 
stories seem, according to Dennet's analysis to be 
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mutually irreducible, a point on which I agree with him. 
But Dennet seems to think that the existence of these 
two logically disjoint ways of looking is not merely 
symptomatic of ontological differences. 
I would be very happy to say that looking at human 
behaviour from the point of view of physiological 
mechanisms alone might be a very useful approach to a 
number of problems. Someone interested in the effect of 
brain damage in certain areas on thp. ability to acquire 
certain motor skills might find mechanistic concepts 
totally adequate for his job, and would have no use for 
the personal story. But someone interested, as I am, in 
the relation between symbol systems and concept 
acquisition, the ways in which the symbol systems we 
use enable us to reorganise our classification of 
experience, needs the personal story in order to even begin. 
Dennet, however, seems unhappy about taking what might 
be termed the 'horses for courses' view. He seems unable 
to escape from a conviction that only exteneional 
characterisations of systems should be acceptable, that 
intentional characterisations are so mixed up with 
mythical ways of understanding that they must not be taken 
seriously. But he doesn't seem able to support his 
conviction. In his conclusions he makes a number of 
statements that I will quote. In these he shows a certain 
amount of confusion, and also gives what I take to be his 
main reason for regarding the intentional mode of 
explanation with suspicion. 
First he writes-
"Thoughts, for example, are not only not to be identif_ 
ied with physical processes in the brain, but also not to 
be identified with logical or functional states or 
events in an Intentional system (physically realised in the 
nervous system of a body)." 
In characterising the intentional system involved as 
something which must be realised in a body in this quote 
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I think that Dennet is doing nothing more than revealing 
his inability to brea~ away from a mechanistic way of 
looking at mind. As for the rest of his assertion here 
I can only say that I agree with him if what he is saying 
is that the extensional and intentional modes of 
looking at thoughts involve different ontologies, that 
they are neither more nor less than different ways of 
looking. If this is not what he means then I must confess 
myself to be incapable of understanding what he is saying. 
The second quote I will give from Dennet's conclusion is-
"The personal story ••• could in principle be rendered 
'obsolete' if some day we ceased to treat anything ••• as 
an Intentional system ••• " 
Here again I see no objections provided what Dennet 
is saying is that people could stop using any particular 
way of looking. But to say this is to make a point that 
. 
tells equally against mechanism, for is people stopped 
looking at the world in the way in which the physical 
sciences approach it, mechanism wouln have been discarded. 
But it is fairly clear that Dennet uses the word 'obsolete' 
here in the same sense that we use it when we talk about 
horse drawn carriages being an obsolete form of 
transport. He implies, in talking about intentional 
char~cterisations becoming obsolete, that extensional 
characterisations are in some sense better. Rut in making 
a judgement of this sort he is making use of a point of 
view. Something is better than something else only by 
virtue of satisfying criteria. And if Dennet's criteria 
are those found in the sciences it is not surprising 
that he finds extensional characterisations 'better.' A 
motor car is a better mode of transport than a horse drawn 
carriage in terms of its speed and comfort. From the point 
of view of aesthetics or of a romantic the horse drawn 
carriage might be judged to be a much better way of 
travelling. 
i. l 
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My final quote from Dennet's conclusions is-
"Intentionality •••• persistantly tempts the theory 
builder into positing man-analogues in his analysis." 
This assertion, I suggest, shows'Dennet's confusion. 
He is incapable of accepting the intentional and extensional 
approaches as being ontologically disjoint. Because of 
this he leaves himself with the unsurmountable problem of 
explaining how neuro-electrical impulses in the brain 
can have content, and, unremarkably, is unable to explain. 
But because he can't stop believing that electrical activity 
in the brain is what is central in a discussion of mind 
he finds himself accusing those who talk about the content 
of experience, those who use an intentional characterisation 
of mind, of postulating a little-man-in-the-mind, a ghost 
in the machine, who reads the brain writing, who ascribes 
content to the neuro~electrical impulses coursing through 
the circu!try of the brain. Such a postualtion is , of 
course, inadmissible, leading to well known problems 01 how 
thisnew entity can ascribe content to its exper~ences; an 
infinite regress results. But to use this arguM&At to 
suggest that talking in the intentional mode is a mistake, 
that talking about the content of experience is mistaken, 
is equally inadmissible. People do experience the world 
in which they live, they see tables and chairs, they are 
aware of the world around them. And to stipulate that to 
talk about this awareness is inadmiss;ble because the 
mechanistic mode of explanation cannot deal with it is 
surely to get things back to front. 
The problem is that talking about the nervous system 
in a purely mechanistic way can tell us nothing about the 
content of our experiences. All this way of characterising 
can talk about are neuro-electrical impulses modified by 
brain circuitry and resulting in movements of the body. 
It cannot explain how such impulses can have the sort of 
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significance for us that we talk about when using the 
intentional mode. But neither can the intentional mode 
tell us about how such significance is ascribed to incoming 
impulses. We have, apparently, two ways of characterising 
the same system, one in terms of physical events and the 
other in terms of information theory, and the two are 
logically disjoint. 
My assertion is that given that there is no way in which 
the extensional characterisation of the nervous system 
can be made to enable us to talk about the experiences we 
have, it must be regarded as useful (for some purposes) 
but an incomplete way of looking at human beings. Insofar as 
our experiences are of things other than neuro-electrical 
impulses we need a different way of looking, a different 
mode of language if we are able to talk about experiences 
in a meaningful way. And if we are talking about the human 
mind and the formation of concepts, ways of classifying 
experience and of giving significance to events, then we 
must use a mode of language other than that which 
mechanists urge upon us. 
The essential difference between myself and a 
mechanist is ontological, we have logically disjoint ways 
of looking at animal behaviour. The mechanist claims that 
the intentional mode of language is a 'second best' way 
of looking. I have denied that this is the case. The 
mechanist might claim superiority for his world view on the 
grounds that it only makes claims that are, in prinCiple, 
empirically verifiable. But even this is a shaky claim 
given the fact that particle physics long ago started 
postulating the existence of certain particles on 
grounds that were more metaphysical than empirical. Thus 
the empirically verifiable events which the mechanists 
claim to be talking in terms of rest on a foundation which 
is justified to quite an extent these days on non-
empirical grounds. The extensional and intentional modes 
of description are logically dist!nct forms of language, 
each embodying a set of presuppos!tions about the nature 
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of what they are being used to describe. (I will have more 
to say about this when I come to discuss understanding.) 
It seems to me that each mode is useful for certain 
purposes, but not for others. The extensional mode 
cannot admit talk of persons in even the everyday sense 
of the word, it cannot deal with many of the things 
people say about themselves and others. Being interested 
in people I find it necessary to use the intentional mode 
of description when dealing with (at least) human 
behaviour. I cannot avoid the problems that this move 
creates for me; I must try to solve them. To avoid such 
problems by taking refuge in mechanism would be, as far 
as I can see, to beg a whole range of important questions. 
In my next section I will discuss the problem of 
perception, keeping in mind what I have said here about the 
necessity of rejecting a mechanist mode of explanation 
when discussing people (or animals who are aware). This will 
get me nearer to returning to the central question of this 
part of my thesis, that of what must be true of the 
pre-linguistic child given that it will, at some stage, 
acquire linguistic skills. 
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Perception, Awareness and Recognition. 
B.A. Farrell in IA Psychological Look at Some Problems 
of Perception,' (R.T.P. lectures vol. 3- 1 68/9), suggests 
that psychological work on the problems of perception is 
showing signs of making philosophical discussion in that 
area redundant. His reason appears to be a belief that 
work on the physiological basis of perception will one day 
give a complete account of how we perceive. I disagree with 
him. The complete ~escription of the physiology of 
perception will not, in principle (if my ar€:,'1lMt.",t. 
against mechanism have any force), constitute an account 
of perceptual consciousness. The fact is that in seeing we 
are aware of what we see, our perceptual consciousness 
has content of which we are aware. And this content is 
something about which a psychologist who insists on using 
only extensional concepts can say nothing. 
As I believe that seeing, hearing, feeling etc. involves 
awareness of whatever is perceived, and as the psychological 
approach favoured by Farrell seems to be one that reduces 
psychology to physiology, I cannot accept his sugGestion 
that we leave discussion of perception to psychology/ 
physiology, although I do not want to deny that looking at 
perception in those ways is a useful thing to do. 
Nevertheless there are those who would say that my 
writing of awareness into perception is unnecessary. One 
such attempt is discussed by Locke (in chapter 2 of 
'Perception and our Knowledge of the External World) - it 
is a view of perception held by Armstrong. 
For A rmstrong "perception ••• is the acquiring of knowledge 
of, or inclination to believe in, particular facts about 
the physical world by means of the senses, normally 
accompanied by knowledge of the means." 
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Now if perception can be fully dealt with in this way 
without introducing awareness, and if analysis of 
knowledge and belief can also be given without talk of 
consciousness, then awareness would appear as an odd 
notion 'tagged on' to an account of human perception/ 
belief/knowledge/understanding, without any justification 
and my insistence on asserting the consciousness of human 
beings would appear to be just a human failure. But 
Armstrong is wrong. 
Locke gives four objections to Armstrong. The first is 
that if perception is fully analysed in terms of the 
acquisition of knowledge and belief and if we acquire 
knowledge of the external world via perception, then 
Armstrong can say nothing at all about the acquisition 
of such knowledge. There is a vicious circle in the 
account which leaves the acquisition of knowledge of an 
external world a mysterious occurance about which nothing 
can be said - Armstrong explains, and can explain, nothing. 
Locke's second objection is concerned with animal 
perception. If perception and belief are logically 
connected then we cannot talk about animals perceiving 
unless we also talk about them formulating beliefs. I 
wouldn't wish to stress this too much in the light of 
Jonathan Bennett's comments in his book 'Rationality,' 
where the importance of language possession as a criterion 
for rationality is indicated. It may well be that giving 
an intentional characterisation of animals is unjustified 
anthroposophism and maybe the notion of perception, taken 
to involve awareness, is not properly used in talking about 
animals. Personally I tend to believe that my dog is, to 
some extent, a conscious agent, but it would take too long 
to investigate the question whether my belief is verifiable 
or merely evidence of sloppy sentimentalism on my part, so 
I will simply note that this objection of Locke's opens up 
massive questions which I cannot deal with here. Locke's 
third objection is related to his first. A sentence like, 
n1 know it's raining outside because I can see the rain," 
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becomes, under Armstrong's analysis, "I know it's 
raining outside because I have acquired the knowledge that 
it's raining outside." This tells us nothing and, further, 
seems to mean that the distinction between veridical and 
illusory perception of the external world depends on our 
having knowledge of that world acquired independ~,ntly of 
our perception of it. This leads to the final objection 
which Locke raises against Armstrong which is that, under 
his view, checking beliefs against experience comes down to 
checking beliefs against other beliefs - in other words 
Armstrong seems stuck with a coherence theory of 
truth. The problem with this can be best illustrated by 
pOinting out that the geometry of Euclid is completely 
consistent and that physicists since Einstein have 
discovered that Euclid doesn't describe space with 
complete accuracy. On Armstrong's view it is hard to see 
that a consistent geometry (i.e. set of beliefs about 
space) can be false, but Euclid, despite the internal 
consistency, is not an accurate account of space. The 
central weakness of coherence theories of truth lies in 
their inability to decide between incompatible systems of 
belief each of which has equal consistency. There are at 
least three completely consistent geometries of which 
Euclid is only one - a coherence theory has no way of 
concluding that Euclid is wrong. These objections show 
that we can't get rid of awarenesS by Armstrong's move. 
Locke talks about awareness in terms of sensory 
awareness which " ••• is connected with certain types of 
brain activity." (p.27) as a matter of contingent fact. 
Sensory awareness occurs " ••• whenever the brain and sense 
organs are activated in their various ways ••• " In saying 
such things Locke is noting that certain physiological 
conditions must be satisfied for perception to occur. I 
agree with him on this but prefer not to use the term 
sensory awareness. This is because I wish to make a 
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stipu1ative distinction between sensation and perception 
which I will observe in this section as a means of making 
my account clearer. 
The distinction I want to make is between a notion of 
perception which has the percepient's awareness of what he 
perceives written into it and a notion of sensation which 
I will take to be fully explicable in terms of neuro-
physiology. This move does violence to the usual 
philosophical notion of a sensation, which has awareness 
written into it - pain for instance is a sensation and one 
of which we are aware. But I would justify my stipu1ative 
distinction by observing that workers on the physiological 
basis of perception do talk about perception in the context 
ofa purely extensional account of the neuro-physiology 
of the sense organs and the brain. Thus in philosophy, 
both 'perception' and 'sensation' are often used in a way 
which presupposes awareness whilst in neuro-physiology the 
same words are used in the context of a mode of 
explanation which (if my remarks in the previous section 
have any force) simply does not admit talk of awareness. 
The relationship between intentional and extensional 
characterisations of human beings is not a logical one, 
the two modes of description are mutually irreducible. On 
the other hand the difficulties associated with mind/body 
dualism seem to indicate that a person is one thing. Thus 
we must accept, it seems to me, that although there may 
be a correlation between extensional and intentional 
accounts of perception, for instance that if I am seeing 
a tree then also my retina is being excited in certain 
ways and my brain is in a particular neuro-electrical state 
the two sorts of account must not be confused, we must not 
produce a hybrid account of perception involving both a 
neuro-physiological model and awareness. It is in order to 
minimise the risk of confusing two different approaches 
, 
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to talking about perception that I will distinguish 
between perception as involving awareness and sensation 
as being a purely physiological phenomena. In later 
discussion I will return to using 'sensation' in its more 
usual philosophical sense, but in this section I will use 
it as having purely mechanistic connotations. In this way 
my account of perception, as a process involving awareness, 
will be kept free from mechanistic presuppositions. My 
stipulative distinction between perception and sensation 
is to be seen, then, as a formal move designed to make my 
account clearer and to help in avoiding dangerous 
confusions, for instance, the confusion involved in 
seeing perception as sensation (in a mechanistic sense) 
plus awareness - an account which leads to the postulation 
of a ghost-in-the-machine and to a fatal and well known 
infinite regress. 
Perception then, involves awareness, in seeing a tree 
we are aware that there is a tree in front of us. It seems 
to me that the notion of awareness may not be analysable. 
Wittgenstein pointed out that all explanation must stop 
somewhere and awareness, I suggest, is a stopping point 
in explanations of persons just as causality seems to be a 
logically primitive concept in the sciences. (I will 
discuss causality briefly in a later section). The most 
important point to grasp, though, is first that awareness 
is totally unanalysable in extensional terms and second 
that this fact is more indicative of the incompleteness 
of extensional modes of description than of the emptiness 
of the concept of awareness. Both these points were 
argued for in the previous section. 
In my discussion here 1 am interested in the fact that 
people are perceptually aware. This leads to the observation 
that what we are perceptually aware of is a world of trees 
and clouds and people, that seeing (for instance) is 
seeing-as. In other words when we perceive we subsume what 
we perceive under some description or concept. This view 
can lead to giving an account of perceptual awareness 
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which is closely tied to language and this issue will be 
examined later in this section. What must be grasped, 
however, is that the attempt to give an adequate account 
of perceptual consciousness is a logically different sort 
of endeavour from the attempt to give an account of the 
neuro-physiological mechanisms of sensation. Here I am 
engaged in the former activity. 
A central question in this section will be t'hat of what 
it is that we are perceptually aware of. I will begin the 
attempt to answer that question by looking at the problems 
which arise when philosophers assert that in perception 
we can only be aware of appearances, not material objects, 
and that statements about material objects can only be -
justified inferentially from statements about appearances. 
The starting point for a great ~any theories of perceptiQ 
has been the observation that when we see something like 
(for instance) a circular plate, we rarely see a circle. 
This is to say that although we are quite happy about 
saying that the plate is circular (or apparently so) our 
visual image 1s almost always elliptical. Thus, the 
ar gu ment goes, what we see is an elliptical image made 
up of patches of light, shade and colour. Any statement 
that we are looking at a circular plate is, therefore, the 
product of inference. We infer from the visual image, 
which is all we are aware of, that it is caused (in some 
sense) by a material object of so~e sort. In this way a 
logical gap is opened up between the material world and 
the world of perceptual experience. On the one hand we have 
the world of material things and on the other we have the 
perceptual experience of which we are aware. On this 
account of perception the central philosophical question 
which arises is that of how our senses can give us 
knowledge of the world in which we live. 
t 
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The immediate problem generated by any approach which 
separates our sense impressions from the real world in this 
way is that it gives a foothold to the sceptic who can 
suggest that although we have beliefs about the external 
world arrived at via perception, we cannot justify those 
beliefs. The only way to establish that we have knowledge 
of the real, external world, according to the sceptic, is 
by supporting statements about material objects with 
statements about perceptual experience. Two sorts of 
attempt to do just this have been made. The first, 
representationism, states that our perceptual experience 
is causally dependent upon external reality. The second, 
phenomalism, makes the relationship between our perceptual 
experience and external reality a matter of logical 
necessity - material objects on this view are constructs 
from sense impressions, the given in perceptual 
consciousness. 
Representationism has a fatal flaw which must lead to 
its rejection. On p.174 of 'The Nature of Things,' 
Quinton writes: 
"Any Representationist theory requires us to accept 
some contingent proposition asserting a relation.of 
causation and perhaps resemblance, between objects 
and impressions. In requiring this proposition to be 
accepted prior to the justification of any beliefs 
about objects it rules out its own justification. What 
is more it destroys the conditions of its own 
intelligibility. How can any theory about the nature 
of objects or their relation to impressions be u~der­
stood if the only words we can understand are those 
which refer to impressions and it is assumed that 
words for objects cannot be defined in terms of them. 
Representationism could only be intelligible or 
justifiable if there was some direct access to or 
acquaintance with objects. But if there is such access 
the assumption that all knowledge of objects is 
derived from impressions must be abandoned." 
Thus the basic premis of representationism is, in terms 
of the theory itself, unintelligible - the conditions for 
its intelligibility contradict the assertion that we can only 
. infer the nature of external reality from the impressions it 
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'causes' us to be aware of. 
I would suggest that causal theories in general tend to 
be the result of theorists' being seduced by accounts of 
the physiology of perception, which are mechanistically 
causal in nature. But although such accounts are perfectly 
intelligible they cannot take the place of philosophical 
theories of perception as they are constructed on a basis 
of physicalist presuppositions which are, philosophically 
speaking, problematic. Any causal account, as Grice admits 
in his article 'The Causal Theory of Perception,' carries 
with it the conclusion that the material world is not 
directly perceivable. Grice lists three contentions common 
to causal theories (p.109 in 'The Philosophy of Perception' 
ed. Warnock). These are: 
"(1) that perceiving is to be analysed in causal 
terms, (2) that knowledge about perceived objects depends on causal 
inference, and (3) that the required causal inference will 
be unsound unless suitable general principles of 
correspondence can be provided ••• " 
These contentions quite obviously fall foul of Quinton's 
objection. Grice doesn't attempt to refute this objection, 
and I can't see how he could, instead he accuses those who 
raise it of being " ••• unsympathetic in a way that is 
philosophically important." I fail to see why causal theorie~ 
should not be attacXed and dismissed in this way mainly 
because it seems to me that the principles of 
correspondence which any causal theory needs in order to be 
able to distinguish between true and false perceptual 
statements cannot be obtained. Such principles cannot 
invoke perceptual experiences, for in that case they would 
be using the notion of perception to analyse itself. 
Thus they must depend upon perceptual statements 
corresponding to facts known independently of perception -
this leads straight back to Quinton's objection, namely 
that if we have direot access to the world then it is not 
true that all our knowledge of it is inferred Lfrom 
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appearences. It might be possible to res~ue causal theories 
by saying that we can have direct knowledge of how things 
are not through perception but through intuition or 
through metaphysics, but this would be an odd course to 
take given the fact that we commonly hold that we know 
(eg.) that it's raining because we see it or because we 
get wet. There is a view to the effect that true 
knowledge is not attainable through the senses but only 
through knowledge of some metaphysical Absolute, through an 
all encompassing, complete and logically consistent and 
necessary account of reality. 
But if causal theorists attempt to prop up their account 
through absolutism they are, in effect, giving way to the 
sceptic, admitting that only beliefs (and not knowledge) 
are acquired through perception and then saying that their 
beliefs can be checked against knowledge acquired other 
than via perception. In any case to attempt to back up a 
causal theory by the invocation of a metaphysical 
Absolute is to abandon the theory for it is to deny that we 
acquire knowledge of the world through causal inferrence 
from appearence. Thus I think we must accept Quinton's 
objections to representationism and give up causal accounts 
of perception. 
Phenomenalism, the idea that we are in some way construct 
material objects from sense impressions, has lasted longer 
than representationism in modern philosophy, but still has 
problems which seem to require its abandonment. Quinton 
(p.175) describes phenomenalism in these terms: 
"Phenomenalism interprets the belief that there is an 
object here as asserting that certain impressions would be 
forthcoming if certain conditions of observations were 
realised, if I opened my eyes, turned my head, put out my 
hand and so forth. If I actually do perceive the objects 
then some of these possible impressions must be actualised." 
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The weakness of phenomenalism is that it asserts a . 
logical relationship between hypothetical statements (eg. 
If someone goes into that room and looks in the right place, 
under the right conditions, he will see a table) and 
statements about existing states of affairs (eg. there is 
a table in that room). The problem is that no finite 
number of purely hypothetical statements can ever be 
logically connected to a statement about what actually is 
the case. My first example in this paragraph is not, in 
fact, a purely hypothetical statement, IIIf someone goes 
into the room ••• ," should be written as, "If someone has 
the impression of going into the room ••• " 
On p.176 ~uinton writes: 
"In fact it is highly doubtful if even these hybrid 
hypotheticals with objective hypotheticals follow from 
statements about objects. The number of conditions that 
have to be mentioned is very large, even if to a great 
extent negative, and almost certainly not known in its 
entirety, since we do not know all the circumstances which 
might prevent an observer from having an impression of a 
table that is right in front of him. We do, indeed, know 
a good deal about the empirical conditions of having ~ 
impressions of what is in front of us, concerned with the 
medium and the physical and mental state of the perceiver. 
Hut we have only discovered this because we have a lot of 
information, independantly acquired, about objects on the 
one hand and the impressions perceivers have of them on the 
other." 
Ayer, in "The Problem of Knowledge," argues against 
phenomenalism in a similar way to ~uinton. Ayer writes 
(p.130): 
"Just as a statement which implies the existence of 
a given physical object is not formally refuted by the fact 
that in a specified set of circumstances the object ~oes 
not seem to be perceived, so the fact that it does. seem 
to be perceived is not a demonstrative proof that the 
statement is true." 
But Ayer goes on to suggest that we can imagine limiting 
cases in which," ••• in what appeared to be the relevant 
setting the object would always seem to be perceived ••• " 
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and similarly for cases in which an object was never 
perceived. Such cases, Ayer suggests, would, in principle, 
establish the truth or falsity of the relevant physical 
object statements, even if, as a matter of fact, there 
are no such cases, our ability for lack of attention, 
self delusion, etc. being what it is. 
Ayer writes(p.131): 
"!he phenomenalists are right in the sense that the 
information which we convey by speaking about the physical 
objects that we perceive is information about the way that 
things would seem, but they are wrong in supposing that 
it is possible to say of the description of any particular 
set of appearances that this and only this is what some 
statement about a physical object comes to. Speaking of 
physical objects is a way of interpreting our sense 
experiences; but one cannot delimit in advance the range 
of experiences to which such interpretations may have to 
be adjusted." 
Ayers position is that physical object statements are 
used by us in a way which makes sense experience count 
for or against their truth, they are not constructions from 
sense data, they are ways in which we talk about our 
experiences he writes (p.131): 
" ••• it does not greatly matter whether we say that 
the objects which figure in it (ie. a theory) are 
theoretical constructs or whether,. in line with common 
sense, we prefer to say that they are independently real." 
I have a great deal of sympathy, as will become apparent 
in later discussion, for Ayer's position here. But it has 
very great problems. Quinton comments (p.177): 
"The virtue of Ayer's position here is that he does 
not hide behind the eirenic principle that belief in 
objects is a theory designed to explain the order of our 
impressions. For by itself that thesis is an evasion of the 
problem rather than a solution of it. The point is: what 
sort of theory? Is it a sUbstantial explanation like the 
atomic theory of matter, or a logical construction, like 
the theories of electrical and magnetic fields? To choose 
between these possibilities is to opt for the representative 
theory or for phenomenalism." 
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Now I accept Quinton's critique of Aver which comes down 
to an assertion that Ayer hasn't really given his account 
any solid basis. I am sympathetic to Ayer's view that 
the concepts we use in talking about the world are used by 
us to make sense of it. But in failing to specify the 
status of the things to which our statements refer Ayer's 
account leaves open a dangerous possibility. If our 
statements don't refer to an independent reality then 
language can be seen as a closed system and reality as a 
social construction and nothing more. This move has been 
made by some sociologists of knowledge and leads to a 
fatally relativistic account of reality. I will be 
discussing the problems associated with this move in my 
section 'Ways of looking!. 
Later in this section, and in later sections, I will 
adopt the view that via language we construct ways of 
looking at what is nevertheless a reality independent of 
the ways in which we conceive of it. Quinton cannot move 
in the direction I will take as his account in 'The 
Nature of Things' is explicitly materialist. He attempts 
to maintain this thesis by discussing awareness entirely 
in terms of intentionality as a grammatical feature of 
language. He does not, however, say anything which shows 
my assertion of the incompleteness of mechanistic accounts 
to be wrong and I therefore feel justified in asserting 
the logical distinctness of accounts of perceptual 
consciousness from accounts of the physiological 
mechanisms of sensation, and in continuing to regard the 
central problem with perception as being to do with 
perceptual consciousness. My desire to discuss perception 
in terms of perceptual awareness of the world will lead 
me to part company from Quinton. But the parting of our 
separate ways doesn't come just yet. Quinton still has 
useful things to say about appearances and I will stay with 
him until I have looked at this part of his account. 
After dealing with representationism and phenomenalism 
Quinton goes on to look at what someone who claims that 
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we can only see appearances, not material things, could in 
fact be saying. He makes the point that we don't in 
general see patches of light, shade and colour, that we see 
things like tables and chairs, trees and houses. But he 
doesn't take the step which I shall take which is to talk 
about, for example, seeing being seeing-as, ie. to say that 
perception involves concept application. Instead Quinton 
attacks the all-we-are-aware-of-is-appearances school by 
looking at three different uses to which the verb 'appear' 
can be put. These are: . 
(i) Epistemic - statements like, "It appears to be a hOrse," ,. 
and, "It looks like a horse," are statements not about 
sense impressions but about a belief which we are not sure 
of. Quinton's point is that such statements are often made 
when something like bad light or too great a distance 
between ourselves and what we're looking at makes us unsure. 
The essential point though, is that such statements are 
clearly about the external world and not about," •••. private 
subjective entities, states, or contents of private 
sense-fields." (p.180). 
(ii) Perceptually Minimal - we can say, "It appears to be 
a horse," or, "It looks like a horse," in a situation where 
we've actually stated, "That's a horse," and 'then been 
asked if we're sure. The point here is that looking like 
a horse is not a sufficient condition for being a horse -
a horse must have a particular sort of physiology and life 
history amongst other things. A wax-work horse or a robot 
horse might fool us into thinking it was a horse, but we 
would be wrong. Here again an appearance statement is about 
the external world. Quinton writes (p.181): 
"If I say of a piece of cloth held up in a poor light 
that it looks, appears or seems to be green I may well mean 
that anyone would be inclined to say that that was its 
colour rather than expressing my own inclination to 
believe that it is green. But I shall not be saying that it 
has the directly visible properties that green things 
usually have for there are no such properties except actuall 
being green which is what I have already, tentatively, 
said it is." 
I, 
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(iii)Phenomenological - this is the sense-data theorists 
notion of 'appearance.' Here, "There appears to be a horse," 
is properly to be defined as, "There is a horse-shaped 
patch in my visual field." Quinton regards a 
phenomenological way of looking as being something we need 
to learn. He writes (p.181): 
"In the phenomenological use of 'appear' and its 
cognAtes we suppose a set of conventional, idealised 
conditions of observation to obtain even though we may 
know that they do not, because we do not, for these purposes 
care whether they do or not. In the case of vision we 
suppose that what we see is on a flat surface a few feet 
directly in front of us in broad daylight. In other words 
we treat what we see as if it were a picture viewed under 
ideal conditions." 
Quinton claims that this is an acquired skill, lacking 
in primitive painters (for example) and that this skill is 
acquired, tI ••• after we have learnt to perceive and describe 
things in the ordinary, natural, non-phenomenological way." 
About this phenomenological skill he writes (p.181): 
"To acquire it is to learn how to adopt an unnatural 
attitude to the world around us which involves the 
supposition of the framework of our ordinary beliefs about 
it. And to adopt the phenomenological attitude is to 
abandon the attitude, psychologically incompatible with 
it, in which we normally look at the world." 
Quinton says that the phenomenological mode is the only 
sense in which appearance statements are about something 
private. He further argues that such statements are not 
given as support for physical object statements whereas 
both epistemic and perceptually minimal statements are. 
He also makes the point that a phenomenological account 
of any perceptual experience is something we construct 
rather than a way of reporting what we are immediately 
aware of. 
It is about now that I part company with QUinton, largely 
because his materialistic intent leads him away from 
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talking in terms of concepts and perceptual consciousness 
which is precisely the direction I want to take. But I 
will agree to quite an extent with what Quinton is basically 
asserting: that there is no gap, logical or otherwise, 
between the world as perceived and the world as it really 
is. This is not to say that we cannot make perceptual 
mistakes or be victims of illusion. It is simply to say 
that there is no justification for postulating a reality 
which, in principle, is inaccessible to human perception. 
There is a problem with this assertion that in 
perceptual consciousness we have direct access to the real 
world which arises from the consideration of animal 
perception. The argument here would be to the effect that 
the world which the senses of animals reveal to them must 
be a very different world to that which our senses reveal 
to us. If this is the case then we must conclude that there 
is a gap between reality and out experience of it. To 
refuse to acknowledge this is to say that human perception 
has a priviledged pOSition over animal perception in terms 
of revealing the world accurately, and we simply have no 
justification for saying this. Now this argument seems very 
strong, but before it can be assessed we must look at what 
sort of account of perception it presupposes. I will look 
at one possible interpretation of the basic argument and try 
to show that it is not as strong an objection to my account 
as it might seem. 
One of the strongest ways of backing up the basic 
objection might seem to be pointing out physiological 
differences between homo~~ens and other species. Insect 
eyes are very different from human eyes, 'so the information 
transmitted from eye to brain in the two cases will be 
dissimilar. Some burrowing animals have very poor eyesight 
and find their way about by scent and touch, two senses, 
which are relatively lacking in sensitivity in human beings, 
so here again we have very different information transmitted 
from sense organs to brain. A final example of different 
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modes of sensing being used comes in electric fish. These 
creatures send out pulsed electro-magnetic fields as a 
sort of radar, they also sense not only disturbances in 
their own electromagnetic fields, but the pressure of other 
fields. There has been some work on psi-phenomena in 
recent years which sug~ests that phenomena such as 
telepathy might be related to the sort of sensing of 
electro-magnetic fields which we know that electric fi~h 
use, but it is clear that this sort of electrical sensitivity 
is a mode of sensing which is at least very poorly developed 
in our species. 
All this 'evidence' in support of the basic argument is 
given (and has to be given) in terms of physiology and 
presupposes a causal account of perception in which the 
world impinges upon the organism producing, in a 
mechanistically causal manner, nerve impulses which flow 
from the peripheral nervous system, are processed through 
brain circuitry etc. What is wrong with such accounts, as 
I argued at length in the previous section, is that they 
have no room for talk of awareness. All this evidence is 
evidence of different modes of sensing in the sense I 
stipulated earlier which is logically distinct from 
- • L 
perception. Stories about different modes of sensation, 
about different mechanisms of sensing, do not, and cannot, 
say anything about awareness. If perception was sensation 
plus awareness then the argument from animal perception 
would be problematic for me, but such an account leads 
inexorably towards the postulation of a ghost-in-the-
machine and hence towards an infinite regression which 
shows that perception cannot be analysed as sensation plus 
awareness. This means that the initial argument from animal 
perception can be seen as an argument from animal sensation 
in a sense which is logically distinct from talk of 
perception taken to involve awareness. So, in fact, on the 
interpretation offered above the initial argument says 
nothing about perception and the 'evidence' of insect eyes, 
burrowing animals and electric fish is evidence about 
I 
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different modes of sensing and has, logically speaking, 
no rele~nce at all to an account of perceptual 
consciousness. The best that can be said is that the 
physiological conditions for perception to occur can differ 
between species, and I can accept this without altering my 
basic position on our ha.ving direct access to the real 
world in perceptual consciousness. 
What makes the so-called 'objection from animal 
perception' seem so strong is the conflation of the notions 
of perception and sensation, the assumption that evidence 
about physiological differences is evidence of a 
difference in the content of perceptual awareness. This 
would only be the case if a mechanistically causal account 
of perception was correct, but mechanism cannot deal with 
awareness and causal theories in general have insuperable 
problems. Thus the physiological evidence, generated on 
the basis of presuppositions incompatible with the fact 
of perceptual awareness, is logically irrelevant to my 
account of perception. 
Nevertheless it might be argued that some animals are 
perceptually aware and that, because of their use of 
different senses, what they are aware of is a very different 
world. It seems to me that this assertion is problematic 
in the extreme. One way of trying to establish this 
position is by tying awareness to concepts. Under such an 
approach what we are capable of being aware of depends on 
the concepts we possess. Later in this section I will be 
rejecting this contention, but for now I will point out 
that it opens up two possibilities. The first is that 
concepts are essentially linguistic entities in which case 
awareness is logically tied to language possession and it 
is wrong to talk of animals which don't possess language 
as being aware, If tbis account were correct then talk of 
animal perception (taking perception to involve awareness) 
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would be improper, it ~ould be unjustifiable 
anthropomorphism. If some concepts, on the other hand, 
were not essentially linguistic, if concepts were seen as 
principles of classification and concept possession were 
seen as a matter of an ability to classify things in 
accordance with the rele~nt principles, then there is no 
difficulty in suggesting that to some extent human beings 
and other animals might share concepts and hence share 
awareness of the same world to that extent. This second 
view still holds some problems for me, but it still holds 
that awareness is concept bound in a way that makes concept 
application, in part at least, a matter of giving content 
to perceptual awareness. My View, however, is that 
conceptualisation is a matter of picking out and attaching 
significance to various aspects of the world to which we 
hace access in perceptual consciousness. I will argue for 
this later and if I am right it follows that a tendency 
to conceive of the world in different ways in no way 
carries with it the implication that people (and animals) 
who conceive of the world differently perceive different 
worlds. What I will argue is that tying awareness to concept 
application leads to a very odd account of what concept 
application is, one which leads either to a sensation 
plus awareness view of perception or else slips into 
solipsism. 
A final point about the argument from animal perception 
must be that differences in sensitivity don't necessarily 
lead to us saying that people or animals whose perception 
is more or less sensitive in different areas perceive 
different worlds. My claim is that in perception we have 
access to the real world, not that what we see, hear etc. 
is all there is to the world. Someone who is colour blind 
sees the same world as someone who isn't but fails to pick 
up certain detail, similarly the deaf and the blind perceive 
the world less well than those who see and hear, they 
perceive the world differently but there is no justification 
for saying that they perceive a different world. This point 
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can be generalised to animals who (assuming for the sake 
of argument that they are perceptually aware) perceive 
primarily via smell or touch or via sensitivity to 
electro-magnetic fields. The fact that we can explain how 
these animals perceive, that we can condition them or 
train them to respond to stimuli or signs which unaided 
human perception cannot differentiate between, is strong 
evidence, I suggest, tha~ they perceive the same world. 
Thus, it seems to me, animal perception doesn't provide 
valid objections to my assertion that in perceptual 
consciousness we have access to the real world. 1 would 
also point out that I have given those who talk about animal 
perception the benefit of a very real doubt. I have not 
discussed the subject of the ascription of awareness in 
any detail, and 1 cannot do so here. But whereas human 
beings are aware it is clear that talk of awareness and the 
use of intentional concepts is not appropriate for 
explaining the behaviour of Amoeba. In his .book, 
'Rationality' Jonathan Bennet concludes tentatively that an 
essential criterion for the ascription of rationality is 
language possession. If this is the case, then maybe language 
possession could also turn out to be a necessary criterion 
of awareness. In this case we should only talk about animal 
sensation. I tend to believe that some animals, notably 
the higher mammals, are perceptually aware, but, as I said 
earlier, I cannot take time to support my contention here. 
In my discussion of animal perception I have accepted the 
contention that animals are perceptually aware without 
question and still found that the objection from animal 
perception doesn't require me to alter my b~lief that in 
perceptual awareness we have access to the real world. My 
position is very much strengthened when we realise that 
in allowing talk of animal perception (as opposed to animal 
sensation) I have accepted, for the sake of argument, a 
contention which is in itself problematic in the extreme. 
47 
Before leaving this subject I should once again stress 
the distinction between sensation and perception. Sensation, 
as I use it in this section, is to do with an essentially 
mechanistic account involving the relationship between 
an organism's nervous system and the world. Perception, on 
the other hand, is to do with a percipient's awareness 
of the world. The two sorts of accounts are very probably 
accounts of the same process from different points of view, 
but" they are logically distinct. A parallel case of the 
two logically distinct accounts of the same phenomenon 
occurs in the wave and particle theories of light in 
physics, which still coexist. In such cases we quite 
obviously would prefer a unified account which would 
replace the two incompatible accounts, but we must accept 
that this unified approach requires a new way of looking, 
not the jettisonning of one or the other current approaches. 
It seems to me that in the case of perception and sensation 
the fact that we know more about what is involved in 
sensation shouldn't be allowed to seduce us into 
jettisonning the attempt to give an account of perception, 
or (although I cannot even suggest how this could be done) 
the attempt to produce a unified account. Perceptual 
consciousness is an important phenomenon and its analysis 
raises different questions which should not be begged. It 
seems to me that many causal theorists and others who 
insist on talking about the the physiology of perception 
are in danger of overlooking very important areas of 
study concerning perceptual awareness. 
I will now begin the attempt to establish my own account 
of perception, starting from Quinton's three types of 
appearance statement: 
(i)ep1stemic - "I'm inclined to believe that it's a horse 
but I'm not all that sure." 
(ii)perceJ>tually minimal - "Anyone would be inclined to 
say that it's a horse." 
(i1i)phenomenolog1cal - "There's a horse-shaped patch in my 
Visual field." 
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I'm not altogether happy with Quinton's characterisation 
and dismissal of phenomenolgy, although I think that the 
phenomenologists have problems when they insist on trying 
to give a linguistic account of what is given in 
perceptual consciousness. I will try to make this clearer 
when I get on to discussing the role of concepts in 
perception. For now I want to observe that the three sorts 
of sentence do form a sort of hierarchy, one which 
culminates in a fourth sort of sentence - statements about 
what really is the case. 
Phenomenological statements seem immune to error in the 
sense that provided we don't tell lies or make verbal 
slips they appear to be incorrigble. But as they do involve 
concept application and no concept application is totally 
immune from error their incorrigibility can be seen really 
to come down to their not being questionable by others - we 
make a claim only about something which, in principle, 
others cannot inspect, and so nobody can demonstrate 
someone else's phenomenological statement to be false. 
There are serious problems with taking them to be a 
fundamental in perception as to represent learning to use 
words as a matter of labelling essentially private 
entities comes up against objections raised by Wittgenstein 
which I will be discussing in the next section. The 
apparent and questionable incorrigiblity of phenomenological 
statements is of little value as it is gained by not making 
any statement about the external world - in reporting how 
things seem to be tin this sense) we Simply fail to say 
anything about how things are. 
Perceptually minimal statements are about an external 
world, but hedge their bet by saying not that something 
!! the case, but rather that anyone seeing 'this' state of 
affairs would be inclined to say that such and such is the 
case. Such statements are more open to question than 
phenomenological ones, but are still fairly safe - "Anyone 
would say that X," can be true when X is false. Interestingly 
such sentences can aleo be false when X is true. For instance 
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if the utterer saw a green cloth in poor light, claimed 
that anyone would say it was green and then, by controlled 
experiment, found that most people said blue or brown. 
Epistemic statements are most open to question and this 
is because of their closeness to a statement that something 
really is the case. An epistemic statement falls just 
short of a'knowledge claim because the utterer makes it 
clear that although he is inclined towards certain beliefs 
he believes the available evidence to be inconclusive. 
The next step in the hierarchy would be to really stick 
our necks out and say that something really is the case, 
that the available evidence makes us believe that (eg) 
there really is a horse there. Here we have stopped 
hedging bets and decided to discount the possibility that 
we are the victims of an illusion, hallucination, or any 
other of the myriad possibilities that can make us wrong. 
In such a situation the utterer discounts the possibility 
of error and makes a knowledge claim. The value of such 
claims is that they open up possibilities for action. If 
we refu8~ to act except on the basis of certainty we can 
never act. This fact, however, doesn't destroy the 
distinction between epistemic statements and knowledge 
claims. The distinction is not logical, it is a matter of 
degree. In the former case the utterer is inclined 
towards certain beliefs but isn't happy with the evidence, 
he would rather not act on the basis of those beliefs 
(although he might at a pinch). In the case of a knowledge 
claim the utterer regards the evidence as good and is happy 
to act on the basis of the beliefs he has. In neither case, 
of course, is the utterer necessarily right. 
It seems to me that the fact that we often act (in 
general - have expectations) on the basis of perceptually 
based knowledge claims and that those actions turn out 
successfully (ie. our expectations are fulfilled) gives us 
reason to conclude that perception is a source of knowledge. 
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This might be questioned by pointing out that the fact that 
someone can shave successfully using a mirror doesn't 
show that what we see in the mirror is reality rather 
than image. But the only reason such an objection can be 
raised is that we know the relation between what we see 
in a mirror and the object of which it is an image.I don't 
want or need, to question the fact that we do perceive 
images in mirrors, photographs and on television, and that 
such images can be inaccurate representations, be incomplete 
or distorted or misleading. It is the case that we do percei~ 
-e images in some cases and that we must be careful about 
inferring from the image to the reality. But the reason 
that we know to be careful of images is that we are aware 
of the differences between them and the reality they 
represent. 
I can accept these points about a distinction between 
images of these sorts and reality, but not that they can 
properly be generalised into an account of perception 
which maintains a distinction between reality and 
appearance. This is because specific cases like these are 
only comprehensible against a backdrop of knowledge of 
reality and the more general account of perception which 
they might be taken to imply must end up as either 
representationism (most likely given the physical explanation 
of such images) or else phenomenalism. Both of these Views, 
as I have shown, end up contradicting themselves, making 
the acquisition of knowledge via perception inexplicable, 
or cutting off such knowledge from an independent reality. 
In the example of shaving by using a mirror we make use, 
in the act of shaving, not only of knowledge of the image, 
(derived perceptually) but also of knowledge of the 
relation between mirror image and object which, again, we 
get through seeing things like people's faces and the 
mirror images of those faces. It should also be noted that 
mirror images are part of the real world and not to be 
contrasted with reality in the same way as some philosophers 
dealing with perception have contrasted., appea~l'1ce and 
reality. A face and its mirror image are not reality and 
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appearence in the philosopher's sense, they are different 
though related, aspects of reality. Our knowledge of the 
relationship between face and mirror image is our 
knowledge of a relationship between different aspects of 
reality. Thus I think it is reasonable to say that our 
ability to act in particular cases on the basis of 
expectations which we acquire through both our existing 
knowledge of the world and our perception in the 
particular context, and the fact that our actions turn out 
successfully/our expectations are fulfilled, supports the 
claim that in perception we have access to the real world. 
In all the cases where this is questioned, it seems to me, 
the questioner can be shown to be holding an incol1erent 
view, or begging the central question or holding a very 
odd notion of reality (as with Plato), or all three. 
Nevertheless I do not want to say that there is never a 
distinction to be made between what we see (or think we 
see) and what is the case. 
The distinction between what we perceive and what is 
the case is not, I want to say, one between reality and 
appearence as used by some sense data theorists - I think 
I have established that such views are untenable. The 
distinction, I believe, is to be made in terms of the 
applicability of concepts. I want to say that in 
organising our perception of the world we subsume the 
basic conte~t of perceptual awareness under publicly 
established concepts. In this process we can make mistakes, 
be deluded etc., and the conditione under which we perceive 
(poor light etc.) can make us uncertain about what we 
perceive. Phenomenological, Perceptually minimal and 
epistemic statements are all ways of hedging our bets 
against errors. In making a knowledge claim we discount 
the possibility of error even though this possibility 
always remains present. All manner of factors, external and 
internal can effect our perception, it is always possible 
that we have made a mistake or been the victims of illusion-
things are not always as they appear. But often we don't 
make mistakes. 
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The distinction between appearance and reality as I wish 
to make it depends upon the fact that we do have ways of 
distinguishing between verdical and illusory or mistaken 
perception - we can do this by checking with others and 
by discovering that expectations which our perceptions lead 
us to have are fulfilled. This position cannot be attacked 
by suggesting that these criteria come down to the 
coherence of the perceptually based beliefs of different 
people or the coherence of an initial set of perceptually 
based beliefs with beliefs acquired via subsequent 
perceptual experience. To mount an attack along these 
lines presupposes a distinction between appearance and 
reality which makes reality inaccessible to perception 
and hence leads to the insuperable problems connected with 
with either representationism or phenomenalism. The 
postulation of a reality which, in principle, is 
inaccessible via perception is unjustified. Thus there is 
no justification for suggesting that the agreement in use 
of language necessary for us to be able to check our 
perception against what others perceive comes down to 
nothing more than coherence or that the fulfillment of 
perceptually based expectations by subsequent perceptual 
experience can be explained by reference to psychology 
rather than the world. It is true that communities do 
reach agreement on matters not related to the perceived world 
-some might accuse religious communities of willfully 
ignoring what they see around them. It is also true that 
expectations can lead to their own fulfillment - we have the 
relationship between teacher expectation and pupil 
performance and also the fact that if we expect tea and 
are given coffee it takes a few sips before we realise 
what we're drinking. But again, the fact that we can cite sue} 
examples shows that we are able to distinguish illusion 
(etc.) from reality in a way that remains incomprehensible 
if we begin from the assumption that, in perception, we have 
no access to the real world. 
Errors in perception, as I have said, result from many 
factors. The r~le of eoncepts in perception is an 
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important source of difficulty, we have (in the case of 
language users) to decide 'Nhether' this' . thing we are 
(eg.) seeing is properly describable as a table or a chair, 
and although such judgements are often straightforward 
they can be problematic. One problem which often turns up 
is the fact that in everyday life we have to make do with 
criteria which strictly speaking are not adequate. For 
instance a cunningly constructed robot horse might fulfill 
all the visual criteria of being a horse and yet 
wouldn't be a horse. The point is that a vigorous set of 
criteria for the correct identification of a horse must 
include not only looking and behaving like a horse, it 
must also include a reference to things like having the 
correct physiology and life history. It is questionable 
here whether we should say that in everyday life we make 
do with incomplete criteria or whether we should distinguish 
between an ordinary language concept of a horse which 
does not involve reference to physiology and life history 
and a specialist biological concept which does use such 
criteria. I suggest that insofar as anybody would be 
likely to admit they were mistaken if what they had taken 
to be a horse turned out to be a robot we should say that 
the ordinary language concept, the criteria which we 
usually take to be adequate (in everyday contexts) for the 
identification of horses, are incomplete. The specialist 
biological concept is more complete but it is not used in 
everyday life as it is impractical to use it and because th~ 
logically inadequate ordinary language concept is 
nevertheless perfectly adequate in a practical sense in 
that, as a matter of fact, we rarely (if ever) see things 
that look and behave like horses which aren't horses. In 
everyday life we use criteria which are practically 
adequate even if they are theoretically inadequate - this 
means that our ordinary language ways of looking have a 
built in theoretical possiblitiy of error which we discount 
simply because such errors, although possibilities, don't 
occur with sufficient frequency to constitute a practical 
difficulty. 
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. . What this implies is that in perceptual conSC10usness 
we are given (in normal circumstances) access to the real 
world. We then formulate ways of conceiving that world, 
and it is the modes of conceptualisation we use which 
constitute the things which we perceive as being things 
of certain sorts, physical objects, persons etc. Each way 
of looking at the world embodies certain assumptions about 
the things it picks out and leads us to have expectations 
about the behaviour (in a theoretically neutral sense) of 
those things. Insofar as those expectations are not 
frustrated we are justified in believing that the 
particular mode of conceptualisation captures some aspect 
of the world. This is the case even for compa~ively 
crude ways of dealing with the world such as ways of 
counting (1,2,3, a few, many) used by some primitive 
peoples. Any group of objects can be counted in this way, 
although we might feel that a more sophisticated counting 
system would be more useful. It is no part of my thesis 
that a way of looking which works, in terms of leading to 
expectations which are fulfilled, thereby gives a complete 
account of how things are in the world. All I'm saying when 
I talk about a mode of conceptualising some aspect of the 
world, 1s that it fits the world adequately - and here I 
take 'adequately' to mean 'adequately given the purposes 
of those using the way of looking' (the problems which 
this raises will be discussed much later in this thesis 
when I look in detail at the relationships between the 
ways of looking which people use and their interests). 
If things start going wrong, if events in the 
world don't turn out as our ways of looking lead us to 
expect, then we must accept that our current beliefs 
about the nature of the world are in some way mistaken, our 
current modes of conception do not captuie adequately 
those aspects of the world we took them as explaining. 
I have outlined the sort of account I want to give and 
in doing so have introduced the idea that concepts are 
centrally concerned in perception ·without giving any 
strong argument as to why this should be accepted as being 
the case. It therefore seems a good idea to begin fleshing 
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out my account by showing the importance of concepts in 
perception. I will then continue with dealing with 
problems arising from the introduction of concepts. 
That perception involves concept application is very 
widely held, largely restin~ on the common sense observation 
which Quinton pointed out - that what we see is a world 
of tables, chairs, trees etc. In other words when we 
perceive we subsume the objects of perception under concept 
headings, we pick out aspects of experience which have 
significance for us. In support of this thesis I would 
point out that in many cases specialists, people who have 
grasped the specialist concepts of a systematic discipline 
often notice significant detail where a layman notices 
nothing special at all. So a geologist notices facts about, 
say, the Lake District which the average holiday maker 
overlooks completely. I am not saying that the non-
specialist sees nothing at all in such circumstances, only 
that the possession of particular concepts allows us to 
pick out significant detail which, if we don't possess 
those concepts, we wouldn't notice (this is a bit over 
simplified but not totally so - later discussion will 
clear up problems to do with the generation of new concepts) 
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Thus, it seems, any explanation of how we direct our 
attention to certain significant aspects of the world 
requires us to talk about concept possession. Hamlyn, in 
'The Theory of Knowledge,' expresses this by saying; 
"In order for a man to see something correctly as X, 
what he sees must be an X, he must have the concept of 
an X ••• "(p.180). 
In other words if we are perceivi~g the world correctly 
we must first have a conceptual framework which fits the 
world and, further, for any individual to see something 
correctly as, say, a table, he must possess the concept 
of a table. Someone who lacks this concept still sees some-
thing when he sees a table, something which he might 
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characterise in a different way, but he doesn't see a 
table in that he lacks the ability to see anything as a 
table - he sees what we call a table but is incapable 
of recognisiiig', it as such. 
The main source of oddness in this account lies with the 
notion of the content of perceptual awareness. 
Conceptualisation seems best thought of as a process of 
picking out and attaching the correct significance to 
particular features of the world to which perception gives 
us access. This implies that there is something given in 
experience and that we apply concepts to this given. On 
this matter Hamlyn writes: (p.186) 
lilt is impossible that the awareness of an object of 
which I have spoken should be gotten through any features 
of sensations as such ••• For this would imply that we first 
had to be aware of these features of our experience, and 
then the notion of an object would have to be reducible 
to these features or would have to be derived from them 
by some process of inference. ~either of these things 
is possible." 
The reasons for the last sentence here are those which 
QUinton draws out. Inference from appearance to object just 
can't, be explained intelligibly. Knowledge can't be given 
in experience, we derive knowledge from experience 
through conceptualisation. 
There is a possible implication which might be drawn out 
from this quote from Hamlyn which (as I will indicate in a 
later section) Hamlyn is equivocal about in his recent 
work. I will draw out this implication and build it into an 
account which I will not accuse anyone of forwarding -
instead I will use it as a straw man, hoping to get some 
useful results out of demolishing it. 
In talking about awareness in the way he does liamlyn 
seems to be moving towards an account of awareness which 
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says that in conceptualisation not only do we direct our 
attention to specific things but also that we only become 
aware of objects as we recognise them to be things of 
specific sorts. A further move in this direction could be 
to say that concepts involve public criteria which are 
established by (and only by) interpersonal agreement in 
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the use of language. I must stress that this account is 
not forwarded by Hamlyn although I believe that there is 
evidence of some tendency in this direction in his recent 
work. What follows from the moves I have built into my 
artificial account is that in perceptual consciousness 
we are aware of a world of tables and chairs etc., that 
we could not be aware of anything unless we possessed a 
linguistically formulated concept of it and hence that 
awareness is inextricably tied in with language possession. 
I cannot accept this account for a number of reasons. 
f1y first problem is that I cannot see how a child could 
ever acquire language if his perception was not org~nised 
in some way and this seems to require talk of pre-
linguistic concepts (I will be discussing this notion more 
fully in later sections)o I also find it difficult to see 
that awareness is tied to language possession. It would 
seem odd to say that a child is not perceptually aware 
at six months old but is at two years old when he can use 
language to some extent. So it seems to me that the account 
I have constructed has two initial problems, it makes 
awareness something which is acquired with language and 
(hence) makes it difficult to explain language acquisition. 
These objections will recur in this and later sections. 
The main problem of my naive account of perception, 
though, is that by bringing concepts into perception at 
too Iowa level it builds into perception the notion of 
using a logically arbitrary system of classification. It 
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builds recognition of a thing as being a thing of a 
particular sort into the concept of seeing tetc.) There 
seems to be little in this account for the idea that 
sometimes we see things which we just can't recognise 
as anything, as when we 'see' something unrecognisable on 
a bedside table when we're still half asleep which, when 
we look more carefully turns out to be the alarm clock. 
Now it might be argued that seeing the alarm clock in this 
example should be explained in terms of the conditions 
under which we view it being such that we can conceive it 
only as a vague looming shape and not as the alarm clock 
it is, and there is something in this; but at a more 
fundamental level this sort of defence of my 'straw man' 
is not available. 
Consider the problem of what we see the first time we 
see an apple, before we have acquired language - what did 
we see? We can't plausibly suggest that we see nothing 
until such time as we have acquired at least some 
linguistically defined concept (of a physical object for 
instance). On the contrary we usually learn words like 
'apple' by o~tension, by learning to use the word to 
refer only to certain of the things we see. So we learn 
linguistically defined concepts by learning to use the 
concept words to name the appropriate objects of 
perception. And unless we were aware of a world of distinct 
things it would be impossible to learn that 'this' word 
is properly to be used only to designate certain things. 
If we could only distinguish between different objects of 
experience once we had acquired some linguistic concept 
we could never acquire any such concept as we would not 
know what was being pointed out (or even that Someone 
was pOinting or looking etc.) 
Yolton, in his article 'Perceptual Consciousness' 
(R.I.P. Lectures '68/9) tries to use psycho-analytic 
notions, like Klein's idea of a pre-linguistic phantasy 
life to explain how pre-linguistic children come to be 
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able to distinguish between different perceptual objects, 
but this is no answer. All such a move achieves is to 
push the question back to the level of asking how the 
child comes to distinguish between different aspects of 
this phantasy life. It is not just perceptual experience 
which needs organising, any experience on this line of 
argument must be recognised as an experience of 
something of a linguistically defined sort before we can 
be aware of it. This account which I have constructed 
cannot say anything about perceptual awareness without 
tying it to a notion of recognition which is just too 
strongly language based. 
I can accept that recognition, in some senses, does 
seem to be part of perception. But if this sense always 
involves the use of linguistically defined concepts, then, 
I think it is clear, the acquisition of language could not 
be explained except by some sort of doctrine of recollection. 
As far as I can see we must accept the coherence of a non-
linguistic notion of recognition in terms (in certain basic 
cases) of an innate tendancy to pick out certain aspects 
of the world as significant. Unless we accept this, I believE 
we find language acquisition to be a mysterious and 
incomprehensible occurence. 
If being aware of seeing something is also recognising 
it as a member of a particular class of things, then 
logically we cannot become aware of anything if at an 
earlier time we could not have been aware of at least 
something. An alternative way of putting this is to say 
that if a pre-linguistic child lacks some concept of a 
'thing' (in an unspecified sense) at any time in his 
life, then he could never become aware of being in a 
world of 'things' and hence could never learn to classify 
these things as being objects of various sorts. 
This fact leads to problems for any account which, like 
this artificial account I am using as a heuristic device, 
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ties concepts to language. Such accounts must ascribe 
innate knowledge of language to pre-linguistic children 
or innate knowledge of a set of structural rules of 
language. A number of attempts to do this have been made 
in terms of ascribing innate knowledge of the deep grammar 
of language - Chomsky and Davidson have both expressed 
such views and I will be arguing that they are not 
justified in doing so in both the next section and in 
my discussion of theories of meaning. For now I will 
simply state that the ascription of innate knowledge of 
language is both unnecessary and unjustifiable - the 
full argument will be left for later. 
If, on the other hand we regard concepts as being 
principles of classification and concept possession as 
being nothing more than having the ability to classify 
things in certain ways, then talk of innate concepts does 
not necessarily carry with it talk about innate knowledge 
of language. There are objections to this view of concepts 
which I will deal with later, but here I simply wish, to 
point out that in my account talking about innate concepts 
doesn't raise the contentious issue of innate knowledge of 
the rules of language. If babies without learning tend to 
pick out certain things as significant because of the 
relationship between those things and naturally significant 
states (and I would speculate that these states might be 
things as basic hunger and its satisfaction - although 
the specification of what ~ naturally significant is a 
job for psychology - not philosophy) then it is proper, 
under my account, to ascribe innate concepts to them. 
The adoption of a notion of concept possession which 
is not logically tied to language allows me to escape 
from one major set of problems which the naive view I am 
working from gets bogged down in. But it doesn't avoid 
another problem which arises from the tying together of 
conceptualisation and the phenomenon of awareness. I built 
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into my naive account the assertion that becoming aware of 
something depends upon conceptualisation, and this comes 
down to recognising it as a thing of a certain sort, or 
more generally as a thing with particular significance. 
Now this doesn't mean that someone who lacks the concept 
of a computer would see nothing when faced with a computer, 
he wouldn't see it as a computer, but he might Bee it as 
a large, metal and plastic 'thing' which makes funny 
noises etc •• But my naive account must hold that we 
cannot be aware of anything unless we can subsume it 
under Borne concept. This seems an odd account of 
conceptualisation to me. I have suggested that concept 
application should be regarded as a process of organisation 
of classification, and if I'm correct then the question 
of what it is that is organised/classified must arise. 
This is where my notion of a given in perceptual 
consciousness comes in. My idea is that in perceptual 
awareness we have direct access to the world but that in 
focussing awareness on particular aspects of the world, in 
picking out certain things and attaching particular 
significance to them we are organising the basic given, 
we are conceptualising the world, looking at it from a 
perpective which picks out aspects of reality which are 
significant for us. This process of picking out/focussing 
attention on significant detail, of classifying the things 
we perceive as being things of certain sorts, is what I 
see as conceptualisation, the principles of 
classification being the concept. The relationship 
between language, modes of conceptualisation/ways of lookin~ 
and the world will be discussed at some considerable 
length later in this thesis. 
There are those, for instance Ryle in 'Concept of Mind,' 
who might question my talking about conceptualisation as a 
process. Ryle says that perception is an achievement 
rather than a process, but he also says that perception 
presupposes the process of observation, about which he says 
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very little (see Locke p.28). Now it may well be that 
talk of someone seeing a tree is such that the statement 
'He sees the tree,' entails the truth of, 'He has seen 
the tree,' but this in no way leads to the conclusiQn that 
seeing cannot be shown to be a process. Seeing-as is 
self evidently something which can take time, we can see 
what is a tree in a mist and be unsure until we have 
looked carefully for a few seconds about whether what we 
see is a tree. I suggest that it is proper and necessary 
to talk about perception-as in terms of its involving a 
process of conceptualisation which, although it normally 
takes very little time, can ta.ke a noticeable time in 
some circunstances. This is a process of judging that f this' 
object of perception is a thing of a certain sort. 
It seems to me that if we fail to distinguish between a 
basic content of experience of which we are aware and the 
process of conceptualisation in which we recognise this 
thing-in-the-world of which we are aware as a thing of a 
certain sort, then we end up with a very odd account of 
concept application. My naive account fails to make this 
distinction and so builds the giving of content to 
perceptual experience into the process of conceptualisation. 
Under this approach the basic content of perceptual 
consciousness is a world of tables, chairs, trees, etc. 
On the other hand I want to say that in perceptual 
consciousness we have, normally, direct access to the 
world, that the given in perceptual consciousness is the 
world and that the process of conceptualisation is one in 
which we make sense of the world, pick out particular 
aspects of the world and attach the relevant significance 
to them. To support my own approach I will examine the 
approach built into my naive view and attempt to show that 
it leads to fatal difficulties, 
The contention I am concerned with is that we can only 
be aware of something which we have subsumed under some 
concept, which we have recognised as a thing of a certain 
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sort. In other words that only through conceptualisation 
can we become perceptually aware of anything. This 
ampunts to saying that conceptualisation is a process 
through which perceptual consciousness is given content. 
The idea of giving content seems te imply that our basic 
perceptual input is content free. A tempting idea at this 
point is that of giving a mechanistic account of 
perceptual input and then saying that conceptualisation is 
a process whereby we read significance into the neutral 
impulses coming into the brain, and thereby become aware 
of the world which, by impinging upon our bodies, causes 
those neural impulses to be generated. 
This account, of course, is totally unacceptable. The ide~ 
of us reading significance into neutral impulses involves 
postulating a ghost-in-the-machine who 'reads' the 
incoming signals - like a telegraph operator reading the 
dots and dashes coming down the line. And this sort of 
account is, once again, the result of confusing sensation 
and perception. Perceptual consciousness is, as as matter 
of logic, inexplicable in terms of the physiology of 
sensation. In giving an explanation of anything we must 
guard carefully against jumping to and fro between logically 
distinct modes of explanation, and to insist on 
introduCing an account of the physiology of sensation into 
an attempt to say something about perceptual consciousness 
is simply to confuse matters. An account of the physiology 
of sensation is a logically different animal from an 
account of perceptual consciousness. A refusal to see this 
will lead to a logically heterogeneous and hence 
inconsistent account. Thus talking about conceptualisation 
being to do with giving content to neural impulses is not 
only logically incoherent, it is symptomatic of a 
failure to grasp a fundamental logical point about two 
different modes of explanation - it's as if someone 
interested in explaining the beauty of a painting began 
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by chemically analysing the pigments used. We must 
conclude that conceptualisation doesn't give content to 
perceptual consciousness in the sense of giving content 
to a content-free 'input' and hence allowing us to become 
aware of it. So one attempt to explain the link between 
concepts and awareness, as postulated in my naive view, 
has failed rather miserably. 
The only other way awareness could be logically linked 
to concept application as far as I can see (and my 
imagination might have failed me) has difficulties just as 
great as those of the view I've just discussed. This is the 
assertion that the world is constituted by the concepts we 
use, that reality is entirely a matter of interpersonal 
agreement. In one sense r feel that the idea that 
reality is a social construct has quite some force, and 
this is to say that I do feel that the interests 
of people play an important role in the choice 
of the ways of looking, ways of conceiving the world, which 
we use. But on my view, which will be discussed at 
length later, although the ways of looking we use are to 
some extent chosen by agreement within a community, what 
is looked at, what is conceived in various ways, is an 
independant world to which we (in normal circumstances) 
have direct access in perceptual consciousness. To go 
beyond thiS, to say that in perceptual consciousness 
nothing is given except a world constituted by 
interpersonal agreement in use of concepts is to move 
straight into idealism in which talk of an independant 
reality is simply unjustified. It would be absurd to make 
such a move. The denial of an external reality would even 
undermine the notion of interpersonal agreement - what if 
other people were nothing more than a figment of my 
imagination? Of course, this view collapses completely 
once we bring Wittgenstein's private language argument to 
bear on it - I'll be discussing this argument in the next 
section. So my second attempt to back up my naive view's 
linking ot awareness and conceptualisation has foundered. 
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The failure of my naive view combines with the 
arguments I borrowed from Quinton to suggest a workable 
account of perception. We must start fro~ the assertion 
that in perceptual consciousness we have direct access 
to the real, public world and not to a world of mere 
appearance from which we must infer the nature of a 
reality which, in principle, is not revealed by our 
senses. I do not deny that we can be deluded, can 
hallucinate or simply make mistakes in perception. But we 
cannot move from the assertion that some perception is 
illusory to the assertion that all perception is illusory 
to do this is to walk right in to some or all of my 
earlier objections to representationism. It is worth noting 
that this sort of view, because of the incoherence of it's 
basic assertion that there is a real world even though we 
can't see it, cannot be taken as sayin~ merely that we are 
always mistaken about how things are. It must be taken as 
saying that none of our talk of an external reality makes 
any sense at all - this will hopefully reduce the 
attractiveness of representationist accounts. 
Perceptually based knowledge claims do form a basis of 
belief upon which we formulate expectations and plan action. 
That such actions turn out successfully, that such 
expectations are fulfilled, gives us reason to believe that 
ourperceptions are verdical. We are not always successful, 
sometimes our perceptions are not verdical, but usually 
we get by. One reason for this is that our identification 
of 'this' as a thing of a certain sort is usually based 
on criteria which are logically inadequate. We accept the 
possibility of error because the logical possibility 
doesn't constitute an unacceptable risk. Even our most 
vigorously formulated specialist concepts aren't totally 
secure, if things don't turn out as his theory predicts a 
scientist can, ultimately, go back and question the basic 
concepts, can come to doubt whether, in fact, they do 
capture the nature of those aspects of reality he took 
them to fit. What I am saying is that empirical knowledge 
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isn't absolutely certain, but it is nevertheless 
accurate enough most of the time to make it worth our while 
to plan our future actions on the basis of well established 
knowledge. Similarly perception is not infallible, but 
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neither is it totally illusory. I should make it clear, 
though, that this belief - that the utility of perceptually 
acquired knowledge in allowing us to plan action suggests 
that we do normally have direct. access to reality in 
perceptual consciousness - is not the central pillar of my 
argument. The assertion that we do have direct perceptual 
access to reality is most strongly established by the quite 
separate argument that its denial leads to either 
representationism or phenomenalism, or some variation on 
these basic themes, and that neither of these basic 
posi tions is tenable. l~y reasons for raising the 
relationship between perception, knowledge and action 
(more generally interests and purposes) have to do with my 
interest in the role of interests and purposes in 
understanding - this will be dealt with later. 
Thus we must say that the external world is revealed 
to us in perceptual consciousness. We must not try to 
explicate this assertion by tagging on to it an 
account of the mechanics of sensation, such accounts are 
quite proper but, as I have shown, are logically distinct 
from accounts of perceptual consciousness. It remains a 
possibility that a unified account of perception might 
one day replace the two logically distinct modes of 
description we now have, but until such an account is 
forthcoming (and I can offer no suggestions about the nature 
of such an account) we must keep the distinction clear. So 
when we're talking about perceptual consciousness we must 
end our explanation at the point of saying that in 
perceptual consciousness we are given access to,an external 
reality. Our experience of the world, I would suggest, is 
only partial, being contingent upon the nature of human 
beings, but what we see, hear, touch etc. is,except in cases 
of hallucination etc., the real world. 
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What is also the case is that, through the use of shared 
modes of conceptualisation, we organise our perception, 
pick out import~t features of the world. The most important 
conceptual frameworks we use in everyday life are those 
built up through language, but as I ~av~ said, we must, 
if language acquisition is to be possible, have some 
innate tendancies to pick out certain aspects of the world 
we perceive as being significant. This move will be argued 
for more fully later. It means that there are some things 
--' ~ -
that are naturally significant for us, that, as a matter 
of human nature, we canlt help noticing what stings or 
burns us, or what satifies hunger. Such things are facts 
about us, although, as I have said, a full account of 
what is naturally significant for human beings is ~o~ething 
._-----
to be given by psychologists, not philosophers. r should 
also say that it is no·'.objection to my thesis that new-
born babies show few signs of awareness and respond to few 
stimuli - it may be the case that some of our natural 
tendancies require a certain amount of physiological 
development betore they become manifest. Wittgenstein . 
pointed out that pointing is a uniquely human activity 
and th~ the siGnificance of a pointing finger cannot be 
learned ostensibly. Bruner (and I will be referring to his 
work more extensively in a later section) has discovered 
that the ability to use and respond to pointing is a skill 
which appears in babies towards the end of their first year. 
The need for development does not undermine my assertion 
that some innate tendancies to pick out certain things as 
significant are necesEary for language acquisition to be 
possible. 
This talk of somethings being naturally significant bring 
with it, as I have admitted, talk of innate concepts. This, 
r believe, is not problematic so long as I keep my account 
of concepts as principles of classification and concept 
possession as being a matter of possessing an ability 
to classify things according to the relevant principles. 
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This account of concepts has been attacked and in a later 
section I will defend it. But it seems to me that the 
strongest defence of it is the observation, made earlier, 
that making concepts essentially linguistic entities 
either makes language acquisition inexplicable or else 
leads to talk of innate }cnowledge of lan~age : - I will 
argue that the postulation of innate knowledge of language 
is unjustified in later discussion. 
The role of concepts in perception is not to do with 
the giving of content to experience, it is to do with 
organising a given content, with picking out certain 
aspects of our experience of the world and 'reading in' 
the correct significance. An example might help to make 
my meaning clear. The first time I walked down Holloway 
Road in North London it was at night. My knowledge of the 
area was virtually nil; I could recognise various things 
as lights, shapes, other roads etc., but I couldn't 
attach any particular significance to anything, all I 
could do was to recognise the various things I saw as member& 
of very general classes of thing. The whole experience 
was strange and rather worrying - I missed the turn-off 
for G.aledonian Road (where the room I'd just moved into was) 
and ended up catching the tube from Highbury and 
Islington to Kings Cross from which point I could find ~y 
way home. rut only a few months later Ho noway Road was a 
familiar place, shops had particular significance, roads 
all went somewhere. What happened was that I had come to be 
able to pick out lots of individual landmarks which had 
signifmcance for me, which told me where I was and how to 
get home. What was given in my experience of Holloway 
Road wasnl.t changed, what had changed was my ability to 
attach significance to that experience. 
It seems to me that this is precisely the role of 
conceptualisation in perception - to allow us to pick out 
I 
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and attach significance to various aspects of the world 
of which we have perceptual experience. ~he a.bility to 
conceptualise our experience makes the world manageable, 
in conceptualising experience we attach significance to 
what we perceive and thus we know what it is what we are 
seeing, know what to expect of it and hence can plan a 
course of action (where appropriate) on the basis of 
that knowledge. ~y Holloway Road experience doesn't quite 
capture this as, of course, my own conceptual development 
was already quite advanced at the time and what I lacked 
was particular knowledge of that area. But there is, I feel, 
an analogy between this experience of mine and that of a 
young child confronted by the world. The parallel lies 
in the problem of having to make sense of something 
unfruniliar and it is this process of getting to grips with 
the unfamiliar, of having to discover which aspects of 
reality have what significance and of 'setting' together 
those aspects of the world which have, for whatever reasons 
and from whatever point of View, the same significance 
that I want to call conceptualisat10n- so conceptual 
development is a matter of progressively learning about 
the world, of acquiring the ability to attach more and 
more significance to more and more aspects of the world as 
revealed to us in perceptual consciousness. One important 
role of education, I think it is clear, must be to promote 
conceptual development in this sense. 
At this point I will leave my account of perception. I 
think I have made my account clear and also that I have 
made the remaining problems clear. In my next three sections 
which will beon(i) The Private Language Argument 
., (ii) Concepts and Language, and 
(iii)The Conceptual Development of the Pre-Linguistic 
Child, Iwill try to deal with the problems left unresolved 
here. The same problems will recurr in later discussion as 
I develop my ideas until, I hmpe, my account of the 
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relationships between the external world, perception, 
concepts and language will be established strongly enough 
so that I can rest an account of understanding on the 
framework they provide. I should also pacify those who will 
have been disquieted by my rather glib and unsupported 
linking of knowledge with action and truth with expectation. 
I am aware that this is not a point of view that would be 
acceptable to many and, indeed, is unsupportable with 
respect to certain kinds of knowledge. But in what I have 
written here all I want to asse:r.t is that in some 
circumstances perceptio~ does provide us with knowledge 
and this is why we often manage to act successfully on the 
basis of perceptually acquired beliefs. As I have said, 
however, the most important support for my contention that 
in perceptual consciousness we have direct access to the 
real world lies in the earlier part of this section where, 
using Quinton's arguments, I tried to show that the denial 
that we see the real world leads to accounts of perception 
which are Simply untenable. 
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The Private Language Argument: its relevance to the notion 
of a given in experience and to the problem of recognition. 
In the previous section I talked about perceptual 
consciousness having content prior to conceptualisation. 
This content may be seen by some as essentially private 
in the sense that no-one else could, in principle, be 
aware of the basic content of my experience. Such an 
observation might seem to bring my account of perception 
up against Wittgenstein's private language argument. I 
must therefore look at my account and at Wittgenstein's 
argument to see whether in fact I have reached an impasse. 
Wittgenstein's argument is also important to my account 
for another reason. In talking about pre-linguistic 
children being able to recognise their mothers I have 
claimed that they are capable of making 'sameness 
judgements,' of judging that 'this' object of current 
perception is (in some sense) the same as something they 
saw yesterday (say). On one interpretation of Wittgenstein 
such a view might appear nonsensical. 
Before going on to look at the private language argument 
I would like to say one thing: the argument is over 
twenty years old and, on the evidence of what has been 
written on the subject, it would hardly be unfair to say 
that Wittgenstein's choice of words when he wrote 
'Philosophical Investigations' was not so precise as to 
present his meaning unambiguously. In fact the number of 
mutually contradictory interpretations of the significance 
and import of the private language argument is quite 
staggering. Thus I must admit that in attempting to 
reconcile my account with Wittgenstein's writings I will 
be looking for what seem to be reasonable interpretations 
ot the relevant passages from 'Investigations.' 
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My objections will be to possible but (in my view) 
dangerous interpretations of what Wittgenstein wrote. 
Whether or not these objections are at all relevant to 
what Wittgenstein intended to say with 'Investigations' I 
do not know. The prose style of that book is not straight 
forward, much of it might even be thought of as cryptic. 
Unfortunately, as the book was put toget~er and published 
posthumously, nobody had any chance to corner the author 
and get him to explain crucial sections (and Wittgenstein 
might not have been very forthcoming anyway) so I am left 
with the task of trying to find a path through the mass of 
interpretation which the private language argument has 
given rise to. I will attempt to find such a path. 
The basic statement of the argument occurs in 
paragraph 258 of part 1 of 'Philosophical Investigations:' 
"Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep 
a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To 
this end I associate it with the sign'S' and write this 
sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the 
sensation. - I will remark first of all that a definition 
of the sign cannot be formulated - But still I can give 
myself a kind of ostensive definition - How? Can I point 
to the sensation? Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, 
or write the sign down, and at the same time I concentrate 
my attention on the sensation - and so, as it were, point 
to it inwardly. - But what is this ceremony for? for that 
is all it seems to be! A definition surely serves to 
establish the meaning of a sign. - Well, that is done 
precisely by the concentrating of my attention; for in 
this way I impress upon myself the connection between the 
sign and the sensation. - But "I impress it on myself" can 
only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the 
connection right in future. But in the present case I have 
no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: 
whatever is going to seem right for me is right. And that 
only means that we can't talk about 'right.'· 
Wittgenstein conceived of language as consisting of a 
multit~de of overlapping language games, each 'game' being 
a form of life ~ithin which linguistic signs are given a 
use, the use a sign has constituting its meaning 
within that form of life (culture ~ sub-culture). The 
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important point here is that the rules of any language game 
are established by public agreement in the use of signs, 
either tacitly as in the case of the natural languages or 
overtly as in the systematic disciplines where rigorous 
definition of technical terms is often a matter for 
international convention. Thus the notion of a language is 
inextricably linked with the notion of a public agreement 
on the use of linguistic signs. And the notion of a private 
language, if that is taken to mean a language which, in 
principle (and not merely in fact), is intelligible only 
to one person, its 'creator,' is seen as being a 
contradiction in terms. 
If this was all that was taken to follow from the private 
language argument, and it may be that Wittgenstein intended 
that nothing more be read into his words, then I would 
have no difficulty in accepting his conclusions. The 
'language game' view of language is, it seems to me, a 
very useful one. But more could be read into his words; 
which is to say that on certain interpretations of sections 
of 'Philosophical Investigations' following para. 258, the 
private language argument would appear to have consequences 
beyond the impossibility of an essentially private 
language. 
The problem is whether the impossibility of g~v~ng a 
use to the Sign 'S~ in a context like that of para. 258 
stems from the absence of rules governing the use of that 
sign or whether the difficulty arises from the (supposed) 
impossibility of making sameness judgements in the absence 
of publicly defined criteria of sameness. In para. 378 
Wittgenstein writes: 
nUBefore I judge that two images which I have are 
the same, I must recognise them as the same." And when 
that has happened, how am I to know that the word 'same' 
describes what I recognise? Only if I can express my 
recognition in some other way, and if it is possible for 
someone else to teach me that 'same' is the correct word 
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here. 
For if I need justification for using a word, it must 
also be one for someone else." 
And earlier in para. 265, he had written: 
"Let us imagine a table lsomething like a dictionary) 
that exists only in our minds. A dictionary can be used to justify the translation of a word X by a word Y. But are we 
also to call it a justification if such a table is to be 
looked up only in the imagination? - "Well, yes; then it is 
a subjective justification." - But justification consists 
in appealing to something independant ••• " 
(265 continues by arguing against the idea that memories can 
be justified by appealing to other memories). 
Now if, and it seems likely, Wittgenstein's intention 
here was to insist that when we use words we are either 
using them in the context of a publicly defined language 
game or else we aren't using words at all, then I am in 
sympathy with his thesis. But this is not what I am talking 
about when I make the claim that there is something which 
pre-linguistic children do that is properly describable 
as Making sameness judgements. 
What I am claiming is that the pre-linguistic child 
learns that certain aspects of its experience have 
significance, and that this can only be the case if it 
recognises those things. And it can only recognise anything 
if it, as a matter of course, 'sets' its experiences 
according to some unlearned criteria. There must be some 
primitive unlearned classification of the 'things' of 
experience if any learning is to be possible otherwise each 
new experience would be, from the childs point of view, 
unique and thus no patterns of associations between 
different sorts of experience could be built up. The 'things, 
which are built up under this system of classification are 
regarded, and reacted to, in similar ways. It is this 
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grouping together that I regard as constituting a 
sameness judgement. 
There is no tension between my account of the pre-
linguistic child and Wittgensteins arguments if his account 
in P.l. is taken to be of how language works and nothing 
more. Linguistically defined concepts 'set' the world in 
a conventionally established way. All the 'things' of 
experience to which a publically defined concept applies 
are the same(ie. the concept of sameness applies to them) 
in that respect. Which is to say that all those members of 
the class of things to which the concept 'red' is properly 
applicable are the same in one respect - they are all red. 
Put simply this becomes: everything that is red is the same 
colour, although of course this breaks down if we abandon 
the over-all concept 'red' and begin to classify colours 
in a more subtle way. Then we get the common place oddities 
of everyday language like saying that blood and a London 
Transport 'bus are the same colour, but different (ie. 
different shades of red which is a reference to a more 
detailed set of colour concepts than the ROY G BlV of the 
'0' level physics spectrum). 
The danger to my account of language acquisition lies 
in an extension of the private language argument which 
Wittgenstein would quite possibly have rejected. I won't 
accuse anybody of having held this View, except, possibly, 
myself at an earlier date, but elements of it seem (to me 
at least) to hover between the lines of the writings of 
some philosophers of language. This is the view that it is 
meaningless to talk about judgements of any kind in the 
absence of language. It is a view that tends towards a 
belief that mind is a function of language, that all talk 
of mind should properly be understood as talk about the 
linguistic habits of human beings. I will.attempt to construe 
a basis for such a view and then attempt to demonstrate 
the fallacy behind it. 
Someone taking this view might first say that my talk of 
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pre-linguistic children classifying their experience in 
certain ways, lias a matter of course," is just a bit too 
far fetched. They might well claim that to classify 
something is to classify it as something, and that involves 
the application of criteria by which this 'thing' is 
identified as a thing of a certain kind. Thus, it might be 
said, my mistake is that of ascribing innate ideas to 
human beings, a move which gives rise to very great problems 
(I will discuss these later). 
The next move might be to observe that correct 
classification depends on the correct application of 
criteria. And as, for the pre-linguistic child, there is 
no means of discovering what the criteria are, let alone 
whether they are being applied in the right way, then 
(in the words of para. 258), " ••• that only means that here 
we can't talk about 'right.'" 
Thus the private language argument is used (improperly, 
I think) against my thesis. The mistake here, I suggest, 
is that in order to make an argument about language apply 
to my thesis about how a child comes to acquire language 
it has been assumed that Wittgenstein's account of how 
linguistic judgements are made is an account of how all 
judgements are made, and this has been done with no just-
ification. But this is only an aside, my main purpose in 
setting up this line of argument is to give it enough rope 
to well and truely hang itself. 
The thesis under discussion might continue by asserting 
that, in principle, any judgement stands in need of 
justification by appeal to something independant: another 
out of context use of Wittgenstein, but one that will 
finally lead to the fatal contradiction. For the language 
user, it might be thought, this appeal to something 
independant might be simply an appeal to other language 
users. But this canno~ be so. If all judgements stand in 
need of justification by appeal to something independant, 
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then any judgement to the effect that these language users 
have just backed up my judgement that, say, 'this' is a 
horse also stands in need of justification by appeal to 
something independant. And this second order 'something 
independant' cannot be other language users, otherwise we 
have an infinite regress. In general it must be fairly 
obvious that if the 'something independant' is something 
external, then the person making the judgement has to make 
a further judgement about whether or not the something 
external supports his initial judgement and this leads 
to the infinite regress. Thus the 'something independant' 
must be something inner and the prime candidate for the 
'language over mind' view must be the individual's 
knowledge of the rules of language. 
This is fatal for the thesis I have set up. If no 
judgements can be made by anyone who does not know the 
rules of language, then no such person could ever acquire 
language. If the rules of language were not already known, 
then no judgements about experience could be made and hence 
no knowledge of the world of experience could be organized 
(including knowledge about the rules of language). Thus, 
under this view, the fact that children acquire linguistic 
competence could only be explained by recourse to an almost 
Socratic doctrine of recollection. Children would have 
innate knowledge of language which would lie dormant until 
'triggered off' by interaction with their environment. 
The thesis could be propped up by using a Chomskyan 
approach. Under such a view we would have innate knowledge 
of the rules of the deep structure of language and what 
would be acquired would be knowledge of the surface 
structure of one particular language. But this would not 
solve any problems. David Cooper has pointed out (in his 
book 'Knowledge of Language') that to talk of knowing rules 
is empty if there is no way of specifying which rules are 
known. Chomsky has set up his transformational grammar in 
opposition to phrase-structure grammar. He doesn't claim 
that the transformational approach fits aspects of 
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language as it is spoken that the phrase-structure 
approach doesn't, rather he claims that it is a better 
way of looking at language. But both transformational and 
phrase structure grammar are technical tools forged by 
linguists and no matter which way of describing language 
is adopted by them, for whatever reasons, there is no 
justification for taking the view that people use language 
in the way they do because they know the rules of one or 
the other of them (or indeed of any other grammar). Cooper's 
point is that any number of formal sets of grammatical rules 
may adequately d~scribe our linguistic behaviour and as 
there seems no way of deciding which set of rules people 
are following when they use language it is inadmissible 
to talk about linguistic behaviour as rule following in 
a stric~ sense. I would back up that point by observing that 
nobody would claim that a falling stone falls as it does 
because it is following a set of rules even though physicists· 
have established rules for accurately describing and 
predicting the motion of falling bodies. 
~he ess~ntial thing to grasp here is that the systematic 
disciplines formulate theories which fit the facts in 
which the discipline (as a public endeavour) is interested 
and which are useful in that they further the disciplinas 
purposes and explanatory ideals. Those theories 
constitute rules for the description of phenomena, and 
often for their prediction (especially in the physical 
sciences). But it is not true to say that the described 
• phenomena occur because they follow the descriptive rules 
the discipline has established. Thus, whilst it is quite 
proper for linguists to describe language in any way they 
find useful, it is improper for th~m to assume that people 
use lan~~age as they do because they follow the rules 
which linguists have formulated. (this topic will be 
covered in greater detail when I discuss theories of meaning 
of the Davidsonianvariety in a later section). 
Once it is accepted that talk of innate knowledge ot 
the rules of language is unjustified, then what I have 
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called the language over mind view of the making of 
judgements can be seen to be fallacious. If I am right in 
adopting the view of Wittgenstein's writings already 
outlined then it would seem that this view of the 
relationship between mind and language could only arise from 
a misunderstanding and hence a misuse of the private 
language argument. When this is grasped then it is not too 
difficult to grasp the idea that the facts about language 
acquisition can only be as they are if it is a basic fact 
about human beings that we just do classify our experience 
in certain basic ways as a matter of course, without 
learning to do so. 
This does not exhaust the possiblities for the 
misunderstanding of the private language argument. The 
'beetle in the box' section (para. 293) is also capable 
of being used to suggest that talk of an 'inner' 
component of experience (and I take perceptual experience 
to be as vulnerable in this respect as sensations) is 
improper or confused. Wittgenstein writes: 
"If I say of myself that it is only from my own case 
that I know what the word 'pain' means - must I not say 
the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the 
~ case so irresponsibly? 
~ow someone tells me that he knows what pain is only 
from his own case! - Suppose everyone had a box with some-
thing in it: we call it a'beetle.' 10 one can look into 
anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a 
beetle is only by looking at his beetle. - Here it would 
be quite possible for everyone-!o have something different 
in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly 
changing. - But suppose the word 'beetle' had a use in 
these people's language? - If so it would not be used as 
the name of a thing at all; not even as a something: for 
the box might be empty. - No, one ca.n 'divide through' by 
the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. 
That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the 
expression of sensation on the model of 'object and 
deSignation' the object drops out of consideration as 
irrelevent." 
Oswald Hanfling, in the Open University text 'Language 
and the Privacy of Experience' (Units 20-22 of course A402), 
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draws attention to the 'ifs' in this section. His claim 
is that it is wrong to interpret this as evidence that 
Wittgenstein had slipped into the errors of behaviourism. 
Hanfling interprets this section of 'Investigations' as 
claiming that if we insist on saying that a word like pain, 
for example, is the name of some essentially private 
'thing~ a 'beetle in a box', then we arrive at the 
conclusion that the existence or otherwise of that 'thing' 
is irrelevant to the functioning of the language game in 
which the word 'pain' has a role. In other words, if I 
have correctly grasped Hanfling's point, Wi ttgenstein was 
not a behaviourist at all, rather he was pointing out that 
the assumption that sensation words name essentially 
private entities leads to behaviourism. This point needs a 
little clarification. 
The view that there is some essentially private thing 
that corresponds to a word like 'pain' is what Wittgens'tein 
was arguing against. This view says that we have these 
things (called sensations) and that we learn to associate 
the sensation word with the appropriate sensation. It is 
an approach which leads to assertions like, "Nobody else 
can have my pain," being taken to be, in some sense, 
necessary truths (although there are problems about trying 
to say in what sense they are necessary truths). 
Wittgenstein's claim seems to be not that such assertions 
are either true or false, but that they have no place in 
the language game of sensations. What has happened here 
is that a grammatical move admissable in the language game 
of physical objects has been improperly imported into the 
language game of sensations and has led to confusion. 
I will attempt to illustrate the mistake made by the 
'private object' approach, but instead of talking in terms 
of sensations I will use the wider category of 
experiences. Consider the following Pairs of sentences: 
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1. a) I have a hat. 
2. a) This hat is mine. 
3. a) You could not have 
my hat. 
b) 
b) 
b) 
I have an experience. ! 
! 
I This experience is mine! 
You could not have 
my experience. 
The b) sentences here are constructed in exactly the same 
way as the a) sentences from a grammatical point of View, 
the only difference being the substitution of 'experience' I 
for 'hat', and yet there are important differences ! 
I between the two sets of sentences. Sentence 2a adds something \ 
to sentence 1a precisely because I could have someone else's, 
hat (they might have left it behind when they visited me). 
And sentence 3a is obviously false, you could have my hat, 
I could give it to you (although I might not). But sentence 
2b doesn't seem to add anything to sentence 1b precisely 
because sentence 3b seems to be an obvious truth. A hat 
is a thing which can be in the possession of someone who 
doesn't own it and the possession and ownership of hats can 
change independantly of each other. For example, say 
person A owns a hat which he loans to person B who, at a 
later date, loans it to person C who is now in possession 
of the hat. A asks B about the hat, and B, being unable to 
return A's property, gives A the money to buy a new ha~ 
saying that he will keep the old one for his own use when 
C returns it 0 him. The ownership/possession sequence goes; 
(i) A owns and possesses the hat. 
(ii) A owns and B possesses the hat. 
(iii)A owns and C possesses the hat. 
(iv) B owns and C possesses the hat. 
The point I am trying to make is that the ownership/ 
possession distinction I have made here has no possible 
parallel in the case of the b) sentences, those dealing with 
experiences. So although the a) and b) sentences are 
grammatically similar we should not allow this similarity 
! 
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to mislead us into thinking of experiences as if they were 
things in the same way as hats are things. This is possibly 
what Wittgenstein had in mind when he wrote in para. 304 
of Investigations: 
II"But you will surely admit that there is a difference 
between Pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-
behaviour without any pain?" - Admit it? What greater 
difference could there be? - IIAnd yet you again and again 
reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a 
nothing." - Not at all. It is not a something, but not a 
nothing either! The conclusion was only that a nothing 
would serve just as well as a somethinb about which nothing 
could be said. We have only rejected the grammar which 
tries to force itself on us here. 
The paradox disappears only if we make a radical 
break with the idea that language always functions in one 
way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts -
which may be about houses, pains, good and eVil, or 
anything else you please." 
To refer back to my sentences 1a and 1b. What 
Wittgenstein is saying here (I think) is that the 
grammatical similarity of such sentences is misleading. We 
can interpret, 'I have a hat,' as saying something like, 
'There are things called hats and this thing that I have is 
one of them.' But to interpret, 'I have an experience,' in 
the same way leads to the same difficulties that arise in 
the 'beetle in the box' example. Thus the whole line of 
argument that rests on the assumption that, 'You cannot 
have my experience,' is in some sense a necessary truth, 
• is a result of falling into a grammatical trap and is in 
error. 
I would suggest that the error in the object and 
designation view of sensations, and of experiences in gen-
eral, arises from taking a sentence like, 'I have an 
experience,' too seriously. It isn't at all problematic 
when we talk about experiences as if they were discrete 
'things' in ordinary language, but when philosophers take 
such usages seriously in attempts to describe how 
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language works, then they find themselves faced with all 
the problems that Wittgenstein pointed out. The way to 
avoid these problems, I suggest, is to look at the notion 
of experience and at the role of language in the differ-
entiation of experience. This I will attempt. For my 
purposes here I will not observe any distinction between 
our experience of the external world and our experience of 
our inner life, sensations, feelings, thoughts, etc. This 
is not because of any prejudice against such distinctions, 
but because my remarks here are relevent to all experience. 
When I discussed perception I said that we must admit that 
our perceptual consciousness has content prior to 
conceptualisation. But I also said that this content is not 
appearence as opposed to reality, the basic content of 
perceptual consciousness ~ the world. Put this way it . 
sounds odd, but in fact I am saying nothing more than that 
in perceptual consciousness we have (usually) direct access 
to the external world. Our basic experience of the external 
world is organized, through conceptualization, so that we 
recognise what we are (eg.) seeing as being a tree, a table, 
or whatever. Similarly I would argue that our experience 
in general has content, we experience feelings, pain etc. 
directly and recognising 'this' sensation as pain is 
recognising 'this' experience as one which is properly to 
be subsumed under the concept heading 'pain.' Unless we 
admit a basic experiential content in the case of ! 
sensations and feelings we end up being unable to distinguish I 
between pain behaviour indulged in by an actor who is I 
I 
simply following a script and someone who naturally is in 
pain. It should be noted, however, that there is an 
important difference between perception of the external 
world and feeling a pain. In the former case there is 
something independant which we are experiencing. In the case 
of pain there is not a 'something' which we experience and 
which is to be correctly labelled as a pain - rather there 
is an experience which we are having which is painful. 
There is nothing wrong with talking about experiencing pain 
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so long as we do not take this form of words too seriously, 
but philosophically speaking we should insist on talking 
instead of painful experience. 
So we must not say that before an individual can use 
the word 'pain' he must recognise a clear and distinct 
sensation which the word 'pain' names. Wittgenstein talks 
about pain-language replacing natural pain-behaviour. He 
further points out that if certain sorts of behaviour were 
not normally associated with feeling pain then the public 
concept of pain could not get off the ground. Put 
together these two elements sug~est that certain aspects 
of our experience cause certain physical reactions in us. 
Our public concept is made possible only by the similarity 
of those reactions, but more is written in to our concept 
of pain than the fact of pain behaviour. What is written in 
is the assumption that the behaviour is a direct and 
immediate result of our experience. If that is not the case 
then the person exhibiting the pain behaviour is shamming 
or acting and is not in pain at all. 
I have already argued in this section that our ability 
to learn new ways of classifying (and hence differentiating) 
our experience presupposes that there are basic ways in 
which we classify experience without having learned to do 
so. What I want to suggest is that Wittgenstein is right 
in saying that a sensation (or an experience) is not a 
something if by that he means that there are not 
necessarily clear and distinct things which form the 
content of our awareness and which we name with words. My 
contention is that experience is best understood as being 
an undifferentiated content of awareness which we 
differentiate by means of classification into similarity 
classes according to our interests and purposes. Natural 
pain behaviour is caused by our experience. When our 
'stream of experience' impinges on our awareness in certain 
ways we usually react with natural pain behaviour, 
although this need not be so in all cases (there is almost 
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certainly room for a mechanistic account somewhere here in 
terms of an event of which we are aware which also triggers 
certain reflexes, tears for instance.) We come, after any 
time, to be able to pick out those occassions when our i 
I 
experience is of the kind which causes those reactions whichl 
constitute natural pain behaviour. When, for instance, we 
touch something hot we can withdraw before we build up a 
great pain and we also recognise the sensation of pain when 
we fail to withdraw soon enough. In such ways our experience 
becomes differentiated and we learn to recognize our 
sensations. 
The main point to make here is that before we can 
differentiate our experience in new ways we must be able to 
differentiate it in certain basic ways. If we did not have 
basic ways of classifying experienc~, then there would be 
no way of acquiring a system of classification. The only way 
to increase the complexity of our system of claSSifying 
experience is by becoming aware that experience of 'this' 
sort is associated with experience of another sort. If a 
baby remained unaware of any distinction between the differ-
ent ways it reacted to different experience, then it could 
not begin to differentiate its experience. And the baby can 
only distinguish between its reactions if it can distinguish 
between its experiences, for it experiences (sometimes at 
least) its reactions. This apparant paradox is already 
familiar ground. It says quite simply that if at any,point 
a human being can make no distinctions between sorts of 
experience, then he will never be able to do so. Thus the 
only way to explain the fact that we do distinguish between 
aspects of our experience ·and that our ways of differentiat_ 
ing experience become more complex through learning is eithe 
by recourse to some sort of doctrine of recollection, agains 
which I have already argued, or else by saying that human 
beings have an innate tendancy to classify their experience 
in certain ways. 
In this way ~ have reached a position from which I can 
I 
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agree with Wittgenstein that a sensation is neither a 
something nor a nothing. Sensation is a category of ex-
perience, a category built up by a language which distingui-
shes between our experience of the external world and our 
experience of the 'inner' world of the mind. We recognise 
our own sensations only in the sense that we recognise 
those occassions when our experiences are properly to be 
subsumed under sensation concepts. But nevertheless there 
remains an 'inner' component to sensation, a basic content 
of awareness which we differentiate through concept 
I 
application. 
This account is useful, I believe, in that it clarifies 
the position of the 'inner' element of experience with 
respect to questions about its essential privacy. We 
differentiate our experience by means of public concepts, 
concepts which define what it is that we are experiencing. 
There is no problem with linking experience to language as 
there is no gap between them - in acquiring language we 
acquire a system of classification which differentiates 
and attaches significance to various aspects of experience • 
. 
In perception we have direct access to a world which we 
then proceed to make sense of in terms of public conceptual 
frameworks. More generally our experiences have a basic 
content but we don't differentiate that content and then 
learn language, in learning a language we learn to 
differentiate that content in various ways. Our shared 
conceptual frameworks structure our experience, but they 
don't generate it, so we must postulate a given content 
of awareness which is what our conceptual frameworks 
differentiate and classify. 
There is no gap between experience and language because 
linguistically defined concepts structure experience. They 
direct ~ur attention towards and attach significance to 
various aspects of what 1s given to our awareness. I do 
not believe, however, that all our concepts are linguistically 
defined. Just as our ability to learn to .differentiate 
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experience in new ways is dependant upon our having 
an innate tendency to classify experience in certain 
basic ways, I believe that our ability to acquire 
language depends on a certain amount of pre-linguistic 
conceptual development. This belief, and objections 
to it, will be looked at in my next two sections. 
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Concepts and Language 
At this point I can start pulling together the strands 
of my argument in order to support my assertion (in my 
initial discussion of the pre-linguistic child) that we 
must accept that pre-linguistic children can recognise 
their mothers ( although not as mothers in the linguistically 
defined sense). And the sense of recognition which must 
explain the reactions of such children is, I shall try 
to show, a non-mechanistic sense. This will bring me up 
against an objection. ~or a non-mechanistic sense of 
recognition brings in talk of people according with 
logically arbitrary sets of rules of classification. And 
such rules are precisely what concepts have been seen 
as by many theorists. Thus when I talk about pre-
linguistic children recognising, in a mentalistic sense, 
I am talking in terms of pre-linguistic concepts. One 
objection to this is precisely Cooperls objection to 
talk of innate knowledge of the rules of language. Pre-
linguistic children donlt know the rules of language, so 
how can we talk of them possessing concepts? My reply will 
be exactly what it was in the last sec~ion, that we are 
mistaken if we put language into the controlling 
position in the mind/language relationship. I donlt need 
to repeat the problems created by making this mistake, I 
have only just finished pointing them out. But I do have 
to give an alternative account of what a concept is, and 
this I will try to do. 
But before I embark on this task, I must first deal witq 
another objection. This objection would be to say that 
although I have rejected mechanistic accounts of the 
behaviour of language users, on the grounds that such 
accounts cannot deal with the facts of awareness, I have 
not yet made any case for the view that pre-linguistic 
children must be regarded as being aware. Thus I have not 
shown that we need to give any more than a mechanistic 
89 
account of the behaviour of pre-linguistic children. I will 
now try to show that we do need to accept children as 
being aware prior to their acquisition of language. 
The main grounds for our having to regard pre-linguistic 
children as aware come straight Irom my discussion of the 
private language argument in the previous section. In 
awareness we are aware of something, our awareness has 
content. Now the view that we can eive a perfectly adequate 
characterisation of a pre-linguistic child in mechanistic 
terms, but that such a characterisation will be inadequate 
after language acquisition sounds odd to start with. But 
if we ignore that oddness for a while and look more 
closely, this view can be seen to be the view against 
which I have already argued. On this view awareness, 
including amongst other things, the content OI 
perceptual consciousness, follow on the acquisition of 
language. But in that case, as I have already argued, the 
acquisition of language itself could only be explained on 
mechanistic lines, and awareness cannot arise on the basis 
of purely mechanistic processes, processes which can be 
completely characterised in mechanistic terms. This view 
arises from the argument that the ascription of content 
to experience can only be achieved by following the rules 
of language. And insofar as that theory is incorrect, 
something I have argued already, this view is mistaken. 
The content of perceptual experience is something that must, 
if my arguments on perception were not wholly misguided, 
be 'given,' that must be immediate (ie. unconceptualised) 
in our awareness. It is further the case that the 
organisa~ion of this content, something which involves 
the making of what I have called 'sameness Judgements,' 
cannot "be wholly language dependant either. If it were, 
then we would have to adopt either a mechanistic View, 
or else the view that we have, in some sense, innate 
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knowledge of the rules of language. And I rejected, after 
discussion, both these views as untenable. 
What seems to be the case is that if language 
acquisition is to occur in the way that it does, and if 
language users are aware, then the pre-linguistic child 
must achieve awareness and some degree of ability to 
organise the content of its perceptual awareness before it 
can acquire language. This is to say that such children 
do experience a world of 'things' and can, to some extent, 
come to recognise those 'things' as things with special 
significance. And this means that pre-linguistic children 
can acquire concepts, although it is not to say that these 
concepts are completely specifiable in terms of the concepts 
embodied in public modes of language. 
Before I can adopt this account of pre-linguistic concepts 
however, I must discuss a strong objection to any talk 
of concept possession in the absence of language. In what 
I have written so far I have regarded sorting into logically 
arbitrary classes as being an essential element in the 
process of conceptualisation, subsumption of experience 
under concept headings. In other words I have regarded 
concepts as being primarily to do with the differentiation 
of experience, using the word 'experience' in a sense that 
implies awareness. I have not claimed that all 
discriminatory abilities, in all species, imply concept 
possession. Some psychologists do this, using the notion 
of ' concept' in a sense which is compatible with mechanistic 
modes of explanation. In terms of this usage the phrase 
"having the ability to discriminate" does the same job as 
"possessing concepts." I, on the other hand, regard concepts 
as being to do with the sorting or differentiation of the 
content of our awareness, thus using the term in a sense 
which is incompatible with mechanistic modes of explanation. 
Thus I regard the term, "concept possession" as having, 
in part, the same import as, "having the ability to 
differentiate and classify the. content of awareness." 
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We sort the 'things' of experiences into classes 
by virtue of their having, in relevent respects, a 
shared significance for us. 
Some might object to the stipulative way in which I have 
given this account of what conceptualisation is. But I 
don't think there would be any relevence in my attempting 
to give an analysis of the notion of a concept to try and 
show that my meaning is, in some sense, the primary sense 
of the notion of a concept. The psychologist's notion of a 
concept is not quite as subtle as that which I wish to 
use, perhaps through a lack of understanding of the 
philosophical considerations, through not grasping the 
logical distinction between a machine and an aware being, 
but, perhaps, because such fine distinctions are of no 
relevence to him. After my discussion of mechanistic modes 
of explanation, of perception, and of the private 
language argument, my reasons for wanting to use the sense 
of 'concept' I have outlined should be fairly obvious. As 
for my giving a justification for having made a move such 
as this, the overt stipulation of the meaning of a crucial 
term, I cannot give one in a few lines. Ny belief, and 
hope, is that looking at concepts in this way will be 
useful in that it will make the facts about people more 
intelligible. If I am right this will become clear in the 
course of this whole work. And if what I write is made more 
successful, in terms of explaining those phenomena in 
which I am interested, by taking concepts to be to do with 
classifying the content of our experience, then the use of 
this sense of the word will have been justified. 
There are people, however, who would want to say that 
the notion of a concept that I want to use is not a useful 
one. Cooper, in an article, IIGra:nmar and the Possession of 
Concepts," (proc. Phil. of Ed. Soc. of G.B. July 1973), 
has argued against a view that discriminatory abilities 
imply concept possession in young children. He has argued 
that in the absence of an adequate usage of the logico-
syntactic apparatus of language there is no justification 
for talking in terms of concept possession. As this is an 
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important issue I will discuss Cooper's article at some 
length. 
Cooper calls his central contention the 'nothing to 
know thesis.' He writes (p.205): 
"This is the claim that it makes no sense to ascribe 
concept-possession to young children. It is not, as the 
sceptic holds, that children have the concepts, only we do 
not know which ones. Rather there is nothing to know, since 
no concepts are possessed." 
Cooper's "young children" include not only what I have 
called pre-linguistic children, he also uses the term to 
refer to children whose language is at the 'telegraphic' 
level, whose language," •• olacks a certain 'logico-syntactic': 
apparatus." (p.204). The sceptical argument with which he 
disagrees is the sort of argument with which I am agreeing 
when I say that the fact that the pre-linguistic child can 
recognise its mother presupposes that it has some concept 
of its mother, but not necessarily the linguistically 
defined concept of a mother. 
Cooper's sceptical theory owes much to the work of 
W.V. Quine, who has pointed out that when a young child 
says, 'Doggie' we have no justification for ascribing to 
it our linguistically defined concept of a dog. :J"or , given 
the lack of grammar in a childs linguistic utterences, we 
cannot identify 'doggie' as a concrete general noun (which 
is what 'doS' is). 'Doggie' might be nearer in meaning to 
'doggish,' an adjective, or 'doghood,' an abstract noun, 
or to a number of other words. And, as interpretations 
of what the child is saying, all three of the examples I 
have given (and some others) are pragmatically adequate, 
in that the child~verbal (and non - verbal) behaviour 
offers no clue to which of them is correct. Only 
if the child uses a language possessing a sophisticated 
logico-syntactic apparatus can we distinguish what should 
be the correct interpretation (in terms of the language we 
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use) of the word 'doggie.' Cooper points out that the concept 
of a dog is a physical object concept, whereas that of" 
doghood has to do with the 'stuff' of which dogs are made. 
Thus to interpret 'doggie' in alternative ways is to 
ascribe di~erent concepts to the child using the word. 
Hence the sceptical thesis says that until a language user's 
use of language becomes sufficiently sophisticated we 
can't know what concepts he's uSing. 
Cooper's next move is to say: 
" ••• if the child's world of concepts is thought of 
as hidden behind, and unrevealed through, his s~ech and 
behaviour, the adult's world of concepts should be similarly 
thought of. Hence one should be totally sceptical about 
whether one's best friend has the concept of dog." 
He then makes use of the private language argument, as it 
applies to languages (rather than sensations) by saying 
that our understanding of our own speech depends on our 
being able to understand the speech of others. What is odd 
about the above quotation from Cooper's article is that it 
overlooks the reasons for being sceptical about what 
concepts a young child possesses. I will use an analogy 
to try and show what I mean. Consider this example. One day 
I leave the staff room to go and buy an apple to go with 
my lunchtime sandwiches. Another member of staff asks me to 
get her an apple and yet another colleague asks me to buy 
him a banana. I go to the shop and buy the fruit which 
costs 30p. altogether. But when I get back to the staff 
room I realise that I've forgotten to ask how much each 
item cost. I can make up an equation for two variables 
that reads: 
2a + b • 30p. (a=apple, b=banana) 
but I can't work out the price of either an apple or a 
banana. Possible solutions are a = 1, b = 28, or a = 2. , 
b = 24, and I know that the most the apples can cost is 
15p. in which case the banana cost nothing and similarly, 
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if the apples were a free gift the banana cost 30p. Thus I 
can state the following constraints: o~ a -\ 15 and 0 ~ b ,30, 
but, because 2a + b ~ 30 gives me insufficient 
information I cannot tell the price of apples or bananas. 
If, however, someone else in the staffroom tells me that he 
has just been to the same shop where he bought one apple and 
one banana at a cost of 21p. I now have a system of two 
equations in two unknowns ( a and b) which is solvable. 
I have: 
2a + b • 30 (from my shopping spree) 
and 
a + b = 21 (from my colleague's) 
The only possible solution to this system of equations 
is a • 9 and b = 12. Thus I know how much money to collect 
from the people I bought fruit for_ 
What is important here is that initially the informatmon 
available to me meant I only knew about the limits within 
which the prices of apples and bananas fell. Hot until I 
had more information could I work out exactly what these 
prices were. In any problem where the solution is some 
specification (be it of prices or of concepts), that 
solution can only be given if the information we have 
constrains the possible solutions adequately. If our 
problem is to accurately locate a radio beacon, then the 
information given to us by a directional reading taken at 
one spot is inadequate, we need two readings taken at 
different locations to pin-point the beacon. If the info 
we possess is inadequate for the solution of our problem 
then we need more information, we don't give up hope of 
solution. 
The problem of specifying a pre-linguistic child's 
concepts is, I believe, insoluble, not because there are 
no concepts, but because our observations of the child's 
verbal activities give us insufficient information about 
the way the child organises its experience. And there is 
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the added difficulty that the child's ways of organising 
his experience will be altered by acquiring a language 
which embodies a particular way of looking at the world 
of experience. Thus, by the time the child's use of 
language is sufficiently sophisticated for the ascription 
of particular concepts to be possible, his conceptual 
framework will have been structured by the fact of language 
acquisition. 
11y contention is that, in fact, the young child's world 
of concepts is unrevealed through his sppech and behaviour 
precisely because his speech lacks the sort of logico-
syntactic structure that would constrain the possible 
pragmatically adequate interpretations of his words to an 
extent that would be sufficient for there to be only one 
pragmatically adequate interpretation. And the fact that 
adults use language in a sophisticated manner is what 
allows us to ascribe particular concepts to, them. 
I think that Cooper has fallen into the same trap as 
those philosophers who have argued that, in principle, 
anyone who knows that P (p a proposition) must be able to 
justify his knowledge in some sort of public demonstration. 
His interest in the problem of specifying what concepts 
people possess has led him to write specifiability into 
the notion of a concept. I will come to his reasons for 
doing so a little later in this section. 
In giving this objection to Cooper's attack on what he 
calls the sceptical thesis I have left unmentioned the 
basic difference between his notion of what concepts are and 
my own. This difference is basically that Cooper regards 
concepts as wholly linguistic entities whereas I do not, 
for reasons which follow from my discussion of the private 
language argument. 
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Cooper writes: 
"l!'or, crudely speaking, employing. a dif~:rent 
conceptual scheme is nothing but emploY1ng a d1fferent 
logico-syntactic apparatus. The weird and wonderful worlds 
of thought ascribed by a Whorf or a Sapir to exotic natives 
may so to speak, be nothing but alternative logico-
syntaxes. And to have no conceptual scheme may be nothing 
but lacking a logico-syntactic apparatus." 
This remark is expanded on in Cooper's book, 
"Fhilosophy and the Nature of Language,n where (ch.5) He 
discusses the Sapir/Whorf hypothesis concerning the 
effect of language on the conception of reality. On p.116 
he writes: 
"We have to admit, I believe, that there can be no 
way of identifying what a man's concepts are except in terms 
of the language he uses. Conceptual ability is essentially 
linguistic ability. If this is so, we can no longer speak 
of there being a correlation between language and 
conceptualisation ••• " 
What I find odd about this quote is the insertion of the 
sentence, nConceptual ability is essentia:}:ly linguistic I 
ability." I agree with Cooper that it is true that behaviour_ i 
I 
al observations other than observations of linguistic ' 
behaviour cannot tell us very much about what particular 
concepts anyone possesses. And this means that we can't 
ascribe particular concepts to anyone without using the 
evidence of what he says. And it follows from this that 
talk of a correlation between language and concepts is 
empty. For, if we ascribe the particular concept C to 
someone on the basis of his making statements S~, ••• S~ 
we cannot then turn round and say that there is a correlation 
between those who possess C and those who made statements 
equivalent to S" ••• S~. To talk about correlation we must 
first find a way of identifying thoses who possess the 
particular concept C which is independant of the way we 
identify those who make statements of a certain sort and 
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this is what is not possible. But this doesn't involve or 
entail an assertion like, "Conceptual ability is 
essentially linguistic ability." 
Cooper's tendency to assert a logical link between 
concepts and language is manifested again on p. 120 of 
'Philosophy and the Nature of Language.' He writes: 
"We have seen that it is highly misleading to speak 
of there being a correlation between linguistic differences 
and conceptual differences among soc:i_eties. That implies 
that language and conceptualisation are distinct phenomena. 
In fact, though, concept differences consist in linguistic 
differences. rviore precisely, I have argued, concept differ-
ences consist in (1) the fact that certain words belong to 
different groups in different societies, and (2) the fact 
that the explanatory analogies employed in different 
societies may be very different ... 
Here again I must suggest that the assertion, " •• concept 
differences consist in linguistic differences," is both 
unjustified and unecessary to Cooper's thesis. What Cooper 
argued in the section preceeding this quote was that the 
existence or not of such things as tensed verbs or ways of 
talking about time and space that have direct correspondance 
to the parallel English language games doesn't automatically 
reveal conceptual difficulties. His arguments can be summed 
up, if rather too simply, by sayinp, that even if the 
grammatical structures of two languages are very different, 
conceptual differences need not exist. Conceptual differences 
are only revealed by looking at the ways in which the 
language games work. If, for instance, there existed a 
language in which sensations were regarded as things in 
the world so that 'pain' and 'blue' were both properties 
of objects, then there would be conceptual differences. 
But again, it seems to me, such conclusions are not at 
all dependant upon conceptualisation being wholly language 
dependant. I accept that linguistically defined concepts 
are by far the most important part of our conceptual 
frameworks, but that doesn't mean that concepts are 
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necessarily linguistic entities, or that language must, 
as a logical necessity, playa part in concept formation. 
The real disagreement between ·Cooper and myself, 
however, is that I believe that a classificatory notion 
of a concept is a useful one to hold. In 'Grammar and the 
Possession of Concepts,' he writes: 
"What I would urge is that concept-possession, so 
understood, is neither a fruitful, well motivated, nor 
explanatory notion. It simply does not provide us with an 
understanding of how we employ the notion in discussion 
about human intelligence and behaviour." 
He goes on to point out that an ability·to discriminate 
does not give any information about what concepts the 
person with that ability possesses. At this point he refers 
to examples. F1rst he uses an example in which a person 
lacking any concept of sex is taught to sort out between 
male and female chicks. Here the fact that the person 
discriminates between male and female chicks tells us 
nothing about the concepts he possesses. It is further 'the 
case, apparently that, in real life, chick-sexers learn 
to perform their sorting of male and female without being 
able to explain how they do it. ~ow if Cooper had disposed 
of the sceptical theory this example would be problematic. 
But, if I am right, the sceptical thesis (which I would 
prefer not to call sceptical, but will, in deference to 
Cooper's prior usa.ge of the term) remains tenable. Thus I 
can say that chick~sexers, asexual or otherwise, possess 
concepts that they cannot specify linguistically and that 
we cannot specify because of lack of (linguistic) evidence. 
In saying this I am not saying that discrimination implies 
concept possession, but that discrimination of objects of 
experience, by conscious agents, implies concept possession. 
I have suggested that Cooper's problem is that he wants a 
notion of a concept which has specifiability built into it. 
In other words he only wants to ascribe particular concepts 
to people, he wants to rule out the possibility of saying 
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that some concept is possessed, but we can't know what it 
is. It is possible that this desire stems from his 
interest in education and an interest in the problem of 
assesment. He attempts, in this paper, to rule out the 
possibility that someone might possess a concept but that 
others might not be able to tell that he possesses it. 
Which, if that were the case, would reassure teachers that 
they couldn't accidentally mis-assess their pupils, for if 
the pupil couldn't manifest his concept-possession verbally, 
then he wouldn't possess the concept. I, on the other hand, 
believe that if one of my pupils possesses a skill, then 
I should ascribe concepts to him, even if he can't give a 
linguistic account of what he is doing. In other words I 
don't believe that concepts are only involved in 
linguistic skills, I believe that there are non-linguistic 
skills that involve concept possession, for instance the 
skills of the musician and the (visual) artist. Cooper's 
language orientated bias is manifested when he writes 
(p.218): 
" ••• 1 am urging that a fruitful notion of concept be 
understood in terms of the sophisticated linguistic 
systems employed by certain subjects." 
But there are oddities in his account. He talks (p.216) 
about conceptual mistakes, and says that there is a 
difference between mistakes which arise from misapplying 
concepts and those which arise from faulty perception. But 
perception involves an element of judgement, I think that 
much is clear, and what is the point of trying to separate 
the process of conceptualisation from the element of 
judgement in perception? It seems to me that Cooper's 
notion of a concept is decidedly odd. Concepts are not 
essentially to do with perception or with a conscious 
being's ability to di!ferentiate and classify the content 
of his awareness. Cooper's concepts are essentially to do 
only with the ability to use language. He writes(p.218): 
"To say X 1s able to discriminate between A's and B's 
because he has the concepts of A and B 'reduces to' X 
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is able to discriminate between A's and B's because he is 
able to discriminate between A's and B's." 
And in saying this claims that the notion of a concept 
under the discriminatory view, is robbed of explanatory 
power. But under his account, "X has the concept of 
carburettor," reduces to something like, "X has the 
ability to use the word carburettor correctly within the 
relevant language game." All I have to say about this is 
that if I take my bike into a garage to have a 
malfunctioning carburettor seen to I want a mechanic 
who can put it right, not one who can converse for hours 
about the things. It might be the case that normally those 
who can put carburettors right can also talk for hours about 
them. But we've all met those who can talk for hours but 
can't actually do anything practical. And if I am put in 
contact with a highly skilled man who converses in 
monosyllabic grunts, I don't mind a bit. What I am trying 
to say here is that if concept acquisition is to do only 
with being able to talk using a sophisticated mode of 
language, then I, as a teacher, am not primarily interested 
in promoting concept acquisition (in this sense). If concept 
acquisition is to do with being able to make sense of some 
aspect of the world, then I am all for it. I believe, as 
I will argue later, that initiation into a particular 
mode of language may be the only way to acquire certain 
concepts. But I also believe that those concepts once 
acquired are useful only insofar as they make the world of 
, 
experience more intelligible, and not insofar as they make 
people into sophisticated users of language. I'he view I am 
trying to establish here is that language is a tool, as 
are other symbol systems. Cooper's mistake, it seems to me, 
is tnat he puts language into the central position in his 
theorizing instead of people. It is people who formulate 
and use language in public endevours, and it is their 
interests and purposes that shape the course of human 
knowledge. 
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It may be that I am being over zealous in my attack 
on Cooper. He does not, in fact, explicitly identify concept 
possession with the use of particular forms of language. 
It is most likely that his thesis is that use of certain 
forms of language is a necessary condition for concept 
acquisition. But, in fact, most of his arguments seem to be 
for a different thesis: that use of certain forms of 
language is necessary for the ascription of particular 
concepts. This thesis would, if his attack on the sceptical 
argument and on the discriminatory notion of a concept 
were accepted, combine with those arguments to establish 
\' 
a conceptual link between language use and concept possession 
I have already given my reasons for rejecting Cooper's attack. 
on the sceptical thesis. 
As for Cooper's claim that a move towards a discriminatory 
view of what concepts are robs the notion of a concept 
of explanatory force, I both agree and disagree with 
him. What such a move does is take the discussion behind 
the notion of a concept. It takes us to the level of 
explaining what a concept is, what we mean by concept 
possession. We can no longer explain a discriminatory 
ability in terms of concept possession. But what we can do 
is to look at how discriminatory abilities are acquired. 
By 'discriminatory ability' I don't only mean things like 
being able to sex chicks. I mean the ability to distinguish 
and classify the content of awareness, this being a logical 
pre-requisite of being able to do things like sex Chicks 
or sort letters. In the development of the discriminatory 
abilities (in the sense just given) of a conscious being, 
I suggest, there are three identifiable stages, two 
before, and one after the acquisition of language. I will 
now leave the diSCussion of Cooper's paper and look at 
these stages of conceptual development. 
Before I do that, however, I should clarify what I mean 
by a discriminatory/classifiatory notion of a concept. It 
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might be thought that taking concept application as 
constitutive of 'things' in our experience and taking con-
cepts to be involved in the classification of those 'things' 
are two different views of concepts. And as I have used 
both these views I might be thought guilty of a crucial 
inconsistency.But I think there is no inconsistency, merely 
the appearance of one. 
It seems to me that it is wrong to think of concept 
application merely as a sort of inert pigeon-holing, a 
slapping on of labels. Rather the identification of some 
'thing' as a 'thing' with particular significance is also 
a classification of the 'things' of experience. We classify 
the 'things' of our experience not only by the perceptual 
characteristics they have, but also by other significances 
they have for us. Dangerous animals and domestic animals 
is as much a classification as mammals, reptiles etc. Thus 
when I say that concepts are involved in classification 
this embodies the idea that concepts are what give 
significance to the 'things' given in experience. We 
classify things by their significance to us. This may seem 
a little vague at the moment, but will (I hope) become 
clearer when I begin to look at the problem of classifying 
signs. For now it will suffice to say that I take a 
statement like lip has a concept of X" (P a person, X an 
object of pes experience) to mean something like, "XiS 
have some significance for P that leads him to classify 
them together." The discussion of how such significances 
are built up will be a central theme throughout much of 
the rest of this thesis. 
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The Conceptual Development of the Pre-linguistic Child. 
In my discussion of perception I argued that in 
perceptual consciousness we have direct access to the 
world, and in my discussion of the private language 
argument I showed that the making of sameness 
judgements cannot be taken to be necessarily language 
dependant. Taken together these two assertions open up 
the way for a further contention - that it is a matter 
of (contingent) fact that we just do tend to classify 
our experience in certain basic ways, that there is a 
naturalistic basis to human modes of conceptualisation. 
The specification of this innate basis is more a matter 
for psychologists than philosophers, but I can 
speculate that things like hunger, warmth and even the 
proximity of other human beings may well be naturally · 
significant for us. It also seems that we must be able 
to pick out, in vision, object from ground (or at least 
distinguish object+ground from ground) without learning 
to do so, as if the world given in perceptual 
consciousness was not a world of distinct 'things' (in a 
theoretically neutral sense of 'thing') we could not 
acquire language in the way we do. And we must possess 
some similar innate ability with respect to sounds as 
here again an ability to separate sounds would make 
it impossible for us to even begin to pick out words 
from background noise. Bruner, in work that I will 
discuss more fully in a later section, has described a 
natural tendancy in babies to follow their mothers' 
direction of gaze and suggests that this is an element 
in the naturalistic basis for the shared reference that 
makes ostensive definition possible. But in order to do 
this the child must be able to distinguish its mother 
from her surroundings and also must be able to pick out 
the object its mother is looking at. The ability to 
acquire language, then, presupposes a naturalistic basis 
to conceptualisation, a basis which establishes some 
experiences as naturally significant and which provides 
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a basis for shared reference. Some maturation is 
necessary for these abilities to appear, but they cannot 
be learned. They provide the basis for learning, 
without there being some innate basis for the 
differentiation of our experience in terms of 
significance,a shared language would be impossible. 
This is the basement level of conceptualisation, the 
innate abilities which human beings must share if a 
public language is to be a possibility. 
The second level of conceptual development is that 
at which the 'things' given in our perceptual 
experience of the world gain significance by association 
with naturally significant states. As a speculative 
illustration, without usurping the empirical role of 
developmental psychologists, I suggest that at this level 
food gains significance for the child as 'that-which-
satisfies-hunger' and that his mother gains part of her· 
significance for the child as 'that-object-of-
experience-which-gives-food.' This example is certainly 
SimplistiC, a psychologist would have much more to say 
here, but all I am concerned to say, as a philosopher, 
is that the child could only begin to attach significance 
to the world as a result of 'things-in-the-world' 
impinging on him and 'webs of significance' being built 
up through the association of those 'things' with the 
naturally significant states which they cause or relieve 
and with each other. At this level, I suggest, the child 
may well not distinguish between its mother (in terms 
of her agency) and a door which causes pain when collided 
with. It seems pOSSible, given the animism which young 
children mainfest in their early language use (talking 
to dolls, attributing agency to inanimate objects etc.), 
that the assumption of agency is natural and that 
recognising some 'things' as inanimate objects is learned 
later- this again is a psychological issue rather than 
one for philosophy. 
The child learns to·recognise its mother as an 
object with speoial significance at this stage. At first 
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the child seems to pass through a stage at which any 
person, or person-like thing is expected to be a source 
of the food and comfort its mother brings. But it is 
clear that at some point during the pre-linguistic 
stage a child comes to recognise his mother as an 
individual insofar as he reacts in a special way to her 
appearance. This level is one at which the child's 
ability to discriminate between the objects of his 
experience in terms of their significance grows in 
complexity through interaction with the environment, 
both the physical world and the people around him. 
At this point it is a good idea to refer back to 
Urmson's reminder that recognition does not necessarily 
involve either remembering the occassion upon which the 
'thing' which is recognised was first encountered or 
identifying features which it has. I can recognise 
someone but not remember where from, and, more 
importantly, I can recognise people and objects without 
being able to give any description of them. Urmson gives 
an analysis of recognition that made it seem very lang-
uage dependant. but was unable to rule out pre-verbal 
recognition. I would argue that even for language users 
recognition doesn't involve an element of 'verbalisability'. i 
At the pre-linguistic level recognition appears as j.at 
something we can do. The classification involved is 
logically arbitrary, but this does not imply that it is 
established conventionally. Insofar as the law of gravity 
is a matter of contingent fact it too is logically 
arbitrary. But nobody would suggest that 11 was 
established conventionally. 
My main contention is that in interaction with his 
environment a baby builds up a primitive 'understanding' 
of different things in terms of their relations with 
naturally significant states. This rather crude 
conceptual framework cannot be specified linguistically 
b.t its existence is evinced by the child's· responding 
differently as different 'things' are (eg.) introduced 
into its field of vision. 
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In perceptual consciousness the child is given access 
to a world of different things. This must be so for if 
at any point the child could not separate (eg.) his 
teddy bear from its surroundings he could never learn to 
do so. Even if the toy's proximity caused(in some sense) 
a feeling of comfort, say, the child would not be aware 
of something in the world associated with the feeling, so 
thenaturally significant response to the world could 
not provide a basis for giving the world significance. 
But initially the things-in-the-world of which the child 
is perceptually aware are undifferentiated in the sense 
that none of them have any significance for him. It is 
precisely through impinging on the Child, eliciting 
naturally significant responses, becoming associated 
with the generation or relief of naturally significant 
states, sensations, feelings and emotions, that things 
in the world gain significance, become classed together in 
terms of the sorts of inner responses they elicit. Were 
there no such natural responses to experience, no 
naturally significant states, the child could not begin 
classifying the things given in perception as things of 
different sorts. 
So it must be a matter of natural (ie. unlearned) 
fact that the child has access to the world of 'things' in 
perceptual experience and that the world elicits (passive) 
responses from the child in terms of inner states which 
just are significant for him. Unless this much is innate 
the child could never acquire language. And the world to 
which the child has access must be the public world. If 
the child didn't see his teddy bear when his mother 
holds it up and says 'Teddy' then ostensive definition 
wouldn't work. Similarly if the child saw a pattern of 
several colours where his mother sees uniform red then 
he could never acquire the ability to use colour 
language by ostension. It might be thought odd that my 
examples of innate perceptual abilities are mostly to 
do with ViSion, after all congenitally blind people 
manage to acquire language (as do some who are born deat). 
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Vision is clearly an important sense, and one which 
plays an important part in language acquisition in 
sighted children (as Bruner shows), but it is not 
essential. Similarly hearing is important for normal 
children. What seems to be the case is that perceptually 
handicapped children have to use other strategies to 
make up, to some extent, for the deficiency which 
constitutes their handicap. A blind child must depend 
on touch and a deaf child must depend on sight (writing, 
lip reading) and touch (the use of a balloon against 
the lips as a means of letting the child experience 
phonemes). But such cases don't undermine my 
argument, they simply require me to acknowledge that 
we have senses other than sight and that we must have a 
certain amount of innate organisation of things like 
touch and hearing (and probably even smell). I find it 
hard to even speculate on what might be involved here, 
but it must be the case that each sense must be innately 
organised in certain ways. It seems very plausible to 
suggest that shared reference for a blind child and his 
mother would be achieved most straightforwardly simply 
by putting the object referred to in the child's hands, 
though it would be for a psychologist to say how 
'touch recognition' works. It also seems likely that 
for a blind person the first steps in language would be 
limited to what can be touched directly and that many 
referring words (eg. clouds, red •• ) would have to be 
learned later in terms of their roles within language 
games as, for an unsighted person, the potential range 
of words that can be taught by ostension is severely 
limited. But it still remains a fact that language 
acquisition occurs and that this presupposes much 
about the child. In particular it presupposes a public 
world to which the child's perception has access as 
much as an adult. The child doesn't attach as much 
significance to that world, cannot pick out 
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as much significant detail, but the world is there for 
a child as much as for a fully fledged language using 
adult and must be if he is to acquire language in the 
way we do. 
Learning begins when the child begins to classify 
the 'things' of perceptual experience in terms of their 
associations with naturally significant states and with 
each other. This is the second level of conceptualisation 
in which 'webs' of significance are built up, centred 
on the child, the world acquiring significance in terms 
of its relationship with the child. At this level people, 
particularly the mother (in general the caretaker), gain 
special significance for the child because of their 
importance as feeders, nappy changers, comforters, etc., 
although it may well be that other human beings are 
naturally significant for babies - this again is an 
issue for empirical research by psychologists, not one 
which philosophy can deal with a priori. In this stage 
different 'things', including different sorts of 
behaviour from his mother, gain significance in terms 
of being nice (ie. something the child seeks to elicit) 
or nasty (something the child seeks to avoid). This sort 
of distinction is crucial in moving towards initiation 
into publicly defined areas of conduct with conventionally 
defined rules for appropriateness of behaviour as such 
crude distinctions give us a basis for reward and 
punishment which are central to the process of 
socialisation in young children. 
During his pre-linguistic conceptual development it 
may well be the case that there is a period during which 
a child does not recognise individuals as discrete things 
enduring through time. The child's mother, for instance, 
does not have special significance from the word go as 
Shaffer and Emerson's work shows. The mother gains 
significance only after a time, at first any person is 
reacted to in similar ways. Even when the child begins 
to show attachment to specific people it may be that 
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the child reacts to them, on different occassions, as 
if what we see as the same person is a different member 
of the same class. Piaget has shown that, for young 
children, out of sight is literally out of mind. There is 
a stage at which a watch with which the child is 
playing is not looked for when it is hidden under the 
blanket on which the child is seated. Only at a later 
stage does the child look for the watch, and only then 
can we assume Ithat the child regards things as enduring 
through time. Until this stage is reached the child may 
not conceive of the same (from our point of view) 'thing' 
as any more than another member of the same class. But 
insofar as there comes a stage when the relevant response 
is elicited only on the reappearance of the same thing 
(the same watch, the child's mother) we must admit that 
recognition of individual's does occur in pre-linguistic 
children. And this is so even if the child manifests 
no behaviour which evinces an understanding of things 
enduring through time even when not within his field of 
viSion. 
What is lacking here is not the ability to recognise 
indiViduals but rather knowledge of physical objects. The 
chilo can recognise individuals insofar as the class of 
things which elicits particular responses has (from our 
point of View) only one member, but as not yet realised 
that if he sees something at time toand again at time t, 
(t, later than t.) t then it was somewhere between those 
times. This understanding of things as enduring 
through time is not present even during the early stages 
of language use and it may be that it is learned with 
language, as a presupposition built into language which 
is justified Simply by the fact that we know that even 
if we can't see the pen with which we were writing a 
few minutes ago it must be somewhere. That this is a 
fact is demonstrated by the fact that looking for the 
pen usually results in our finding it, even if it did 
fall in the settee. But such knowledge is not necessary 
for the acquisition of language. The discrimination of 
'things' of various sorts and of certain individuals, 
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those that are important for the child, is a necessary 
pre-requisite for language acquisition even if the 
childs understanding of the nature of those 'things· is 
crude compared to the public modes of understanding 
we acquire through language. 
Language brings with it a better understanding of 
the world, better in the sense that viewing the world in 
terms of the public conceptual frameworks built into 
language makes it more comprehensible, more efficiently 
handable. But the child must acquire a pre-linguistic 
'understanding' of the world in order for it to be poss-
ible to initiate him into language. And this pre-linguistic 
development in conceptual framework is not culture-
specific. Insofar as a child belongs to one race 
(genetically speaking) and born into one culture can be 
transplanted, reared by parents of another race in 
another culture (as with the Vietnamese babies adopted 
by American couples at the end of that war), and can 
acquire the language of his new home, the naturalistic 
basis for language acquisition must be common to all 
humanity. 
The most important point I have tried to make here is 
that a certain amount of conceptual development through 
learning is a necessary pre-requisite ~ language 
acquisition. If a child could not learn to classify the 
'things' of which he is perceptually aware in some ways, 
particularly in learning to recognise important 
individuals and the significance of .certain of the vocal 
noises those individuals make, then language acquisition 
could never get off the ground. Repetition is an 
important element in language acquisition, and if the 
child didn't make certain basic sameness judgements 
as a matter of natural fact, then no new sameness 
judgements could be made. Unless (this is a speculative 
illustration again) the child recognised being fed as 
significant it could not come to recognise its mother 
saylng (eg) 'Dindlns,' as a Sign of impending food and 
111 
could not later come to use 'Dindins' as a way of getting 
food. this, again, is overly simplistic and later 
discussion will give a more subtle account of what goes 
on in language acquisition. 
For now, though, I am concerned with arguing that 
a certain amount of pre-linguistic conceptualisation is 
a necessary pre-requisite for the occurance of 
.': I,. .. 
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language acquisition. Talk of pre-linguistic concepts is ;1 ~ 
not empty. Further,as my arguments in earlier discussion 
have shown, talk of concepts is to do with the ability 
of conscious beings to distinguish, in terms of their 
significance, between experiences, both of their 
perceptual experience of the world and their experience 
of inner states, emotions, feelings and sensations. 
Mechanistic accounts of 'conceptualisation' just are 
inadequate. 
I have now dealt with two of the three levels of 
conceptualisation. The third is that of linguistically 
formulated concepts. It is at this level that concepts 'have 
become physical object concepts rather than formal 
concepts etc. What I say here will be incomplete as I will 
confine myself to a brief outline of some of the ways 
language works. This is because this part of my thesis 
has been designed to establish, through the consideration 
of the acquisition of language, that the organisation of 
mind is not wholly a function of language. That language, 
and other symbol systems, playa part in the organisation 
of mind, our ways of looking, is something 1 accept whole 
hearted1y, and in the rest of what I write the explication 
of this process will be dealt with at length. Hut I also 
hold that language and other symbols are essentially 
tools. We can be given a plane, say, and taught to use it, 
and the nature of the plane will dictate the skills we 
acqUire, what we will be able to do with it. But this 
constraint 1s not absolute. If we want to do something that 
our plane won't allow us to do we can actually manufacture 
something that will do the job. I believe that our relation 
I ; 
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with publicly defined symbol systems is similar, they 
constrain what we can say and what we can find out about 
the world by directing our attention to certain features of 
our experience. But again, this constraint is not absolute, 
if there is something we wish to express, some relation we 
wish to know more about, we can forge new symbolic forms 
as tools by means of which we can further our 
understanding. 
Put briefly, my understanding of the role of language 
in concept formation is that once we have acquired a 
particular language, our concepts are 'fixed' (but not 
immutably) by the grammar of that language. The grammatical 
form of a language, the tacitly formulated rules which 
govern the use and meaning of words tand the relation 
between use and meaning will be discussed later), embody 
assumptions. And the assumptions embodied in different 
languages are not the same. 
Cooper, in his chapter on the ~apir/Wharf hypothesis 
in 'Philosophy and the Nature of Language,' has argued 
convincingly that grammatical differences between 
languages don't establish conceptual differences between 
the cultures using those languages. But he has also pointed 
out that, by looking at the structure of the various 
language games a culture uses, conceptual differences 
can be found. The Hopi Indians of North America, for 
instance, have no language games which directly 
correspond to our ways of talking about space and time. 
Instead of talking about the future the Hopi talk in 
terms of what can be hoped for, and the past is what 
cannot be hoped for. Thus the Hopi can talk in terms of 
time, but for them time is a mental concept. Similarly 
the Hopi have no • pure , spatial concepts, instead they 
talk about distance in terms of the complexity and 
magnitude of the tasks needed to span it. 
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The point here is that language is theory laden. 
Linguistic concepts define a way of looking at the world, 
and different languages embody different world views. 
But this doesn't mean that translation is impossible. 
Although the English language is structured in a way 
which makes it easier to talk of space and time in one 
particular way, it is possible, if rather labourious, 
to make the language express the Hopi way of looking. 
Put simply it seems that human beings tend to conceive 
the world in the way which is easiest to express using 
the language of the culture into which they are born. But 
this fact does not imply that an individual's native 
language acts as a straight-jacket on his mind. One of 
Wittgenstein's main point is Philosophical Investigations 
is that we should be very wary of the grammatical traps 
our native language sets for us. His whole discussion 
of sensations shows that by following grammatical rules 
we arrive at an untenable view of what sensation is. Thus 
although language embodies assumptions about the world 
the reflexivity of language, our ability to use 
language to discuss language, enables us to 'dig out' and 
question those presuppositions, and hence we can change 
language, arrive at new ways of looking at the world which 
can replace older established ones. 
The power of language lies precisely in the fact that 
it enables new statements about objects of experience 
to be made, and understood, independantly of our having 
direct experience of them. Thus I can know a great deal 
about, say, New York, without ever having been there. 
Similarly new concepts, new ways of classifying experience, 
can be formulated linguistically and then tested against 
experience to see if they fit the world. Our experience 
of language itself can enable us to acquire new concepts, 
new ways ot looking. Fhilosophy and literature are examples 
ot this. 
114 
Language then, is a very powerful tool. But so too, I 
believe, are other symbolic forms - painting and 
sculpture and music. And all of these are symbolic forms, 
I will argue, and are also manifestations of mind. They 
are created by people with shared interests 
and they are created with the aim of expressing and 
clarifying our experience of the world in which we live, 
a world which includes people who are manipulaters of 
publicly defined symbol systems. 
In this first part of my thesis I have looked at a great 
deal of philosophy of mind in order to try and give a 
useful picture of language acquisition. What 1 have 
concluded is that if language is acquired in the way it 
appears to be, then we cannot keep on looking at concept 
acquisition, the development of mind, as though it is the 
same thing as the acquisition of linguistic skills. The 
acquisition of sophisticated linguistic ability is an 
important way of acquiring concepts. But it is not the 
only way of acquiring concepts. If it were, then there'would 
be no way of acquiring language. And similar arguements, I 
think it is fairly obvious, apply to the problem of 
initiation into other symbol systems. 
My conclusion is that the relation between mind and 
language lor any other symbol system) is complex, but that 
mind is prior. We must accept, I suggest, that symbol 
systems are tools of people, are manifestations of mind 
formulated to further understanding of those aspects of the 
world that people find important for whatever reasons. 
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Signs and Stimuli 
In this section I will attempt to establish a useful 
distinction between signs and stimuli. More precisely I 
will try to set up such a distinction based upon what I 
have already written. There will be an element of 
stipulation in the distinction I make, but I believe this 
to be unavoidable. I will try to show that the use of the 
word 'stimulus', and related terms, in ordinary language 
and its specialist use by psychologists are both rather 
imprecise. This imprecision in usage, I think, could be 
dangerously confusing. I will stipulate in an effort to 
avoid confusion and my stipulation will be justified insofar 
as a possible confusion is avoided. 
For some time now, within the British Analytic 
tradition, conceptual analysis has been regarded as the 
appropriate tool by which meanings can be established, 
thus avoiding the stipulative definition of key terms. 
It seems to me, however, that both the ordinary language 
and psychological useage of the term 'stimulus' is so 
imprecise as to make the picking out of primary usages 
las opposed to secondary or parasitic usages) nothing more 
than a stipulative exercise in disguise. I choose, 
therefore, to stipulate overtly and to justify my 
stipulation in terms of usefulness. I will try to 
distinguish between signs and stimuli in a way that is 
useful in that it minimises the risk of confusion of the 
sort that arises when the difference between mechanistic and 
mentalistic modes of explanation is misunderstood. I have, 
of course, already discussed the results of such 
confusion at some length. 
In ordinary language there is nothing at all wrong 
with an expression like, Ita stimulating conversation," 
or with a sentence like, "Reading Philosophical 
Investigations acted as the stimulus for my interest 
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in the philosophy of language." The conversation would 
be understood has having started off the speaker on 
some new line(s) of thought, and it would be understood 
that my reading of Fhilosophical Investigations started 
off my interest in the philosophy of language. I think 
that ~o understand the word 'stimulus' in ordinary 
language as meaning whatever started off some line of 
thought, interest, or course of action is quite proper. 
This interpretation of stimulus is neither particularly 
interesting, nor is it very informative from a 
philosophical point of view. It carries with it no 
theoretical implications of the sort a philosopher 
would wish to discover. But that doesn't mean that using 
the word in this way is, or should be, regarded as improper 'I 
in the context of everyday conversation. Our use of lang-
uage need only be as precise as the context demands, 
and in ordinary language, as opposed to specialist modes 
of language used in the systematic disciplines, we have 
little need to use language in a pendantic and rigorously 
precise manner. That the meaning of the word 'stimulus' 
as used in ordinary language is vague is of no great 
importance to us as ordinary language users; it is 
sufficiently precise for our everyday purposes. 
To say that our usage of the word 'stimulus' in 
ordinary language is imprecise is not to make a damning 
accusation. But to say that a psychologist's use of the 
same word is imprecise ~ to make such an accusation. 
'Stimulus'is not only a word in ordinary language, it is 
also an important technical term in psychology. And 
demands are properly to be made on the use age of 
technical terms which are improper when made on the usages 
of ordinary language. In other words there are good 
reasons for demanding rigorous precision in the use of 
the technical terms of a systematic discipline, demands 
which would be mere pedantry if made on ordinary language 
usage. ln later discussion I will argue that such 
demands are only proper when the specialist modes of 
language are designed to be informative. Precise ~finition 
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of terms is useful in terms of a desire to express 
information unambiguously. In other contexts ambiguity is 
desirable - it is an important element in aesthetic 
expression. Insofar as psychological language is designed 
first and foremost to be informative, to say that 
psychologists are imprecise in their use of the word 
'stimulus' as a technical term is to accuse them of giving 
imprecise information. 
In my discussion of stimulus/response explanations of 
behaviour I argued that the relation between stimulus and 
response stood in need of explanation in terms of 
something 'inner'. I also said that for many behaviourist 
psychologists this 'inner' component is regarded as 
physiological, they seek to maintain their position by 
making their theories essentially mechanistic. This sort of 
approach is common in psychological literature, the first 
section of B.A. Farrell's article, 'A Psychological Look 
at some problems of perception,' (R.I.P. Lectures '68-69), 
gives a survey of work done on the psychology of 
perception by experimental psychologists and physiologists. 
Dennet's book, 'Content and Consciousness' is, of course, an 
attempt to give philosophical respectability to the 
attempted reduction of psychology to physiology. But many 
behaviourist psychologists have not made any move towards 
adopting an account of this 'inner' component, physiological 
or otherwise. They still insist on trying to explain 
behaviour as resulting from an organism being exposed to 
a fthing-in-the-world' which is the stimulus. Rachlin, on 
p.174 of 'Introduction to Modern Behaviourism' seems to 
take this line when he writes: 
"It is arguable whether the concepts of excitation 
and inhibition are necessary to mediate between 
environment and behaviour. As behaviourists, we 
would prefer to relate stimuli such as the green 
and white keys directly to the organism's behaviour." 
Now I am confident that such theorists are wrong, that by 
refusing to take account of the 'inner' factor they open 
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their accounts to fatal objections, and I have given 
some of the possible objections. But until these 
psychologists make their theoretical choices it is 
difficult to say what they mean by stimulus. There are 
two main ways in which the 'inner' component in the 
stimulus/response relation could be characterized. 
The first way is that which has proved most popular 
with those American Behaviourists who have accepted the 
need to characterize the 'inner' component. This is to 
adopt the view that an organism ~human or otherwise) is 
properly to be characterized as nothing more than a 
physiological mechanism. On this view the stimulus is a 
thing-in-the-world which when it impinges upon the 
organism, causes tmechanistically) an initial stimulation 
which, after being processed through the circuitry of the 
organisms nervous system tcentral and peripheral) causes, 
again mechanistically, certain gross movements. This is 
a view for which identification of the stimulus depends on 
prior identification of the 'caused' behaviour. It is also 
a view which has no way of dealing with awareness. I have 
already argued against this view and rejected it as being 
inadequate for a characterization of human behaviour. 
But it is a view which is held and the meaning of the 
term 'stimulus', as used by proponents of this view is 
sufficiently clear for objections to be raised against 
mechanistic accounts. 
Although I have rejected this approach as an inadequate 
explanation of human behaviour in general, it is an adequate 
method of characterizing such things as the knee jerk 
reflex. It seems to me that the use of the term 'stimulus' 
is best restricted to such contexts. 
In what I have already written I have used the word 
'stimulus' as if it has mechanistic connotations and 
will continue to so so. In other words, for the sake of 
lucidity, I will use the word 'stimulus' to denote some 
event which produces a specifiable response from an 
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organism mechanistically, something which has a natural 
causal efficacy by virtue of the physiological nature of 
the responding organism. 
I, 
if 
I believe this usage of the term 'stimulus' to be in 'I 
keeping with the modern psychological usage insofar as 
that usage has been established by psychologists who 
have adopted a mechanistic view of the organism involved 
in a stimulus/response relation. But, as I have pointed 
out, not all psychologists who would describe themselves 
as behaviourists have made this move. 
This brings me to the second possible move for those 
behaviourists needing to give an account of the 'inner' 
factor involved in the stimulus/response relation. Such 
a psychologist could choose to regard a stimulus as an 
object of experience and could say that the animal under 
observation behaves, or acts, in particular ways because 
he perceives the stimulus. This theory would be causal 
in much the same way as the causal theory of knowledge 
although this would not necessarily be mechanistic 
causality {and, could notbe i~ my ~rguments against 
mechanism have any forcel 
It would be as well for me to say something here 
about the notion of mechanistic causation and about an 
alternative concept of causality involving agency. 
Mechanistic causality is concerhed exclusively with the 
characterisation of events in extensional terms. A system 
is characterized in terms of discrete events, the 
interfaces between those events being explained by the 
notion of mechanistic causality. Thus a billiard ball 
moving over a surface strikes a second ball at rest and 
causes it to move, and the results of such a collision 
are amenable to description in mathematical terms. The 
stationary ball begins to move because it is struck by 
the moving ball and this 'because' is causal. Causation 
is an assumption built into a way of looking. We see ball 
A moving, then ball ~striking the stationary ball B, then 
" 
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we see ball B moving, and we write in that ball B moves 
because ball A strikes it. Next we construct a mathematical 
model to describe the causation, one that predicts the 
movement of B after being struck by A, and if we are 
successful in producing sach a model then we take our 
assumption of mechanistic causality to be justified. This 
notion of causation is basically a collision model. An 
event impinges upon the world and other events are caused. 
Mechanism, as a theory of human behaviour, attempts to 
explain all events, including those normally thought of as 
resulting from human action, in terms of this Icollision' 
model of causality and hence fully describable in terms 
of physics (or more precisely, mechanics). 
An alternative model of causality is one which is 
designed to deal with the actions of agents and which, 
because it has awareness written into it, is not 
amenable topurely existentional description. In a sentence 
like, 'I went downstairs because I heard the ·phone ring,' 
the 'because' again can be thought of as causal. Hut here 
the extensional characterization of the events will 
not give a useful story. We have to include reference 
to the individual involved being aware, of recognising 
part of the content of his perceptual awareness as being 
the ringing of the 'phone and of his going to answer 
the 'phone for some reason. Nobody has to answer a 'phone 
and frequently people don't: 
When dealing with conscious agents we have to take 
into account such things as their reasons for acting as 
they do. 1f an answer-phone device is rigged up it will 
go into motion when the 'phone rings, because the 'phone 
rings, because its physical nature is such that the 
electrical impulses of the ringing 'phone switch it on -
this!! mechanistic causality. But with people there is 
the fact of their agency which 'sits between' events 
which they become aware of and the actions they perform so 
that even when there is a normal course of action, such 
as answering a 'phone that rings, there is a possibility 
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that there will be reasons why that normal course of action 
should not be taken. In such contexts talk of stimuli as 
if they have natural causal efficacy (in a mechanistic 
sense) is inappropriate, as I have argued already. 
The use of the word 'stimulus' in accounts of human 
behaviour seems decidedly odd. It would seem better to 
discard the collision-model of causality and say simply 
that the person acts in such and such a way because the 
state of affairs he perceives has a certain significance 
for him. And this significance mayor may not have been 
learned (although it most probably has). Thus the word 
'stimulus', if its use were insisted upon, would mean 
something like, 'something that has significance for 
somebody' (this will be discussed further in later sections) 
And the word used by philosophers from Pierce to Merleau 
Ponty to denote something which has significance for 
somebody is • sign. , This is the usage I intend to adopt. 
But even so we can still talk of causality in the context 
of Signs, but it is a causality which involves more than 
the natural causal efficacy of events in an extensional 
sense. This notion of causality involves reference to 
the awareness and agency of individuals. In this sense 
event \E) caused a person's (p) action (A) only in the 
sense that piS awareness of E under some description 
(accurate or not) constitutes all or part of pta reasoqa 
for performing A. 
In summary, the distinction I intend to adopt taCitly 
is as follows: a stimulus is something which causes 
certain specifiable motions in an organism by virtue 
of the nature of an organism as a physiological mechanism. 
It has a natural causal efficacy in the production of 
those events. A Sign, on the other hand, is object of 
perceptual awareness which has significance for somebody. 
In particular contexts people may tend to act in certain 
ways because they perceive particular signs, but there is 
no necessity about this. In subsequent sections I will 
say much more about signs. They are, after all, a central 
concern of this thesis. 
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SignS. 
In 1897 ~eirce wrote: 
"A sign, or representation, is something which 
stands to somebody for something in some respect or 
capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates 
in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or 
perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it 
creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. 
The sign stands for something, its object. It stands 
for that object, not in all respects, but in 
reference to a sort of idea, which I have called 
the ground of the representamen." 
We have here a tri-partite relation between a sign, its 
ob~ect tie. what it denotes) and the interpretant which 
is,according to Peirce, some sort of mental entity. The 
interpretant is a problematic entity, it is some sort of 
mental sign or a mental image of the actual sign. It is 
precisely the sort of artefact that Ryle (in 'Concept of 
Mind') pictures as sitting quietly in the 'museum' of 
the mind waiting to be viewed by the 'ghost-in-the-
machine'. As such the interpretant, as a postulate, has 
no explanatory power. It simply doesn't say anything 
about how signs can have significance for people, it merely 
pushes the problem of significance back into the problem 
of how the mental ~efact can have significance and 
constitutes the first step in a well known infinite 
regression. 
Similarly Peirce's notion that the significance of a 
sign is that it stands for something, its object, is also 
problematic. In 1910 he wrote: 
"The sign can only represent the object and tell 
about it. It cannot furnish acquaintance with or 
recognition of that Object; for that is what is 
meant in this volume by the Object of a sign; namely 
that with which it presupposes an acquaintance in 
order to convey some further information concerning 
it. No doubt there will be readers who will say they 
cannot comprehend this. They think a Sign need not 
relate to anything otherwise known, and can make 
neither head nor tail of the statement that every 
sign must relate to such an object. But if there 
be anything that conveys information and yet has 
absolutely no relation no reference to anything 
with which the person to whom it conveys the 
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information has, when he comprehends that 
information, the slightest acquaintance, direct or 
indirect - and a very strange sort of information 
that would be - the vehicle of that sort of information 
is not, in this volume, called a Sign." (p.100) 
It isn't easy to get at what Peirce mea.ns by 
'acquaintance' here, particularly as he talks about the 
possibility of acquaintance being indirect. But it seems 
clear that, for Peirce, the significance of the sign lies 
in its relation to the object it denotes and depends upon 
the sign's 'reader' being acquainted with .the object 
denoted. And, perhaps, this acquaintance with the object 
can be either by direct perception or indirect, via 
verbal description, although Peirce doesn't make this clear. 
Nowhere in his account, however, does Peirce deal with 
the significance of logical operations like 'and' or 'not'. 
And in general his account seems to be adaptable, in the 
context of language, only to the meaning of words, not 
sentences. There is some justification, I think, for the 
suggestion that Peirce's account is too much tied up 
with a meaning as reference approach, although the refer-
ence is via mind, the Sign/object link being mediated by 
the interpreta nt. What is lacking is a grasp of richness 
of language, of how we do many things besides referring 
and paSSing on information by linguistic means. 
Peirce also seems to have tended towards Russell's 
mistake of confusing referential statements with 
existential statements. Also in 1910 he wrote: 
"The Objects - for a Sign may have any number of 
them - may each be a single known existing thing 
or a thing believed formerly to have existed, or 
expected to exist, or a col1ation of such things, 
or a known quality or relation or fact, which single 
Object may be a collection, or whole of parts, or 
it may have some other mode of being, such as some 
act permitted where being does not prevent its 
negation from being equally permitted, or something 
of a general nature desired, required, or invariably 
found under certain general circumstances." (p.101) 
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This passage suggest very strongly that the object 
denoted by a sign was seen by Peirce as existing or 
having existed or about to exist in some sense. In 
particular his remark about the objects of signs perhaps 
having, " •• some other mode of being," suggests that he 
was committed to the view that the significance of a 
sign depends upon it being related, via the interpretant, 
to some state of affairs which has being, which is, ie. 
which in some sense exists. It may be, of course, that I 
am misinterpreting Peirce here. But, quite simply, I can 
imagine no other interpretation for his remarks. The 
problems arising from this sort of approach to the 
analysis of the significance of signs tie. meaning) will 
be dealt with at length in later discussion. 
It is difficult to say whether the weaknesses I have 
pointed out are, in fact, weaknesses in Peirce's conception 
or whether they are flaws which I have read in to his 
account. The interpretant is clearly a dangerous postulate 
and must be written out of my own account. Similarly I 
must not make the mistakes of confusing meaning with 
reference and of assuming that reference implies existence 
for reasons that will be dealt with later in Borne detail. 
But it is difficult to pin Peirce down on these latter 
two points, his account is none too clear on them. Each 
time he moves towards these views he seems to qualify . 
them, to draw back. But I myself must avoid them completely 
and approach the analysis of signs in a different way. AS 
a preliminary offering I will say that a sign is something 
that has significance for somebody. ~hat significance 
may be that it refers to something lexistent or not), but 
signs have other significances besides reference. Many 
of our linguistic utterences, for example, are involved 
with the expression of feelings. When someone curses 
after hitting his thumb with a hammer, he is using a Sign, 
but that use is not to be unders·tood. in terms of 
reference. Similarly, logical operators create problems 
for referential views. 'Red' may well be analysable 
referentially, but 'not red' creates unsurmountable 
problems for this approach. 
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In later discussion I will attempt to deal with two main 
problems; that of giving a useful classification of types 
of sign and that of giving an account of the sorts of 
significance which signs have for us. But for now I want 
to draw attention to some general features of signs. This 
will, by making the nature of signs a little clearer, 
facilitate later discussion. 
Nelson Goodman, in his book, 'Languages of Art', makes 
a distinction between a symbol and its inscription, which 
is to say that what we see (or hear) is the inscription. 
Thus 'dog' and 'DOG' are two different inscriptions of 
the same word (symbol), the spoken word being another 
form of inscription. I want to extend this description 
to cover all signs. I will use the word 'instance' and talk 
about the instances of a particular sign being what we 
perceive. This may sound like a quibble, but in fact it is 
a useful distinction to make. 
If we take an example like, say, black clouds being a 
sign of rain, the sign/instance distinction can be both 
explained and used to reach useful conclusions. The first 
remark to be made must be that, "Black clouds are a sign 
of rain," is a rather crude approach towards a 
meteorological theory. It states that an event of one 
kind, the appearance of clouds of a certain sort, is 
often followed by an event of another kind, rain. To 
describe it as a meteorological theory is gOing too far, 
it is not a finding which results from systematic enquiry 
(and meteorology is a systematic discipline) it is a rule 
of thumb and it is not particularly reliable, but it 
is reliable enough to warrant taking a raincoat or an 
umbrella when going out when such clouds are about. 
But the clouds which we recognise as signs of rain are 
not of one specifiable colour or of a specifiable shape. 
We expect rain when we see a sky of uniform grey, we also 
expect rain when we see a mass of almost-black cumulus 
rolling towards us across a blue sky. My point is that 
we don't recognise only one sort of cloud as a potential 
bringer of rain. We recognise easily distinguishable 
types of cloud formations 
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as belonging to the single class of rain cloud, just as 
we identify the word 'dog' whether it is printed, spoken 
out loud, or displayed in lights. This is to say that 
objects of experience which we have no difficulty in 
distinguishing from each other are nevertheless classified 
together as instances of the same sign, whether that 
sign be rain clouds or the word dog. 
It is clear that this grouping together of very different 
things as instances of a sign cannot be explained in 
terms of similarities between the objects of experience 
themselves. Rather those things are grouped together by 
virtue of their having the same significance for us in some 
respect. In other words we should not make the mistake 
of generally identifying a sign with a thing of a certain 
sort ~ie. having certain physical/experiential 
characteristics), although in some cases, for instance 
road signs, this is the case. In general we must regard a 
sign as being the class of objects of experience which 
are united by virtue of the fact that, in some respect, 
they have the same significance for us. And the members of 
the class which constitute the sign are the instances of 
the sign. 
This formulation needs a little clarification. It 
should be apparent that the object of experience/sign 
correspondence will not be 1:1. The same object of 
experience might constitute an instance of more than one 
sign. A car's brake lights, when they go on, tell us that 
the car is braking. It need not be the case that, as the 
car brakes, red lights go on at the rear, but the 
conventions governing motor vehicles dictate that cars be 
built that way. At the same time that a car's brake lights 
act as a conventionally defined sign lie. a symbol), 
their mere existence signifies something about the state 
of our technology, and for a visiting bug-eyed monster 
to gather information investigating the technology in 
domestic use on our world would constitute 'reading' 
such things as brake lights as signs of a quite different 
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sort. This suggests that signs should not be thought of 
as things-in-the-world. The instances of signs are 'in 
the world', but their status as instances of a particular 
sign (or signs) is dependant on the'way of reading' 
being used, on the significance that is read into them by 
someone who is making use of a point of view. Here is not 
the place to go into how things acquire the significance 
for us that they have and how, when we recognise a 
thing as a member of a certain class of things,we also 
'read into' it significance beyond what is immediate to 
our senses. I have already (in the section on perception) 
touched on this question and will come back to it later. 
For now all I want to observe is that the identification 
of an object of experience as an instance of a sign depends 
on the use of a way of looking at it. 
The final question to be answered about signs here is 
that of whether a sign is a sign in some objective way or 
whether a sign is only a sign when it is being 'read,' 
by someone. lt might be thought that, on an account like 
the one outlined here, to call something a sign, or an 
instance of a sign, is to say nothing more than that 
someone has just ~ead a particular significance into it. 
This is a question that will only be dealt with fully 
when I discuss the subject of the significance of signs 
(ie. meaning) which I will be doing later. But I will 
attempt to give a brief outline of my ideas here. 
The key notion for the notion of a sign is that of 
reading significance into objects of experience. This is 
to say that identifying an object of experience as an 
object of a certain sort is to identify it as an object 
with a particular significance. And that significance is 
built up through the relationship between particular 
objects of experience and the interests of human beings. 
This is simply a repetition of my point that a sign must 
be thought of as the class of its instances, those 
instances being classified together because, from some 
point of view, they have the same significance for us. 
Thus, identifying something as a member of a particular 
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class of 'thing' is to recognise it as having a 
particular significance. And we often identify things visu-
ally which have functional significance, for instance 
we recognise a chair and hence (if we are right) know we 
can sit on it. The fact that something might be intended 
for a chair that doesn't look very chair-like is not 
very important. Absolute certainty about anything is 
unavailable in human life, but we are right often 
enough to justify our confidence in dealing with the 
world. 
Now this identification of an object of experience as 
an object of a certain sort is what I have called, in 
earlier discussion, conceptualisation. And concepts are 
public. By 'public' here I mean 'interpersonal' and what I 
am saying is that the ways in which we classify the 'things' 
of our experience is not a matter of personal whim, but 
rather a matter of interpersonal agreement. At the linguis-
tic level this agreement is ensured by the use of a common 
language between members of a form of life, and all 
languages embody ways of classifying objects of experience 
although there is not always a 1:1 correspondence 
between the classification systems of different languages. 
At the pre-linguistic level, psychologists ~eg. Bruner, 
of whom more later) tell us that shared reference is 
gained through non-verbal communicative interaction. 
And, as I have already argued, that fact that we can come 
to share a language and communicate using it presupposes 
that human beings by their nature must find certain 
experiences naturally significant. At this level agreement 
is not conventional as in language, but rather it is a 
matter of genetic fact land here genetic should not be 
taken has having connotations of the merely physiological 
or biochemical.) 
What all this leads to is the fact that identifying 
signs depends on the use of an interpersonally established 
way of looking, a system of classification arrived at 
by people with shared interests. Thus, although people 
formulate these ways of looking, it is possible to talk 
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about particular ways of looking, for instance those of 
the systematic disciplines, without asking whether a 
particular person on a particular occassion made use of 
it. And if an object of experience, under a particular 
way of looking, would be read as a sign ofacertain sort, 
then it is perfectly reasonable to call it a sign of that 
sort without reference to whether or not people have 
read it as such. In other words the staUE of an object 
of experience as an instance of a particular sign depends 
upon its having a particular significance under some way 
of looking and not upon the question of whether this or 
that person in fact looked at it that way. 
From here it follows that we can properly be said to 
inhabit a world of signs, signs defined by ways of 
looking built up by human beings. As our ways of looking 
become more sophisticated the world around us becomes 
more significant, more pregnant with meaning. ~t seems 
to me that one important aim of educators must be to make 
the world of experience more significant for our pupils, 
so that they see that the evidence of their senses has 
import which goes far beyond what is obvious. And further, 
we should surely make it ,clear that this ability to go 
beyond what is straight forwardly apparant is no 
mystical activity, but is a human activity, and one 
which takes many forms. 
Bearing these remarks in mind I will now attempt to 
establish a useful classification of signs and then will 
go on to say more about the problem of how the world 
becomes a world of signs for us, how signs gain 
significance. 
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The classification of signs: Peirce's notions of icon, 
index and symbol. 
The classif1cation of signs into icons, indices and 
symbols is only one way which Peirce classified signs. 
Burks, in his article, 'Icon, Index and Symbol,'tPhilosophy 
and Phenomenological Research~ June 1949) refers, in a 
footnote, to work in which he and Weiss discuss no less 
than sixty six different classes of sign to be found i~ 
Peirce's writings. I have no space here to go into an 
in-depth discussion of Peirce's work on signs, and have 
no need to do so. I have already pointed out a number of 
difficulties with Peirce's conception of what a sign is, 
and a comprehensive account of his work would involve me 
in giving an extensive critique of his whole philosophy. 
His theory of signs is based on a very personal and 
idiosyncratic approach to philosophy which it would take 
a lot of work to examine fully. But I am not going to 
spend time on such an undertaking. The notions of icon, 
index and sign are the most important part of Peirce's 
philosophical legacy insofar as it is this way of class-
ifying signs which his philosophical heir's have judged 
to be most useful. I intend to examine Peirce's account 
of each of these three signs in the light of my own 
discussion so far in order to see if there is anything 
in these categories which will prove useful for my 
purposes as a philosopher of education. To make things 
easier for myself I will discuss each category of signs 
separately and will begin by discussing the,notion of a 
symbol. 
\1) Symbol. 
In 1903 Peirce wrote tI quote the Buchler article unless 
otherwise stated): 
"A symbol is a sign which refers to the Object it 
denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association 
of general ideas, which operates to cause the Symbol 
to be interpreted as referring to the Object." 
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In 1902 he had written: 
"A symbol is a sign which would lose the 
character which renders it a sign if there were no 
1nterpretant." 
And still earlier, in 1893, he had written: 
"The symbol is connected with its object by virtue 
of the idea of a symbol - using mind, without 
which no such connection would exist." 
These formulations still embody the weakness of 
Eeirce's general definition of a sign ~discussed earlier) 
particularly the maintenance of meaning-as-reference and 
of the interpretant as a mental 'thing'of some sort. I 
therefore cannot simply adopt this view of symbols, I 
must re-work it in order to avoid problems that have been 
elucidated since ~eirce's day. First I must reject the 
idea that the significance of a sign must always be that 
it refers to some object and also any reference to an 
interpretant. Thus I end up with something like: "A symbol 
is a sign which gains its significance by virtue of being 
used as a sign." In other words, for a symbol, the instances 
of the sign gain their (symbolic) significance by 
convention, they are defined as being instances of the 
sign. The instances of the sign, or to use Goodman's 
terminology, the inscriptions of the symbol, have the 
significance which defines them as instances/inscriptions 
by virtue of a decision having been made, either tacitly 
or overtly, that they should have that significance. 
Without such a convention, established, as Peirce saw, by 
people who are users of symbols, the particular 
inscriptions could not gain the significance they have. 
This is to say that the word 'dog' is only a word insofar 
as language users use it in certain ways, for instance 
to refer to a certain class of objects of experience. For 
some being who failed to grasp the conventional nature 
of language the word 'dog' could not gain the significance 
it has for language users, it would remain a squiggle on 
a page, or a noise. 
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An essential feature of a symbol tnecessary but not 
sufficient) is that it is used. A rain cloud or a flash 
of lightening is not a symbol although such things are 
signs. It is further the case that such naturally 
occuring signs can be used, for instance the makers of 
horror films make tover)abundant use of a great many 
things like thunderstorms, dark shadows, cobwebs etc. 
Such things are signs but not symbols as their 
significance arises from facts about the relationships 
between people and the world and not from convention. It 
is arguable, of course, whether we naturally have a 
negative response to things like cobwebs, but in a case 
like fear of the dark ~or at least apprehensiveness of 
it) an explanation in terms of an inability to see and 
hence an increased vulnerability has much more plausibilty 
than any story about its being a social convention. 
A furyher point here is that by 'use' here I don't 
necessarily mean use in communication, although, as I 
will try to show in later discussion, it is in 
communicative interaction that we acquire language, the 
most important symbol system. The use I have in mind here 
is use in expression, that is in putting information or 
feeling into a publicly observable form. Briefly, 
expression involves choosing inscriptions of symbols 
which have, within our form of life, the significance we 
wish to make public and producing those inscriptions. As 
Wittgenstein made clear, and as I have said already, 
the idea of an inscription having appropriate significance 
depends upon its being defined interpersonally as having 
that significance. Thus any expression is, in principle, 
comprehensible to other members of the appropriate form 
of life insofar as it is comprehensible to its author. 
Expression plays a part in communication, but does not 
constitute communication. A communicative act must embody 
an expressive act (in the sense outlined above) and must 
also involve communicative intent. ~his is over simplified 
and a,more detailed account of communication must be left 
133 
until later. But the central point remains that although 
it is necessary for a symbol to be used that ase is not 
necessarily a use in communication. For instance, someone 
who curses when he stubs his toe may not have any 
communicative intent at all in cursing, he may simply 
be giving vent to the pain he experiences. 
There is one question about symbols that I have left 
untouched so far. I have said that the instances of 
symbols gain the significance which they have as symbols 
by convention. But this isn't quite clear enough. The 
question remaining is that of whether the instance has 
its symbolic significance only by virtue of convention 
or whether some object of experience which has 
significance in some non-conventional way can properly 
be said to be used symbolically in some context. 
As an example of what I mean I offer the following 
example. Consider the case of some ancient king who 
kept lions chained at the base of his throne. The problem 
would be that of whether it would be proper to say that 
those lions were a symbol of the king's power. Similarly 
consider the lion-skin robe which is the badge of the Masai 
warrior. To become a warrior a young Masai must go out 
with his spear and shield and kill a lion. It is the 
skin of the lion he has killed that the Masai warrior 
wears as the badge of his rank. To kill a lion with a 
spear must take a lot of nerve and skill. So anybody 
who had done it might properly be described as a brave 
man. And, in ordinary useage, we might say that the 
lion-skin robe of the Masai warrior is symbolic of his 
bravery. 
The problem with talk of symbols in such contexts is 
that these symbols could be said to attain their sig-
nificance not by convention, but because lions are 
powerful and ferocious beasts and because the ability to 
tame such animals, or to kill them armed only with spear 
and shield is quite an achievement. Thus the man who 
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manages such tasks is a man to be respected. 
But this line of argument doesn't tell us much 
about the status of the chained lions or the lion-skin 
robe as signs. Further it is the case that the chained 
lions would be very likely to have been well fed and 
hence would have spent most of the time sleeping rather 
than being ferocious. And the Masai warrior's robe would 
be likely to become moth-eaten and worn after a few 
years. And yet both retain their significance, the former 
as a sign of the king's power and the latter as the 
badge of a warrior, a sign of the warrior's bravery. 
The important feature in the use of such signs is 
selectivity. ~ot everything that is true of lions in 
general is relevant to the significance of the chained 
lions or the lion-skin robe. Besides being, at times, 
ferocious and dangerous animals, lions are lazy, sleepy 
beasts, but this fact is overlooked in the above contexts. 
In other words the significance of the lion in these 
contexts is governed by conventions about what facts 
about lions are to be taken as relevant. ThuB, I Buggest, 
it is proper to say that, in such contexts the lion is 
being used as a symbol. 
This leads to a dichotomy in the notion of a symbol. 
First there is what I will call the pure symbol for which 
the significance of the instances of the symbol is purely 
a matter of convention. ln principle anything could be 
counted as an instance of such a symbol if a deCiSion, 
either tacit or overt, was made to that effect. The other 
class of symbol consists of iconic s~mbols for which the 
instances of the symbol are not arbitrary. Each instance 
of such a symbol must be describable, as an object of 
experience, in a particular way, and it is this descripton 
which constitutes the significance of the symbol. The 
instances of such a symbol may be describable in many oth~r 
ways. But their significance as instances of that partic-
ular symbol is dependant only on the particular 
g8~~ii~:ion that convention rules to be relevant in the 
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It is also worth pointing out that this notion of 
describability is not always dependant on fact. For 
instance the description of cows as holy under the Hindu 
religion and the use of the snake as a symbol of wisdom in 
Chinese mythology (and also, I am informed, in the Bible) 
seem to have nothing to do withthe observable character-
istics of those animals. This suggests that these uses 
of the cow and the snake are as pure symbols.On the other 
hand the use of a piece of paper of the correct dimensions 
as a pattern for a pane of glass is iconic as the 
significance of the pattern is dependant upon a description 
of it in terms of linear dimensions and not in other terms. 
Justification for my adoption of the term 'iconic 
symbol' for this latter class of symbol will be given in my 
discussion of Peirce's notion of an icon which will 
follow the next section which is a discussion of indices. 
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(11) Index. 
In 1903 Peirce wrote: 
"An Index is a sign which refers to the Object 
that it denotes by virtue of being really affected 
by that Object." 
In 1902, in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and 
Fsychology, he had written: 
"An Index is a sign which would, at once, lose 
the character which makes it a sign if its object 
were removed, but would not lose that character 
if there were no interpretant ... 
And earlier, in 1895, he had written: 
"Psychologically, the action of indices depends upon 
association by contiguity, and not upon association 
by resemblance or upon intellectual operations." 
As in the case of symbols, Peirce's account embodies a 
meaning-as-reference approach and still talks about the 
interpretant of a sign, which he took to be a mental 
sign. The 'interpretant', insofar as it is a mental 
entity in the museum of the mind must be eliminated 
from any account I adopt, for reasons given in earlier 
discussion. The meaning-as-reference approach, which 
is Peirce's general approach to the significance of 
signs, still causes problems here. It seems to have been 
Peirce's view that the identifying criterion of an 
index is that it indicates. He included sundials and 
clocks in one list of indices {see th.e ~uchler article 
3.e) because they indicate the time of day. But he also 
calls a bullet hole an index because it is caused by 
the passage of the bullett, thus being, tI ••• really 
affected by that object." And, of course, in 1895 the 
relation between index and object was understood in a 
more general way, as arising from contiguity, the 
question of a causal connection, which I take 'really 
affected' to imply, not arising. 
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The first point to make is although it may be a necessary 
condition that a sign must refer in order to be an 
index, this cannot be a sufficient criterion. The name 
'Wittgenstein' refers to a person, but it is a symbol, 
its function as a name is a matter of convention. 
The second point here is that Peirce, at different 
times, approached the classification of signs in 
different ways. The main thread in his discussion of 
indices seems to have been the attempt to define them 
through the nature of the sign/object link. But in 
identifying indices as signs that indicate he was 
involved in trying to classify signs in terms of their 
function. This latter move, I think, is a source of 
confusion. Signs are used for many purposes by human 
beings. SymbolS can be defined as referring, but also, 
like 'and' 'but' etc. can serve as logical operators, 
not referring to anything, but significant in that they 
modify the meaning of a sentence. Peirce saw that the 
words of language have many functions, but instead of 
realising that he was defining indices in a way that 
conflicted with his way of defining symbols. he ploughed 
on and made a number of odd statements, for instance, 
that personal pronouns are indices {see the Burks 
article). In discussing symbols I said that being used 
for expression is a necessary but not sufficient 
criterion for the identification of a symbol. A baby 
crying is an expression, and an expression which, 
according to psychological research, mothers can learn 
to interpret in certain broad ways ~Ricks 1971 - referred 
to on £10 of Bruner's 'Entry into EarlY Language: a 
spiral curriculum'). But we would not, therefore, jump 
to the conclusion that such babies were using symbols, 
any more than we would call a dogls snarl a symbol 
although we might interpret it as a warning to stay 
clear. Thus a claSSification of signs in terms of 
function would cut across the class of symbols, and I 
do not want to fragment that class in such a way. I 
thing that a classification of signs in terms of 
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function, although possible, would not be a very 
useful approach in educational terms. It is my view, 
as I have already said, that each specialist mode of 
language is a tool. lt is also clear that language in 
general is symbolic in the sense I have already outlined. 
Thus I am slowly working my way towards characterising 
education as a process of initiation into various ways 
of symbolically representing the world of experience, 
ways which increase our understanding of that world. 
For this purpose a functional characterisation of signs 
is not particularly useful as it would cut across and 
obscure a distinction which is very important. This 
distinction is that between animals that can only 
acquire knowledge at first hand and those that can 
acquire knowledge indirectly. fhis dividing line is the 
same as that between symbol using animals and the rest, 
but only so long as symbols are defined in the way I 
have adopted. fhe transmission of knowledge through 
symbolic representation is something only humans, amongst 
the creatures of this planet, are capable of. lAlthough 
recent exPeriments with chimpanzees suggest that we might 
be able to extend the community of symbol-users to include 
some other primates, and work with dolphins is throwing. 
up some puzzling results.) It is not the only use to 
which we put symbols, but it is a very very important one. 
Thus I am not interested in following up the line 
of Peirce's thought that led him to think of indices as 
things which indicate. I am more interested in the 
approach which led him to characterise the index/object 
linkage as one of, 'being really affected' or else 
contiguity. In the case of something like black clouds 
being a sign of rain there is a lmechanistically) caused 
relation between the appearance of certain sorts of cloud 
and the occurence of rain. Meteorologists are involved 
in studying the causal mechanisms involved in weather 
systems. But this should not be allowed to mislead us 
into thinking that such causal mechanisms are relevant 
to the nature of the sign. Talk of causal mechanisms is 
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a mode of explanation. To say that clouds are made up 
of water vapour and that in the right conditions that 
water vapour condenses and falls as rain is to explain 
the mechanisms of rain fall. But it does not explain 
how it came about the people came to understand that some 
clouds are rain clouds whilst others are not. This can 
only be explained in terms of a frequent tnot necessarily 
constant) conjunction of events. The appearance of clouds 
of certain sorts often preceeds rainfall. To note such 
a fact is to realise that the appearance of such clouds 
is a sign of impending rainfall. 
Knowledge of causal mechanisms may help us to see what 
states of affairs are signs of other states of affairs, 
but this doesn't mean that understanding a state of 
affairs as a sign is dependant on such knowledge. This 
may be the case in some instances, for instance the 
reading of a pH meter tells the chemist much about the 
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substance he is testing. But although knowledge of causal :11 
mechanisms may give us a better understanding of what ~: 
aspects of a state of affairs are crucial to its reliability! 
as a Sign, and although such knowledge may well reveal 
as signs things which were never understood as signs 
of that sort before, such knowledge is not essential fQr 
signs to function as signs. Constant, or at least frequent 
conjunction of events or states of affairs in general, is 
sufficient to enable one state of affairs to act as a sign 
of another. The operant notion here is that of correlation 
talthough not in the technical sense used in statistics.) 
If we notice that an event of one sort is followed by 
an event of another sort, like rain clouds preceeding 
rain, then we come to regard the first event as a sign 
of the later event. But this temporal order is not 
necessary. A bullet hole, when correctly identified, tells 
whoever identified it that a bullet was found earlier. 
Any reader of police-procedural novels teg. Ed McBain's 
87th. Precinct novels) knows that forensic and ballistic 
experts can project backwards in time by making tests 
on dead bodies and bullets to indicate with a high 
degree of probability what sort of events must have taken 
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place. 
Such signs are indices, but all indices are not of 
equal standing. What makes an object of experience a 
sign for some other object of experience is a frequent 
conjunction, not necessarily constant, but sufficiently 
frequent to make the incidence of one without the other 
an unusual occurance. And when I say 'object of experience' 
lam using 'object' in its grammatical sense. So I do not 
believe that an index must refer to a physical object. 
Thus if experiences of one sort are often associated with 
experiences of another sort then we tend to notice this 
association and the occurance of one of the events leads 
us to expect the occurance of the other. Or, retrospectively 
if, under some way of looking at the world of experience, 
event B normally follows event A, and we see event B 
occuring, we assume that event A has occured even if we 
didn't experience it. 
This is where explanations of the links between events 
or states of affairs comes in. In the sciences causal 
chains of events are described, which is to say that 
the scientist~ experiences of the world are described in 
terms of causal chains of physical events. Once such a 
description, or a mode of description, is attained, the 
scientist can identify an isolated event as a member of 
a particular type of causal chain and, if he is right, can 
extrapolate and make statements about what preceeded 
that event or about what will follow it. In other words, 
he can say what he would have experienced if he had 
been in the right place earlier and what he will 
experience if he stays where he is lor moves to the 
appropriate location). The accuracy of his extrapolations 
will, of course, depend on whether he has the right 
theory, whether his characterisation of the causal chain 
is adequate for his purposes. And a scientists 
extrapolations need not betamporal It is also possible 
for scientists to discover a conjunction between 
logically unrelated descriptions of a state of affairs. 
Thus a seismologist can say that a description of 
141 
bedrock in terms of the way in which it transmits and 
reflects vibration has a correlation with a description 
of the rock in geological terms. Thus seismology is of 
use to oil prospectors. 
But the fact that indices which are characterised in 
terms of physical events or states of affairs which are 
parts of causal chains, which are elements in physical 
mechanisms, are more reliably informative than those 
which are characterised less systematically is not to 
say anything about indices as indices. lt is a matter 
of fact that the approaches of the systematic disciplines 
are better suited to their purposes, that systemisation 
is useful. But in the final analYSis we should not make 
the mistake of writing the procedures of the physical 
sciences into our notion of an index. If I have lived in 
one neighbourhood for years and have always seen one of 
my neighbours with his dog, and never seen the dog 
without my neighbour, then I am fully justified in 
assuming that, if I see the dog, the neighbour is 
somewhere around. There is no logical certainty about 
this, but the probability is sufficiently high for the 
rational course to be to act on the assumption. The 
conjunction between my seeing the dog and seeing my 
neighbour occurs with sufficient frequency for me 
reasonably to take the appearance of the dog as a sign 
that my neighbour is in the vicinity. And this fact 
also means that I will tend to think of the man and his 
dog together, they will be linked in my mind. 
I reject, then, Feirce's view that an index must be 
really affected by its object. Or, to update the 
formulation, I reject the view that the significance of 
an index consists in knowledge of a mechanistically 
causal connection between an index and its object. That 
there might be a causal link involved in the relation 
in some other sense of causality is, however, likely. 
If someone always associates his grandfather with steam 
trains because his grandfather was a railwayman, then 
the link is indexical, even if his knowledge of the link 
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between his grandfather and steam trains is indirect, it 
arose through hisgrandfathe~ physical involvement with 
the railways. But even if the underlined 'because' 
is understood causally, this is not mechanistic 
causality. and cannot be if my objection to mechanistic 
explanations of human experience are accepted. 
Having 'talked round' the notion of an index I will 
now attempt to give some positive characterisation of 
indices. First I must reiterate that nothing is a sign 
in itself. Anything is an instance of a sign only insofar 
as there exists some point of view from which that 
objects gains significance. Thus the notion of an iddex 
comes down to the notion of what it is to 'read
' 
the 
world indexically. To read the world symbolically is to 
grasp the significance of some object of experience 
which it has by virtue of the conventions governing its 
expressive use. To read the world indexically is to grasp 
the significance of some object of experience by virtue 
of its connection with other objects of experience and 
with ourselves. Thus an index indicates something to 
somebody by virtue of that individuals knowledge of the 
natural links between the object of experience which is 
the index and some other object of experience, some 
state of affairs or event or action (depending on the 
ontological point of view of the experience). And here 
'natural' has no connotation other than non-conventional. 
Thus if I find a piece of paper with writing-like . 
'squiggles' on it on some desert island I can fairly 
take it as an index, as indicating the presence of some 
intelligent being on that island at an earlier time. And 
I can do this even if I cannot tell, because of my 
ignorance of the conventions governing the language 
used, what the 'writing' says. 
Thus an object of experience is an instance of an 
index if and only if there is some way of looking under 
which that object of experience has significance which 
it has gained through its association with some other 
I 
.' \1 
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object of experience and not conventionally. And here 
'object of experience' must be taken to include anything 
that is a distinguishable entity from any point of view, 
including events, actions, feelings etc. 'Association' 
here must be taken to include spatial and temporal 
conjunction between logically unrelated descriptions. 
Thus an ~.E.G. reading might serve as an index for us if, 
at some point, researchers manage to establish reasonable 
correlations between brain states and states of mind, 
although before this could happen psychologists would 
have to work on ways of characterising state of mind 
independantly of using E.E.G. readings of brain states~ 
Indices gain their significance by conjunction, in 
ways I have tried to describe at some length. In grasping 
that some object of experience is an instance of an 
index (or can be read that way) there is no reference to 
convention. There is only an association, by the 'reader' 
of 'this' object of experience with some other, an 
association built up through past experience with some 
other, an association built up through past experience 
of their conjunction or else knowledge of such 
association passed on by others. 
This fits in well with Alston's point (in 'The Phil-
osophy of Language') that reading a sign indexically 
involves no reference to any communicative intent which 
may lie behind the production of the sign. A pilot, 
seeing smoke rising from a desert island, can reasonably 
take it as a sign (an index) of human habitation. And 
the indexical reading of the smoke is justified whether 
the fire was made as a signal fire, in which case it 
was lit with communicative intent, or as a cooki~g'fire 
in which case no communicative intent is involved. This 
is an important point for looking at what happens when 
language is acquired. The pre-linguistic child has no 
knowledge of the conventions governing the use of words 
prior to his experience of people speaking (or, to be 
more precise, making noises since the child, having no 
knowledge of the conventions of language, can have no 
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concept which is equivalent to the language user's 
concept of speaking). Thus the child must read the 
world indexically, he must note conjunctions between 
experiences, the experience of his mother ta significant, 
for the child, individual) making certain noises and the 
experience of being fed, say. At some point the child 
arrives at an understanding that, say, the noise his 
mother makes when she says, 'Din-dins' tor some other 
bit of baby-talk, which is basically the language mothers 
seem to favour when addressing young children) is a 
sign that food is on its way. It is at a later stage 
when babies go beyond indexical 'reading' of the world. 
Then they begin to say, 'Din-dins' themselves, firstly 
just as a noise to produce, but then as a sign which they 
use. Exactly what significance a child attaches to the 
first words they use is unspecifiable, as I have argued. 
Ferhaps, initially for the child in my example, the word 
'Din-dins' is just a sort of incantation, a noise which 
preceeds the appearance of food. Later, perhaps, the child 
gets the idea that somehow that noise has an effect 
which is the appearance of food. So long as this is 
, 
true the child is still regarding the word indexically. 
But after a while the child comes to understand that 
the noise is to be used in communication, that it has 
no direct relation with food, but is understood by its 
mother as having something to do with food. When the 
child begins to make this leap, from mere association 
of objects of experience tmaking a noise and food 
appearing) to understanding that the noise is only 
associated with food by its mother and other people, 
then it is beginning to understand words as symbols. 
It can be said, then, that both indices and some 
symbols denote objects of experience, they indicate those 
objects, the significance of those signs is derived 
from their association with other objects of experience. 
But the distinction between indices and those symbols 
which indicate is that in the case of the index the 
association is a matter of natural fact, things just 
happen to be that way, whereas in the case of referring-
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symbols the association has arisen because of a tacit or 
overt decision which people have made to use them in that 
way. That the same object of experience could be 'read' 
as both index and symbol creates no problems, I have 
covered this point in my general discussion of signs. I 
will now go on to discuss my notion of an icon. 
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l111} Icons. 
The notion of an Icon is, I believe, the most 
confused of the symbol/index/icon complex. In 1903 
.Peirce wrote: 
"An icon is a sign which refers to the object that 
it denotes merely by virtue of characters of its 
own, and which it possesses, just the same, whether 
any such Object actually exists or not. It is true 
that unless there is really such an Object, the 
Icon does not act as a sign; but this has nothing 
to do with its character as a sign." 
Peirce's examples of icons are a mixed bunch. The least 
problematic is • ••• a lead pencil strea~as representing 
a geometrical line.' Much more problematic are examples 
such as the following: 
u a 1x + b1y .. n 1 , 
8 2X + b2y • n 2 • 
This is an icon, in that it makes quantities look 
alike which are in analogous relations to the 
problems. In fact, every algebraical equation is 
an icon, in so far as it exhibits, by means of 
the algebbraical signs lwhich are not in 
themselves icons}, the relations of the quantities 
concerned. If 
Here again, I suggest, we find the same confusion 
arising that arose in Peirce's discussion of indices. 
The problem is that of whether we classify signs in terms 
of their functions or in terms of how they are grasped 
as signs. ~eirce's tendancy to drift from one to the 
other of these ways of looking at signs led him to say 
that because personal pronouns indicate people lwhich, . 
as Burks points out, is itself a problematic assertion) 
they are indices. And yet it is clear that personal 
pronouns, as elements in language have the significance 
they possess only by virtue of the conventions governing 
their use within-a particular mode lor particular modes) 
of language. Thus, on the view which I have adopted, and 
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which Peirce adopted on some occassions, anything which 
functions as a word in a language is a symbol. 
Peirce's confusion arose from his not grasping the 
fact that symbol systems can be made to do almost 
anything. Symbols can indicate ~ they can exhibit 
relations, in fact one way of characterising the activities 
of scientists is to say that they seek to create a symbol 
system the rules of which parallel observed regularities 
in the world. Part of the construction of such a symbol 
system would, of course, be the definition of concepts 
useful for the scientists task. The way the non-Euclidean 
--" - .. - -- - ------.-. 
geometries challenged the classical conception of space 
and opened the way for Einstein could be looked at in 
this way. 
In not grasping the power of symbolisation, in the 
sense of conventionally defining Signs, Peirce failed to 
realise that a classification of signs in terms of function 
could only obscure the importance of symbols. A 
classification of signs in terms of function can only 
fragment the category of symbols if the category is 
understood as consisting of conventionally defined signs. 
Thus symbols were dubbed as both indices and as icons 
by Peirce. 
For my purposes in this thesis 1 believe it to be 
crucially important for me to demonstrate that it is 
the ability to symbolise, in the sense I adopted earlier, 
which is the 'extra something' that makes humanity 
the dominant life form on this planet. It is the ability 
to create and use signs for our own purposes that separ-
ates us from other species. Thus I have opted for giving 
a classification of signs in terms of how they are 
constituted rather than how they are used. And it is 
in terms of how an object of experience can come to be a 
Sign that I will look at in the notion of an icon. 
This 1s not to say that looking at signs in terms of 
,1 
~I 
[I 
I' 
f' q [, 
.! 
tl 
II I: 
!I 
!; 
I· 
,', I: 
r 
'; 
I 
I' 
I' 
t il 
! 
I 
I 
• r 
148 
their function is not an important thing to do. When I 
discuss the questions of significance and of communication 
in more detail I will, in fact, be discussing, in part, 
the different sorts of things we can do with symbols. 
But for now I am interested in distinguishing the 
symbolic from the 'naturally' defined in signs. And hence 
I am interested in giving some account of what exactly 
it is that humans can do that other species (with some 
apparent exceptions eg. chimps) cannot. But that discussion 
must wait until after I have dealt more fully with the 
notion of an icon. 
It should be fairly clear, from what I have already 
written in this section, that I cannot agree with Peirce 
that to say that an icon exhibits is to say ver~ much 
about icons. Put more rigorously, I am prepared, for the 
sake of argument, to concede (for now) that a necessary 
feature of icons is that they exhibit certain features. 
But algebraic equations can be used to exhibit relations, 
and such explanations are, in my terms, symbolic. So I 
cannot accept the exhibiting of characteristics shared 
with other objects of experience as a sufficient criterion 
for something to be an icon. 
In my first quote from Peirce at the beginning of this 
section he wrote that, " ••• unless there really is lsuch) 
an Object, the icon does not act asasign; but this has 
nothing to do with its character as a sign." This is a 
decidedly odd assertion. 1 have already tried to show 
that we must understand a sign as being the class of its 
instances, the class being defined by those instances 
having a shared significance from some point of view. 
Unless I am very much mistaken this implies that any 
Signs character as a sign depends on its having a 
particular significance (from some perpective). If, then, I 
identify something as an icon I am indentifying it lfor 
the present at least) as something which denotes something 
else by virtue of shared characteristics. But if there is 
no 'something else', then there are no shared characteris-
tics. In identifying anything, as I argued in my 
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section on perception, there is an element of risk, we 
are usually right, but sometimes we're wrong. So if I 
were to identify something as an icon, but there was noth-
ing it denoted, I would be wrong. Whatever the thing was 
that I wrongly denoted, it could not be an icon. 
But all this is not getting at the real weakness of 
the notion of an icon. Peirc~s real problem is that any 
object of experience possesses any number of characteristics. 
And this is to say only that there exist any number of 
ways of looking at any object of experience, and each 
way of looking picks out identifying characteristics 
according to its interests. So the problem 
about 'reading' something as an icon is that it is 
necessary to pick out which characteristics of the thing 
being peroeived are relevant to its function as a sign. 
For instance if I pick up a paint colour chart I know 
that I'm looking at the colour of each of the coloured. 
rectangles, that their shape and the chart's layout are 
irrelevent to my purposes in looking at it. But if the 
managing director of a paint manufacturing company was 
to be given a proposed new chart by his advertising 
agency, then the reverse would be true. He wouldn't just 
be interested in the colours, he would look at the whole 
layout of the chart to see if it looked as though it 
might encourage customers to buy his firm's products. 
Similarly if I take a piece of wool into a shop the 
assistant is likely to understand that I'm looking for 
wool to match. Here the colour, thickness and number 
of strands will be relevant to her understanding my sample 
as a sign of what I want, the length of my sample would 
not. If, on the other hand, I wanted a pane of glass for 
an oddly shaped window 1 might cut a piece of paper to 
the correct size and shape and take it to the glazier. 
In this case the colour and consistency of the paper 
would be treated as totally irrelevant, only the linear 
dimensions would be relevant to the task of , cutting 
glass to the correct shape. And if I cut my pattern out 
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of wallpaper the glazier would pay no attention to 
the pattern, although the same piece of paper taken to 
a wallpaper shop would be 'read' as a sample of the sort 
of paper I wanted to buy for my walls. 
The point of all this is that the 'reading' of an icon 
seems to involve not only the icon's possession of 
characteristics, but also an assumption by the 'reader' 
that only certain of these characteristics are relevant 
to the icon's functioning as a sign in a particular 
context. what is missing in Peirce's account is this 
reference to the reader's selection of ch~racteristics. 
And the selection of relevant characteristics of the icon 
is something that depends on agreement about what is 
relevant in a particular context. 
This is to say that for an icon to function in any 
way at all there must be public agreement about how 
they are to be used. Without such agreement there would 
be no reason for the woolshop assistant to do anything 
more than cut off a piece of wool of the same length as 
my sample from the first ball of wool that came to hand. 
And it would be quite reasonable for the glazier to 
explain to me that glass is clear and not patterned like 
my sample, or else to hand me a square piece of glass 
painted to match the pattern of the wallpaper. 
Luckily, however, there are rules lsometimes only 
tacit - our knowledge of the rules of symbol systems will 
be discussed later) governing the way we use the sorts of 
descriptive aids I am discussing. The person in the 
woolshop and the glazier both know I want something 'like 
this' and furthermore each knows what 'like' means within 
their own working context. So the surrealistic events I 
have just described don't happen very often in real life. 
There are established conventions about how such things 
are 'read' and those conventions enable us to avoid 
confusion. But those conventions, accordance with which 
is necessary for the correct reading of icons, also 
identify icons as symbols (in the majority of cases at 
least). 
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Icon's, I wish to say, are a special kind of 
. 
symbol. They are symbols which denote by sharing the 
characteristics of whatever it is they denote. But they 
are symbols in so far as they need not share all the 
features of what they denote and not all their features 
are features of what they denote. Thus the correct 
reading of an icon inextricably involves the reader 
according with the rules governing the use of that 
object of experience as an icon, rules which establish 
which characteristics of the object of experience are 
relevant to its role as an icon. 
There are two main pOints to clear up before I am 
finished discussing the notion of an icon. ln my 
formulation of what counts as an icon, or more 
accurately an iconic sy~bol. I have talked in terms of 
shared characteristics. This is rather vague. More 
precisely I should have talked in terms of descriptions 
which are true of both the icon and what it denotes or 
of a set of concepts that can properly be applied to 
both an icon and what is denoted. But Peirce didn't 
talk in these terms, he talked of an icon denoting 
" •••• merely by virtue of characters of its own •••••• 
which it possesses •••• ", and he talked about icons 
exhibiting relations. 
I have argued that icons are a special sort of symbol. 
But I haven't yet clarified the question of exactly what 
sort of symbol should be counted as iconic. In particular 
my discussion has left open the question of whether we 
should include such things as algebraic expressions as 
they are used by mathematical physicists in the class 
of iconic symbols. It seems to me that we should not. 
In any 'pure' symbol system the nature of the inscription 
as an object of experience is formally irrelevant to its 
function as a symbol, although in terms of practical 
'useability' it is important that the inscription is 
not too difficult to make or to read. Thus I can define. 
the letter 'A' to stand for the relation 'above' such that 
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x A Y has the meaning, "x is above y", without 
implying the existence of anything ls) corresponding 
to the designations x and y. Mathematics involves 
the study of relations ~not usually of such trivial 
ones), but the question of existence is irrelevent to 
the Mathematics. The mathematician deals in abstract 
notions, it is irrelevant to the mathematician las 
mathematician) whether any object of experience fits 
into his theoretical framework. The use of the work of 
pure mathematicians by mathematical physicists is no 
easy step. The physicist cannot merely assume that a 
mathematical formulation parallels empirical data on the 
world of experience. He can assume this only as a working 
hypothesis, he must test his assumption against empirical 
data and must reject it if the data is inconsistent 
(in a statistical sense) with his hypothesis. 
It is wrong, I think, to think of any purely symbolic 
representation lin the sense I have outlined) as 
exhibiting relations which obtain between objects of 
experience. Rather the relations which, by convention, 
obtain within the symbol system parallel those which 
obtain in the world of experience in the sense that 
extrapolations drawn from manipulations within the 
system do correlate with events in the world of experience. 
Of course a scientists theories are not usually that 
reliable. Every researcher knows that no matter how 
successful a theory is in parallelling events in the 
world there is a high probability that one day an applica-
tion of his theory will come up with wrong predictions. 
And then a new theory will be needed, this is how science 
progresses. Theory must be regarded as a way of enabling 
us to understand those aspects of the world which we 
have picked out as important. It is dangerous, for 
reasons I have already discussed, to think of theory 
as a description of a world more fundamentally 'real' 
than the world revealed to us in our everyday perceptual 
experience. 
1 
1 
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If I am right on this point, then there is no 
justification for saying that any purely symbolic 
representation exhibits, as opposed to describing, 
relations which it shares with the world of experience. 
And hence it is improper to regard algebraic equations 
as iconic in any sense. This suggests that we must look 
upon icons as symbols which denote by virtue of 
characteristics they possess, keeping in mind what I 
have already said about the necessity of knowing what 
characteristics are relevant to the icon's being an icon 
in any particular context. And as the mere possession 
of characteristics cannot tell us anything about how 
the icon denotes, then I think it is fair to assume that 
the relation between an icon and whatever it denotes 
must be understood in terms of characteristics shared 
by the icon and what it is that is denoted. Thus icons 
are a special kind of symbol for which the physical 
nature of the instance or inscription is important. They 
are symbols in so far as their significance depends upon 
convention. But unlike, for instance, the words of 
language, their significance derives not only from the 
conventions governing their use, but also from their 
precise physical nature. 
This brings me to Peirce's notion of a hypoicon. I 
will not attempt to go into his theoretical definition 
of what counts as hypoicons, that would involve an 
unwarranted amount of discussion of Peirce's rather 
idiosyncratic meta.physics. Eut he did include paintings 
and diagrams in this class. I have little use for the 
notion of a hypoicon in my present endeavour, but I 
think it is fairly clear that paintings don't come 
anywhere near my category of iconic symbols. Nelson 
Goodman, in ~anguagesbf Art,' argues very convincingly 
that the Iresemblance' of, say, a portrait to the object 
it portrays is mediated by conventions which are a 
cultural variable - our conventions differ from those 
of ancient Egypt for example. And it is also clear that the 
correspondance between a person and his portrait in terms 
nf linear dimensions, colouring and almost all other 
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physical characteristics is none too precise. We 
recognise someone from a painting much more easily 
than from a verbal or written description, but, it 
seems to me, a painting is nearer to a poem than to 
a life-size hologram in terms of sharing characteristics 
with the object it denotes, and hence should not be 
thought of as a paradigm of iconic symbolism. 
Diagrams, on the other hand, do seem, in some cases, 
to come nearer to being icons. A blue print, for instance, 
is not merely an encoding of specific information. 
Someone can derive knowledge from a blue print which 
the man who drew it up never knew, just by taking a 
measurement which was not .needed for drawing it ,up. And 
a blueprint, by definition, shares characteristics with 
the machine it is a blueprint of. Linear dimensions are 
preserved, or if not preserved in fact are scaled so 
that the actual dimension can be discovered by measurement 
and scaling up. Similarly the bearing lin a geometrical 
sense) of one part from another is preserved. 
But is this convincing? A pencil line in a blueprint 
stands for an edge on the finished object, but they are 
only the same in so far as each is Viewed, abstractly, 
as an instance of geomatrical line. On the other hand, 
though, is it pOSSible, without unreasonable stipulation, 
to give an account of two objects of experience sharing 
characteristics other than in terms of their being one 
description that fits them both? I think not. Any diagram 
that can be described to some extent in the same terms 
that the thing of which it is a diagram can be described 
is to that extent an iconic symbol. The fact that the 
diagram might be drawn in ink on paper and the finished 
item might be cast in steel is irrelevent here. If each 
can be described as, say, being fourteen inches high, 
then in that respect the diagram is properly to be 
regarded as iconic, although not probably, in most other 
respects. 
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This probably sounds odd, but it is not, I believe, 
symptomatic of some inner weakness of my account of icons. 
Rather, I suggest, it is symptomatic of the danger of 
trying to classify symbols too precisely. Symbols are 
used for communication, and the history of the growth 
of human knowledge is also the history of people inventing 
new symbol systems. In such a dynamic situation any 
attempt to classify is likely to run into difficulties, 
a classification may seem correct at one point in time, 
but later a new mode of expression might evolve that 
just won't fit. In such a situation the only possibility 
is to classify in any way that seems useful but not to 
be surprised by some blurring between the classes. 
It seems clear to me that a useful way of looking 
would be to say that icons are a special kind of symbol, 
the significance of which depends both on a convention 
and on the nature of the inscription. Samples of cloth 
or wallpaper are a clear central case of iconic symbolism. 
Diagrams incorporate iconic elements, but also embody 
'pure' symbols {ie. the physical nature of the inscription 
is theoretically irrelevent.) This only means that in 
using symbols we are not very particular about • purity. , 
We use symbols for purposes and when we have a purpose 
we use what is available without any reference to any 
theoretical notion of purity. Such notions are the 
domain'of'the philosopher and the distinction they lead 
to are made for philosophical purposes. In everyday life 
few philosophers would be so pendantic as to demand their 
rigid observation. 
The notion of an iconic symbol hinges on the necessity 
for conventions which govern the question of what 
characteristics of an icon are relevant to its function as 
a sign. There is however, one possibility that might 
establish a class of pure icons. This possibility is 
that certain characteristics of certain objects of 
experience might be picked out by all human beings as 
a matter of natural fact, independantly of there being 
any conventions. 
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This is not merely to say that there may not be any 
convention which is explicitly statable in linguistic 
form, or, more accurately, which has not been explicitly 
stated because either nobody has yet managed it or else 
because there is some taboo against doing so. That 
conventionality consists in the existence of explicitly 
formulated and generally known rules is not, in my view, 
a justifiable position. I have already mentioned (in 
discussing the private language argument) Cooper's 
objection to the position that says that our ability 
to use language is dependant upon our knowing (in some 
sense) the rules of language. And yet language, surely, 
is a paradigm case of a convention governed system. In 
my discussion of meaning I will look at Cooper's argument 
in more detail and will suggest an alternative 
characterisation of conventionality. 
What is needed for a sign to be a pure icon is that 
certain objects of experience are seen by human beings 
as exhibiting certain characteristics without our having 
learned to pick out those characteristics. Alston writes: 
"Inprimitive religion, ritual acts may focus 
around a bull, a mountain, or a sacred fire 
without there being a.n explicit account of 
what gives these objects the Significance 
they have •••• the bull •••• is being treated 
as sacred because of certain characteristics 
it embodies to a marked degree, such as 
virility, even though none of the workers 
has formulated this as such. The bull could then 
be said to function as an icon of virility ••• 
without this functioning being tied down by 
any convention or,rules." 
I'm not totally convinced by Alston's examples here. 
Fire is an important 'technological' advance: it makes 
such things as cooking and the firing of pots possible, 
is also useful in ground clearance and keeps dangerous 
animals at bay. That fire should be thought of as 
important in a primitive culture could well be explained 
indexically, by aSSOCiating the flame with its uses. 
And it seems to be a feature of religions in general 
that they make holy what is SOCially important. About 
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the worship of a mountain I can only suggest that if 
the role of the mountain in the life of a primitive 
culture were, as a matter of physical fact, important, 
then again its initial significance could arise 
inaexically. And this would be easy to explain if the 
mountain happened to be a live volcano. Again, with the 
bull/virility link, it seems more likely to me that 
the importance would arise indexically. Bulls are 
temperamental creatures and, as such, are more 
dangerous than useful for most purposes. Modern stockmen 
castrate most male beasts, but they always need one ,. 
fully endowed male for stud. ~he bull/virility link is, 
I suggest,again indexical, arising from the fact that 
the only reason anybody would want a bull around is 
in order to use it at stud. 
At a more fundamental level I argued earlier that 
for language acquisition to be possible we must, as 
human beings, have an innate tendency to classify the 
things of experience in certain basic ways. And as 
classification always depends on the things classea 
together having the sa~e significance from a point 
of View, then this suggests that, for human infants, 
certain experiences have a natural significance. 
My own view is that this natural significance is 
probably best understood as arising from the 
satisfaction of certain basic needs, needs which have 
some psychological/physiological immediacy like the 
need for hunger to be satisfied, for warmth, perhaps 
for affection. But it may be that such an approach, in 
which things acquire significance indexically by 
association with these primary drives (to use the 
psychological terminology) is an inadequate basis upon 
which to build an account which adequately deals with the 
available psychological data. If this is the case, then 
we may need to postulate pure icons. 
r am not a psychologist and am not qualified to make 
any statement about whether or not there is any 
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psychological data which is explicable only by saying 
that there are objects of experience that must be regarded 
as pure icons. I tend towards the view that all icons 
are iconic symbols but in some cases the selection of 
characteristics which are relevent to some objects function 
as an icon is weighted by the indexical significance of 
that object lor that class of objects) within a form of 
life. But I cannot state categorically that this is the 
case. the question, it seems to me, is an empirical 
one and, as such, lies within the jurisdiction of 
psychology. What r would say, however, is that the view 
that significance flows outwards through the indexical 
significance of things-in-the-world to human beings 
because of the nature of human beings has an explanatory 
power which, as far as I can see, the postulation of 
pure icons simply does not have. 
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1-1eaning and Communication. 
The Significance of Signs - an approach to the theory of 
meanIns. 
In my discussion of concepts r argued that talk of 
concepts must be understood as being talk about human 
habits of conceptualisation, that a concept should not. 
be thought of as a 'thing' which someone possesses anymore 
than pain is some sort of rthing.' Similar remarks must 
be made about meaning. There is no such thing as a 
meaning, meanings cannot be pointed at, rather signs are 
meaningful to people - signs are significant. There is 
no great harm in talking about meanings of signs or about 
someone grasping a meaning so long as this doesn't lead 
us into philoeophical error. But our normal everyday 
ways of talking are notoriously lax and to take the 
grammatical form of ordinary language ways of talking 
too seriously is, as Wittgenstein showed with language 
of sensation, likely to lead us astray in doing 
philosophy. 
Reifying meanings is something which has happened in 
·philosophy. Those philosophers who hold that the meaning 
of a word is that to which it refers made this mistake. 
Counter examples to this approach abound. F~ege pointed 
out that the phrases, "the morning star," and tithe 
evening star," both refer to the planet Venus but have 
different meanings. Strawton, in 'On Referring,' where 
he criticizes Russell's Theory of Descriptions, wrote: 
"The source of Russell's mistake was that he thought 
that referring or mentioning, if it occured at all, 
must be meaning. He did not distinguish ~ tan 
expression) from B ta use of an expression); he 
confused expressio~s with their use in a particular 
context; and so confused meaning with mentioning, 
with referring. If I talk about my handkerchief, I 
can, perhaps, produce the object I am referring to 
out of my pocket. I can't produce the meaning of 
the expression, 'my handkerchief,' out of my 
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pocket." 
Strawson goes on to suggest that giving the meaning of 
a word, in the relevent sense of 'meaning' is to 
" ••• explain and illustrate the conventions governing 
the use of an expression." The point here is not that 
reference and meaning are not related, but that meaning 
cannot be explained in terms of what a word or phrase 
refers to. Rather we must explain meaning in terms of 
use and one use to which words can be put is in referring. 
These remarks are vague in the extreme and will be 
amplified in later discussion. 
Another semi-reification of meaning is covered by the 
umbrella-term 'mental-entity theory'. Peirce's 
interpretant 1s such an entity. Such theories explain 
the word/world link as being established via a mental 
image or mental sign of some kind. Wittgenstein's 
Picture Theory (from the Tractatus) is a sophisticated 
version of such a theory although the fact that 
Wittgenstein later rejected it renders unneccesary any 
detailed discussion of it here. One objection to such 
theories is that some meaningful phrases cannot, in 
principle, give rise to images, for instance the phrase 
'four dimensional space.' But a more general objection 
is that such an account says nothing about how some 
sign can have significance for somebody. If the meaning 
of some 'thing' in the world is explained in terms of s~me 
mental entity, the problem of signigicance is only 
pushed back one step to the question of how that mental 
entity can have significance. For instance, if I visualise 
a street map in order to get where I'm going any theory 
of meaning must explain how the 'mental' street map has 
significance for me, just as it must answer the same 
question about the real thing. To explain the significance 
of the mental entity in terms of other mental entities 
simply leads to an infinite regress ~nd also seems to 
come perilously close to requiring the postulation of 
something akin to Ryle's 'ghost-in-the-machine, , in order 
to exp~ain how mental entities are read. 
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Again this does not, I think, mean that mentalistic 
concepts are out of place in a theory of meaning, but 
that we must not think of the mind as some 'sort of 
ghostly museum where 'meanings' are exhibited. I will 
argue later that the significance of symbols ~especially 
language) arises through their place in a shared 
conceptual scheme,a common way of classifying experience 
established interpersonally within a form of life. 
An alternative approach to the problem of meaning, 
particularly the meaning of referring sentences/words, is 
via some form of the principle of verification. 
Schlick's version is, 'The meaningof a proposition is 
the method of its verification," (from 'Meaning and 
Verification'). This is vague, Ayer in 'Language, Truth 
and Logic' offers "A sentence is factually significant 
to a given person if, and only if, he knows how to 
verify the proposition which it purports to express." 
The crucial notion in Ayer's version is that of 'factual 
significance.' This clearly doesn't exhaust the 
meaning of utterances. A teacher bellowing, 'Silence!'at 
an unruly class is not making a statement with any 
factual significance, he is giving an order (whether 
successfully or not). 
But even within the relatively narrow confines of 
factually significant statements verificationism fails. 
It is hard to give criterion for what is, in principle, 
verifiable. Many of the laws of physics cannot be verified 
directly, they are arrived at indirectly. Waisman (in an 
article 'Verifiability,' reprinted in 'The theory of 
meaning,' ed. G.H.R. Parkinson) has pointed out also 
that there is, strictly speaking, a logical gap between 
observation statements and physical object statements 
which could prove embarrassing for a verificationist 
approach. 
Yet, again, the failure of a theory should not be 
allowed to blind us as to an important point which the 
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verificationists were getting at. We can explain this 
'intuitively' by saying that we would surely not allow 
d ' . , that someone, for instance, understood the wor p~g 
if he could not recognise a pig when he saw one. Again, 
the vagueness must stand for a while, to be clarified in 
later disoussion. 
One strong feature of the theories of meaning I have 
sketched out here is their preoccupation with the 
language/world relation, and this is a very important aspect 
of any theory of meaning. But referring is only one of .the 
. - . . 
things we do with language, we also give orders, make 
requests, persuade etc. My own belief is that the 
essential element in any theory of meaning must be the 
speech act. We must acknowledge that learning a 
language is neither more nor less than learning how to 
do things with words. It seems clear to me that some 
of the attempts to elucidate meaning in purely 
extensional terms, like those of Davidson and his 
followers, of Quine (in 'The Roots of Reference) and of 
Chomsky, with his insistence on approaching language from 
the pOint of view of syntax rather than semantics, are 
plausible only in the light of the fact that philosophers 
have traditionally treated language as a formal entity 
and not as a tool used by people for purposes. 
This is a contentious position to take in view of the 
influence of those philosophers I have just named. But 
I think it is the right position to take. I will now 
attempt to back up this claim with both philosophical 
argument and evidence from psychologists like Brown and 
Bruner as to how children do aquire language. 
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Meaning and Truth. 
In his article, 'Truth and Meaning', (Synthese 
xvii -'67), Donald Davidson attempted to adapt work by 
Tarski ('The concept of Truth in Formulised Languages' 
in the book 'Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics') to give 
.' .' . 
a theory of meaning for natural languages. This approach 
involves giving the truth conditions of a sentence S 
of any object language in terms of a meta-linguistic 
structural description of that sentence in strictly 
non-intentional terms. There are a number of technical 
problems with Davidson's original account which are 
thoroughly discussed in the book 'Truth and Meaning' (ed. 
Evans and McDowell). But what I am concerned with here 
is the assertion, central to Davidson's thesis on meaning, 
That meaning can be discussed independently of discussion 
of what paople do with language. This is an important 
point as, despite the fact that the detail of Davidson's 
own theory of meaning has been disputed, there is a great 
deal of work being done based on his central belief that 
the meaning of language can be elucidated fully in 
extensional termS without recourse to discussion of an 
utterer's intent. 
There are a number of problemswith Davidson's theory, 
for instance how can the meaning of an order, like, 
"Get Out!" be elucidated in terem of truth conditions? 
But such quibbles don't really get at the important point 
which is the question of whether we should take a formalised 
theory of the Davidson-type seriously as a contender 
for the role of a theory of meaning appropriate for 
natural languages. My personal feeling is that we should 
not. 
Davidson himself, in an article in the Evans/McDowell 
book, seems to have admitted a basic fallacy in his approach· 
• 
He wrote: 
" ••• ,my mistake was to overlook the fact that 
someone might know a sufficiently unique theory ••• " 
(for produCing the -metalinguil:itic des~ri"Ption)" 
Ii thout knowing that"'i t was su.rf~Ciently 1ln~que. 
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The distinction was easy for me to neglect 
because I imagined the theory to be known 
by somebody who had constructed it from the 
evidence, and such a person could not fail to 
realise that his theory satisfied the constraints. n 
Thus, the existence of the theory is not enough, 
someone must both know it ~ know what sort of theory 
it is. The trouble is that this understanding of the 
theory, by a potential user, is not, in principle, 
includable in a Davidson-type theory which is supposed 
to explain such understanding. Davidson's initial theory 
was one of translation and it failed. But beyond this 
I wish to suggest that even had Davidson's theory not 
failed for internal reasons it still would not be 
adequate as an explanation of how people can understand 
their native language. The crux lies in the dist:inction 
between knowing and following a theory and according 
with a theory. The point is that a Davidson-type theory 
might be produced for a language which made it possible 
for a theorist to write down the meaning of a 
sentence metalinguistically. But such an achievment would 
not in anyway establish anything about how people under-
stand their home languages unless a further claim was 
made to the effect that a native speaker's ability to 
speak a language can only be explained in terms of his 
possessing, in some sense, knowledge of a Davidson-type 
theory. But such a claim falls foul of an argument given 
in chapter 4 of David E. Cooper's book, 'Knowledge of 
Language'. This is a very important argument so I will 
repeat it. 
Cooper contrasts the behaviour of a foreigner who has 
learned English from a book with that of a native speaker 
of English who never possessed any sort of English text 
book. The case of the foreigner is very similar to that 
of a theorist who knows a Davidson-type meaning-theory. 
Both understand English because they know the rules of 
the language and they know the rules because they had them 
written down and learned them. Even if, after a While, 
such a rule-follower no longer needs his written rUles, 
and if, as he becomes more fluent in his use and under 
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standing of English, he even forgets the specific rules, 
we can still say he speaks English because he follows 
rules, and we can specify which rules lin principle 
if not in fact). This route to speaking English is obviously 
a paradigm example of rule following behaviour. Cooper 
calls it R.F.B.1. 
Now the native English speaker produces very similar 
b~haviour to that of our non-native English speaker. They 
both speak English. But in the native speaker's case there 
is a problem with talk of rules. This arises because 
any particular reference set of behaviour can be described 
by any number of logically distinct sets of rules. The 
logical distinctness can be achieved Simply by making 
sure that deleting of one rule from a particular set of 
rules {R1) produces a set of rules (R1-) which has a set 
of reference behaviour which is not coextensive with that 
of a set of rules {R2-) produced by deleting any number 
of rules from any other of the sets of rules other than 
the original R1. The problem is that the evidence 
available for the native speaker cannot, in principle, 
establish which set of rules he is following, whereas 
it is relatively easy to get hold of a non-native speake~s 
text book. 
This doesn't, however, mean that the native speakers 
mastering of English cannot be referred to as rule 
following behaviour. We can decide to call it rule 
following for no other reason than that it is similar 
to that of a nonnative speakers. And we know R.F.B. 1 is 
rule following. Cooper calls the native speaker's 
linguistic behaviour R.F.B.2. 
The problem for Davidson-type theories is that they 
have to argue along the following lines: 
• 
• • 
~i) person F1 produces R.F.B1 because he knows 
theory T. 
\ii) F2 produces R.F.B2 {practically 
indistinguishable from R.F.B2 ) 
\ii1) 22 knows theory T {in some sense). 
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But this mode of argument is invalid. If we call 
R.F.B2 rule following merely because it is practically 
indistinguishable from R.F.B1, we are using analogical 
extension. we merely decide to extend the use of 'rule 
following' to cases of R.F.B2. ~ut the above argument 
involves analogical inference, saying its similarity 
must mean it follows the same rules, and this is invalid. 
The argument is of the same form as: 
• 
• • 
li) P1 doesn't drink alcohol because he is a 
devout methodist. 
lii) P2 doesn't drink alcohol. 
\iii) F2 is a devout Methodist • 
It is the case ,though, that P2 might be total1y 
irreligious, and might love alcohol, but happens to 
have an ulcer which necessitates abstinence. 
This argument shows up the gap between theory and 
fact in explanations of how people understand language. 
People don't know any theories of the Davidson-type 
\or of the transformational grammar type), And, what's 
more,there is no justification for saying that his 
apparent lack of knowledge is due to the fact that our 
knowledge of such theories is tacit - Cooper's argument 
demonstrates this fact. 
The main gap between theory and fact in language, 
though, is that theories of the Davidson-type, of the 
Chomskyan kind, and those like Quine's in "Roots of 
Reference", are too well constructed. ~hese theorists 
lespecially Quine and Davidson's heirs - see the ~vans/ 
,i.'o'lcDowell book) are much better logicians than the rest 
of us and they make demands on their theories which we 
simply couldn't start to make in ordinary language. 
This leads Quine, on P100 of 'Roots of Reference, to write: 
"Quantification, in the form in which we have come 
to know and love it, is less than a hundred years 
old. ~till it is in principle a combination and 
excision of pre-existing idiom. It can be 
paraphrased into oldand ordinary English. By 
considering what steps could lead the small child 
or primitive man to quantification, rather than 
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to the less tidy referential apparatus of actual 
English, we arrive at a psychogenic reconstruction 
in skeletal outline. We approximate to the 
essentials of the real psychogenesis of reference 
while avoiding inessential complications." 
Coming from Quine, I find this highly disappointing. 
~he man who pointed out "the dangers of ascribing 
particular concepts to young children because their 
linguistic utterances did not adequately constrain the 
prQgmatically adequate interpretations possible, now tries 
to convince us that the rigorously worked out notion of 
reference which he, a formal logician, has come up with 
after a lifetime of research is the same notion of 
reference which people understand in the terms of the word 
'dog' referring to a dog in the world. The point which 
has to be made is the fact that many of the concepts in 
everyday use are confused and ~to the philosopher) 
confusing doesn't mean they don't eXist, or that they are 
unusable. In specialist contexts the understanding of 
reference in an everyday way might lead to problems. Thus 
Quine's revised language of reference might prove a useful 
tool in some contexts. But to try and produce an account 
of the psychogenesis of reference in terms of a 
sophisticated theory in formal logic is simply to make 
a mistake. 
In the first chapter of, 'An Introduction to the 
~hilosophy of Mathematics', Russell pointed out that 
what, psychologically speaking, constitutes our base 
in the concept of number, is, logically speaking, 
somewhere in the mid-range. In other words, Russell 
warned against silly ideas like assuming that, because 
people can count, they have, in some sense, knowledge 
of the axioms of the natural numbers. This, it seems to 
me, is exactly the sort of mistake which theorists like 
Davidson, Chomsky and Quine have made. Instead of seeing 
their theories as formalised descriptions, useful for 
certain purposes, they have seen their formal structures 
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as reflective of people's mental lives to an extent 
which the theoretical basis simply does not justify. 
The point is that a theory which, when known, would 
allow an a.lien to perform some human acti vi ty is not, 
because of this, an account of how the human mind 
functions. Consider the problem of how an archer gets 
an arrow to hit a target. To get a computer to perform 
this action we would have to programme it with laws of 
motion which take into account things like air resistance, 
wind-speed, force exerted by the bow, relative positions 
of bow and target, direction of wind etc. The computer, 
using modified Newtonian equations and current data on 
all the relevant variables would fire the arrow and hit 
the target. But human beings don't work like that. Our 
learning is hit and miss. The human order lets fly an 
arrow and looks where it goes, he then changes direction, 
elevation and strength of pull until the arrow goes 
where he wants it to go. A coach will give directions 
on the best way to hold the bow, position the feet etc., 
for success in hitting the target. After a while, through 
practise, the human archer might (or might not - success 
isn't guaranteed) manage to inCUlcate habits of posture 
and bodily movement into himself so that he is 
successful in hitting the target. 
ThiS,. I suggest, is how we learn language. We try 
to communicate and gradually, in a hit and miss fashion, 
come to acquire habits of speech which allow us to 
communicate successfully with others. To describe this 
process in terms of the acquisition of a body of 
theoretical·knowledge about language is simply to be 
wrong. Theoretical models of language have their uses. 
~avidson, for instance, seems mainly to have been 
interested in a theory of translation in the first 
instance. But one such use is B£! the description of 
the mental processes underlying language use. 
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~he fact is that the notion of there being an entity 
called language which we can acquire knowledge of is no 
more than an abstraction from the fact that certain of 
the expressive/communicative acts of people can be 
described as linguistic acts. Now the identification 
of a linguistic act does depend on the notion of a 
language being made up of a finite number of particles 
combinable in certain ways to produce significant 
~with the fo~m of life) utterances. But this is just a, 
formal classification of the ways in which people 
communicate, and a classification which is not widely 
observed by non-specialists - musicians often talk of 
music as a language despite the fact that it doesn't 
satisfy the formal syntactic criterion. 
Thus I maintain that the only way to grasp the 
significance of language, or any symbolic form, is to 
approach it in situe, to show how people come to use 
such symbols for purposes and with intent. In other 
words I maintain that the only way to explain the 
meaning of any symbolic expression, word or sentence, 
is to show the uses to which it can be put within a 
particular language game ~bearing in mind that it may 
have conflicting uses in different language games). 
All this might be thought of as too quick a dismissal 
of Davidson-type theories, but I don't think it is. I 
am not concerned with the internal problems generated 
in the attempt to construct a theory of this sort as 
I reject the claim that such a theory Can constitute 
an explanation of our understanding of linguistic 
utterances, even of statements lwhich is all a 
~avidsonian account is designed to deal with). 
Any formal description of the truth conditions of 
statements can only explain our understanding of 
statements if that understanding consists in knowledge 
of the theory which generates those descriptions. Cooper's 
argument undermines this suggestion with respect to 
the linguistiC abilities of native speakers of a 
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language - there just isn't any plausibility in the 
suggestion that people know ~tacitly or otherwise) 
Davidson's or any related theory. 
This objection could be resisted by suggesting that 
the sort of theory under discussion is a formal way of 
trying to discover what we must know if we are to use 
language as we do. The actual form of the theory, it 
might be suggested, is irrelevent, what is important 
is that the theory as written embodies the conceptual 
framework which we must arrive at if we are to be 
linguistically competent. What this approach is saying 
is that, once we have a Davidsonian ~or related) theory 
for any language, we can say that any speaker of that 
language knows the theory. Knowing the theory, on this 
line of argument, just i! being able to speak the 
language. The position adopted involves the acceptance 
of the assertion that a speaker's mastery of "his language 
consists in an implicit grasp of a theory of meaning for 
that language. 
Michael Dummet { in I What is a theory of meaning"(' -
in 'Mind and ~anguagel ed. Guttenplan) raises a number 
of objections to the Davidsonian approach, but doesn't 
seem inclined to take issue with the basic assertion 
that our ability to use language consists in tacit 
knowledge of a theory of meaning. His objections deal with 
the technical problems of Davidson's account which, he 
suggests, are unsurmountable. Dummet doesn's like the 
holism of the Davidsonian approach. After discussing 
particular problems he writes {P.138). 
" ••• the idea that we can ••• , by reference to 
the totality of all judgements made by speakers, 
obtain a single Uhiform representation of the 
manner i~ w~ich the bearers of all the names 
and the ex"tensions of all the predicates of the 
language are determined, overlooks the diversity 
of the many types of expression our language 
contains, and the gradations of level at which they 
lie. II 
171 
The details of Dummet's objections are available for 
anyone to look at, but my feeling is that he fails to 
engage with one fundamental problem - that of how, and 
in what sense, a formal description of how people use 
language, of what judgements the users of language 
make, can constitute an explanation of how it is that 
we can use language as we do. 
To identify the ability to use a language as consisting 
in (tacit) knowledge of a theory of the sort in question 
seems either to fall foul of Cooper's objection or to 
abondon its explanatory claims. If it is said that r can 
only speak English because I have tacit knowledge of a 
theory of meaning of a sort which a Davidsonian ~or 
related) approach is aimed at making explicit my reply 
is simply to raise Cooper's objection. 
1f the reply to this move is to say that my ability 
to speak English is not the result of my prior knowledge 
of the theory but rather that my ability 'consists in' 
my knowledge of the theory. then my rejoinder is that 
the theory has no explanatory power. I will explain. 
For simplicity let us assume there is a Davidson-type 
theory, T, which satisfies all the technical demands 
which logicians might make on it and which is the theory 
which, as a native speaker of bnglish, I am supposed 
to have tacit knowledge of. If my linguistic abilities 
consist in knowledge of T in a sense which avoids Cooper's 
objection then it seems to me that what is being said is 
that my knowledge of T and my ability to speak ~nglish 
are the same thing. 
What is undeniably the case is that I possess certain 
verbal dispOSitions, these dispositions ~re constitutive 
of my ability to speak English, what that ability consists 
in. But to say this does not in anyway explain my mastery 
of the English language. To say that I possess certain 
verbal dispositions which I share with most people who 
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live in England is to say that I speak English and in 
no way explains my ability to speak/understand the 
language. Further, to give a detailed formal description 
of those dispositions constitutive of my mastery of 
English makes no contribution to the task of explaining 
• 
that mastery. The explanatory part of any theory of 
meaning must, surely, say something about how mastery 
comes about. This is what a theory of the sort I'm 
discussing cannot do. To avoid Cooper's objection the 
protagonist of theory T must say that my ability to speak 
~nglish just is my knowledge of T, just is my possession 
of the relevant verbal dispositions. 
I'm labouring the point, but it is important to do 
so. Either my knowledge of T is said to explain my 
possession of the verbal dispositions, as my (primitive) 
knowledge of motorcycle mechani~s explains why I check 
for a spark, fuel blockages and dirt/water in the 
carburettor when my bike won't start, or else my 
knowledge of T and my verbal dispositions are the same 
thing. The former case is ruled out by Cooperls argument, 
the latter case is one in which my knowledge of T is 
identified with my disposition to use language in 
accordance with T. This involves the protagonists of 
T holding a dispositional account of knowledge and this 
is simply unhelpful. I do what I do when my motorbike 
won't start because of the relevant knowledge I possess, 
the fact that I know a little about motor cycle mechanics 
explains my disposition to do those things. To give a 
dispositional account of knowledge is unhelpful because 
it robs the statement' I do what I do because I know 
what I know,' of explanatory power. Under a dispositional 
account this statement is indestinguishable from 'I do 
what 1 do because I do what I do,' and this says no more 
than, 'I do what I do.' Thus T, whilst it might be 
useful, to linguists for instance, simply doesn't explain 
anything about my (or anyone else's) understanding of 
language and hence is inadequate as a theory of meaning. 
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In subsequent sections I will argue that the meaning 
of an utterance is to be analysed in terms of its speech 
act appropriateness within a form of life. It seems to 
me that 'theories of meaning' of a Davidsonian-type might, 
if technical problems such as those raised by Dummet can 
be overcome, prove useful as a way of translating 
statements in natural languages into statements ~n a 
rigorously defined metalanguage, thus 'exhibiting' 
the meaning of the naturally occuring language clearly 
and unambiguously to anyone who understands the metalanguage. 
This would make such a theory a useful technical tool. 
But in so far as a theory of meaning must solve the 
problem of explaining a native speaker's mastery of his 
language I believe that we must conclude that any theory 
of the Davidson type must be counted as inadequate. The 
central problem is that a formal description, for instance 
a law of gravity stated in mathematical form, is not an 
explanation. A satisfactory law of gravitiation must 
describe accurately what happens when a body falls under 
graVity, but the law doesn't explain what gravity is. 
Similarly even if a successful Davidsonian theory was 
forthcoming all we would have would be an accurate formal 
description, one with which our verbal activities would 
accord, but this accordance with the theory is not 
evidence that we achieve it by knowing and. following the 
theory in any sense beyond that~of R.F.B.2. Whatever a 
successful Davidson-type theory could achieve it simply 
cann~t solve the problem of explaining a native user's 
knowledge of .. his language. 
174 
Meaning and Use - Speech Acts. 
Talk of coming to grips with the problem of meaning 
by looking at how people use language has been seen as 
an important break through. But although its importance 
as a new direction for linguistic philosophy is 
indisputable, the notion of a 'use of language' is not 
as problem free as some philosophers have thought. 
Alston in his article 'Meani~g and Use' lin Parkinson), 
raises a number of questions about what the relationship 
between use and meaning is. He looks at examples of the 
kind: 
"The use of 'presumably' is inappropriate at this 
point. 
The use of sedatives is not indicated in his case. 
'A' used 'Communist' effectively. 
'Amen' is used to close a prayer," li.144), 
and concludes that such non-technical uses of 'use' are 
of little help to giving a useful explication of the 
meaning as use approach. 
Alston approaches the problem of meaning and use by 
noting that telling somebody the meaning of a word is 
putting him in a position to use it. He writes lP.146) 
"Ultimately a meaning-statement la statement as to 
- what a linguistic expression means) is to be tested 
by determining what people do in their employment 
of the expression in question. For in saying what 
the meaning of an expression is, what we do is not 
to deSignate some entity which could be called the 
meaning of the expression, but rather to exhibit 
another expression which has some sort of 
equivalance with the first ••••• e.g. 'Procrastinate' 
means 'put things off'." 
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The rest of Alston's article is taken up with attempting 
to elucidate this notion of equivalence of expressions. 
He comes down to the idea that expressions are equivalent 
if they can be substituted for one another in sentences 
without altering the illocutionary act potential of the 
sentences. Equivalence of sentences depends upon the 
equivalent sentences having the same illocutionary act 
potential. I will not go into the technical problems which 
arise from this approach and which lead Alston to produce 
more sophisticated versions of this basic account, designed 
to deal with the multivocality of expressions. I will also 
leave, for now, any discussion of illocutionary acts. 
what I want to look at as the idea that an adequate 
account of meaning can be got from this notion of sameness 
of meaning. Alston denies ~footnote E.159) that such an 
account makes meaning purely intralinguistic. His position 
is that the link between sameness of meaning and 
illocutionary acts and between such speech acts and the 
world keeps meaning linked, although indirectly, to the 
extra-linguistic world. But, although this assertion may 
well be correct, Alston doesn't explain the link between 
illocution and world and seems unable to do so. In a 
footnote ~~.164) he writes: 
"It seems that we cannot give an adequate account 
of knowing lor learning) the meaning of a word in 
terms of sameness of use. I can know ~learn) the 
meaning of 'tree' without knowing llearning) that 
'tree' has the same use as some other expression. 
But if we had an appropriate concept of the use 
of 'tree', we might well be able to show that what 
I know ~learn) when I know tlearn) the meaning of 
'tree' is that it has a certain use." 
I would suggest that Alston's article is useful in that 
it shows how language can grow by defining new terms 
reflexively. Thus a pupil in school can learn'1sos01es' 
as the name of a triangle with two sides the same so long 
as that pupil knows what a triangle is, knows. what the sides 
are and knows what it is for two sides to be the same. 
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But this sort of process, of which I will have more to say 
later, cannot be used to explain a child's first steps 
in language except in a slightly altered version. 
If we stress the importance of communicative and 
expressive acts when discussing the significance of 
symbols we can, I believe, get somewhere, Wittgenstein 
suggested in 'Investigations' that the language of pain 
replaces natural pain behaviour as an expression of pain 
and that pain words ( and sensation words in general) should 
not be thought of as the names of sensations. This idea 
of linguistic behaviour replacing pre-linguistic 
communicative/expressive behaviour has been taken up by 
some psychologists working on the acquisition and early 
development of language. In his lecture "Language and 
Experience". (in 'John Dewey Rediscovered' ed~ R.S. Peters), 
Bruner argues that long before a child's verbal utterances 
• 
can be plausibly called linguistic there arise procedures 
whereby mother and child ensure jOint attention. This is 
done, 
n •••• by monitoring each other's gaze direction, 
by using distinctive phonological markings, 
by developing primitive and idosyncontic labelling 
procedures, by developing demonstrative heuristics 
like showing etc." 
By the age of 1, months Bruner's experimental subjects 
were able to reply to questions like, "Where's the ball?" 
by pointing to the ball. Pure pointing, as a way of drawing 
attention to some object, had, however, appeared between 
12 and 13 months. Bruner's work shows clearly that the 
pre-linguistic communications between mother and child 
are very complex and that the child's communicative acts 
are very often instrumental, they are aimed at getting 
something, a toy, a sweetie, a kiss and a cuddle being 
amongst the most usual objects of desire. His work has led 
Bruner to write: 
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" ••• the child is in fact learning not so much a 
language, as how to proceed in achieving certain 
ends by the use of language. The input is not a 
corpus; the output is not a grammar." 
Going back to Alston's approach we could s~ggest that a 
child initially gets into language by discovering that he 
can achieve his ends better by linguistic means than by non- i 
linguistic means. In other words he is more likely to get 
his teddy-bear by pointing and saying something 
phonetically similar to 'Teddy,' than by pointing and 
burbling at random. This is a crude example, but adequate 
for my purposes. My suggestion is that if we look at what 
people do with symbols, including the highly ambiguous 
'symbols' defined between a mother and her (pre-linguistic) 
child, we can move towards getting a grip on the 
relationship between meaning and use. 
A baby wants something. He discovers, by trial and 
error, that by performing certain actions he can get it. 
Thus the actions become symbols in the making, although 
it is not clear at first whether the baby understands his 
actions as a means of communicating what he wants to his 
mother or whether he sees them vaguely as a way of 
getting what he wants. The child's actions, of course, 
can only be properly be regarded as symbolic when he 
understands that his actions only get him what he wants 
because his mother reads them as having significance. And 
it is unlikely that this happens at a very early age. But 
Bruner's data, including his observations that pre-linguistic 
children 'do learn to direct their mother's attention to 
things of interest, suggests that communicative intent 
of some sort is present before any linguistic competence. 
The details here don't matter particularly from a 
philosophical point of view. The point here is that the 
acquisition of language, in its first stages, can be looked 
at in terms of the child learning that a communication 
using specific verbal signs is likely to achieve the same 
ends as a communication not using such Signs, and is 
likely to do so more reliably. There is also evidence that 
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this tendency of linguistic communication to improve 
lin terms of reliability in achieving ends) on non-
linguistic communication is artificially arranged by 
mothers. Bruner, and Brown and Bellugi (in 'Language' ed. 
Oldfield & Marshall) in seperate research both remark that 
as children acquire more linguistic competence mothers 
begin to feign incomprehension of communications which, 
at an earlier age, were understood straight away. 
What I am suggesting here is that we should see the 
significance of a symbolic act in terms of what sorts of 
things we can do by uttering (or in general exhibiting) 
those symbols. Thus when we hear someone say something 
we understand them as doing something by using symbols 
which are defined interpersonally within a form of life 
as being appropriate for performing certain sorts of 
speech act. This is still vague, but it points out an 
important fact: that the meaning of words (or symbols in 
general) is a matter of what use any particular symbolic 
expression has within a form of life, and 'use' here is to 
be understood "in terms of an interpersonal agreement within 
a form of life as to which symbols are appropriate for the 
performance of certain sorts of communicative and expressive 
acts. 
Having got this far, my next step will be to look at 
Austin's, 'How To Do ~hings With Words." 
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Austin - How to do things with words. 
I am interested, in this section, in Austin's 
locutionary/illocutionary/perlocutionary act trichotomy. 
I will not, for reason's that will (hopefully) become 
clear, adopt Austin's approach, instead I will attempt 
to draw out ,trom Austin's account what I take to be an 
account of meaning more suited to educational purposes. 
In particular I will attempt to skirt the problem of what 
constitutes a communicative act. This is not because I ' 
regard the emphasis put on communicative intent by many 
writers (e,g. Grice and Strawson) as a wrong move. It is 
because I feel that a clearer account of meaning will be 
obtained if, for now, the probiems of communication are 
allowed to go through' on-the-nod'. I do not intend to 
ignore those problems, rather I prefer, for the sake of 
lucidity, to leave them 'til later. Thus, although I may 
seem to regard the comprehension of utterer's intent as 
unproblematic in what I write here, this should not be 
taken to mean that I am begging important questions. I 
am simply leaving them for later. 
According to Austin a locutionary act, n •••• is in the 
full normal sense to do something - which includes the 
utterance of certain noises, the utterance of certain 
words in a certain construction, and the utterance of them 
with a certain 'meaning' in the favourite philosophical 
sense of that word, i.e. with a certain sense and with a 
certain reference. "(lecture 8, first paragraph). An 
illocutionary act is performed in performing a locut10n~or, 
as Austin put,it: 
"To perform a locutionary act is in general, we may 
say, also and so ipso to perform an illocutionary 
act, as I propose to call it. To determine what 
illocutionary act is so performed we must determine 
in what way we are using the locution: asking or 
answering a question, 
giving some information or an assurance or a 
warning, announcing a verdict or an intention, 
pronouncing sentence, 
making an apPointment or an appeal or a criticism, 
making an identification or giving a description, 
and the numerous like. 1I 
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In Austin's usage the locution/illocution dichotomy 
parallels the 'meaning' ~i.e. sense and reference) / 
force dichotomy which I must deal with. As an illustration 
of this distinction I offer the following example. A 
friend seems to be taking seriously the idea of spending 
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Christmas in Siberia. I say, "It's cold in Siberia," to :! 
him {call this S). The 'mp.aningA ' ~Austin's sense) / force I 
distinction can be illustrated by approaching the significance i 
of 5 in two ways. 
First we can get the meaning A ~i.e. Austin's sense) ,., 
of S by noting the explicit informational content of 5, 
i.e. that information, or putative information, which can 
be got from 5 without reference to my intent in uttering 
it. If someone knows what it is to be cold im which ice 
is cold), knows what'Eiberia' refers to and understands 
the grammatical conventions governing the structure of 
sentences, then he has grasped the meanin~ -.of S. In 
using such terms as 'knowing what it is to be cold,' and 
'understands the grammatical conventions ••• ' I am begging 
a lot of questions which neither Austin nor Wittgenstein 
~whose work first moved towards looking at language in use) 
answered. These problems will be dealt with when I have 
extracted what I want from Austin's account and begin to 
fill in the detail of my own account. 
The illocutionary force of 5 is not necessarily 
dependant on its sense or reference ~although it may be.) 
No analYSis of a sentence in terms of the meanings of 
individual words or phrases and syntactic structure will 
necessarily give a clue as to the force with which it was 
uttered. Thus, 'It's cold in Siberia' whatever it means.1 , 
has a force beyond that meaning~,a force which has to do 
with my intent in uttering it. My friend who was considering 
spending Christmas in 5iberia would probably read my 
utterance of 5 more as an expression of disapproval than as 
a passing on of information. If I intend my utterance of S 
to expres8 and communicate my disapproval of my friends 
plan, and it he understands me as disapproving, then, in 
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Austin's terminology, I have performed, by uttering S, a 
felicitous illocutionary act, namely of disapproval. 
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In this example I could have used an explicit performative ~ 
for my illocution. I could have said., "I disapprove of ~I 
spending Christmas in Siberia because it's cold there," 1 
in which case the meaninSA of my utterance would also I 
make clear the illocutionory force with which it wasj 
uttered. ~ut in general we don't use such explicit 
performatives all that often, and in many cases there is 
no generally accepted way of making our intentions explicit. 
I could intend to insult someone by saying, "You have a 
mathematical understanding which is rivalled by that of 
a two year old chimp,H and I could be understood as 
uttering an insult by whoever I said it to. But. as 
Austin points out, insulting is not something which can 
be done by us~ng an explicit performative. In English at 
least the utterance, "I insult you," is simply not in 
general use. 
There are a number of problems arising from the 
locutionl illocution distinction and from the roles of 
intention and convention in performing those sorts of 
speech aot. The first point is that the distinction between 
locutionary and illocutionary acts appears to collapse 
under scrutiny. This is something which Austin himself 
points out. If I can say "Paris is the Capital of France," 
to someone as a bald statement, then 1 am doing nothing 
more than stating. But even if I have no other intention 
than to state, this is enough to allow it to be suggested 
that my utterance was an illocutionary act, an act witn 
the illucutionary force of a statement. It seems unreasonable 
to create a seperate category of speech act for acts of ~ 
stating as opposed to acts of warning or threatening or 
informing. It is true that Austin held that no illocutionary 
act could be said to have been performed unless uptake was 
secured, thus writing communication into his account. And 
this could allow locutions to be defined as statements 
made without any communicative intent, as mere expressions 
of knowledge or belief. But it seems to me that such a 
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move, although it might formally preserve the notion of 
a locution, would not be helpful in the task of writing 
a theory of meaning. 
Instead I prefer to make a break with Austin at this 
point, or rather I prefer to try to reformulate what I 
take to be the important aspects of Austin's locution/ 
illocution dichotomy in a way which I find more 
illuminating but with which Austin might not have agreed. 
I prefer to regard the making of a linguistic utterance 
as a speech act and to observe that there are two ways 
in which we commonly read such acts. The first way in which 
we read a speech act is by decoding it's informational 
content, by reading what it says about what. This is the 
same thing as grasping the meaningA of what is uttered 
without regard for the intent of the utterer and can be 
thought o£ as 'looking' at the utterance as a locution 
in Austin's sense. This involves grasping ~in a way to be 
elucidated in later discussion) the conventions governing 
the sense and reference of the words used and the 
conventions governing the structure of sentences. There is 
no problem about characterising the uttering of sentences 
with a specific meaningA, or informative significance as I 
prefer to cal~ it, or the grasping of the informative 
significance of sentences as a convention-governed 
activity. 
The second way of reading speech acts is by looking at 
the sentences or phrases uttered as being appropriate 
for certain purposes. Thus an utterance like, 'Get lost,' 
is learned, within certain forms of life, as a forceful 
way of telling someone to go away. And we read the utterance 
as revealing the utterer's intent that we really should go 
away, as well, perhaps, as an expression of the utterer's 
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annoyance at our l continued) presence in his proximity. r 
This reading of utterences as revealing an utterer's intentinnsi 
and as expressive of his affective stateS(i.e. feelings, 
emotions etc.) I wish to call reading the cognitive force 
of the utterance. Cognitive force is closely linked to 
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Austin's notion of illocutionary force, but my inclusion 
of the utterer's affective state in what is revealed by 
the cognitive force of an utterance makes it a wider 
notion. In general I want to define the cognitive force 
of an utterance as what it reveals about'the utterer's 
state of mind, the reasons behind his commission of the 
particular speech act including both intentions and 
affective states tincluding things like being in pain). 
I do not wish to write uptake into my notion of a 
speech act because, although communication is an important 
aspect of language use and although language acquisition 
is grounded in communicative interaction, we also use 
language in expressive ways. For instance if someone 
hammering away in the next room lets loose a torrent of 
abusive language I can reasonably grasp from his use of 
such language that something has gone wrong and that he 
is expressing anger, frustration and maybe even pain. 
There is no need for discussion of communicative intent 
in such a context, there is only a linguistic expression 
of certain affective states (and I use this term loosely) 
which is overheard and understood. It seems to me that 
Austin restricted his notion of an illocutionary act in 
a way which both complicated and cut down the scope of the 
notion. I wish to use my notion of cognitive force in a 
much wider way. My break with Austin will be justified 
or not by the work which I can get my notion of cognitive 
force to do within the wider context of my thesis. 
This reformulation, however, does not avoid one of the 
central problems with Austin's notion of an illocutionary 
act. Austin maintained that such acts were conventional 
in nature. He gave examples like those of an umpire saying, 
"Out!" a judge saying, "Guilty," both of which are 
conventional. ~ut there is a gap between conventionality 
of this kind where explicit rules are being followed and 
saying that disapproving of holiday plans by saying, "It's 
cold in Siberia," is a conventionally defined speech act. 
If illocutionary acts are conventional, or, in terms of 
~y refo~m~+~tio~L if the cognitive force of a speech act 
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is conventionally defined, then this conventionality 
must be something beyond the conventions which govern 
the informative significance of sentences. Otherwise 
cognitive force would not be distinct from informative 
significance. This point has been taken up by Strawson 
in his article, "Intention and Convention in Speech Acts," 
~re-printed in Parkinson - ~The Theory of Meaning.") 
Strawson doubts whether many cases of illocutionary acts 
do, in fact, involve conventions beyond those governing 
the meaningA of an utterance. He writes: 
"Surely there may be cases in which to utter the words, 
"The ice over there is very thin," to a skater is to 
issue a warning tis to say something with the force 
of a warning) without its being the case that there 
is any statable convention at all ~other than those 
which bear on the nature of the locutionary act) 
such that the speaker's act can be said to be an 
act done as conforming to that convention." 
Strawson is here suggesting that although there are clear 
cases in which context bound conventions define the force 
of an illocutionary act, this does not mean that there are 
always these 'extra' conventions ~beyond those governing 
meaningA) governing illocutionary force. In the above .. 
context, "The ice over there is very thin," functions 
as a warning not because its use is governed by explicit 
convention of the sort that makes, "Guilty," an appropriate 
form of words for the foreman of a jury to declare a 
defendant guilty. Rather the appropriatness of. "The ice 
over there is very thin," depends upon its meaningA and 
upon the assumption within a form of life that thin ice 
is a danger to be avoided. Phis seems to suggest that the 
illocutionary tor cognitive) force of an utterance can depend 
directly upon the utterance's meaningA ~or, in my terms, 
informative significance) in the context of utterance. 
So the force of an utterance can derive from its informative 
significance in that cognitive force can derive from the 
bearing the conveyed information has on the likely, or 
usual \within a form of life), actions of someone in 
receipt of that information with respect to the state of 
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affairs specified. And this is to say only that if I am 
skating on a frozen pond and someone says to me, liThe ice 
over there is very thin," then, because 1 don't want to 
fall through the ice into icy water, I will probably take 
the information passed on to me as a warning to stay away. 
To read such an utterance in such a context as a warning 
is so reasonable that it would be unlikely that anyone 
intending it as a warning would feel it necessary to make 
the fact that it was intended as a warning explicit. 
But all this does not mean that cognitive force does 
not involve conventionality above that involved in defining 
the informative significance of an utterance. The generation 
of cognitive force may depend upon an utterance',s informative 
significance, but it must also be dependant on those 
SOCially defined presumptions and judgements constitative 
of a form of life. Cognitive force must derive from 
judgements made within a particular form of life about 
whether 'this' sort of statement in 'this' context 
constitutes a threat or a warning, politeness or rudeness 
or whatever. In other words a judgement about what sort 
of speech act is being performed from the point of view 
of its cognitive force and hence what sort of speech act 
someone from the form of life would normally be performing 
if he were to choose to use that form of words in that 
context. Knowing how to use words for their cognitive 
force is knowing what sorts of judgement are normally 
made within a form of life about what sorts of statement 
in what sorts ()f context. The assumption is that an initiate 
of a particular form of life, knowing the judgements likely 
to be passed on his utterances tin terms of cognitive force) 
can be held responsiblefor the cognitive force ot his 
actions. If he thought about what he was saying then he 
must have known what ju'dgements would have been made and 
hence must have acted intentionally. Evidence of 
thoughtlessness or of having failed to see an alternative 
interpretation may be regarded as mitigation in say, the 
case of of rudeness. In general, though, we tend to judge 
the utterance rather than the utterers intent. This can 
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lead to severe problems particularly for attempts at 
comnunication between language games. Judgements as to the 
cognitive forces of an utterance are conventions basic 
to a form of life and are a cultural variable and it 1s 
this variability which creates problems in trans-
cultural communication. 
The main point here though is that the appropriateness 
of a particular .locution (or utterance with a certain 
informative significance) for the performance of a particular 
illocution (or for carrying a certain cognitive force) 
should not be thought of as problematic. This problem 
arises only if we make the mistake of thinking that 
language is primarily concerned with producing utterances 
with a certain informative significance and that the making 
of utterances with a particular cognitive force 1s something 
we learn to do later, 
This, as Bruner has shown, is a misconception of 
language and its acquisition. Language is acquired as a 
way of doing things, not merely as a way of labelling 
and precisely specifying states of affairs. Learning how 
to make factual statements is an important part of 
language acquisition, but children also learn to ask for 
things, to ask questions, to report pain or hunger. And 
Bruner's research shows clearly that there is no 
psychological priority to learning how to make statements. 
Analysing the significance of linguistic acts in terms of 
informative significance and cognitive force will, I 
believe, prove useful. But a useful technical approach 
does not necessarily reflect the nature of what is analysed. 
Thus analysing meaning in texmsof informative significance 
and cognitive ~, does not imply that language use is 
compounded of two distinct activities any more than the 
fact that the analysis of the motion of a projectile through 
space is done easiest by taking components along three 
mutually orthogonal axes should be taken as evidence that 
r 
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the projectile is, in fact, moving in three directions 
at once. 
My contention is that we should regard language not 
as a formal entity to be analysed formally, but as a tool 
evolved by human beings and used for certain purposes. 
When we learn language we learn how to do things with 
words, we learn to state, ask questions, warn, threaten 
etc. by learning what forms of words are appropriate 
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for such acts. Thus as we learn to use language correctly I ::1 
within our native form of life we learn what sorts of 
linguistic utterances constitute what sort of speech acts 
in which contexts. One of the things we learn to do is to 
encode information in linguistic form and to decode other's 
utterances in order to acquire information, but we also 
learn how to act in other ways, we learn what sorts of 
utterance have what sort of cognitive force and when, how 
to ask for something to eat, or a new toy, how to say when 
we hurt, how to perform any number of speech acts for which 
the informative significance of the utterance is either 
instrumental in or irrelevent to the conveying of an intent 
or the expression of an affective state. 
In the case of speech acts in which intentionali~y is 
relevent conventionality plays a part in enabling us to 
make our intentions public. It plays a part by defining, 
within a form of life, the sorts of linguistic utterance 
which are appropriate for performing the various speech 
acts within certain broadly defined contents. These 
conventions are not all as fully defined as those 
governing informative significance. It is the caSe that 
we often mistake the intentions of others, but it is also 
the case that we usually manage to read them with 
reasonable accuracy. Expressive language is an odd case. 
We can use such language intentionally as in saying, "My 
hand hurts." But there are cases, such as saying when 
we miss the nail and hammer our thumb, where we simply 
let rip with no intention to do so - indeed we may be 
embarrassed by our own outburst. This seems to be a clear 
case where a linguistic outburst directly replaces saying, 
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"Ouchl" Similarly there are cases where people speak Ii 
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responses (like 'Ouchl), which are linked indexically with Ii 
particular affective states become suppressed and replaced I: 
with symbolic utterances which, nevertheless, still function, I 
in a sense, as indices. Most teachers know the value of 
being able to produee a fair copy of such behaviour as 
a way of emphasising a point when dealing with discipline 
problems. 
Ignoring, for the sake of clarity, those cases in which 
we lose control of some affective state and give vent to 
our feelings linguistically we can say something about the 
convention-dependance of the cognitive force of an 
utt~mce. What we learn, as we acquire language, are ways 
to act. In a linguistic act the motives behind someone's 
utterance may be many and complex - but such acts involve 
producing an utterance intentionally with a particular 
end in mind. Conventionality comes in because the forms of 
words appropriate to attaining the required end are 
specified interpersonally within a form of life. Thus, 
when we want to ask a question we use certain grammatical 
structures and certain vocal inflections. And the correct 
grammatical construction and correct vocal inflection is 
defined socially within a form of life. What form of words 
is appropriate for which speech acts is a matter of 
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convention. Thus the cognitive force of particular utterances ~ 
ii 
is a matter of convention. It is further the case that many :i 
of the conventions governing cognitive force are not 
grammatical. As with Strawson's example the cognitive 
force of an utterance can drive from the relation of the 
informative significance of an utterance to the assumptions 
basic to a form of life. We learn that to say certain 
things in certain contexts is rude or constitutes 
threatening behaviour, and so we become able to be 
intentionally rude or to threaten in similar contexts when 
we encounter them. But such assumptions, as they could 
logically be abondoned or exchanged for others, must be 
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regarded as conventional. I would argue therefore that 
cognitive force ~ dependant upon convention either 
directly as when syntactic structures appropriate for 
certain speech acts are specified or indirectly as when 
syntactic structure gives no clue as to cognitive force 
but the cognitive force is clear in the context of 
utterance to those who know the (conventionally defined) 
presuppositions and judgements constitutive of a form of 
life. 
the 
This implies a notion of conventionality which might 
well be regarded as problematic, much as the notion of 
rule following behaviour is problematic when the rules 
cannot be specified. This is particularly so in the case 
of the conventionality of the presuppositions constitutive 
i 
of a form of life. Talk of tacit knowledge of such convention 
merely obscures the difficultie3 involved. The problem of 
how people come to follow non-explicit conventions is the 
same as that of how people who know no explicit rules of 
language nevertheless accord with such rules in their use 
of language. It is a problem with which I will deal later, 
although I have said much that has a bearing on this problem 
in earlier discussion. 
I wish to draw attention once again, before going on 
to discuss Austin's notion of a perlocutionary act, to an 
important difference between Austin and myself. Although 
my notions of informative significance and cognitive 
force are closely related to Austin's notions of locution 
and illocution, I have not made my classification in terms 
of type of speech act. My classification is in terms of the 
sorts of significa.nce which linguistic utterances can have. 
Approaching meaning in this way enables me to avoid talking 
about the technical requirements of a communicative act. 
Within a form of life, and often within certain physical 
contexts, the conventions governing the forms of life (and 
hence the language game) establish which linguistic 
utterances are appropriate for what sorts of linguistic act. 
In my terms an utterance constructed and uttered in 
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accordance with the relevant rules in a particular 
context has a particular informative significance 
and/or a particular cognitive force whether or not 
anyone ~eads it. In saying this I am ignoring, to quite 
an extent, questions about communication, although it 
is obvious that in most cases an utterer makes his 
utterance intentionally, using the appropriate lwithin 
the form of life) form of words, inflections, bodily 
postures etc., and his intention will be correctly 
read by anyone from the same form of life. But this 
does not deal with the problems of communicative intent, 
it merely goes around them. My intention is to try to 
establish an account of the significance of symbols 
lparticularly language) without getting bogged down in 
discussion which, I believe, is best seperated from a 
discussion of meaning. ~his may leave a few loose ends 
and if it does then I will attempt to tie them off in 
my discussion of communication. 
One point to be made here is that, as I have said, 
I don't hold that in using language we do two distinct 
things corresponding to informative significance and 
cognitive force. Neither do I see any justification 
for restricting meaning to cover only sense and 
reference (i.e. what I have called informative 
significance). As far as I can see the meaning of a sign 
must be taken as the significance which that sign has 
under the relevant way~s) of looking. And, for language, 
at least, that significance consists of both informative 
significance ~what it says about what) and cognitive 
force lwhat it tells us about the utterer's intentions 
and affective states). Thus I regard myself as proposing 
a theory which deals with components of meaning, both 
components being defined conventionally in the sense 
that, within a form of life, certain forms of words are 
defined conventionally as being appropriate for certain 
speech acts in certain contexts. We may read other things 
from other's utterances, for instance social class from 
their grammar or geographical origin from their accent. 
, 
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But these are not to be included as part of the 
significance of the utterances as symbol. Hather it is the 
case that we can read linguistic and other symbolic 
utterances both as symbols and as indices. I will say 
more about this in later discussion. 
Austin's notion of a perlocutionary act is the most 
problematic of the three types of speech act he tried 
to specify. Austin wrote: 
"7here is yet a further sense lC) in which to 
perform a locutionary act, and therein an 
illocutionary act, may also be to perform an act of 
another kind. Saying something will often, or 
even normally, produce certain consequential 
effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions 
of the audience, or of the speaker, or of other 
persons, and it may be done with the design, 
intention, or purpose of producing them; and we 
may then say, thinking of this, that the speaker 
has performed an act in the nomenclature of 
which reference is made either lC.a) only 
obliquely, or even (C.bJ, not at all, to the 
performance of the locutionary or illocutionary 
act. We shall call the performance of an act 
of this kind the performance of a perlocutionary 
act or perlocution. tlecture 8). 
Austin gives examples, one of which is: 
Act lA) or locution 
He said to me, "You can't do that." 
Act lB) or illocution 
He protested against my doing it. 
Act lC.a) or perlocution 
He pulled me up, checked me. 
Act (O.b) 
He stopped me, he brought me to my senses etc. 
He annoyed me. 
A perlocutionary act is intended to produce some effect 
in the audience's thoughts, feelings, actions etc. If I set 
out to be rude to someone and they realise I am being 
intentionally rude, then I have performed a successful 
illocution, If they are offended by my rudeness, then this 
1. irrelevapt to my 8uQcessful performance of an 
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illocutionary act and it does not identify my act as 
a perlocution. A felicitous perlocutionary act requires 
both that I intended to achieve the particular end 
li.e. to offend) and that that end was achieved. 
-' 
This makes it difficult to distinguish between the 
consequences of an illocution and the effects of a 
perlocution. Austin's initial attempt at distinguishing 
the two was to say that a formulation like, "In shouting, 
'Stop!' he pleaded with me to stop," shows that shouting, 
"Stop:~ was an illocution whereas, "By shouting, 'Stop!' 
he pulled me up," shows it to be a perlocution. But this 
distinction between, "In x-ing he y-ed," and, "By x-ing 
he y-ed," is problematic and not a little stipulative 
in a dangerous way, being tied to a particular style of 
English. In any case, in lecture 10 of 'How to do things 
with words', Austin concludes that, " ••• these formulas 
are at best very slippery tests for deciding whether an 
expression is an illocution as distinct from a perlocution, 
or neither." 
The notion of a perlocutionary is the least worked out 
of Austints three classes of speech act. I cannot attempt 
to sort out the problems it embodies, and, indeed, have no 
real desire to do so. Instead T wish to once again draw 
what I take to be the important point from Austin's notion 
of a perlocutionary act and embody it in a notion of 
my own - that of the affective force of an utterance. 
The difference between my notion and Austin's will be 
seen easiest through an example in which person A 
frightens person B. Suppose B is afraid of spiders and is 
just about to enter the bathroom. A, who knows of B's 
fear of spiders, says to him, "There~s a spider in the bath, 
"lS). B stops, being afraid to enter the bathroom. Of the 
many possibilities I will consider two: 
1). There is a spider, A has seen it and wants to 
warn B about it. In this case A's action in uttering Sis, 
in Austin's terms, an 1llocution, so long as B understands 
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that A is warning him. 
2). There is no spider, A simply wants to keep Bout 
of the bathroom. In this case A knows of B's fear of 
spiders and his intention in uttering S is to keep B 
out of the bathroom by making him afraid to enter. This, 
in Austin's terminology, seems to constitute a perlocution. 
I make a break with Austin by saying that the affective 
force of S in both these examples is that of making B 
afraid. For me the question of A's intention in uttering 
S is irrelevant to the affective force lalthough not to 
cognitive force). For me the affective force of a sign with 
respect to any particular individual is the effect that 
sign has on that individual's affective state, feelings, 
emotions etc. I am making a further break with Austin in 
ignoring changes in actions. 1 do this because it seems 
clear to me that people act in all sorts of ways for all 
sorts of reasons. They may change what they are doing because 
they receive certain information, either about the world 
beyond their conversation or about the intentions, feelings 
and general attitudes of the person talking to them. They 
may also change their behaviour because what someone says 
to them disturbs them, upsets them or makes them happy. 
Thus I don't find it useful to talk in terms of the 
affective force of A's uttering S to B being to stop B 
entering the bathroom. Rather the affective force of 5 
was to make B afraid and B then didn't enter the bathroom 
because he was afraid to do so. B could have refrained from 
entering the bathroom for any number of reasons, for Instance 
if A has passed on the information that the floor had just 
been washed and needed a few minutes to dry. In this case 
~'s reason for changing his actions would be to do with 
the informative significance of A's utterance and nothing 
to do with anything remotely like affective force. 
Affective force remains the most problematic of my own 
notions. Certain considerations may require me to conclude 
that Affective force is not part of the meaning of a symbol 
in the interpersonal sense in which the conventionally 
defined informative significance and cognitive force are. 
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Rather affective force might turn out to be an extra 
and very personal dimension to the significance of 
signs. This will be looked at when I discuss the detail 
of my own account which 1 will begin doing by looking at 
the notion of informative significance. 
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Informative Significance. 
There is a case for arguing that the concept of 
information has accuracy written into it. In other 
words that whatever is conveyed by a fals~ statement 
is not properly to be called information. Such an 
argument would imply that my use of 'information' 
in my notion of informative significance is improper. 
Alternative terms like 'propositional significance' 
might be suggested, but I want to talk about the 
informative significance of non-linguistic symbolic 
representations like graphs and blueprints and, as 
Scrimshaw has argued ( Statements, language and art:some 
comments on Prof Hirst's paper), it is wrong to talk 
about propositions in a non-linguistic context. Thus, 
as far as I can see, my only course is to apologise 
for any violence my present use of the word 'information' 
may do to the ordinary language concept and state that 
I use the word 'information' here without prejudice to 
the question of whether what is conveyed is true or false, 
accurate or inaccurate. 
The notion of informative significance is to do with 
the idea that information can be encoded symbolically 
according to rules established within a form of life. 
Thus the passing on of information between two people 
depends upon the participants in the interaction 
. 
according with the same set of encoding/decoding conventions. 
This much is relatively unproblematic. Problems arise 
when we look at how people within a form of life come 
to accord with a particular set of rules in their use of 
language and other symbol systems. Ideas like Chomsky's 
ascription of innate knowledge of the rules of deep grammar 
are not particularly helpful here. In terms of Cooper's 
argument 19iven in detail in 'Meaning and Truth'- above) 
everyday language use is R.F.B. 2 - it is called rule 
following because what people do is done as if following 
rules, but, in principle, there is no way of specifying 
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which set of rules is being followed. Thus it is 
impossible (in principle) for Chomsky to say what 
it is that we have innate knowledge of and hence 
his claims for innate knowledge seems unjustifiable. 
We do not know any set of explicit rules of language, 
but linguists can produce sets of rules which Ifit' 
linguistic behaviour, with which our everyday uses of 
language accord. What is needed is a genetic account 
of how children acquire language skills. Psychologists 
like Bruner Bnd Brown are working in this area. I will 
make reference to their (as yet incomplete in Brunerls 
case) work in trying to give a genetic account of how 
people within a form of life are able to learn to encode 
and decode information symbolically, and hence give 
substance to my notion of the informative significance 
of a symbolic representation. 
The first step in this process is that of learning 
to label aspects of the world linguistically. There is 
no great problem here. As Bruner's work shows shared referenc@ 
is established between mother and child at a pre-linguistic 
stage, at first through activities like monitoring each 
other's direction of gaze and later through pointing. 
The:~onitoring of gaze direction seems to me to be an 
unlearned activity and Bruner also seems to be inclined 
to believe that the progression from grasping to pointing 
is also a matter of development. These phenomena, together 
with a tendency to conceptualise experiences in certain 
broadly similar ways (which, as I argued earlier, we must 
have if langua~e is to be possible) seem to constitute 
the innate basis of language acquisition. The details are, 
of course, a matter for psychology rather than philosophy. 
Given that shared reference is established before any 
of the child's vocalisations can plausibly be described 
as linguistic the problem of how a child comes to acquire 
his first words is rendered much less problematic. The 
mother uses a word like, say, 'Teddy' when both she and 
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her child are attending to his teddy bear and, after 
a while the child catches on and uses the sound, 'Teddy', 
to ask for the bear. Bruner, again, described how games 
of give and take, coming to involve 'naming', were common 
between his experimental subjects and their mothers (and 
between the children and the researchers). At this pOint, 
though, the word, 'Teddy', cannot be classified as a 
name or as anything else. This follows from Quine's point 
(in 'From a Logical Point of View') that we can only 
specify a child's linguistic concepts when his use of a 
ccncept-word is sufficiently sophisticated to limit the 
pragmatically adequate interpretation of the word as used. 
That the child associates the word with the object is 
clear at an early age, but the child will often use the 
word not merely as a name, he will also use the word with 
the force of a demand or a request. From the point of 
view of informative significance, however, we can say 
that as soon as the child's use of a particular linguistic 
aign becomes clearly associated with a particular object 
or class of objects, then its referent is established, 
the word is associated with a particular aspect of 
experience. To make this move is to ignore those aspects 
of language use which are not relevant to informative 
significance. I must again stress that this is a formal 
move designed to make my account more clear. I am not 
suggesting that acquiring the ability to encode/decode 
information has any psychological priority in language 
acquisition. The evidence suggests that it does not. 
The process of acquiring first words is clearly a 
matter of trial and error. Brown, in his article 'How 
Shall a Thing be Called', (in Language' ed: Oldfield 
and Marshall), quotes the example of Wilhelm Stern's 
son Gunther who created words 'psee' for leaves, trees 
and flowers, and 'bebau' for all animals. He also quotes 
Lombrose's report of a child who used 'qua qua' for both 
duck and water and 'afta' for drinking glass, the contents 
of a glass and a pane of glass. Less creative are the 
frequently occurring cases of children who, learning the 
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word 'cat' proceed to call anything furry and four legged 
a cat, or those who use something like 'Dadda', for 2]1 
men. The narrowing down of the scope of referring words 
and the modification of the words themselves occurs through 
repeated correction by the mother. This requires the child 
to grasp some notion of negation but this again is 
unproblematic. In the pre-linguistic mother-child 
interactions the child learns that some actions are proper 
and some improper. Bruner has described games where the 
mother builds up a tower of building blocks and the child 
demolishes it. The child quickly learns to wait for 
completion before knocking the structure down. Bruner also 
describes the case of a child of seventeen months who, 
upon approaching a chair upon which he was not allowed 
to climb, was heard to mutter, "Nonononono •••• " in a 
long string. Thus an idea of negation related to a notion 
of what is not allowed seems to be an early acquisition. 
The acquisition of first words as having referrents 
in the world, then, is not problematic, although the 
restriction of the referrent class for the various words 
to the range which is socially defined takes time to be 
achieved. But at this stage the child's linguistic 
capabilities are severely limited and althou~h his 
repertoire may include count nouns (like book), mass 
nouns (like 'gas') and names for perceptual qualities 
(like 'red'), there is no justification for assuming 
that the words are differentiated in any way - that is 
something which comes later. Thus we can say that, at the 
most basic level, the informative significance of a 
referring word derives from its aSSOCiation, defined 
publicly and learned by a process of trial, error and 
correction, with some aspect of the world. 
The next step in a child's early language is that 
of a move to 'telegraphic' speech. McNeil in an article 
'The Creation of Language' (again in Oldfield and Marshall) 
quotes Brown's work with Adam, an American boy. Some of 
Adam's first sentences were: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
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Two Boot. 
Hear Tractor. 
See truck~ M~my. 
Adam make tower. 
A gas. 
These utterances exhibit a number of features. First 
is the fact that (ii) and (iii) are examples of attention 
directing utterances, demonstrating that speech acts with 
specific cognitive force are an early lineuistic phenomenon. 
Sentences (i), (iv) and (v) are more interesting from the 
point of view of informative significance. But all five 
examples (and most telegraphic sentences recorded according 
to McNeil) show a grasp of correct subject-predicate 
ordering. It is this jump from single word utterances 
to sentences in which word order is arranged according 
to certain simplified semantic rules that psycho-linguists 
claim is impossible to explain except in terms of an 
innate knowledge of deep grammar. 
The important point is that getting the words in the 
right order requires that the child should possess a con-
ceptual framework with respect to the words he knows which 
classifies them as words of different sorts. Once the 
child possesses such a claRsification of words he can, 
by grasping that his mother's sentences put the words of 
different sorts in certain ordera, generate new sentences 
by fitting different words of the same class in the correct 
pOSitions in sentences, the correct pOSitions being those 
in which his mother puts words of that sort. The research 
on Adam was carried out by Brown and Bellugi (1964) who 
concluded that Adam haa three categories of words. Words 
like 'boot', 'tractor', 'truck', 'mommy', 'tower' and 'gas' 
were used in a way which suggested that they were 
categorised as nouns. 'Hear, 'see', and 'make' functioned 
like verbs. The rest of Adam's words were classified as 
modifiers by Bellugi and Brown and were a mixture of types 
of word from the point of view of adult grammar. There was 
no evidence of any more subtle sub-classifications within 
the broad 'noun and 'verb' classes. 
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The establishment of the 'noun' class is, from the 
evidence, the initial step in language. First words 
tend to be labels for discrete and enduring objects 
of experience - this is a rudimentary notion of a noun. 
The establishment of a seperate class of verbs is probably 
made necessary by the fact that these words do not fit in 
easily with the 'thing'-labels which are the nouns. A 
word like 'make' will not readily be associatable with 
a particular class of object. But the child, through 
pre-linguistic interaction with his mother, will have 
some concept of 'doing', of action, even if the concept 
is something like, 'what an object does in achieving 
an effect'. Some of the words which don't work as labels 
for discrete objects ('nouns') will, nevertheless, work 
as names of actions. In grasping this the child will 
arrive at a seperate classification, that of 'verbs' 
(although the conception at this stage will be crude in 
the extreme). 
The class of modifiers will be 1efined negatively 
for the child, as being words which are neither 'nouns' 
nor 'verbs'. The child will learn to use such words in 
so far as there is a regularity in where they occur in 
sentences with respect to the nouns and verbs, so that 
if 'a' turns up regularly before a noun in his mother's 
speech, that relation will be grasped. Correct ordering 
of nouns and verbs will similarly be achieved by imitation 
not of particular utterances, but of the way the mother 
orders her classes of word. In this way the child can 
acquire the habits of ordering words correctly without 
there being any question of his acquiring a body of 
theoretical knowledee about his native language's 
grammar. It is interesting to remark here that Bru~er 
and others have noted that mothers tend to use a 
simplified mode of language when speaking to their 
children in which clues as to word order are not 
obscured by the use of more complicated grammatical 
constructions used by adults. Fraser, Bellugi and Brown, 
in an article 'Control of Grammar in Imitation, 
Co~prehension and Production', report that in three year 
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olds comprehension of the passive voice (in which the 
order of subject and object is reversed) is very poor. 
This seems to be in keeping with the idea that a child's 
initial experiences of language are made more ea~ily 
comprehensible by the mother using a simplified form 
of language in which the rules are much more straight 
forward than those of the fully fledged adult language. 
Finally, in this digression into psychology, I must 
sketch the move from telegraphic to more syntactically 
whole language. What happens taccording ro Bruner and 
others) is that the moth~r 'ups the ante~ on communication. 
She will feign incomprehension of perfectly comprehensible 
telegraphic utterances in order to push the child towards 
using sentences which fit in with the normal syntactic 
etiquette of the form of language. The child is forced 
into acquiring more complex habits of speech in order 
to communicate. 
All this may seem both sketchy and not fully relevant 
to what is supposed to be a di~cussion of informative 
significance. The sketchiness, I hope, will be excused. 
I have simply tri~d to give an idea of how a child might 
come to ~cquire the ability to construct novel sentences 
(i.e. sentences not heard by him before). I have tried 
to show that there is no need to explain this process 
by recourse to anything like innate knowledge of the 
deep grammar of language. As for informative significance, 
I believe that looking at the way in which a child makes 
his first steps in language suggests an account of what 
the informative significance of a linguistic utterance, 
or any symbolic representation, consists in. 
I have already argued that the informative significance 
of individual referring wc~ds results from the association 
of the word, in people's minds, with a particular aspect 
of experience. This doesn't explain how competent language 
users distinguish between referring words like 'dog' and 
'red~ but I will leave that problem until a li~tle later 
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in this discussion. The relationship between individual 
referring words and the world of experience, then, is 
that in learning to use those words we impose a 
particular mode of classification onto the world, each 
referring word labels a sub-set of experience. More 
complicated sentences derive their informative significance 
by specifying an intersection between these sets or a 
relation between them. 'Red door' specifies a subset of 
experience which is properly subsumable under the set-
heading's 'red'and 'door'. Word order here is simply a matter 
of syntactic etiquette within the form of language. In 
English we say 'the red door' in French the order is 
different: 'la porte rouge'. 
Relation words are more problematic. 'The cat is on 
the mat' can be reduced to 'C8t on mat' without loss of 
informatiY8 significance, the rest of the fully fledged 
sentence consists of what I have called syntactic etiquette 
it is the extra trimming which is part of the way one says 
things and is theoretically irrelevent to the informative 
significance, we learn it because we want to co~unicate 
felicitously - without our linguistic advances being 
rejected. 'Cat' and 'mat' in 'Cat on mat' are straight 
forward referring words. The 'on' is a problem with which 
I haven't yet dealt, but I don't think it to be a 
particularly difficult one. 
In making statements we report states of affairs (or 
putative states of affairs). The referring words we use 
pick out the relevant 'things' involved in the state of 
affairs, the relation words pick out relations between 
those things, Once a child has grasped the meanings of 
the referring words he can grasp the meanings of relation 
words by relating sentences like, say, 'cat on mat' to 
a state of affairs in which the cat is indeed upon the 
mat. The onus,-.of course, being-on the mother to make 
sure it is. Thus, 'cat on mat' or, later, 'the cat is 
on the mat' becomes a linguistic label for a particular 
state of affairs ~ a way of reporting that state of 
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affairs to others within the form of life. 
What I am suggesting is that the informative 
significance of a symbolic representation derives from 
conventions which relate the elements in the representation 
and the structure of it (i.e. the ordering of the 
elements) to a subset of the world of experience. A 
symbolic representation has informative significance 
in so far as it specifies, according to the conventions 
operant within a form of life, a particular subset of 
experience or putative experience. This suggests an 
approach to the truth of empirical statements. If I say, 
'The front door of this house is red' (assuming that 
in the context of utterance 'this house' has an 
unambiguous referent) then I am over-specifying a 
state of affairs, 'The front door of this house ••• ' 
specifies a subset of possible exp~rience - we can go 
and look at it. The addition of ' ••• is red' suggests 
that if we do go and look at the front door we will see, 
when we look at it, something properly describeble as red. 
The truth of an analytic statement like "All unmarried 
man are bachelors' will derive simply from the fact that, 
according to the relevant conventions, anything labellable 
with the phrase 'unmarried man' will be also properly 
labellable with the word ~achelor'. This, however, is • 
a digression. 
So far, in this discussion, I h~ve laid a great deal of 
emphasis upon the relation between langua~e and actual 
experience. This arises out of my interest in language 
acquisition in which process the relating of linguistic 
utterances to states of affairs actually perceived 
is of paramount importance. But languaee, in its fully 
developed form, is not tied down in any way. The fact is 
that once we have acquired a reasonable proficiency in a 
small area of language we can advance in our language 
skills by 'boot-strapping'- we can use language in order 
to learn more about language itself. 
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A word like 'Unicorn', for instance, has no 
existing referent. But it is, nevertheless a 
referring word. We can learn this in two main ways. 
We can encounter the word in use and, by its position 
in sentences (as a subject, say), by the fact that 
certain attributes are predicated of it, we can 
conclude that a Unicorn is a 'thing' of which certain 
things are true. Alternatively we can be told that a 
Unicorn is a horse with a single horn in the middle of 
its forehead - someone can define the word for us. And 
such a definition is creatine a sub-set of putative 
experience for us which we can comprehend with a little 
imagination even though we cannot, in fact, have the 
experience of seeing a Unicorn. Similarly we can recognise 
a relation word or a verb by the ways in which it is used 
even though we don't understand it, and, again, we can be 
given an explanation in terms which we do understand. 
There also symbols which have no direct relation to the 
world of experience, for instance those of pure 
mathematics and formal logic. But in everyday languaEe we 
are used to words like 'and' and 'not' which, although 
they have no referents, perform a role within the symbolic 
mode. So it's not impossible, although most people find 
it difficult, for us to imagine a whole mode of symbolic 
representation in which a symbol's only significance 
is its role within the system. Such formal systems do 
not, of course, have informative significance beyond that 
deriving from our knowledf,e of the systems syntactic 
rules. But formal systems are like that anyway. The 
introduction of the notion of a formal variable having 
an existing reference class, as in applied mathematics, 
is well known to be problematical in the extreme. 
Three areas of lack of clarity remain in my account 
80 far. First I have not made clear that conte1~ plays 
a part in establishing the meaning of words. Some words 
are multivocal, for instance sensation in, " It was a 
strange spinning sensation," and, "This film is a sensation." 
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Goodman, in 'Languages of Art', suggests that we should 
regard such words as being examples of two symbols which 
have different, sometimes related, meanings but only one 
set of inscriptions. Alternatively we can regard such 
words as being one symbol with two senses. I personally 
find Goodman's analysis less confusing. But whatever 
account of multivocality is adopted it is clear that the 
meaning of a multivocal utterance in a context is usually 
clear from the context of utterance. This is not always 
the case - the 'imprecise1use· of ambiguous terms is a 
common device in poetry. Other worns like 'this' or 'I' 
depend irrevocably on the context of utterance for the 
specification of their referents. 'I' always refers to the 
utterer, except in reported speech. And words like rthis' 
and 'that' depend either on grammatical conventions 
governing which, more explicit, referring word they 
stand instead of or upon some extra-linguistic procedure 
like pointing. Such considerations do not affect my 
explanation of informative significance, they simply 
demonstrate that language is a tool which people use 
mainly in interpersonal communication and not merely 
a carefully defined system for accurate description. 
The second area I have not yet covered is the question 
of how words become differentiated into classes like 
words which are the names of physical objects and words 
which refer to perceptual qualities. This again is a 
matter of context, but in the wider sense of what sorts 
of linguistic context those words have a use in. More 
familiarly we can see that such distinctions arise from 
the different sorts of words having a role in different 
language games. We can say, "Red is bright," but not 
"Red is big," and we can say, "Elephants are big," but 
not "That door is Elephant,". This may seem to reflect 
something about the world, but I suggest that this is 
not obviously so. In later discussion I will deal with 
the relation between our ways of describing the world 
and its nature, with the problem of which way of talking 
about some phenomenon or class of phenomena constitutes 
i ' 
: I 
i I . 
I ' 
i 
!I 
, ~ 
206 
a better understanding of the world and in what sense. 
It seems to be a feature of the ways in which human beings 
view the world that discrete and enduring physical objects 
are given a primacy within our ontologies. But it is a 
matter of contingent fact, not of logical necessity, 
that this is so. It may seem slightly fanciful, smacking 
of science fiction, to postulate a world in which physical 
objects don't have priority. But, as Quine has pointed 
out, without placing a word like 'dog' in the context 
of an entire language we can't be sure whether it means 
'dog' in the sense which we, as initiates of a particular 
language, understand the word. Physical objects could be eon-
ceived as ~erely transitory manifestations of some 
permanently enduring essence - 'dog' in this mode of 
conceptualising being best translated into our way of 
conceiving as something like, "thither dogium." 
It is the division of language into various language 
games that classifies words in~o different types, and 
the use of a word from a particular language game 
carries connotations with it, derived from other ~ords, 
, 
other modes of talking which are constitutive of the 
language game being evoked by that use. The important 
point here if that the fact that we say, "The leaf is 
green," makes it odd, but not incoherent, to imagine 
a language in which the same state of affairs would be 
properly reported by, "The green is leafy." Again this 
point elaborates rather than opposes my earlier account 
of informative significance. 
Finally I have to clear up the relation between the 
informative significance of a symbolic representation 
and actual experience. I have said that the relation 
between symbolic representation and the world of 
experience ,is established via a system of classification. 
a conceptual framework, which specifies the symbol as 
representing a sub-set of possible or putative experience. 
This should not be taken as meaning that any symbolic 
representation which is informatively significant must 
define a sub-set of possible (in prinCiple if not in fact) 
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experience. This is usually the case, but need not be 
so, as in the case of a false empirical statement which 
specifies a state of affairs which, on investigation, 
turns out not to exist. 
There are other possibilities. Consider the following, 
remembered from my schooldays: 
One fine day, in the middle of the night, 
Two dead ~en got up to fight, 
Back to back, they faced each other, 
Drew their swords and shot each other. 
This verse has informative content, just as the phrase, 
, a square circle' has. But it cannot possibly (both in 
principle and in fact) describe any state of affairs 
which could exist. It involves intersections of sets 
of experience which could not possibly intersect (e.g. 
men facing each other back to back) and therefore although 
separate parts do refer to possible experience their 
conjunction cannot (we can have a state of affairs A, 
and one..,A, but -(A • .vA)). Our reaction to such 
conjunctions depends upon context. In the case of the 
rhyme we are amused, if something of the sort turns up 
in a judge's summing up we are outraged. Normally the 
informative significance of a symbolic representation 
does specify a subset of possible experience. But 
sometimes the intersection of sets of possible experience 
invoked is, in principle, empty, so that there could not 
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be an instantiation of it. For this reason it is better ij 
to say that a symbolic representation's informative 
significance derives from its invocation of a particular 
intersection/concatenation of categories of possible 
or putative experience, that invocation being dependant 
upon the reader's correctly reading referring words as the 
appropriate concept headings and grasping what sorts of 
intersections/spatial relations are specified by the 
representation's (syntactic in the case of language) 
structure. 'Putative' is included here to cover those 
intersections/concatenations which are, in fact, impossible 
by definition. 
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A final remark must be about referring words for 
which the referent's existence is problematic. Amongst 
such words are 'meson' and 'quark' from particle physics, 
and 'God'. Such words are not really problematic, they 
are not words leBrned in naming the extra-linguistic world, 
They are words which have a role within language and our 
understanding of them depends on their use within a 
form of language, which. marks them as referring words 
independantly of any question of beine able to point 
at their referents. In other words we acquire the notion 
of a referring word by using such words to label aspects 
of our experience. We then learn that referring words 
function in certain ways within language. And finally 
we identify anything which fulfills those roles as a 
referring word ~ whether or not there is anything in our 
experience to which that word refers. 
The notion of informative significance having been 
discussed at length, I shall now move on to a 
discussion of cognitive force. 
209 
Cognitive Force. 
I have already said a great deal about cognitive 
force in my discussion of strawson's remarks about the 
conventionality of illocutionary acts. I need not 
reiterate my arguments for the assertion that the 
cognitive force of an utterance is conventionally 
established. But I will make some observations, that 
will, I believe, clarify the role of intention in 
purposely making an utterance with a certain cognitive 
force ( in performing an illocutionary act in Austin's 
terminology). 
I have said that the wayan utterance with a 
particular informative significance gains cognitive force 
is by being judged as rude, or polite, or being 
threatening or just as being informative (which 
approximates to being regarded as a locution). Such 
judgements are made not of the utterance alone, but of 
the utterance in the context of utterance. And those 
judgements are made against a backdrop of assumptions 
within a form of life which can be characterised as stan-
dards of propriety - what it is proper to say in what 
contexts. But here a problem arises about what is judged-
the utterance or the utterer's intent. It seems to me 
that the answer is that the utterance is judged, but 
together with that judgement should go the assumption 
that as that utterance in that context is, say, impolite, 
and as the utterer, being an initiate of that form of life, 
knows this, then it is reasonable to conclude that that 
person, having knowingly used a form of words which was 
impolite, was being intentionally impolite. And this being 
the case any factors suggesting that the utterer does not 
know what cognitive force that utterance has in that 
context (and within that form of life) should mitigate 
his impoliteness. One such factor, of course, would be 
if the utterer was an initiate of another form of life _ 
particularly if that form of life uses a different language. 
Thus, when I visited my French pen-friend whilst at school, 
I was allowed to get away with addressing his father as 
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'tu' on occasion whereas my penfriend would have been 
pulled up for such lack of respect. My lapses were put 
down to lack of command of the French language not to 
a lack of respect for my penfriend's father. 
Thus, within a form of life, it is the utterance 
in context which has the force and the utterer's 
intent is deduced from this via the assumption that he 
knows what force the utterance has in the particular 
context and that he used that utterance intentionally. 
Any factors which explain that he did not or could not 
have known that his utterance in that context had that 
force establish that he was not being (say) intentionally 
rude. This is not to say that it is proper to talk about 
unintentional rudeness. It is to point out an important 
area where break-downs in communication can occur. If it 
is agreed that it is impolite for a guest to implicitly 
insult his host, then it is impolite for someone who is 
a guest in the hOl1se of a portrait painter, say, to make 
disparaging remarks about one of his hosts paintings 
even if he thought it was a bad portrait. Put if, for 
some reason, the guest failed to connect host and painting, 
perhaps by describing a painting he saw which he thought 
was terrible, but the name of the painter of which he had 
forgotten, then he might commit the faux pas of condemning 
his host's work. If the guest had not made clear that he 
had forgotten who painted the portrait, the host and 
other guests might construe from his remarks that he was 
intentionally insulting the host. This, however, would not 
be the case and the unfortunate amateur critic might 
mitigate hie rudeness later by revealing the fact that 
he didn't know that his host and the painter were one 
and the same person. In this cast the guest would not 
be guilty of rudeness although he might be considered 
guilty of excessive stupidity (or a victim of unkind fate). 
But the painter might continue, if the misfortune were 
not explained to him, to consider the guest to be an 
extremely unpleasant and impolite person. Such occurence~ 
where one person's judgement of theciognitive force of 
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another's utterances are based on the assumption that 
the utterer knows something,which, in fact, he doesn't 
know, are not at all uncommon. I would suggest, then, that 
for the utterer's intent to be clear, both utterer and 
audience must have in mind essentially the same 
specification of the context of utterance. If this 
condition is not fulfilled then misunderstandings are 
likely to occur. 
A particularly dangerous example of this sort of 
midunderstanding is when initiates of different forms 
of life come into contact. Here both parties may begin 
the interaction with goodwill, each observing his own 
standards of polite behaviour. But a failure to grasp 
that what constitutes politeness is a cultural variable 
may lead to alienation. Thus a small town shopkeeper in 
France might form a poor opinion of the English because 
some tourist leaves his shop without the usual nod and, 
"Monsieur," or the same tourist might feel annoyed about 
a waiter who offered him coffee and then took it away 
when he said, "Merii." 
There is a similarity between the 
wayan utterance reveals the utterer's intent or 
affective state and the way in which indices gain 
significance. The use of a p~rticular utterance indicates 
an intent or affective state, but whereas for indices 
the link between sign and what.is indicated is a matter 
of naturally occuring fact, the link between utterance 
and intent/affective state is a matter of convention. 
But there 1s one area where the index/symbol dichotomy 
is strongly linked. So far in this section I have 
concentrated on that aspect of cognitive force where the 
utterer's intent is revealed by his use of an utterance 
defined as having a particular force within a form of 
life, But there'is another aspect of cognitive force _ 
that of utterances defined as appropriate for the 
expression of affective states. And it is here where 
the strongest similarity between indices and symbols 
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can be found. 
We can read someone's blushing or stammering as 
indexical of nervousness, shyness or embarrassment. 
The tensing of muscles and the draining of blood from 
the face is an innex of anger. And crying or exclamations 
like, "Ouch!" are indices of pain. But such naturally 
occurring 'tell-tale signs' are also often accompanied 
by linguistic (and sometimes non-linguistic) symbols. 
And the naturally occurring indices of such affective 
states can even become completely suppressed and 
replaced by symbols defined as appropriate, within a 
form of life, for the expression of such states. 
These alternative expressions of affective states are 
defined interpersonally as appropriate for the job and are 
cultural variables (an English speaker who hammers his 
thumb instead of the nail might say, "Ch Dear" or "]3alls,"-
a French speaker would almost certainly say, "Merd e:"). 
And this establishes that such signs are symbols. But 
what is interesting is that in many cases where such 
utterances are used questions about utterer's intent seem 
inappropriate. . Someone hearing a flow of invective 
issuing from a room where hammering has been going on 
will assume, propably correctly, that something has 
gone wrong and if the invective is preceded by a yelp 
of pain then they will probably have an idea about what 
exactly it is that has gone wrong. But this is an 
example of reading an utterance without the utterer 
having intended to communicate anythingJhe was just 
expressing pain and/or fustration. 
In many contexts, though, expressions of affective 
states will be used intentionally to communicate that 
something has, for instance, annoyed us. An example of 
this is the teacher who 'hits the roof' in order to 
emphasise that a class has been behaving badly. This 
often involves the augmentation of the affective state 
with a little judicious acting. Many teachers regard 
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the ability to 'hit the roof' convincingly as a valuable 
part of their armoury. A display of anger or sorrow 
frequently has more impact on a class than a quiet and 
reasonable explanation of why the class behaviour was 
unacceptable,although such performances are best used 
as auxiliary to, rather than instead of, such explanations. 
It can be seen, then, that cognitive force involves 
two distinct (but not mutually exclusive in a particular 
utterance) elements: the revealing of the utterer's 
intentions and the expression of the utterers affective 
states. The appropriateness of an utterance (in a context) 
for exhibiting intentions/expressing affective states 
is established conventionally within a form of life, 
and these conventions are not to be identified with those 
governing informative significance although explicit 
performatives can, in some (not all) instances, give the 
cognitive force of the utterance as part of the utterance's 
informative significance. 
We learn to encode/decode cognitive force as we acquire 
language, as we learn to communicate our desires, feelings 
etc. in the ways accepted (and acceptable) within our 
form of life. Bruner's work in particular makes it clear 
that learning to do this is something which occurs as 
part of our initial strivings with language. It is 
important to realise, however, that language acquisition 
is not learning to encode/decode cognitive force and/or 
informative significance. Rather cognitive force and 
informative significance are aspects of the significance 
of language and learning to encode/decode them according 
to the relevant conventions is something we do whilst 
learning how to do things with words (and symbols in 
general) within our native form of life. And again I 
must repeat that although much of what I have written 
here and in earlier discussion has a bearing on the subject 
of communication, and although one of the most important 
things we learn how to do with words is to communicate, 
I have purposely avoided any detailed discussion of 
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communication. This will be left until later. 
My discussion of cognitive force has so far be.en 
restricted predominantly to the context of language. 
But cognitive force, especially expressive force, is 
important in other modes of symbolic representation. 
In both the visual arts and music artists often attempt 
to convey feelings. A portrait or landscape is not a 
photograph, usually the artist attempts to express 
his feelings about, as well as represent, his subject. 
And schools of art arise in which certain conventions 
of expression are adhered to (although to varying degrees). 
This is especially true of music. We can all recognise 
a love theme, a happy piece or an introspective piece. 
And composers make use of these established conventions 
in writing, often juxtaposing or even superimposing 
disparate elements to create an effect. Thus a happy 
carefree theme can be harmonised in such a way as to 
suggest an undercurrent of sadness or impending catastrophe. 
Stephen Sondheim,composer of 'A Little Night Music', stated 
on the television programme 'A Little Light Music' 
(B.B.e. 2 Feb. 19'78) that he often seeks to create a 
mood of ambivalence by introducing a contrast in 
emotional content between the words and music of his 
songs. 
Artists use the conventions which have grown up in 
their cultural traditions with respect to expressive 
force, they do so intentionally and we can identify 
their intent. We can also identify the feelings 
expressed. These ~ conventions. The classical music 
of Northern India uses different musical 'utterances' 
to express sadness to those used by musicians raised 
in the European tradition. Similarly the blues, as an 
expression of sadness, oppression and in many cases 
resentment, is a product of AfrO-American culture. These 
examples, though, introduoe·another dimension to the 
subject of expression in the arts. Elements of the blUes 
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and the classical tradition of Northern India hAve 
both been incorporated into compositions by composers 
reared and trained within the European classical 
tradition, Ravel being a prominent example of someone 
who engaged in this activity. Clearly works of art can 
trancend cultural barriers and this raises the question 
of whether the significance of such works is entirely 
symbolic. 
Symbols are defined as symbols within a form of life 
and that being the case someone with no knowledge of the 
conventions operant within the form of life cannot, in 
principle, understand the symbol correctly. But people 
do, for instance, listen to music of a culture different 
from their own and, because of its impact on them, make 
a point of learning more about it. To an extent, perhaps, 
this can be explained away by pointing out similarities 
between the sounds produced by the musicians of the two 
cultures (although not between the musics' cognitive 
force as defined within the cultures). But this seems to 
be unsatisfactory on two counts. Firstly there is a 
subjective reply that could be given. I could say that a 
raga like Bhairavi, played by a master like Vilyat Khan 
is simply, for me, a moving sound experience without 
any reference to convention. This, speaking subjectively, 
seems to be the case (for me at least) although it is 
open for others to simply pooh-pooh the idea. 
The second point arises from the fact of change in 
modes of artistic expression. Cognitive force is define~ 
conventionally and conventions are used - I do not attempt 
to deny this at all. But some people don't like the current 
conventions and change them. They do so by producing a 
work of art which breaks the rules but which still, somehow, 
manages to communicate the artist's feelings. Could 
anyone, upon hearing Ligetti's 'Requiem: a mass for the 
dead of our time', written for the dead of Hiroshima 
and Naga.saki (amongst the rest), mistake the composer's 
sadness, horror and disgust for war? And yet the sound 
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of the instruments and voices have little in common with 
the music of, say, Bach. The conventions have changed, 
as do the conventions of ordinary language. Here there 
can be no recourse to talking about a need for ways of 
encoding new information, We can talk about a need for 
reflecting a new way of looking at war and its victims, 
and about a need for new ways of expressing feelings and 
emotions. But such talk makes no sense if we see works of 
art as entirely circumscribed by convention, for then 
to break a convention would be to produce a meaningless 
work or at best one with a very obscure meaning. 
I am not ar~ing here for the abandoning of talk 
about convention in the expressive use of symbols. This, 
quite clearly, would be wrong. I have argued very strongly 
that cognitive force is convention-dependent and it is clear 
that conventions of expression exist within the arts. 
What I ~ arguing, though, is that an account of the 
expressive force of works of art cannot be entirely given 
in terms of conventionally defined cognitive force. 
Artists do, from time to time, come up with works which 
make about minimal use of the conventions operant within 
their mode of endeavour, but which still communicate 
something, and strongly, And the music of another culture 
can also, it seems to me, communicate in a way that seems 
to by-pass convention. 
Cognitive force, as I have defined it, is the 
significance of a sign in terms of what it reveals about 
its utterer's intentions and affective states. It derives 
from the judgements made within a form of life about the 
propriety or otherwise in certain contexts, of particular 
utterances and thus defines what utterances are appropriate 
for what purposes and allows an utterer to communicate 
intentions and to express (intentionally or not) affective 
states. 
It may be that we should regard meaning as entirely 
constituted by the areas which I have tried to cover 
with my notions of informative significance and cognitive 
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force. But, as far as I can see, such a move would 
constitute establishing a conceptual link between 
meaning and convention through stipulation. There are 
good reasons for doing this. The significance which 
symbols have, as symbols, ~ conventional and if we 
are interested in a theory of meaning for symbols, as 
symbols, then we must stop at the boundaries of conventions. 
But, misguidedly or not, I have embarked upon an 
attempt to say something useful about the sienificance 
of signs. I talked earlier about the significance of 
indices, but in my discussion of meaning up to now, 
I have talked primarily about the conventionally defined 
sienificance of signs. All this is very well, but I 
have also pointed out that an object of experience can 
be an instance of more than one sign and of both an 
index and a symbol. I have also left open, although in 
doubt, the question of whether there is anything which 
could be classed as an icon as opposed to index or 
symbol. NOW, faced with the question of whether the 
significance of a work of art can be entirely explained 
in terms of its being a (conventionally defined) symbol, 
I find myself wondering whether there is something else 
besides, and whether, perhaps, that something else will 
open up the way for talk of something that could 
reasonably be called iconic significance. The resolution 
of these problems lies in the discussion of the most 
problematic of my three notions I derived from Austin -
that of affective force. 
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Affective Force. 
Both informative significance and cognitive force are 
constituted conventionally, by certain sorts of symbolic 
representation being defined as having a certain 
significance/force within a form of life and hence 
appropriate for the performance of certain sorts of 
symbolic (including speech) acts. My notion of affective 
force has to do with the affective responses which signs 
elicit, and the first question to be lOoked at here is 
not whether words, or other symbolic representations, 
elicit affective responses, which they unquestionably 
do, but whether the eliciting of such responses is 
properly to be regarded as part of the significance of 
symbols as symbols. 
Max Black, in his book 'The Labrynth of Language', 
makes a distinction between the emotive influence of 
words and what might be thought of as their emotive 
meaning. The latter, he argues, gains plausibility only 
against the back-drop of a causal theory of meaning in 
which the affective state is triggered by the 'stimulus' 
of a particular form of words. Understanding emotive 
meaning consists in having a disposition to respond 
affectively to the trigger-words and these dispositions 
are established through social conditioning. I don't 
think I need reiterate the wide range of objections 
to such accounts, but Black's account is not without ii 
problems. On the subject of emotive meaning he writes (P.170): 
"The crucial point is that we can understand 
emotive language, whether or not we are 
swayed by it: we don't need to share the 
feelings expressed in "Bitch" or "KraUt" 
(happily enough) in order to discern the 
intended force of these derogatory epithets." 
From my point of view these remarks seem to be talking 
about what I have designated as the expressive element 
in cognitive force. I can agree fully with what is said, 
but still be unsatisfied. What I want here is some account 
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of how we can be swayed by emotive language, it is 
phenomena like this that I want to explain by recourse 
to some (as yet unspecified) notion of affective force. 
Black, in fact, has very little to offer in this direction 
beyond the following(again P.170): 
" ••• , the feeling expressed by felicitous words 
can no more be separated from them than can 
the attitudes conveyed in a Seurat painting 
of a picnic in the park. We respond to the 
affective values by a kind of sympathetic 
insight of which we should be hard put to give 
an adequate analysis; but it is beyond dispute 
that we can more or less adequately discern 
the embodied feeling. The point to be stressed 
is that adequate response to the emotive 
aspects of discourse, whose importance can 
hardly be overstressed, is far less a matter 
of brute undisciplined arousal of feelings 
than the causal theory, in its cruder forms, 
would tend to suggest." 
I am in sympathy with the remarks, but they are vague. 
Working from the notion of cognitive force I accept that, 
knowing what sort of feeling is conventionally expressed 
by a particular symbelic representation, we would 
imaginatively 'feel' that feeling as a sympathetic 
response to it. Similarly a painting can remind us of 
something about which we have strong feelings and can 
elicit an affective response in that way. For instance 
Eduard Munch's figures always remind me of the pictures 
of inmates of concentration camps and so I find his 
paintings 'horrible' - in the sense that they invoke 
the feelings of horror I have about concentration camps -
and very disquieting. And again, my dislike of the sort 
of political animal (in the widest sense) who talks 
long and encouragingly whilst saying nothing, and in the 
long run does very little else but spout rhetoric, means 
that listening to political speeches annoys me. 
But although I am happy to say that the affective force 
of symbols can derive from nothing more than an association 
between the symbol and something else about which we have 
feelings of some sort, or from an imaginative augmentation 
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of cognitive force, an imaginative 'imitation' of the 
feelings which led the author of a symbolic representation 
to choose that particular one, I don't feel that this 
is a complete account of affective force. The imaginative 
augmentation of cognitive force is too much tied to 
established convention and therefore cannot hope to 
deal with the fact that we can be rocked back on our 
heels by a work of art which has massive impact despite 
breaking all the rules. The transference of affective 
response by association (whatever the reason for the 
association being made) is similarly an ineffectual 
explanation of such phenomena. We would be hard put to 
explain the impact of a Jackson Pollock painting, or the 
music of Cecil Taylor in terms of their reminding us of 
something else, although we might have fond memories 
of a time when we first saw or heard a work of art. 
And anyway this sort of association seems best described 
as constituting in part the connotation of the work -
what, by incidental association, is invoked .. by 
experiencing the work. 
Connotation, of course, is a wider notion than that 
of transference of affective response by association. 
A phrase like, "The little tramp," referring to Chaplin's 
most famous character, has all sorts of connotations, 
it evokes many features of the old silent movies as 
well as feelings of nostalgia. But there is no doubt 
that we should include the affective responses to a 
phrase like "the little tramp," deriving from its use 
in describing Chaplin's famous character, as constituting 
(part at least of) its affective force. 
My point,though, is that the impact of some symbolic 
representations, in terms of affective response of an 
audience, doesn't seem explicable in the above terms. 
In literature, where words almost invariably carry some 
sort of informative significance, and in visual art 
where images are often recognisable as representations 
of things in the non~artist1c world, this may seem 
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debatable. Similarly with music using the established 
conventions of an established tradition. But with new 
music, music that breaks the rules, the gaining of 
affective force by imaginative augmentation of cognitive 
force or by transferring to the music feelings about 
something we associate, for some reason, with that music, 
seems implausible. 
It seems to me that there is a need for a notion of 
affective force which includes an acknowledgement of 
the fact that sometimes an experience simply does 
elicit a brute emotional response from us. One example 
would be a lover of Bach, Beethoven and Brahms who, upon 
stumbling upon a performance of some of Schoenberg's 
later works and finding himself faced with something 
he doesn't understand, becomes agitated and angry as 
a means of self protection. Contrasted with such a 
person might be someone without preconceptions as to 
what an orchestral work should sound like who finds the 
experience of listening to a serial composition strangely 
moving in ways he would be hard put to describe in words, 
and goes back for more. Of course, to be fa1r, we must 
contrast with both of these a third party who finds the 
wholething totally empty and goes home bored at the 
interval. 
What is becoming clear in this discussion is that 
affective force is part of the significnace of symbols 
as symbols only in an indirect way. The one tie between 
affective force and convention is through the imaginative 
augmentation of cognitive force in which, knowing the 
(conventionally defined) force of an utterance, we can 
grasp the affective state(s) which led the utterer to 
produce that symbolic representation and hence 'feel' the 
same way through imagination (or perhaps, for the cynics, 
imagine we feel the same way). 
Affective force deriving from association between 
symbol and something else or between the symbol and our 
222 
feelings about what it denotes is not part of the 
meaning of the symbol as symbol. Rather. it is an extra 
significance written into the symbols - an association 
with happy times and enjoyment, say. Thus, 'the little 
tramp' refers to a much loved Chaplin character because 
it has been used for that purpose. But that character 
is well loved by millions of people allover the world 
and thus 'the little tramp' besides having the informative 
significance of specifying the particular, is a phrase 
which brings back memories of good times, which evokes 
pleasant feelings for all these people. 
The affective force in this sense derives from the 
life history of individuals, what has happened to them 
and how they feel about various 'things' of experience. 
The name 'Fred Bloggs' to a man who has been cheated by 
someone of that name, might have the affective force of 
reducing him to paroxysms of rage. The name 'Emily', to 
a person whose daughter of that name has died, might have 
the affective force of reducing her to helpless tears 
of sorrow. And the sight of a Wbanner to a man who 
thought Britain had got rid of facism when Mosley's brown 
shirts were driven off the streets might have the affec~ive 
force of making him both angry and afraid. This aspect 
of affective force derives from the individua~s affective 
responses to the world in which he lives. It is not 
conventional - it mayor may not be rational. But it is 
an important aspect of people and in dealing with 
people it is important to be careful about which 'buttons' 
we push (not that this is a suggestion of mechanistic 
causality operant here). 
The third way in which a sign can have affective force 
is simply by the fact that it 'hits' someone like that. 
It is predictable that such an assertion will seem out 
of place in a philosophical discussion, but I find it 
impossible to avoid in the light of what I have said about 
indiViduals' affective responses to, in particular, works 
of art. I am Simply suggesting that certain experiences 
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elicit certain affective responses in certain people 
for no reason which can be given in terms of learning 
or association, it is simply the·way those people, 
because of the sorts of people they are, respond. 
There is some evidence that many of us (humans) respond 
to certain experiences in certain ways. Trivially a 
loud bang makes us jump - but I'm not talking about 
such events which can fully be explained in terms of the 
physiological mechanisms of the body. More interestingly 
research has sUGgested that we like grass, that schools 
with playing fields have less problems with discipline, 
that pastel shades on the walls of our houses make us 
feel relaxed whereas more vivid shades cause agitation. 
Going further, fast, rhythmic music seems to be 
regarded as more agitating to listen to than slow, 
legato pieces - this could be explained in terms of the 
agitated movements required in the performance of the 
former - and this is the case across cultures. If we can 
say that, for a great many human beings across various 
cultures, one sort of music makes us feel agitated, 
wanting to move, whilst another sort makes us feel relaxed, 
then is it so difficult to suggest that more precise 
emotions can be elicited by a wide variety of experiences 
in different people? 
What I am trying to talk about is elusive. It is the 
element which makes one 'towny' feel uneasy in the 
country side whilst another will look at rolling 
moorland or woodland and will feel elated by the 
experience. It is also the stuff of the aesthetic 
experience - the experience that some people have of 
feeling their emotions heightened as they look at or 
listen to a work of art. 
And, if I am accepted as talking about something 
real rather than as weaving phantasies, then maybe there 
is something here to identify as an icon - something 
which has significance for some individual Simply because 
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it happens to have significance for them. A person hears 
the music of, say, a Duke Ellington and from then on is a 
fan, just b2cause he gets a 'jolt' a 'buzz~ whatever it 
can be called, from listening to a jazz orchestra playing 
those technically incorrect but emotionally satisfying 
voicings. 
I regret not being able to argue more strongly or 
with more technical precision for this element of affective 
force. In the end I must appeal to the experience itself 
and say that anyone who has got lost in a book, been 
drawn into a painting or been put through an emotional 
wringer by a piece of music will know what I mean. I 
believe that I am talking about something real and 
something inexplicable in terms of my first two, less 
problematic, aspects of affective force. If much of my 
argument for this third element has been persuasive 
rather than rational I apologise, but I would rather be 
guilty of persuasion than of ignoring what I, and many 
others, regard as the most important aspect of a work 
of art. 
This is the end of my section on the significance 
of symbols. I have tried to show that the meaning of 
symbols as symbols can be explicated in terms of two ways 
of reading them which are as being informatively significant 
and as ahvinB cOBnitive force. I have also tried to give 
as full an analysis as possible of those notions. In my 
notion of affective force I have tried to give an analysis 
of how signs in general (including both symbols and other 
objects of experience) can come to elicit, or just eliCit, 
affective responses from us. 
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Meaning and Speech Acts. 
In my discussion of meaning I have tried to show that 
linguistic utterances (and other symbolic representations) 
can, in one sense, be said to have certain significances 
in themselves. When we learn language we learn that 
certain forms of words are defined interpersonally, 
within a form of life, as being appropriate for the 
conveyance of information, say, and, in general, for the 
performance of certain speech acts. We learn how to 
encode what we know or believe in a linguistic representation 
which has the appropriate informative significance and we 
learn about what sort of utterances have what force in 
what contexts. In other words the interpersonally defined 
informative significance and cognitive force of a linguistic 
representation constitute the appropriateness of an 
utterance of that representation for the performance of 
particular speech acts in particular circumstances. 
This reference to circumstances is, of necessity, 
built in to our notion of language. We don't learn to 
use language by learning a body of abstract theory, we 
learn it in situe. We learn how, in specific contexts, 
to do specific things with words. Informative significance 
is less context dependant than cognitive force, but even 
so a sentence like, "It's cold there," remains 
uninformative in the extreme in the absence of further 
information - for instance that it's a reply to the 
question, "What's it like in Siberia at Christmas?" 
Thus even the informative significance of a particular 
utterance will often remain unclear unless the utterance 
is seen in the context of a whole conversation. And often, 
as in the case of an utterance like, "It's over there," 
we need to see the physical context of the utterance 
too, the lineuistic utterance lacks informative significance 
in the absence of augmentation by gesture - pOinting or 
nodding the head in the appropriate direction. 
Cognitive force 1s very context dependent, often being 
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derived from a notion of what it is proper to say in a 
particular sort of situation, for instance the notion 
that it is rude to contradict one's host at a dinner 
party. Some utterances, like swear-words, have a built in 
cognitive force in some forms of life (in some contexts 
one Simply doesn't swear unless one wishes to offend) 
but not in others. There is also the fact that the 
cognitive force of an utterance may depend on the 
relevance of its informative significance to some state 
of affairs as with Strawson's example of the warning to 
the ice skater, and here context is all important. 
What this means is that a great many utterances, viewed 
out of the context of utterance, are multivocal with 
respect to their informative significance and/or cognitive 
force. And even in context some sentences remain ambiguous, 
either by accident or design. Thus my assertion that 
linguistic utterances can be thought of as having signific-
ances in themselves is highly suspect if language is thought 
of as an entity having, in some sense, existence apart 
from, and £rior to, its uses. It seems to me for reasons 
which should be clear from earlier discussion, that in 
my present endeavour I should resist any temptation to 
treat language as being an essentially formal entity 
(although this is not to say that the formalisation of 
language cannot be justified for some purposes). Any 
formal notion of language is a derivation from the fact of 
human possesion of language skills. Any apparent gap 
between language and its use is an illusion generated by 
the formalisation. 
My contention is that a theory of meaning for natural 
languages should approach language in-situe, should look 
at what people do with words and explain how it is that 
they manage to do what they do. In other words we must 
explain speech acts, and it is a feature of speech acts 
that they are performed in the world by people with 
purposes. The context should never be cut off from the 
speech act Simply because to do this is to do violence to 
the facts about speech acts. Language is a part of human 
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life and any individual's utterances are made in a context 
, whether that context be the physical surroundings 
of someone engaged in relatively inconsequential 
conversation or the social climate which underpins the 
writings of a Plato or a Voltaire. Such things as physical 
environment and form of life are the background to every 
linguistic utterance and the notions of informative 
significance and cognitive force are inextricably linked 
with a n6tion of context which embraces everything from 
the place in which the utterance is made to the form 
of life of which the utterer is an initiate. 
All this does not necessarily mean that it would be 
possible to devise an explicit set of rules describing 
the cognitive force of utterances - (Davidson and his 
followers have not yet managed to produce an explicit 
account of even informative significance). What it means 
is that within a form of life there is strong agreement 
in central cases as to the appropriateness of certain 
utterances for the performance of certain speech acts 
although there are 'grey' areas, particularly in respect 
of cognitive force, in which the sort of speech act for 
which 'this' utterance, in 'thie' context, is appropriate, 
ie unclear. 
This interpersonally defined speech-act app~opriateneS8 
does not, however, completely delimit the ways in which 
we use language and this fact requires that I make a 
modification to my account so far, a modification which 
will introduce the intention of an utterer and will expand 
my account of meaning into something nearer an account of 
communication. As an illustration of this distinction 
between the meaning of an utterance (in the sense discussed 
earlier) and the speech act being performed I offer 
the following example. We are in an Embassy somewhere in 
central Europe, ambassador A 1s about to leave the 
building and secretary S says to him, "The weather 
report says there will be rain this morning, I should 
take a raincoat if I were you." A puts on his light 
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coloured raincoat and leaves. In terms of what I have 
called speech-act appropriateness S's utterance is 
properly to be seen as a statement about a weather 
report, a warning about possible rain and advice about 
what would constitute a reasonable precaution in the 
light of that possibility. If S were being straightforwardly 
helpful, as people often are, if he did hear a weather 
forcast predicting rain and simply wishes to warn and 
advise A, then his utterance constitutes a non-problematical 
use of language in which he has chosen a form of words 
defined interpersonally as appropriate for his purposes 
and uttered them with intent which, again in terms of 
interpersonally defined s~~ech act appropriateness, is clear 
to anyone who understands the mode of language used. It is 
proper to say of S's utterance that this is how one might 
warn of rain and advise the wearine of a raincoat wivhin 
the relevant mode of language, and if S has those intentions 
then he used that utterance in a way which corresponds 
to the notion of speech act appropriateness within the 
language. 
Under this first interpretation of S's utterance the 
'meaning' of the utterance and what S is doing uttering it 
cOincide. But this need not be the case. Amongest the things 
people commonly do by way of language are lying and 
misleading. And in performing such actions what we do is to 
use linguistic representations which are defined as 
appropriate for particular speech acts without having the 
appropriate intentions and/or whilst having very different 
intentions. Suppose secretary S is, in fact, a spy who knows 
that A is getting very close to discovering that fact. S 
arranges to have A assasinated and tells the gunman that 
A will leave the embassy wearing a light coloured raincoat. 
In this case S's warning about rain and advice about 
wearing a raincoat is not uttered with any of the intentions 
which the utterance would normally reveal. Indeed there might 
not have been such a weather forecast, S's primary intention 
is to get A into the raincoat so as to identify him for the 
gunman. 
229 
What is clear from this example is that there must be 
normal uses for utterances, that, within a form of life, an 
utterance, made in a particular context, is likely to be 
seen as a performance of a particular sppech act, and this 
means that this notion of what I have called speech act 
appropriateness defines, in central cases, the 
intention(s) which an utterer should have in normal cases of 
making 'this' sort of utterance in'this' sort of context. 
In the second account of SiS utterance, S could only be 
successful if A was not suspicious of him, if he accepted 
S's utterance at face value and assumed that S's intentions 
were those which people normally have when they say something 
of that sort. 
The idea of there being intentions, " ••• which people 
normally have when they say something of that sort," is 
not completely unproblematical. Someone could warn someone 
else of impending rain completely by accident - he could 
be engaging in idle conversation, mention that the weather 
forecast said that there was going to be rain and the person 
to whom he was speaking could then say something like, "I'm 
glad you mentioned that, I could have got wet - you did know 
I was going out, didn't you?" and receive an apology from 
the first person who both knew that there was going to be 
rain and that the other person was going out, and hadn't 
linked the two. 
The important leason from this example is that the notion 
of speech act apropriateness is to do with what sort(s) of 
thing can be or are normally, done using certain 
utterances in certain sorts of contexts. It is, therefore, 
also closely tied to the ways which people are likely to 
'read' utterances, but it does not always reveal an utterer's 
intent accurately. This follows from the fact that people 
often speak idly, without thinking about what they are 
saying - we can be upset or offended by someone who is 
simply thoughtless as well as by someone who is acting -
Purposively in saying what he says. We can though, talk 
in terms like, " he should have known better," which implies 
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that sometimes thoughtlessness is culpable, and we do excuse 
someone's social misdemeanours given mitigating 
circumstances - for instance a French child addressing hls 
teacher as 'tu' would be punished whereas an English child 
who made the same mistake (on a visit to a French school) 
would be excused on the grounds of his speaking an unfamiliar 
language. 
Such considerations, it seems to me, show that there is 
a large area of language use where the speech 'Bct 
appropriateness of an utterance in a specific context is 
fairly well defined in the sense that within the relevant form 
of life people will tend to see the utterance of 'this' 
form of words in 'this' sort of context as the performance 
of a particular speech act. But whether or not it is a 
performance of the speech act will depend on whether, in 
fact, the utterer had the appropriate intention(s). If 
there was no notion of propriety linked with the use of 
utterances, then we would find it difficult to say anything 
useful about the wrongness of lying. If there were no 
convention that a statement, when made, should be true, 
or at least believed to be true, then there could be 
no justification for anyone to be outraged when told a 
lie. And we would not be able to act on what we are told 
by others if their statements could not, in general, be 
expected to be true. 
Out ability to read the cognitive force of others' 
utterances depends, it seems to me, on the existence of 
a body of convention or custom which defines the speech 
act appropriateness of a large central area of language us~ 
within a form of life. But the infer~nce from utterance to 
utterer's intent is not direct. An utterance may be uni-
vocal only given the context of utterance, or it may be 
multivocal even then (this is often intentional in the 
utterancesof poets and politicians, though for different 
reasons). Further the utterer's use of the particular 
utterance must be purposive ~ without ulterior motive. I 
say purposive because it is usually pointless to talk of 
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intent in idle chetter beyond an intention to be 
friendly and pass the time. I say without ulterior 
motive to draw attention to situations already 
mentioned in which people lie or else deceive by 
telling only part of the truth about some state of 
affairs. There is also the possibility of someone's 
having two (or more) intentions only one of which is 
revealed by his utterance. S, in my earlier example, 
might have intended to warn A of impending rain (assuming 
rain had been forecast) but only in order to 'set him 
up' for the gunman. Here one of S's intentions was 
clearly exhibited by his warning (i.e. his utterance 
was appropriate for the act of warning A of rain} but 
his other intention, that of setting A up, was not 
exhibited at all. 
My conclusions are that a notion of speech act 
appropriateness is necessary to the explanation of 
our normal everyday grasp of language. But the notion 
must not be interpreted trivially as saying that there 
is a 1:1 correspondence between linguistic 
representations and the speech acts for which they are 
appropriate{ and hence the proper intention with which 
they should be uttered). Rather the appropriateness of 
utterance U for speech act A derives from a great many 
factors including U's informative significance, the 
physical context of utterance, the social context of 
utterance, the states of knowledge/belief of the utterer and 
his audience etc. (and these factors overlap in many ways). 
The appropriateness of a particular U for a particular 
A is not always clear, we can be unsure of what someone 
is up to even if they are being straight forward, but 
for a large central area of U~ and A's the appropriateness 
of U for the performance of A in certain contexts (in the 
widest sense of context) is established clearly by 
interpersonal agreement within a form of life. And this 
means that anyone uttering U in the right context will be 
understood as performing A. And, assuming that the person 
speaking is an initiate of the appropriate form of life, 
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the utterance of U in the appropriate context without the 
intent appropriate to A or with a hidden ulterior intention 
beyond that intent, will be regarded as a culpable act -
he should have known better. 
Questions about how we can know anything about someone's 
intentions given that anyone can use any utterance in 
any context in an inappropriate (or, we mieht say, improper) 
manner can only be answered by saying that, if we insist 
on looking at individual utterances separately, we have 
a lot of trouble in saying any thine useful. But in fact 
we don't have vast amounts of trouble, and this is 
because we don't look at each utterance someone makes as 
a separate entity, to be evaluated in isolation. Speech 
acts are only one mode of human action, and a person's 
actions are not to be seen as isolated segments of his 
life, rather actions form sequences, overlapping strands, 
which t06ether form a continuous thread. When we evaluate 
what someone says at a particular time and in a particular 
place we do so ,against the backgrounq of other actions 
(linguistic and otherwise) he has performed. And just as 
earlier action can colour our assessment of someone's 
later actions, so we can reassess an earlier action on 
the basis of later ones. It is also the case that different 
people's actions inter-relate and that what people tell us 
and what is the case are related. If someone turns out to 
be unreliable on matters of fact we know not to trust him 
in future. 
My point is that speech act appropriateness le~ds us, 
at least in central cases, to assume, in the absence of 
factors which lead us to doubt his straightforwardness, 
that someone making an utterance (U) in certain contexts 
is performing a specific speech act (A) and therefore 
has (at least) intention (I) an intention appropriate 
to the performance of A. In any particular cas~ there 
is a possibility of our being wrong, but speech acts 
aren't isolated instances, they inter-relate and have 
consequences, and if the consequences of a particular 
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interpretation of a particular U are not what we expect 
(e.g. if we act on 'information' received and it turns 
out wrong), then we know we misinterpreted, or else that 
the utterer's intent was not the appropriate one for the 
utterance of U in that context. 
The notion of speech act appropriateness, then, is to 
do with an interpersonal agreement as to what one could 
properly be doing in making a particular utterance in a 
particular context. The important feature here is that the 
notion of context must be very widely interpreted to 
include everythin~ from the relevant form of life to 
physical surroundings and the general tenor of the 
conversation. For instance the utterance, "If I had a 
face like yours I'd only go out after dark," can be a joke 
or can be an attempt to be offensive. The question of how 
an audience will read such an utterance depends on context. 
If it is said to a stranger in a certain tone of voice, 
and in a conversation where there has been some not-so-
friendly disagreement, then it will be read as an attempt 
to be offensive. If, on the other hand, it turns up in a 
conversation full of jokes it will be read as such. This 
has nothing to do with utterers' intent- it is all too easy 
to make a 'joke' which falls flat and is generally seen 
as being in bad taste, or to offend someone unintentionally 
and yet leave the offended party with an impression that 
you intended to offend. 
Speech act appropriateness which covers both informative 
significance and cognitive force is a matter of how 'one' 
should perform certain speech acts in certain contexts 
within a form of life. As such it provides a basis for 
our ability to understand from one another's utterances 
what our intentions are in making the utterances. It is 
not an infallible system - not all our utterances are m8de 
with any intent beyond that to be understood and we cannot 
always be sure that a particular individuals use of an 
utterance in a particular context is proper. But we can 
root out improprieties and we know not to attach too much 
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weight to idle chatter. Most importantly some notion 
of speech act appropriateness is essential if we are to 
explain our dislike of things like lying and misleading. 
Without some such notion we cannot explain why there is 
a presupposition that statements made should be true 
(indeed, such a presupposition is constitutive, in part, 
of speech act appropriateness). 
This section has introduced a distinction between 
meaning and utterer's intent which will be useful when, 
in the next section, I discuss communication. 
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Communication. 
In his article 'Meaning' R.P. Grice approaches the 
problem of meaning by contrasting usages like "Those 
spots mean measles," (natural meaning) with usages such as, 
"Three rings means the bus is full," which he calls non-
natural meaning. Grice works through a number of formulations 
of truth criteria for 'A meant something by U' (A a person, 
U an utterance) before arriving at the following: 
"IA meant ... something by x' is (roughly) equivalent to 
'A intended the utterance of x to produce some effect 
in an audience by means of the recoenition of his 
intent' and we may add that to ask what A meant is to 
ask for a specification of the intended effect •••• " 
Th1s may be systematised into the following complex of 
intentions: 
(s: speaker; A: audience; U: utterance; i: intention) 
(11 ) S intends to produce some effect in A by 
uttering U. 
(1 2 ) S intends that A recognises i 1• 
(1 3) S intends that A's recognition of i1 shall 
constitute all or part of the reasons for the 
intended effect to be achieved. 
Such an analysis of meaning can easily be translated into 
an account of communication - if S produces the intended 
effect in A in the specified manner, then S has communicated 
• 
with A. But, Grice's account is not without problems. 
Strawson, in 'Intention and Convention in Speech Acts', 
gives a counter example to the above formulation which 
requires that Grice's account be reinforced by: 
(i4) S should intend that A recognise (i2 ). 
In other words that not only should S intend U to produce 
some effect in A, he should also intend A to recognise 
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this intent ~ intend that A should recognise his (S's) 
intent that A should recognise his primary intent. 
Putting things in this clumsy way will, I think, arouse 
disquiet in anyone with an eye for an infinite regression. 
Straws on writes: 
"It is possible that further arG~ment could be 
produced to show that even adding this condition 
is not sufficient to constitute the case as one 
of attempted communication. But I shall rest 
content for the moment with the fact that this 
addition at least is necessary." 
And this suggests that Strawson canno~ rule out the 
possibility of further argument requiring an (i 5 ) that 
A should recognise (i4 ), and maybe i 6 , i 7 , •••••• 
This possibility results, according to Searle, in his 
book, 'Speech Acts', from Grice's failure to say anything 
more than he did about the effects which S seeks to achieve 
in uttering U. In 'Meaning' Grice uses examples like that 
of a policeman stopping a car by waving as paradigms of 
meaningftft, and Strawson's example which introduces the 
necessity of (i4) is one in which, "S intends by a certain 
action to induce in A the belief that P ••••• ". Both 
of these fall into Austin's category of perlocutionary acts. 
Searle (in his discussion of meaning P.42) claims 
that this confusion of perlocution and illocution is 
fatal to a Gricean type account. He makes a distinction 
between meaning and what the utterer is doing which is 
not wholly dissimilar to that which I mane in my 
discussion of speech act appropriateness. He also makes 
the point that it is possible to communicate successfully 
without producing belief (or any other perlocutionary 
effect) and even without intending to do so - it is 
possible to make a statement of fact, and for that 
statement to be understood, without the utterer caring 
whether or not he is believed. Searle writes (P.47): 
"The characteristic intended effect of meaning is 
understanding, but understanding is not the sort 
of effect that is included in Grice's examples of 
effects. It is not a perlocutionary effect. Nor 
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can we amend Grice's account so that meaning is 
analysed in terms of understanding. That would 
be too circular, for one feels that meaning and 
understanding are too closely tied for the latter 
to be the basis for an analysis of the former." 
Searle (P.49) offers a revised analysis (of a statement): 
S utters sentence T and means it (i.e. means literally 
what he says)c 
S utters T and 
(a) S intends (i 1 ) the utterance U of T to produce 
in H the knowledge (recognition, awareness) that the 
states of affairs specified by (certain of) the rules 
of T o~tain.(Call this effect the illocutionary 
effect, I.E.) 
(b) S intends U to produce I.E. by means of the recognotion 
of (i1 ). 
(c) S intends that (i 1) will be recognised in virtue 
of (by means of) H's knowledge of (certain of) the 
rules governing (the elements of) T. 
There are a number of problems inherent in Searle's 
account which, from my point of view, make it unsatisfa~tory. 
Condition (a) is problematic for Searle himself as it talks 
about producing knowledge, recognition or awareness in H ," •• 
that the states of affairs specified by (certain of) the rules 
of T obtain." This flies in t~e face of one of Searle's 
objections to Grice. The fact is that we can make a statement, 
and be understood, without trying to convince anybody of 
anything. If I am faced with an obstinate superior who is 
wrong on a matter of fact I may come to the point of 
stating the facts baldly as a way of passing any subsequent 
blame squarely on to him and without any expectation or 
hope that he might believe what I say, become aware of 
the facts (as facts) or recognise what I say as true. 
Searle uses an example of this sort himself (P.43). 
My other objection is to condition (c), where H's 
I 
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recognition of (i 1 ) is required to result from, " •••• H·s 
knowledge of (certain of) the rules governing (the elements 
of) T.n My objection here is not so much to what is 
written as to what is not written. If Searle here means 
knowledge of rules in the sense of Cooper's R.F.B. 2 then 
I have no objection. But R.F.B. 2 is rule following only 
in an extended sense - the behaviour is called rule 
following because it is like that of people whose 
linguistic behaviour is, demonstrably, the result of 
specifiable rules having been learned. And this 
interpretation of condition (c) is problematic for Searle's 
account, for H's knowledge of the rules (if H is listening 
to his native language) consists in nothing more than 
his ability to read the speaker's intent. Thus condition 
(c) has no explanatory power on this interpretation. 
Condition (c) would have explanatory power if H's 
knowledge of rules was given some substance either by 
recourse to a Chomskyan model or in some other way. But 
Searle doesn't do this, he seems to regard this appeal to 
knowledge of the rules of language as unproblematic, which, 
I hope my discussion of meaning has made clear, it is not. 
This means that although I can make use of certain aspects 
of Searle's account of meaning in my efforts to say 
something about communication. I cannot accept his account 
as it stands. 
I have briefly set out Grice's work and the 
modifications and revisions to it suggested by Straws on 
ans Searle without being able to agree that anyone of the 
three suggested formulations establish a tenable account 
of either meaning or communication. My account of meaning 
stresses the instrumental nature of language and says, 
in effect, that the meaning of a linguistic representation 
is to be understood in terms of what, through interpersonal 
agreement, it can be used to do within a particular 
linguistic community. This speech act potential can be 
thought of as being rule governed in the sense that rules 
may be formulated which describes the ways in which users 
ot a p,~t1cular mode of language combine words in the 
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production of meaningful sentences. But, as I have 
argued at length, the ability of members of a linguistic 
community to perform felicitous speech acts should not 
be taken as evidence of their knowing any particular set 
of rules. Most people's knowledge of language is, to put 
it simply, p~ctical knowledge of how to use it 
felicitously, not theoretical knowledge of a body of 
syntactic theory. The problem with communication is one 
of explaining the role of intention and of deciding to 
what extent the person being communicated with has to 
grasp the utterer's intent. I will make use of the work of 
Grice and Searle in what follows, but will modify what 
they have said and will make use of the terminology I 
have already established. 
One problem with the notion of communication is that 
of deciding what sort of thing is properly to be 
contrasted with it. Is it possible, for instance, for a 
communication to be a lie? In one sense I think it is. 
A letter can sometimes be called a communication and 
can be full of untruths, thus a communication could be 
called a pack of lies. But this sense of the word is not 
really very useful as a philosophical term. At this point 
I will once again choose to stipulate what I mean by 
communication rather than get involved in a suspect 
attempt at conceptual analysis. My stipulation will be 
in line with that implicit in the work of Grice, Straws on 
and Searle, and will be to the effect that in a case of 
communication the form of words will be transparent with 
respect to cognitive force, that the words chooen will be 
appropriate, in the context of utterance for the exhibition 
of the utterer's intention(s). Thus I make communication 
a normative concept - one communicates only when the speech 
act(s) one intends to perform corresponds, in the context 
of utterance, with the interpersonally defined speech act 
appropriateness of the form of words used. This is normative 
because the notion of speech act appropriateness has to 
do with what one should be doing by uttering a certain 
form of words and not what one could be doing. Thus altho~h 
a statement like, " I didn't break the cup," is, in one 
sense, an appropriate way of lying when, in fact, I did 
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break the cup, this sense of appropriateness is not included 
in my notion of speech act appropriateness. In this latter 
usage I take 'appropriate' to have connotations of what 
is proper, and, as I argued when I introduced the notion 
of speech act appropriateness, there must be a 
presumption that proper language use does not include 
things like lying, misleading etc., otherwise language 
would not be able to function usefully in the way it does. 
In the light of these comments I can make a preliminary 
attempt at an account of what it is for a speaker, S, to 
communicate with an audience, A, by means of an utterance, 
U. First it is important to remember that S need not be 
making a statement, he could be telling a joke or 
expressing annoyance. What is important for communication 
is that A grasps what S is doing in uttering U an~ further, 
that this comprehension of what S is doing results, in 
part at least, from A's understanding of the informative 
significance and/or cognitive force of U. Rut this isn't 
enough. If S is telling a lie (i.e. he intends to deceive 
A) he may fail because A knows both that what S says 
is untrue and that S knows it to be untrue. In this sense 
A will fully grasp S's intent ~ he will do so, in part, 
because he understood what S was saying to him (i.e. he 
decoded the informative significance of U). The attempt 
to make a distinction between a communication and a lie 
(or allied speech act) must therefore rest upon a further 
intention. In the case of a communication S must intend 
that A's reading of the cognitive force of U should reveal 
S's primary intentions in uttering U to A. This account 
is closely related to those of both Grice and Searle 
but unlike the former it talks in terms of understanding 
and revealing intent rather than the fatally loose 
'effect' and unlike the latter it does not rely on what 
I feel to be. a dangerously vague appeal to knowledge of 
the rules of language. A more formal setting' out would be: 
S communicates with A by uttering U • 
(1) S intends (i1 ) to perform a particular act 
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(with respect to A) by uttering U. 
(2) S intends (i 2 ) that A will recognise that speech act 
(and hence i 1 ) because he (A) grasps the speech-act-
appropriateness of U in the context of utterance. 
Thus the important point in communication is that the 
communicator chooses a linguistic representation which 
not only has the appropriate informative significance 
and cognitive force for his purposes, but which also 
reveals those purposes to his audience. 
There is one final addition which must be made before 
the above conditions actually become truth conditions 
for the statement, 'S communicates with A by uttering U'. 
A teacher might enter a classroom full of attentive pupils, 
draw a right angled triangle on the board (unlabelled 
except for the right angle, say) and then turn to the 
class and say, "In order to discover the length of the 
hypotenuse of a right angled triangle you must calculate 
the square root of the sum of the squares of the other 
two sides." Now the kids, from the context of utterance, 
will probably guess that the teacher is trying to teach 
them something, and they probably manage to get as far as 
the fact that this 'something' is about a right angled 
triangle and that the drawing on the blackboard is of 
such a trianele. Beyond this, however, the kids may quite 
possibly be lost. The teacher intends to teach his pupils 
about Pythagoras' theorem - he clearly satisfies condition 
(1). He stands at the front of the class ans (say) adopts 
a 'teacherish' tone of voice and the kids grasp that he ~s 
teaching ( or trying to teach), so condition (2) is 
satisfied to some extent. ~ut the pupils have not really 
arrived at an adequate understanding of what he has said. 
The contention here is that for communication to have 
taken place the communicator's audience must adequately 
understand what he says. And understanding is not an all 
or nothing affair - understanding is a matter of degree 
and so, therefore, is communication. 
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There is, however, more to be said here. The central 
question to be answered is that of to what degree does 
communication demand uptake, or, to put it another way -
is communication a performanCt,e or an achievment word? 
If it is a peformance word, then nothing more is involved 
in communication than someone having an intent to 
communicate - there is no demand that his efforts should 
be successful in the sense that whoever the communication 
is directed towards should understand the cOMmunicator's 
intent. I should ad~ here that fully grasping a 
co~municator's intent is understanding his utterance, 
Searle writes (P.43): 
"In speaking I attempt to communicate certain 
things to my hearer by getting him to recognise 
my intention to communicate just those things. 
I achieve the intended effect on the hearer by 
getting him to recognise my intention to achieve 
that effect, and as soon as the hearer recognises 
what it is my intention to achieve, it is generally 
achieved. He understands what I am saying as soon 
as he recognises my intention in uttering what I 
utter as an intention to say that thing." 
If, on the other hand, communication is an 
achievment word, it makes no sense to talk of 
co~munication if the co~unicatee has not adequately 
unde~stood the significance of the communicator's utterances. 
It seems to me that communication must be an achievment 
word. This will become clear if we look at other words 
with meanings similar to, but different from 'co~municate'. 
We can say, for instance, of two people holding differing 
political views, that they spoke a great deal but hardly 
co~municated at all, the implication being that their 
views were so opposed that neither really understood the 
real significance of what the other was saying, that the 
underlying systems of values of the two views were so 
dissimilar that understanding of either one by the other 
was made impossible given the tacit nature of the values 
and the absence of discussion of the~ in the conversation. 
We can say. of talking to a foreigner for example, "I 
talked a lot, but he didn't understand much of what I 
said," but it/would be odd to say, "I communicated at 
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length, but he didn't understand a word of it ... 
It seems to me that the distinction between speaking 
and communication can best be made by saying that speaking 
is a performance in which we indulge at various times for 
various reasons and that communication is something which 
we can achieve through speaking (although also in other 
ways e.g. writing). In other words, communication involves 
uptake - if someone doesn't understand what we say 
adequately then we have not communicated. Examples like 
that of the Druical school where the Elders are bound 
to communicate through traditional circumlocutions and 
archaisms are not problematic here. To initiates of the 
Druidical tradition such ways of speaking are clear 
in meaning, to others they are not. It could be said 
that the Druid's ways of speaking, in common with those 
of many religions, are designed to cOMmunicate with 
initiates and to mystify anyone else - and they are 
successful in their purposes. Similarly the jargon used 
in many systematic disciplines is only an aid to 
communication amongst initiates - to the neophyte the 
use of specialist vocabulary is often a barrier to 
communication with the initiate, indeed learning the 
specialist mode of language is an important part of 
initiation into any systematic discipline. 
If I am right in saying that communication is an 
achievment word, and I think I am, then part of some S 
communicating with some A must be A's arrival at an 
adequate understanding of S's utterance U. And here 
'adequate' must be taken as meaning that A's reading 
of U must lead him to correctly grasp S's intentions in 
uttering U. Thus, in my example of the teacher teaching 
Pytha80ras' theorem, The teacher has not communicated 
fully with his pupils unless they fully grasp his 
intentions and this involves fully understanding what he 
has said about Pythagoras' theorem. A partial understanding 
such as I described means that only a partial 
communication has been achieved - the pupils have 
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correctly grasped part of the teacher's intentions but 
not the most important part, they have not grasped what 
it is that the teacher intends them to learn about, 
namely Pythagoras' theorem. 
One of the most important ways in which communication 
can fail is when a communicator (S) wrongly assumes that 
h~ audience (A) is an initiate of a particular mode of 
language. In such cases S may choose a linguistic 
representation (U) which, in the context, is appropriate 
for his purposes and, in uttering it, assume that 
communication has taken place. But if A is not an initiate 
of the appropriate mode of language then his/their reading 
of U is unlikely to result in the sort of grasp of S's 
intentions which S would have wished for. Any initiate 
of the relevant mode of language would, in many such 
cases, have fully grasped SiS intention(s), but an 
inadequate degree of communication with A is achieved. 
Such problems occur in communication between native 
speakers and non-native speakers of natural languages and 
also between initiates and non-initiates of the specialist 
modes of language which have grown up around the systematic 
disciplines. Of particular interest to me is. a speCial 
case of the latter situation where the initiate of a 
specialist way of talking is a teacher and the non-initiates 
his pupils. A failure to regulate carefully the amount 
of specialist language used can lead to a break down of 
communications between teacher and pupils. 
What this means is that a failure to choose the form 
of utterance carefully so that the informative significance 
and cognitive force of the utterance, from the point of 
view of the audience, is that which exhibits the 
intention(s) of the utterer (whose point of view may not 
be that of the audience), may lead to a failure to 
communicate. The point is that if some S intends to 
communicate he must intend that his utterance U should 
reveal to A the intentions he has which are relevant 
to the communication. If A does not grasp those intentions 
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then S has not communicated adequately, and one way in 
which communication can fail is if SiS choice of U is not 
one which has the relevent informative significance and 
cognitive force with respect to the formes) of life of 
A. Given that, in communication, S has the active role and 
A the passive role, the onus must be on S to make the 
appropriate choice of U. This is to say that if S wants 
to communicate then the onus is on his to get through to 
A - it hardly makes sense to suggest that if S wants to 
communicate the onus is on A to understand him although 
there is a case for saying that if A doesn't understand 
he could be expected to let S know so that S can try again 
using some alternative U. I am not attempting here to 
impose any duty to communicate on anybody, but if, for 
some other reason, some S has a duty to communicate, then 
that duty must entail a duty to choose his U's carefully 
with respect to what the relevent A is likely to under-
stand. The question of whether teachers have a duty to 
communicate with their pupils will be discussed later •. 
Considerations such as these require the addition of a 
third condition to my account of communication and, 
for clarity, a substitution of 'informative significance 
and cognitive force' for 'speech act appropriateness' 
in condition (2). The full analysis is now: 
S communicates with A by uttering U.-
(1) S intends (i1 ) to perform a particular speech act 
(with respect to A) by uttering U. 
(2) S intends (i2) that A will recognise that speech act 
(and hence i 1 ) through grasping the informative 
significance and cognitive force of U (in the context 
of utterance.) 
(3) A's interpretation of U must reveal S's i1 to him. 
It must be noted that (3) comes close to saying that 
the encoding/decoding conventions which S and A accord 
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with in their appraisal of U must be equivalent in 
essentials. Communication is not merely a matter of the 
communicator having all the right intentions - the 
person to whom the communication is directed must 
understand what is said correctly. This is not a problem 
in communications within a form of life, but problems can 
ar1.se betwe!n forms of life. Such problems must be looked 
for and dealt with by careful choice of language and 
even, in extreme cases, by explicit discussion of 
intentions and meanings. Teachers in pqrticular must, if 
they want to 'get through~ to their pupils, be sensitive 
to problems arising from differences between their own 
habitual mode of linguistic expression and those of their 
pupils. A teacher, to be successful in any terms, must 
communicate and communication will only occur if the 
communicator's utterances are chosen so that they have 
the appropriate informative significance and cognitive 
force from the point of view of the person being 
communicated with. Part of the teachers job must, 
inevitably, be to change and enrich his pupil's uses of 
language, but such change can only be possible if the 
teacher begins with a mode of language comprehensible to 
his pupils. 
A final area in need of clarification before I go on to 
a discussion of understanding itself is the relationship 
between meaning and understanding. Earlier in this 
section I quoted Searle who said: 
" ••• one feels that meaning and understanding are too 
closely tied for the latter to be the basis for aD 
analysis of the former." 
I agree that there is a close connection between meaning 
and understanding, but not that it is too close for meaning 
to be analysed in terms of understanding. Such an analysis 
would be fatally circular if it were the case that underst-
anding involves concepts and that concepts are essentially 
linguistic entities. But, if my arguments have been correct 
it is wrong to see concepts as essentially language 
dependant and hence understanding £!n be used in an 
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analysis of the meaning of symbolic representations. This, 
in fact, is what I have done. My conclusion, in my 
discussion of meaning, was to the effect that the 
meaning of a symbol is the significance which it has within 
the relevent form of life. And this is the same as 
saying that a symbol~ meaning (within a particular form 
of life) is the significance which it is generally 
understood as having by initiates of that form of life. 
My general thesis throughout the whole endeavour is that 
it is wrong to think of lan~lage or anything else as 
constitutive of the human mind. I have argued that 
language is a tool, that the genesis of language must be 
dependant upon certain facts about human beings and that 
the notion of conceptualisation cannot be logically tied 
to language as, if that were the case, language 
acquisition would be impossible to explain except by 
recourse to some sort of doctrine of recollection - and 
such doctrines are, as I have shown, proble'matic in the 
extreme. 
It seems to me that the notion of understanding lies at 
the basis of human life, that language and knowledge are 
manifestations of this basic faculty of the human mind 
which we call understanding. In my next section I will 
pursue this idea further, 
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Understanding. 
Throughout this thesis I have tried to emphasise the 
primacy of the human mind for any account of signs. A 
central objective has been to show that an abstract 
discussion of signs in terms of logical structure, 
although possible and even useful for some purposes, is 
dangerous in that it is likely to obscure what I regard as 
an extremely important point - that signs are signs 
only because people can (in principle) read them and 
hence that signs are constituted, in part, by the 
conceptual abilities of human beings. My account of 
meaning, I hope, demonstrates this and also suggests a 
particular way of characterising understanding. 
I wish to suggest that understanding is best seen in terms 
of grasping the significance of X (whatever is understood) 
whether X be something someone just said, a language or 
motorbike mechanics. And this 'grasping of significance', 
I suggest, is best characterised in terms of someone 
using a conceptual framework which picks out significant 
details in what is understood, which focuses his attention 
on relevant aspects of his experience and attaches the 
correct significance to them. Thus a man who understands 
motorcycle mechanics will possess a conceptual framework 
which will direct his attention to certain parts of his 
motorcycle and enable him to make such judgements as, 
'That's O.K.," "That will need replacing soon," "If you 
don't replace that you're going to have a nasty 
accident," etc. 
This characterisation of what constitutes an 
understanding of motorbikes does seem unusual, we would 
usually say that someone knows a lot about such things 
in the sense of theoretical knowledge. But such 
characterisations, although perfectly proper, are 
dangerous in the hands of philosophers who have a tendancy 
to over-stress the role of theory. Whilst the man who 
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services my motorbike undoubtedly does possess a lot of 
theoretical knowledge, much of w~hhe can state, the 
important difference between him and myself is not that he 
possesses theoretical knowledge that I don't. The 
important difference is that he can find faults or near-
faults which I don't notice. I go to him mainly because 
after a ride down the road and a five minute inspection, 
he can suggest minor repairs which I had never thought 
about but which would become major repairs if left undone. 
I take my machine to him not merely because he knows 
(theoretically) more than I do, but because he sees things 
I miss. What I am leading towards here is something 
like Polanyi's (Personal Knowledge) idea that 
understanding is not fully characterisable in terms of 
proposit ional knowledge. Such knowledge is part of 
understanding, but understanding must consist primarily in 
what I wish to call conceptual skills, skills involved in 
picking out relevant detail and attaching the correct 
significance to it. In other words an important part of 
understanding is the ability to read various aspects of 
what is understood as signs and to act appropriately, and 
in this, as I have already argued, the possession of the 
relevant conceptual framework is central whether the sign 
is index or symbol. For now I intend to leave hanging the 
question of what makes this or that conceptual framework 
relevant. I will come back to this problem in later 
discussion. 
At this pOint, however, I am going to tackle the problem 
of the relationship between undertanding and knowledge. 
In particular I will look at the account which Hamlyn gives 
in his book, 'Experience and the Growth of Understanding' 
of the relationship between knowledge and concepts. 
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Knowledge and Understanding. 
At the beginning of chapter six of his book Hamlyn writes: 
"I have said more than once already that, as I 
understand the matter, to have the concept of X is 
to know what it is for something to be X, and that 
this can be a matter of degree since one can have 
knowledge of some aspects of X without necessarily 
knowing others. To have a concept of X is to believe 
something about what it is for something to be X, 
and this belief mayor may not be right. To the 
extent that we can speak of the correct or right 
underst~nding of something, we can speak of ~ ~i 
concept of that thing and the concept is therefore 
objective and shareable with others. Belief , 
presupposes knowledge to the extent that one must 
know what it is that one is believing about ann what 
it is for SOMething to be what th~t thing is believed 
to be. Thus it seems to follow that one cannot have 
! concept of something unless one has the concept of 
something or other (though not necessarily of that 
which one has a concept). A subjective understanding 
presupposes participation in a public and objective 
understanding at some point; it is in this sense 
that it presupposes knowledge." (p.74) 
Hamlyn accepts that perception presupposes concepts and 
believes that concepts presuppose knowledge and hence that 
perception presupposes knowledge although he is careful to 
say that this presupposition is logical and not necessarily 
temporal. In an attempt to avoid any suspicion that this 
point of view might lead to talk of innate knowledge, 
and realizing that learning involves perception, he makes 
a distinction between learning and coming to know. On page 
91 Hamlyn writes. 
"We may say, 'I came to know at that point that it 
was so, although I did not recognize at the time 
t~at I did know it.' I want to emphasize this pOint, 
S1nce it follows from it that there is certainly noneed 
for us to assume that if the child comes to know 
something he must know or be aware that he does 
k~ow whatever it is. Provided - and this is an 
extremely important proviso - the child is in a 
position to have knowledge at all, then if he or 
she distinguishes between X and Y (in whatever way 
this is revealed in behaviour), if there is indeed 
a difference between X and Y, and if the child's 
distingUishing X and Y is pot a chance event (however this too is revealed ln the oehaVlour of 
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the child in the circumstances), then we might well 
have sufficient grounds for saying that he or she 
has come to know the difference between X and Y • 
••••• On the other hand, to say that the child has 
learned that X and Yare different would be to 
imply rather more: that the child has come through 
experience to connect this point with other things 
that he or she knows, and that these other things 
are the basis of the learnine. One might indeed say 
that learning is connecting items of knowledge in 
the way specified, whereas not all this is implied 
in simply coming to know." 
If these two rather lengthy quotes are compared it 
becomes clear that Hamlyn's account still has very great 
problems. For Hamlyn being able to distinguish (non-
accidentally) between X's and Y's is evidence of the 
distinguisher's having come to know. But, surely, being 
able to distinguish between objects of experience as 
being of different kinds involves concept application 
and, according to Hamlyn, concepts presuppose knowledge. 
Thus, if I have grasped Hamlyn's meaning correctly, coming 
to know involves acquiring concepts and acquiring concepts 
involves coming to know. This two way impication suggests 
that coming to know and concept acquisition can only 
occur simultaneously. And this fact, together with the 
absence of any clear criteria distinguishing the two, 
makes it seem possible that they are the same thing. It 
seems to me that the problem here is solvable only if we 
shift perpective slightly and say that talk of knowing 
and talk about the possession of concepts or conceptual 
skills are, for the most part, interchangable ways of 
talking about certain functions of the human mind. It 
further seems to me that on a closer scrutiny Hamlyn's 
distinction between coming to know and learning is 
problematic and that my approach, in terms of the 
development of conceptual skills, has greater range and 
explanatory power than Hamlyn's more traditionally 
epistemological approach. 
First the distinction between learning and coming to 
know. I have argued that, for language to be a possibilty, 
human beings must naturally tend to pick out certain 
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aspects of experience as significant. This tendancy, as 
far as I can see, need not be anything spectacular, it 
could arise from something as basic as the biological 
nature of the human organism. A child could learn to 
distinguish food by association with the satisfaction of 
hunger. and learn to recognise his mother by her 
association with food (which she provides) and because she 
cuddles him. This process of coming to attach 
significance to objects of experience because of their 
association with naturally significant states such as 
hunger and its satisfaction, pain and its relief, warmth 
etc., seems to me to be properly describable as learning. 
The statements, 'That baby can distinguish its mother,' 
and, 'That baby knows its mother,' seem. to me, to have 
some informative significance. My notion of learning 
does not satisfy Hamlyn's criterion.' •••• that the child 
has come through experience to connect this point with 
other thjngs that he or she knows ••• ', although it does 
satisfy the requirement, ' ••• that these other things are 
the basis of the learning.' This is because although the 
naturally significant states (eg. hunger) provide the 
basis for learning to distinguish certain objects of 
experience (learning in ~ sense), they themselves are 
not to be regarded as objects of knowing. Sensations are 
not things we have that, by some inner mysterious perception. I 
we can come to know. To say, 'I know I am in pain/hungry,' 
is to say no more than. 'I am in pain/hungry,' and, further 
more, is philosophically dangerous. This point comes from 
W!ttgenstein and was fully discussed in my earlier 
discussion of the private language argument. 
Hamlyn could, it is true, stipulate that the first steps 
from naturally significant states to discriminating 
between objects of experience should be called coming to 
know and that only later steps should be properly deSignated 
as learning. But this serves only to obscure the continuity 
of a child's conceptual growth. a process in which new 
objects of experience gain significance through their 
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association with already significant objects of experience 
- a process grounded in naturally significant states like 
hunger etc. which are significant for human beings 
because of our nature. I must stress here that, 
philosophically speaking, all I have established is that 
for language acquisition to occur there must be some things 
that just are naturally significant - exactly what these 
things are is a matter for psychology, my speculations here 
are illustrations, suggestions about possibilities and 
should not be taken as assertions of empirical fact. 
This line of argument also shows that Hamlyn's 
assertion, , ••• to have the concept of an X is to know 
what it is for something to be an X,' is misleading if 
taken in the way his further assertions (in the first 
quote of this section) show him to take it. In particular 
at the 'basement' level of conceptualisation, the basis 
for linking objects of experience with naturally 
significant states, the child just is hungry or cold or 
in pain and it distinguishes between those states. Later 
when the child distinguishes his mother, his feed bottle 
or a favourite toy, we can talk about him knowing that 
'this' is bis mother, but this is only an alternative way 
of saying that the child's conceptual development has 
reached a stage at which he picks out his mother as an 
object of experience with special significance. 
So far, though, the tension between my account and 
Hamlyn's might be seen as little more than a matter of 
terminology. On p.9S he writes: 
"I have said that anything that the young child can 
be aware of must be initially undifferentiated; that 
is to say that it will be for the child nothing in 
particular and everything in general. It is 
doubtful, however, if that can really be true, since 
the human child is born with a natural constitution 
which brings with it natural dispositions and way~ 
of response to things." 
The knowledge which the child acquires because of these 
'natural dispositions and ways of response,' is 
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explained by Hamlyn as being acquired through 'coming to 
know' rather than through learning and it is clear that 
this distinction can be made even if I don't like making 
it. But there is more to our disagreement than 
different preferences in terminology. I have adopted a 
notion of what a concept is which makes the possession 
of the concept of an X a matter of being able to pick out 
correctly those objects of experience which are X's and to 
ascribe the correct significance to them in terms of 
recognising them as objects for certain kinds of 
appropriate behaviour, certain appropriate attitudes etc. 
Hamlyn analyses possessing the concept of an X in terms 
of knowing what it is to be an X. Thus, for Hamlyn, 
concept acquisition occurs only at the point of coming to 
know whereas I am prepared to talk about innate concepts. 
On my account of what a concept consists in, the fact 
that babies are born able to attach the correct 
significance to certain experiences means that theybring 
certain concepts with them. 
I want to argue for my view of concepts by suggesting 
that Hamlyn's account has insuperable problems, problems 
which his distinction between having ~ concept of some 
X as opposed to having the concept of it is designed 
(I-think) to overcome but doesn't. Having any concept of 
something, for Hamlyn, involves being, ' ••• in the position 
to accept truth as truth, and this must be in the position 
to recognise correction and correction.'(p.92) I'm not 
sure how much is written into this and whether it's really 
necessary to talk in terms of truth and correction in a 
situation where a child learns (eg) that it can't crawl 
through walls by crawling into a wall and rebounding 
(painfully). But if Hamlyn's formulation can include such 
occurences as part'.of infant learning I will not 
quibble with him. My point is that we cannot insist that 
accepting truth as truth and recognising correction as 
correction must always involve becoming a party to 
convention even if it does in a very large and important 
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class of learning situations. We can learn much about the 
world by simply colliding with it (both literally and 
metaphorically.) 
My real objection to Hamlyn's account of concept 
possession, however, comes from my belief that, despite 
his obvious intentions to the contrary, he hasn't really 
escaped from the problems which arise from tying concepts 
too closely to language. On pages 78 and 79 of his book 
he discusses what is involved in possessing the concept 
of a clutch (as in a car without automatic transmission). 
He writes (p.78): 
"Knowledge of an X may, however, be a matter of 
degree, as I have already said, and it may find 
application to cases in various ways. There is a 
sense in which someone may, for example, know what 
a clutch on a car is without being able to give any 
account of what it is, in that he is able to get in 
to a car ••• and drive it away, using the clutch in 
the process." 
Here we have an example of someone having ~ concept of a 
clutch but not the concept. Hamlyn continues by saying 
that someone who could give an account which, normally, 
we would understand as reflecting an understanding of 
what a clutch is, but who got into a car (with a clutch) 
and tried to drive it away without using the clutch would 
(if he wasn't a superior driver who could drive without 
using the clutch) thereby reveal that he lacked a full 
understanding of what a clutch is. He concludes (p.79): 
"Understanding what a clutch is in the full sense 
involves not only being able in principle to eive 
an account of what it is but also being able in 
principle to recognise a clutch as an object for 
certain appropriate forms of behaviour. w 
It seems fair to interpret this discussion of Hamlyn's 
as concluding that having ~ concept of an X involves 
both being able to distinguish X's as objects for certain 
forms of behaviour and being able to give an account of 
......... 
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what an X is. This sits ill with what he wrote on p.74 
(I give the full quote at the beginning of this section): 
"Thus it seems to follow that one cannot have ~ 
concept of something unless one has the concept 
of something or other (though not necessarily of that 
of which one has ~ concept)". 
Taking these assertions together we find that under 
Hamlyn's account someone cannot possess any concepts at 
all unless he has the concept (as opposed to a concept) 
- -
of some X (whatever X may be). Further, anyone who possesses 
1h! concept of some X must, in principle, be able to give 
an account of what it is to be X. 
It seems possible that Hamlyn wrote the (in principle) 
giving of an account of what a clutch is into his account 
of fully possessing the concept because he has confused 
two problems. The first is the problem of what is involved 
in someone possessing a concept, the second is the problem 
of how we can know that someone possesses a concept. 
Following on from what he says about possessing the concept 
of a clutch in the full sense (on p.79) he says: 
"The complexities of the know]edge involved in this 
indicate how implausible it is to suppose that an 
account of what it is to have a concept can be 
provided in terms of a p8ttern of response to stimuli 
or in terms simply of the occurance of a mental 
event. Even the suggestion that having a concept 
involves structuring things seems in this context 
rather thin, since the knowledge involved in having 
the concept is capable of manifestation in a variety 
of ways and cannot be achieved/conceived in terms 
of anyone way of structuring the world." 
Here Hamlyn seems to echo David Cooper in writing 
speci!iability into concept possession - I argued in earlier 
discussion that this is a mistake. 
But this is a digression. Hamlyn says that pre-linguistic 
children (and some animals) ~ have concepts, he also 
says (in the quote from p.74) that possession of any 
concepts presupposes the possession of ~ concept of 
something or other, and he also says (p 79) that possessing 
!h!.. concept of 
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something involves in principle being able to give an 
account of what it is. This tin principle' is difficult 
to be sure about, but in the context of his whole argument 
one job it must do is to allow pre-linguistic children 
into the community of 'concept-possessors' by saying th~t 
although they can't use language at the pre-linguistic 
stage (by definition), this is only a matter of contingent 
fact and that, since they are potential language users, 
since they ~ acquire language, they will, at some 
point, be able to give an account of their understanding. 
If this sounds like so much gibberish I apologise, I'm 
just trying to imagine how we might attempt to rescue 
Hamlyn's account of concept possession. The attempt fails, 
however, because it ignores a central fact about 
language acquisition. 
It is clear from the account of many psychologists and 
philosophers (some of whom I have referred to in earlier 
discussion) that language acquisition in itself requires 
a modification of the child's conceptual repertoire. The 
literature is full of examples of young children whose use 
of language reveals a failure to observe distinctions we 
normally make in the use of words, from calling anything 
four-legged-and-furry 'doggy' to more elaborate inventions 
like the use of 'psee' for leaves, trees and flowers, 
'beba.' for all animals and 'qua-qua' for both duck and 
water (quoted in R. Brown's article 'How shall a thing be 
called' p.89). 
In other words, both on my account and Hamlyn's, by 
the time a child has sufficient skiil with language to 
give an account of his understanding of anything, his 
ways of conceiving the world will, in fact and in principle, 
have been modified to fit the conceptual framework 
enshrined within his native language. And here 'in 
principle' means that if the child's conceptual framework 
was not modified, then, as a matter of logic, he would not 
be able to use language as, at the level of first words, if 
the child never came to classify (eg.) all dogs together 
as members of the same class he would never be able to 
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use the word 'dog' correctly. Thus a pre-linguistic child, 
in principle,is unable to give any account of his understan-
ding of the world as, by the time he can give any sort 
of account at all, his ways of conceiving the world 
will have altered. This seems to lead to the conclusion 
that, in the absence of language we cannot properly talk 
about concepts, knowledge or understanding, although 
this is clearly not what Hamlyn wants to say. 
I have already argued for my notion of a concept and 
see no reason for modifying it. I believe also tha~ my 
comments on Hamlyn's account of knowledge and understanding 
show that his analysis of concept possession has 
inadequacies. My contention is that my own approach is 
better for the task at hand - although this assertion 
itself is one that will have to be clarified in later 
discussion. 
Before moving on to further discussion of understanding 
I will try to derive the bare bones of an account of 
knowing from my own account of understanding as the 
possession of a framework of conceptual skills which we 
use to discover the significance of objects of experience 
and hence to read them as signs. 
In my discussion of informative significance I said 
that the truth of a statement is a matter of its over 
specification of some aspect of experience such that a 
state of affairs is specified and then stated to be 
subsumable under certain further concept headings. If all 
the predicated concepts are properly applicable to the 
state of affairs specified then the statement is true 
(and the state of affairs specified can be language). This 
is a crude account (the topic will be discussed more 
thoroughly later) of the first condition for the truth 
of 'P knows that Sf (p a person, S a statement) which is 
that S must be true. Here is not the place to go into long 
discussions of knowledge and belief or of causal theories 
ot knowledge. Instead I will use a second condition. 
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'F must be non-accidentally right about S' and will not 
go into the mass of problems which would arise in a 
detailed explication of the non-accidentally' clause. 
What I want to suggest is that pes being right about S 
is a matter of his subsuming the state of affairs which 
S (which is true) is about under the same concepts as 
S subsumes it. For a language user this is fairly 
straightforward as, if he uses the language in which 
S is made, he will (provided he is capable of grasping 
the informative significance of S) possess all the 
relevant concepts and if he has conceptualised t~at 
aspect of the world in that way he will know that S, 
even if he has never uttered S, or even if he would 
never have used quite those words to express that 
informative significance. Difficulties arise when we 
make statements across cultural boundaries. 
Anthropologists have long said this - it is problematic 
to describe a cannibal as being wrong or to say that he 
must know that he's doing wrong. ThiS, again, will be 
gone into more thoroughly in later discussion. 
Difficulties also arise when we ascribe particular 
knowledge to pre-linguistic children. This is a point 
I have been over before; to say that a baby recognises 
its mother is to say that it picks out, as having some 
special significance, that object of experience which 
we, correctly, describe as its mother. But to say that 
is not to say that the child's conception of its mother 
is the same as that which a language user understands • 
as the meaning of 'mother'. Neither must we make too 
many assumptions about what significance a baby attaches 
to its mother. I have speculated on the subject of what 
it might be that is naturally significant to a human 
being, and I think that my speculations are both 
plausible and consistent with much of the relevant 
psychology I have read. But philosophically speaking 
all that can be established (if my earlier arguments are 
correct) is that somethings ~ be naturally significant 
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for all normal human beings if language is to be 
possible. The job of specifying exactly what is 
naturally significant is an empirical one, properly 
to be done by psychologists. 
The difficulty of specifying what someone does or 
does not know, however, does not constitute a weakness 
in my account. As Hamlyn pOints out, (in the second 
quote in this section) a man may know and yet be 
unaware of his knowing. If this is true, which I believe 
it to be, then there is no difficulty in saying that 
someone may know something that I not only do not know 
but am incapable of knowing - there are a great many 
mathematicians and mathematical physicists who are in 
that class of people 'though I wish they were not. And 
this is to say that maybe, as a matter of fact, I am 
incapable of acquiring certain concepts and hence 
incapable of knowing certain things because I can neither 
look at the world in that way, nor fully understand any 
symbolic representation used within that way of looking. 
Understanding,then,can be viewed in terms of the 
possession of a conceptual framework relevant to what 
is understood (and the analysis of this 'relevant' will 
be given later). The possession of,and ability to apply 
correctly, the relevant conceptual framework (to use the 
relevant conceptual skills) is to understand the particular 
object of understanding - for to understand is to 
understand something. Knowing on the other hand appears 
in my account as a particular application of this more 
general understanding, when the framework is used to make 
comprehensible a particular aspect of experience. A true 
statement is a linguistic encoding of the information 
known by the knower, a linguistic representation which, 
by the relevant conventions, has that particular 
informative significance. 
Language and Understanding. 
As we become more expert with language the world 
becomes more densely populated with significant detail. 
The acquisition of a new referring word involves not 
only being able to use that word correctly in sentences 
it also involves being able to recognise what it is 
that the word refers to, which aspects of experience 
are properly labellable by that word. As is clear from 
the psychological date referred to earlier, learning new 
words involves learning to classify experience in new ways, 
which is to say that the fact of getting further into 
language unavoidably carries with it a necessity for 
conceptual change as new 'settings' are accomodated. 
Thus each step into language involves a conceptual 
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accomodation, a change in ways of looking, which allows 
the initiate to attach significance to new words in 
terms of their grammatical function, and reference - class 
(where applicable). But, of course, all this talk of 
new words is a little misleading if it is not remembered 
that we don't learn theories, we learn how to use words. 
This is to say that conceptual adjustments we make as we 
become more deeply initiated into the mysteries of 
language are not to be tho~ght of in general, as the 
learning of some theoretical framework. We learn, by 
trial and error, how to perform linguistic acts and how 
to interpret others' linguistic acts. A framework of 
explicit theory may parallel the conceptual framework 
of an adult language user, but the language user does not 
necessarily know the theory - his conceptual framework 
is functionally equivalent to that encoded in the 
theorists' rules, nothing can be said beyond this. 
Nevertheless explicit theory is an important part of 
human understanding and my central purpose in this section 
is to attempt to say something about the steps involved 
in moving from the language of everyday lif'e towards 
the more restricted languages of the systematic disciplines 
and to show how, and in what sense, this process can be 
a way of increasing someone's understanding. 
A key notion in what I want to say will be that of 
a language game. I want to talk about the systematic 
disciplines taking language games from ordinary language 
and developing them into specialist language games or 
even, as in subjects like geography, welding together 
bits and pieces from other language games {including 
specialist ones} into a mode of language suitable for 
the pu~poses of geographers. But this requires th~t I first 
establish what I mean by 'language game'. The term, of 
course, is Wittgenstein's, but although I will discuss 
his ideas I must stress that what I am after here is a 
coherent notion of what a language game can be taken 
to be that is useful for my purposes. There will be no 
attempt, except in passing remarks, to give a critique 
of Wittgen&tein's notion or, what this would entail, 
to give an exegesis of Wittgenstein's account of 
language games. 
Rhees, in his article "Wittgenstein's Builders" 
(Proc. Arist. Soc. '59 - '60), objects to Wittgenstein's 
account of the builders {at the beginning of Philosophical 
Investigations} on the grounds that such a system of 
signals does not come up to the mark as a language. 
The central objection here (if I have grasped the point 
correctly) is that Wlttgenstein's conception of a 
language game as being constituted through agreement 
in reaction to certain signs within a form of life is 
too thin. Rhees wants to say that a form of life and 
its associated mode of language are much richer than 
Wittgenstein requires of his notion of a language game 
and hence that Wittgenstein's notion does not do justice 
to language in the real world. 
I am not certain that Rhees' characterisation of 
Wittgenstein's ideas is wholly accurate, but Rhees did 
study under Wittgenstein and is therefore more likely 
to be right than myself. I will therefore bow to Rhees' 
greater authority and express agreement with him on the 
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point that more than agreement in reaction is needed 
to establish a notion of language games which will be 
useful in reaching an understanding of language as it is 
used. 
The question of how a language game is constituted 
and the question of in what way a language is 
differentiated into language games are closely related, 
and the task of answering these questions is not easy. 
Wittgenstein himself was not very helpful here -
Rhees writes ~P. 176): 
H •••• Wlttgenstein did say in the Brown Book, 
for instance, that the various language games 
he had mentioned as making up a language were to 
be regarded, 'not as incomplete parts of 
language, but as languages complete in themselves, 
as complete systems of human communication 'l.P.81)." 
and goes on to point out that the idea of philosophical 
mistakes arising from, for instance, the confusion of 
the language games of physical objects and sensations 
through attaching undue weight to grammatical similarities 
seems intelligible only if the different language games 
are part of the same language in some sense. If language 
is nothing more than a collection of language games then 
the notion of different language games belonging to the 
same language needs clarification, and Wittgenstein 
doesn't provide this. 
Anthony Kenny, in chapter nine of his book, 'Wittgenstein', 
draws attention to fu~ther problems which arise from 
consideration of Wittgenstein's examples of langauge games 
in Philosophical Investigations, Kenny suggests that 
contrasting the language games of statements or questions 
with those of measurement or language games with the 
word 'game' shows some confusion in the notion as a set 
of measurements or the word 'game' can occur in statements 
or questions. 
I am not convinced completely by these arguments, but 
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my lack of conviction stems largely from a lack 
of confidence in any particular interpretation of 
Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's writings are, it seems 
to me, too cryptic to ever allow us to be sure that 
'this' is what he meant. The strength of his later 
writings lies in their suggestiveness rather than in 
any presentation of a carefully argued thesis. I find 
the notion of a language game very suggestive, if rather 
vague. This being the case I shall take a course here 
very similar to that I took in my discussion of the 
private language argument namely that of trying to 
establish my own notion of a language game. 
The first problem to be tackled must be that of 
how to look at language, only then can I move towards 
a differentiation of different modes of language, different 
language games. When I discussed meaning I said that we 
could only give an explanation of how linguistic signs 
have meaning for people if we looked at language as 
being something that people use. People do not acquire 
a body of syntactic knowledge, they learn how to do things 
by means of linguistic signs. In order to perform 
felicitous speech acts we must learn how to order words 
in the appropriate ways, for if we don't say the right 
words in the right order people will not grasp our 
meaning, we will fail to perform our speech acts 
felicitously. 
In this way we come to do things by using a certain 
vocabulary li.e. making the appropriate vocal noises) 
and by ordering that vocabulary (those noises) in certain 
ways. We come to accord with certain rules of syntax. 
That sets of explicit rules do parallel the syntax of 
our speech does not, as I have argued, establish anything 
about our knowing texcept in. an analogical sense) such 
rules. An explicit set of rules, written down 
symbolically, can encode a conceptual framework which 
is functionally equivalent to that of a native speaker 
of a particular mode of language, but this does not 
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entail that the speaker is following that particular 
set of rules tor indeed any explicit set of rules). 
A particular language can, however, be looked at as being 
unified by having a central core of vocabu1ary and of 
syntactic rules. If a number of different groups of 
people, different in respect of geographic location 
or occupation or in any other non-linguistic sense, 
speak to one another ~i.e. within individual groups) 
using similar sets of linguistic signs and according 
with similar syntactic rules, then they can properly 
be regarded as speaking the same language. 
There are problems here, but not, I think, 
insuperable ones. Different dialects of ~nglish do 
show a variance in grammar, but they do share what 
Wittgenstein called a family resemblance and most 
actually do share certain grammatical features - syntax 
is not a problem. The main problem is in talking of 
different groups using similar linguistic signs. The 
inscriptions of symbols can vary f,reatly between dialects 
of English, so that a broad Glasweigian accent is 
virtually incomprehensible to other English speakers, 
and similar observations can be made about a broad Jamaican 
accent. This problem can, however, be overcome by 
familiarity, we can recognise, after a while, that we are 
simply hearing unusual (to us) inscriptions of symbols 
we know. 
A symbol is the set of its inscriptions and the set 
is defined by all inscriptions sharing the same significance. 
The notion of shared linguistic Signs, then, has to do 
with the symbols of the different groups of language 
users having similar sets of inscriptions and shared 
significances in central cases. And this means that, 
broadly speaking, the different groups must share a 
common core mode of conceptualisation, more, I suggest, 
in the area of the informative significance of utterances 
than in that of cognitive force which has more tendency 
to regional variation. I say 'in central cases' because 
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individual quirks in some areas of symbolisation 
need not indicate differences in language any more than 
local oddities in certain areas of syntax. 
What we need, then, to establish that different 
groups share a language, is a fairly close similarity 
in syntax, and a shared set of symbols with fairly 
similar sets of inscriptions (we cannot use writing as a 
criterion here as many primitive groups still exists 
who simply have no written language). There is quite 
a lot of vagueness here, but I don't think that it is 
either fatal or avoidable. It is not fatal because we 
can talk in terms of family resemblance in which the 
syntax and/or modes of conception and/or inscriptions 
of all the various groups don't need to share common 
features, they simply need to form a linked system. 
Wittgenstein's metaphore was that of the strands of a 
rope which are not all interconnected and yet form a 
unity. The vagueness is inescapable because the edges 
of, say, the English language are not sharply defined. 
~ome dialects are so far from the mainstream of English 
that although relationships can be seen to exist we feel 
wary of calling them the same language. I am thinking 
of the more extreme version of Jamaican patois which 
seems not to fall easily into the model of being English 
with a few unique rules of syntax and a different accent 
on the symbols' inscriptions and then there is Pidgin 
English which is so truncated in both syntax and 
vocabulary as to seem more like a code than a full language. 
r~ly suggestion is that looked at from the point of 
view of syntax and vocabulary in the way just outlined 
we can give an account of what a language is and assert 
the unity of, say, the English language. But looked at 
from another point of view, that of what can be said 
about what, languages fragment and the barriers between 
languages ~in the syntax and vocabulary sense) disappear. 
Thus English anf French can be said to embody the same 
language games in so far as a 'what can be said about whet' 
criterion fragments the two languages into similar 
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sets of words, or rather into similar sets of concepts. 
The implication of what I've said so far is that there 
is a logical gap between a language game way of looking 
at language and the ways of looking used by grammarians 
and logicians. But in fact this apparent gap just isn't 
there. In particular the notion of groups of people 
using the same vocabulary lin central cases) seems to 
require reference to some sort of notion of a language 
game. A word is a symbol and, as I said earlier, we must 
regard a symbol as being a set of inscriptions, a set 
defined by those inscriptions having a shared significance. 
This means that an assertion that different groups share 
a vocabulary can only be supported by showing that the 
words used are, in fact, properly to be called instances 
of the same symbol. Thus we must look at what we mean 
when we talk of different linguistic signs having a shared 
significance. In the case of referring words we could 
take 'same significance' to mean 'same reference class', 
but this is inadequate as clearly 'human being' and 
'featherless biped' have co-extensive reference classes 
but not the same significance, and anyway words like 
'and' ~nd 'not' couldn't be dealt with in this way. It 
seems to me that we can only unify symbols in terms of 
what, in principle, we can use inscriptions of them to do-
in terms of their speech act appropriateness within a form 
of life. 
This speech act appropriateness (~overing both 
informative and cognitive force) leads us towards a 
notion of language games. It leads us to looking at what 
can be said about what. If 'this' symbol is the same 
as 'that' symbol it will be appropriate to use inscriptions 
of them is the same sorts of sentences, what can be said 
using the one will be sayable using the other. So to 
show that two groups ~ sharing vocabulary we must show 
that not only are the inscriptions similar, 'but that, 
taken as instances of their symbols, they fit into the 
same sort of sentences, do the same job. Thus if we 
found a,co~ity .. of apparently English speaking people 
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who used the words 'tim~ and 'space' in the way the Ropis 
use them, so that the words only have a role in sentences 
where time is linked with expectation and space with 
action, we might be forced to conclude that those people 
understand 'time' and 'space' differently to the way 
English speakers normally understand those words. There 
are difficulties here which arise from questlons about 
over-literal translation, for instance the fact that in 
Japanese 'night fall' becomes 'the falling of the night' 
with 'the falling' being used as a noun doesn't 
necessarily mean that the Japanese think of 'a falling' 
as an entity of the same sort as 'a brick'. Grammatical 
differences don't imply conceptual differences - to 
establish conceptual differences we must show that the 
links between concepts are structured differently by the 
different groups of language users. The Ropis' linking 
of time with expectAtion and space with action (its 
difficulty and complexity) is what shows that they 
conceive of space and time differently to the way 
English speakers conceive of space and time. 
There is also the question of belief, whether it 
makes sense to talk of shared language games but 
different beliefs. In one sense it doesn't, although 
people whose beliefs differ to some extent can discuss 
their differences so long as there are areas where they 
don't differ. The point is that talking about the world 
as being a world of physical objects (say) is, to some 
extent, a matter of belief. We ~re never absolutely 
~ertain that a particular way of conceiving things is 
the right way, all we know is that looking at the world 
in 'this' way leads us to have certain expectations of 
it and that in so far as these expectations are 
fulfilled it seems reasonable to assume that the way 
of looking we're using captures the nature of the world 
to some degree. Being committed to any way of looking 
involves belief in the sense that it involves accepting 
certain metaphYSical assumptions which we become happier 
with as our expectations are fulfilled, our actions 
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successful. Such beliefs are like a working hypothesis 
in the sciences, we're never absolutely ce~tain we're 
right but as long as looking at things in a particular way 
leads to success the rational course is to go on using 
that way of looking. This is an over-simplified account, 
it will be structured more thoroughly in my next section. 
But the central point for my account here is that being 
committed to looking at the world in any particular way 
involves holding certain beliefs about the world (although 
this way of talking, as I argued in the previous section, 
can be dangerous when we are looking at the early 
development of children). Sharing a language game 
usually involves sharing basic presuppositions and 
hence beliefs, and these may be held uncritically as is 
often the case in ordinary language (and sometimes the 
case in the systematic disciplin~) or critically as is 
the case with a researcher reaching out beyond established 
ways of looking. Thereis also the possibility of using 
a way of looking without believing in it, for instance 
working on the assumption that 'this' way of looking 
does capture some aspect of the world in order to test it, 
to try it out, but such an attitude is one which ultimately 
leads to acceptance or rejection of the way of looking 
and is most usually found in the specialist discipline, 
not everyday life • Someone who takes this stance is 
holding himself apart from the community of belief. 
Sharing a language, in so far as it involves sharing 
a vocabulary, must involve sharing language games and 
hence beliefs. But again I must stress the notion of 
family resemblance and the fact that the 'edges' 
of a language are usually blurred. So not all native 
speakers of a language need to share identical beliefs 
about the nature of the world, rather there will be a 
continuity of belief systems. It does seem likely 
however, that at some levels, for instance the nature 
of the world as a physical system, the vast majority 
of, say, English speakers (and, indeed, of language 
users in general) are likely to share one language game. 
In terms of interpersonal behaviour and moral discourse, 
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however, the diversity of beliefs is almost certainly 
much greater. 
I should also point out that differences in beliefs 
don't necessarily lead to lack of communication. The 
unreflective 'playing' of language games can lead to 
communication breaking down, but a sensitivity to our 
own and others' presuppositions, a careful approach 
to what others say, can lead to understanding. In this 
way we realise, for example, that the Hopis aren't 
necessarily wrong about time and space, they just 
conceive them differently from us. Thus understanding 
a language game doesn't necessarily involve sharing the 
beliefs which underpin it even though those beliefs, 
held by the relevant community, are, in part, constitutive 
of the language game. We can understand that people don't 
share those beliefs - an atheist can understand the 
motives of a believer without sharing his. belief • The 
question of if and how we can choose between ways of 
looking, modes of conceptualisation, will be looked at 
later. Finally on the subject of belief it is quite 
obvious that two people can share a language game but 
not beliefs in the sense that 1 can believe that the 
last train goes at 11-30p.m, and a friend can believe 
that it goes at 11-15p.m. This is not the sort of belief 
I've been talking about. The beliefs which underpin 
language games are beliefs that 'this' way of looking 
captures, to some extent at least, the nature of the 
world in which we live - it is this sort of belief, 
beliefs fundamental to particular forms of life, I have 
been talking about. 
Langauge games, then, are areas of language defined 
by the connections between concepts and hence by what 
it makes sense to say. Thus any word that can replace the 
X in, "This X is heavy," is a physical object word, it 
makes sense to call a brick or a table heavy but a 
colour word like 'red' or a sensation word like 'pain' 
can' t replace the X. k sent·ence like, " This red is heavy," 
or, "This beauty is heavy," doesn't make sense in English. 
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The question which now arises is that of how language 
games are to be distinguished. We might begin by 
suggesting that they are logically disjoint areas of 
language, that any sentence which mixes concepts from two 
language games will not make sense, thus 'brick' and 
'heavy' being words from the language game of physical 
objects can be combined in "This brick is heavy," whilst 
the lack of sense of "This red is heavy," arises because 
the word 'red' comes from a different language game -
that of colours. But this is too simplistic a view 
HThis brick is red," does make sense, many words play 
a role in more than one language game, 'brick' obviously 
does and the 'he' in 'he is big' and 'he is naughty' 
seems also to be operating first in the physical object 
language game and secondly in the language game of morality. 
A more promising approach is on the level of a subject/ 
predicate type of analysis. It's a fact that, in any 
language, only certain words refer to 'things', existing 
entities, whilst other words ~like 'red') are only 
predicated of 'things'. On this sort of approach we 
would say that distinctions between 'things' are 
established by the sorts of predicate the relevant 
referring words can sensibly take. Or, perhaps, we might 
give a metaphysical argument designed to establish that 
there are, in fact, certain specific sorts of 'thing' 
independently of human modes of conceptualisation. Here 
distinctions between sorts of predicate or thing' would 
be established in terms of logic. The problem with this 
sort of account lies in the metaphysical distinction 
between the pre-existent 'things' and the secondary 
qualities we predicate of them. The fact that such 
distinctions ~ built into our languages does not 
establish their logical necessity. Further the distinction 
is dependent upon asserting a rift between the world 
as it really is and the world as we see it. In my 
discussion of perception I stressed that concepts are 
centrally involved in directing our attention to 
significant detail of the world 'given' in perceptual 
consciousness. In talking about the world we use concepts 
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and those concepts are built up interpersonally 
through language, not given in perception. It seems 
to me that the best we can do in talking about the 
relationship between reality and our knowledge of 
it is to say that the world is such that it can be 
conceptualised in certain ways. To say categorically 
that the world is precisely as we say it is constitutes 
a very problematic assertion las I will show you later). 
This is a difficult point to get across. fhe distinction 
is between an assertion that 'this' account is absolutely 
true in the light of eternity and saying that 'this' way 
of looking leads to expectations that turn out right and 
hence that we think that we have a conceptual framework 
which captures some aspects of reality to a reasonable 
degree. Asserting absolutes las I will argue more fully 
later) is problematic, if we claim certainty a sceptic can 
always pOint out the possibilities for error. But that our 
ways of looking do capture the world to some extent is 
a more easily defensible claim. The assumptions which 
underpin many of our ways of looking are beliefs which 
are justified only in terms of the success of the way 
of looking (the question of what constitutes success 
will be looked at later) - they are not logically 
necessary truths, nor can they be shown to be absolute 
truths about the nature of reality. Any of our current 
ways of looking can. in the light of experiences which 
seem subsumable under that way of looking but don't 
'turn out' the way that way of looking leads us to 
expect. be called into question. Thus the way we use 
language is not merely a question of how things 'really' 
are (i.e. in the light of eternity) or just a matter of 
what sort of distinctions it is possible, in terms 
of some all embracing logic. to make. It is also a 
question of how we decide to use language and this, 
as I will argue later is to do not only with the world, 
but also to do with the ways we come to conceive of the 
world as we engage with the problems it presents us with. 
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The idea that there is no logical necessity about 
any of our current ways of looking, or families of 
ways of looking, can be demonstrated by an exa~ple. 
Imagine we came across a group of people whose language 
appeared to render, "The leaf is green," as, "The green 
is leafy." Now initially we wouldn't jump to any 
conclusions, after all grammatical differences don't 
imply conceptual differences on their own. But suppose 
that these people use all colour words in a very odd way, 
what if they £2 talk about the 'weight of the red' and 
what if we talk to one of their wise men and discover that 
to them the world is composed of several distinct 
substances, each substance a colour, and that each 
colour can take on certain forms, or can combine with 
other colours to give intermediate colours and take on still 
more forms? So these people might have a 'physiCS' based 
on seven elements (the ROYGBIV of the visible spectrum) 
backed up by a whole body of metaphysical/theological 
speculation. In such a case, I suggest, we would have to 
conclude that these people conceptualised the world 
in a different way to us. 
We could, of course, admit this and go on to say that 
they are just wrong, that their system only works 
because they haven't got very far in understanding the 
world and that it will become unworkable if they try 
to go on developing it. I believe that there is much in 
this point of View, but that it is dangerous if it 
leads us to assert too glibly the general superiority 
of one way of looking over another. In my next section 
I will be trying to show that one way of looking can 
only be judged as better than another given shared 
problems, that we can only judge this fictitious way 
of looking I have created as inferior to, say, modern 
physics, if it is true that it is designed to do the 
same job as physics. 
But in any case the point I am now concerned with 
is that in using language to talk about the world we 
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make assumptions about the world which, in the light 
of experience, can be justified or called into question 
but which in many cases cannot be conclusively established 
as absolutely true or false in any clear cut way, either 
empirically or logically. Even in the sciences the 
incoherence or inaccuracy of a basic world view, for 
instance Newtonian physics, cannot easily lead to its 
abandonment. All ways of looking embody problems (both 
empirical inaccuracies and logical inconsistencies) 
but it is quite rational to hold onto a particular 
view if it does fit the world to a reasonable degree. 
After all to be without a way of looking is to be 
without any rational me~ns of planning a course of 
action, so a way of looking which has problems is 
better than none at all - the rational course is to 
hang on until a better world view is generated. 
So where does this get us with language games? It seems 
clear to me that attempting to impose a logical structure 
on language is likely to obscure an essential point -
that language is a way of making sense of the world in 
which we find ourselves. There may be logical distinctions 
in language such as that between intentionality and 
extensionality, but to focus attention on these features 
is to take a spectatorial view of language, to abstract 
it from its role in human life. Having made certain 
assumptions about the world in which we live we discover 
that certain sentences don't make sense, adhering to a 
particular world view imposes certain restrictions on 
our use of language. But even if we can manage to give 
a formal account of the distinctions in language which 
our basic assumptions force us to make all we will have 
done is to describe one way of using language, we will 
not.have established a priori modes of langu~ge. This, 
it seems reasonable to suppose, is why Wittgenstein gave 
up the logical approach to language he used in the 
Tractatus and moved to the looser approach found in 
Investigations. The distinctions between language games, 
and the rela~~onshi~between them, tell us as much 
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about the prevalent world views of a form of life 
as about the world. Language games are areas of 
language where the connections between concepts 
are relatively dense, but the edges of language 
games, like the edges of language, are not distinct, 
we know that it's proper to talk literally about an 
angry man and improper to talk about an angry electron, 
but there's confusion as we go through the animal 
kingdom - 'an angry amoeba' sounds odd whereas 
'an angry lion' sounds alright. 
This is why we must stop abst~acting language from 
human life, we must approach language from the point of view 
of what it makes sense for peopl~ to say within a form 
of life and we must accept that the rules operant 
within a form of life just aren't as well defined 
as a logician like Davidson would have us believe. In part 
one of Philosophical Investigations (para.130) 
Wittgenstein writes: 
"Our clear and simple language games are not 
preparatory studies for a future regularization 
of language - as it were a first approximations, 
ignoring friction and air resistance. The 
language games are set up as objects of cOf!lparison 
which are meant to throw light on the facts of 
our language by way not only of similarity, but 
also of dissimilarities." 
As (and if) I understand this passage Wittgenstein 
took the notion of a language game as descriptive of 
a community's linguistic practice rather than a way 
in which we can discover the 'mathematicg of language. 
Because language games are generated in use and not 
by deduction from axioms they are open ended. Taking 
a notion like 'physical object' as the focus of 
attention in language we discover strong links with other 
concepts, we discover the physical object language game, 
a game based on assumptions 'written in' to looking 
at the world in that way. But any physical object can be 
regarded as 'beautiful' or 'ugly' and this way of 
looking is not part of the physical object language game, 
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it is a different (but not logically distinct in any 
obvious way) language game - that of aesthetics. 
Aesthetics doesn't approach the world from the basic 
assumption that 'things' are physical objects related 
in a system of mechanistic causality (and this isn't 
even an adequate account of the presumptions under-
lying modern physics). Aesthetics approaches the world 
tin part) from the basic viewpoint that 'things' have 
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a relevance for peoples' affective lives and the 
language of aesthetics is to do with m~king sense of 
'things' from this perspective. 
Thus, I suggest, language games are differentiated 
by their approaches to the world, by the sort of events 
and phenomena (in a theoretically neutral sense of 
these words) which are taken to be central for the ways 
of looking. Such language games may make more use of 
certain concepts than others but there is no rigid 
logical break - mathematicians aren't talking 
metaphorically when they talk of an elegant proof, they 
mean it. Further the fact that languaf,e games are built 
up through trying to make sense of certain aspects of 
the world means that the 'same' language game can evolve, 
basic concepts and characteristic statements changing 
through time. Thus the languaee game of physical objects 
may embody a particular way of looking, a particular 
set of concepts at one point in time, but these concepts 
are not themselves to be regarded as constitutive of the 
historically continuous language game. This again, is a 
vague account which will be made clearer in the next 
section. 
I~account of language garnes, then, is that they 
are areas of language built up on certain basic 
assumptions, assumptions which give some concepts priority 
over others and which lead to only certain sorts of 
sentences making sense. As we acquire language we learn what 
it is proper to say and what it is wrong to say, and 
this is to say that a~ we are initiated'into various 
language games, we inherit a whole set of beliefs about 
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tbe nature of things, that some things are people, 
some are physical objects etc. At any point in time 
a language game will be identifiable with a particular 
conceptual framework and, especially in ordinary language, 
these frameworks will have a certain stability, but 
this shouldn't blind us to the possibilities of change 
through time. In the systematic disciplines conceptual 
change is more explicit, but, as I will argue in the 
next section, the systematic disciplines still generate 
language games ~ the existence of the systematic 
disciplines can only be explained in terms of 
communities of interest developing certain areas of 
ordinary language more systematically (again I will 
develop this idea later). 
Language games are not, as I have argued, logically 
distinct. They are built up through certain phenomena, 
being taken together and explained in particular ways, 
against a background of presupposition which, again 
as I have said, may be justified or not. But language 
games can overlap, geography, for instance makes of 
concepts from different areas, as does history. It is 
also the case that language games can develop within 
larger language games, for instancewhen I~ths begins 
to fragment into geometry, statistics, mechanics etc., 
all of which have dissimilarities as well as similarities. 
This almost anarchic multiplication of language games 
arises because language is not a formal system, it is 
part of human life. People take an interest ~for whatever 
reasons) in some aspect of the world and use language 
to make sense of what things the"y1re interested in. As 
they use the concepts which seem appropriate to the 
objectls) of their interest they discover and forge 
connections between them (forge because making sense 
of something involves imaginatively constructing a model 
using familiar concepts and then seeing if the model 
has implications which fit the world - more en this 
later). Thus people generate small scale language games. 
Some of these language games resemble one another, so 
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we get areas like physics which is a mass o~ ~~all 
language games with a family resemblance which, as 
physics becomes unified, are slowly brought together, 
inconsistencies being got rid of talthough never 
completely). But links between physics and other 
areas still exist because of the nature of language 
games and the intimate involvement of language with 
human life in general. In particular links are 
maintained with ordinary language where the original 
language games are found, language games which exist 
because, in coming to deal with the world, to make 
sense of it, people have found it necessary to use different, 
and sometimes logically incompatible, ways of looking. 
My notion of a language game still hasn't been fully 
established, and won't be until I've dealt with the 
relationship between ways of looking, and human interests/ 
problems which I'll be doing next. But I hope it's clear 
that language games are distinguished not so much in 
terms of logic as in terms of what it makes sense to say. 
What it makes sense to say is dictated by what we're 
talking about and, as I have argued, what we are 
talking about depends on how we see things. How we see 
things depends to quite an extent on the concepts we use 
and those concepts depend on the way we learn to use 
language, i.e. on the language games we learn. 
This may sound circular, but it isn't, what is the 
case is that we use language as a way of making sense 
of the world. Now how we can conceptualise the world 
depends partly on the world, but also on our own powers 
of creativity. We can only create a way of looking, 
a conceptual framework, imaginitively and then see if 
it works, for instance if the expectations it leads us 
to have are fulfilled. If a way of looking works then 
we are justified in claiming that, to some extent, it 
captures the nature of the world, but we can never 
(except in the case of successfully specifying an 
Absolute-something I will discuss more fully later) be 
sure that it's completely accurate - at any time we 
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might find something it should account for but doesn't. 
What it makes sense to say is dictated by our way of 
looking, but if our way of looking doesn't work then 
we abandon it (sooner or later). The nature of a 
language game depends both on our imaginations (i.e. 
what sort of explanations we come up with) and on the 
nature of the world - once we have an explanation of some 
phenomenon we can only decide whether it's a good one 
by seeing if it fits the phenomenon. Thus a good 
explanation of a chemical reaction is;likely to be 
nothing like a good explanation of the affective force 
of a work of art. The different sorts of explanation 
which fit different sorts of phenomena will overlap, 
i.e. show family resemblances and will overlap in 
surprising ways,(e.g. an aesthetically pleasing piece 
of experimental apparatus in physics). This is only 
to be expected given that often what is gOing on is 
a process in which people try to understand the world 
not by seeking out the form of the Absolute, but by 
prying and prodding into different areas in a piecemeal 
fashion. Ordinary language is a massive conglomerate 
of different language games, each appropriate for 
dealing with some aspect of life, but none either 
very well developed or clearly defined. The systematic 
disciplines draw on only certain aspects of ordinary 
language and develop these systematically to give 
language gamest ways of looking which evolve to increase 
our understanding of certain aspects of the world. 
I hope that this account has done two things: 
firstly show what a language game can be taken to be 
and why different language games arise, and secondly 
to show that the idea of giving a list of language 
games is inappropriate. We could fragment language 
into areas as small as we like by stressing any 
dissimilarities we find, or we could produce a smaller 
number of areas of language (modes of cognition/forms 
of knowledge) by giving more weight to similarities. 
But there would be a great deal of arbritrariness 
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in such a process. We can, however, identify a number 
of historically continuous communities concerned with 
understanding particular aspects of the world and human 
life and this is something that I'll be discussing 
later. 
For the rest of this section I want to look at how 
initiation into the specialist language games can be 
a way of increasing/expanding someone's understanding. 
Being initiated into a specialist language game is, 
besides learning how to use certain specialist words 
in the correct ~within the language game) way, learning 
to conceptualise the world in certain ways, learning 
to pick out relevant aspects of experience and to 
attach the correct significance to them. And here 
'relevant' and 'correct' can only be defined within 
the language game (although they can also be e7aluated 
in terms of their solving the specialist problems of 
those who form the community which generated the 
language game). In this sense being initiated into 
a language game is being initiated into a new mode 
of understanding, a new way of attaching significance 
to certain aspects of the world. And this amounts to 
learning that certain aspects of experience are signs 
with a particular significance, whatever that 
significance might be. 
Learning to use a new mode of language, if it involves 
coming to be able to use the concepts embodied in the 
language game as a means of coming to grips with some 
aspect of the world and not merely being able to use 
the words correctly, is a way of expanding understanding. 
I write'in the condition that the conceptual framework 
should be grasped as more than something which enables 
the symbols used to be put together correctly as an 
'understanding' of this sort would not involve grasping 
the full significance of the symbols used. If a theory 
of meaning along Davidson's lines (in purely extensional 
terms) were f~lly worked out then quite possibly a 
.'. . 
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computer could be programmed to use any mode of 
language correctly in terms of producing meaningful 
sentences. But the computer would not thereby understand 
what it was saying, would not grasp the significance 
of its utterances in terms of indicating appropriate 
action or attitude. 
Language is not a formal entity, it is a means 
of acting, we learn how to do things with words. The 
systematic disciplines use words to construct ways 
of looking at the world which are appropriate for 
solving certain problems. Anyone who does not appreciate 
a specialist language game in these terms does not, it 
seems to me, understand the form of life it is part of. 
r hope this will become much clearer and better supported 
through my discussion in the next section. 
A further remark in this section must be to the 
effect that although coming to understand some aspect 
of the world via initiation into the relevant language 
game is an important way of achieving understanding, it 
is not the only way. Even for an initiate of a particular 
way of looking, one who is committed to a particular 
discipline, there is no absolute tyranny of language 
game over mind. A man who is interested in the problems 
of a discipline and who has a fine grasp of its current 
conceptual framework can nevertheless come to the 
conclusion that the established ways of looking are 
inadequate for the explanation of some phenomena \say). 
Thus Einstein was capable of breaking away from the 
conceptual framework of Newton and generating his own 
way of looking. This is an oversimplistic way of talking 
about scientific change. But for now all I want to point 
out is that it is possible to reject certain parts of 
a way of looking and replace it with something else. 
This may be something which people set in their ways 
find difficult, but it is clearly not impossible. 
An extension of this point is to say that we should 
not think of the established systematic disciplines as 
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the only respectable modes of understanding. There 
may be areas of human understanding which have not yet 
been systematised to any degree. Serious scientific 
research on Psi phenomena is a relatively recent 
development, and some of the work done in the Soviet 
Union in the last fifteen years, using advanced 
electronics to augment the 'medium', could not have 
been carried out very much earlier (some details are 
given in 'Psi: psychiP discoveries behind the iron 
curtain' - Ostrander and Schroeder Pub: Abacus). 
There might also be areas of human understanding which 
simply aren't responsive to any mode of Eyste~atisation 
which we have used. I am thinking now of things like 
the 'eye' of a stock-man. Sone people have a knack for 
picking out the right breeding stock (dogs, horses or 
budgies) and their animals always seem better than those 
of less talented breeders. Scientists attempt to introduce 
system into stock breeding and rearing, but there are 
still areas of choice where some people make the right 
decisions more often than others. And these 'instincts' 
are even'present in the systematic disciplines themselves. 
There is no way to systematically describe what happens 
when a researcher makes a conceptual leap in order to 
get around a problem. But it is undeniably true that 
some people manage to do this fruitfully whilst others 
fail to do it or else find themselves up blind alleys. 
My contention is that whilst linguistic accounts of 
ways of looking are useful in that they can point the 
way to others, so that coming to understand the linguistic 
account can be a way of making a conceptual accomodation 
and hence coming to see the world in a new way, this is 
only one (although very important) way in which understanding I 
can be reached. Such linguistic accounts can also be 
useful for the researcher whose research has become 
confusing for him. But behind the linguistic facade 
~ 
lies the fact of the human mind making conceptual 
adjustment in order to read the world better. And 
although language is useful in this process it is not 
always necessary. At times langua~e gives out, but 
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people can still cope. And sometimes those people come 
back and manage to make language say what it seemed 
incapable of saying - this, it seems to me, is one of 
the most inspiring features of Wittgenstein's later 
writings in which he seems always to be reaching 
beyond language and, having found a hand-hold, hauls 
language up to a point where he can say, or hint at, 
what seemed unsayable. Language does not limit mind, 
it is too mutable, too open to change. If someone has 
something to express, then, if the modes of symbolic 
representation available aren't up to the job, he can 
forge a new mode from the bits of the old. 
Finally, in the same vein, the idea that all new modes 
of symbolic representation must, in principle, be fully 
explicable in terms of older modes must be rejected, 
although not completely. A conceptual break like that 
between Einstein and Newton cannot be fully explained 
in hierarchical terms, although to an extent Einstein 
can be looked on as an improvement on Newton. But behind 
the corrections to Newton's equations of motion lie 
massive differences in conception of time and space. 
An equation like E_Mc 2 or M1:11 Mc 2 2' can only be grasped 
c Z- v 
if old notions of energy and matter as different are 
jettisoned. 
My contention, which I will argue for very shortly, 
is that such discontinuities, which appear as terrible 
problems for anyone approaching human understanding 
from the point of view of formal logic, are not really 
all that difficult to understand. If we take a paradigm 
of understanding to be that of a group of like minded 
people facing a problem which they can't see their way 
round and trying to come up with some solution, then we 
will get somewhere. Such people have a specialist language 
game built up through trying to solve past problems. 
If the conceptual framework, the way of looking, they 
have used before won't work this time they have a choice 
either of saying that the problem is not one for them 
or that their way of looking in unable to deal with 
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the problem. In the latter case it is open to them, 
if all fiddling with the accepted conceptual framework 
fails, to change their way of looking so that old problems 
are given modified solutions and the new problem solved. 
All this move requires is that the discipline should 
not be regarded as closed, but rather as an outgrowth 
from ordinary language, developed to deal with specific 
area of problems. If this is done then a discussion 
about whether 'this' or 'that' way of looking is best 
can be carried out in ordinary language the criterion 
of ~est' being, 'that which seems most likely to further 
the discip~ines problem-solving purposes~ 
My basic position, so far, is that in using language 
to talk about the world we adopt a world view, a way 
of looking that makes it appropriate to say only certain 
things, to conjoin only certain concepts, although, as my 
examples' an angry amoeba' and 'an angry lion', were 
designed to show, the 'rules' are far from being rigidly 
defined. Any way of looking is justified only in terms 
of success in doing some job, in m~king sense of some 
aspect of ~eality ~in some cases, e.g. religion, of an 
assumed-to-exist absolute being) so that it leads us 
• 
to have expectations that are fulfilled or enables us 
to plan courses of action that turn out as we intend or 
serves some other end. This success is what convinces 
us that any particular way of looking 'captures' reality 
to at least some extent and makes us happier about the 
metaphysical presuppositions built into the language game. 
I further contend that the specialist language games 
are developed by taking only certain parts of ordinary 
language (i.e. by focusing attention on only certain 
sorts of phenomena) and elaborating the ordinary-language-
games to give them better explanatory power ~i.e. a better 
'fit' to the relevant phenomena) and scope. I believe 
that in this process a reference to the problems/explanatory 
purposes of a community of like minded people is necessary. 
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From an educational point of view what is important 
is that initiation into already developed specialist 
language games is a way of increasing understanding. 
In order to say more about what such initiation must 
consist in and in order to establish this approach more 
firmly I must now expand the account I've sketched so far, 
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Ways of Looking. 
Words can have roles in more than one language game 
as I have shown, and some language games e.g. those of 
physics and aesthetics are logically distinct in the 
sense of being mutually irreducible. This means that there 
are more ways than one of characterising the world, 
things can be looked at in more than one way_ Consider, 
for example, the case of a botanist and a maker of 
cricket bats looking at a particular willow tree. Both 
will see, in an ordinary language sense, the sa~e tree, 
they will agree that 'this' is a willow tree, perhaps 
that It's a nice-looking tree etc. But in a more 
specialist sense the two will see very different trees. 
The botanist, by virtue of being initiated into the 
specialist language game/ way of looking of botany 
will pick out, as significant, features of the tree 
the bat-m~lker simply won't notice, and similar;Ly the 
bat-maker's specialist skills will lead him to pick out 
significant detail which the botanist will miss. So 
as soon as people put on their 'specialis~shats' they 
begin to look at the world in ways different to the 
ways non-specialist use, specialists pick out different 
detail and attach special significance to that detail. 
But they nevertheless see the same world as everybody else 
insofar as both specialist and non-specialist can agree 
on what they see at the level of ordinary language. 
This fact, that we have different ways of looking which 
give different characterisations of the same thing, 
raises problems. The first problem is that of making 
sense of the idea of looking at the same thing in 
different ways. We can't talk about sameness here in 
terms of what is said by the different ways of looking 
as they often characterise the 'thing' they are dealing 
with in very different ways. We could try saying that 
sameness depends on there only being a single referring 
word used by both ways of looking. But that too raises 
problems as the criteria for the use of that 'word' may 
287 . 
be different within the two ways of looking, so that, 
from within them, the context-specific meanings of the 
word may be very different. So it might be argued that 
the 'single' word is, in fact, best looked at as being 
two different words, as with the word 'tree' in, 'That 
is an oak tree,' and 'This is a shoe tree.' 
Now from one point of view the idea that the 'same' 
word has different meanings within different language 
games can be seen to have some force. For the botanist 
and cricket bat maker, operating within their specialist 
language games, the phrase 'willow tree' has different 
significances. But this doesn't mean that we must say 
that these differences in meaning amount to the sort of 
'different word, same inscription' distinction which my 
example of the two uses of the word 'tree' sugf,ests. 
This is because there is no rigid divide between language 
games. Neither the botanist nor the bat maker first came 
across 'willow tree' as a technical term within a 
specialist way of lookine, both would typically know the 
phrase as a referring expression within ordinary language, 
and both would be capable of picking out instances of 
willow trees without using specialist concepts. It is, 
I sugGest, at the level of ordinary language that we can 
find agreement between initiates of different specialist 
ways of looking and it is this agreement which makes it 
possible for us to talk coherently about different 
specialist ways of looking leading to different accounts 
of the same phenomena. 
It is important to grasp that if language games were 
all logically diSjoint then it would make no sense to 
talk of the same word having a role in different language 
games or of different ways of looking giving different 
characterisations of the same thing. We can only talk 
like that because referring words are, basically, nothing 
more than linguistic labels for classes of things. It is 
in the process of trying to make sense of those 'things' 
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that words come to have a role in different language 
games and those language games are inter-related, in part, 
by the fact that the basic referring words seem to fit 
equally well into different modes of language - a box 
can be wooden, larGe, heavy etc., which means that 'box'has 
a role in the physical object language game, and the same 
box can be exquisitely carved, beautiful, etc., which 
shows that 'box' can fit into the language game of 
aesthetics. The obvious point here is that there are 
'things" called boxes in the world and we can come to 
understand them from different point of view, as physical 
objects or aesthetic objects for instance. But to say 
this only makes sense if language games are not logically 
disjoint, if referring words are, in essence, seen as 
being theoretically neutral terms which receive their 
theoretical 'charge' through being used (and usable) in 
various language games. Only by taking this approach 
can we explain how we can choose to 'lift' a referring 
word from one language game to another, how we can decide 
to look at objects of experience in different ways, for 
instance, decide to look at a musical instrument solely 
in terms of physics in the hope that a characterisation 
in those terms might help us to find out what precisely 
makes what musicians, 'looking' aethetically, judge to be 
~ good violin. 
This line of thought must lead away from the notion 
that language is to be seen as a collection of logically 
disjoint parts, and towards the view that language mus~ 
be regarded as a way in which we collectively attempt to 
make sense of the world in which we find ourselves, logical 
distinctions, where they occur, being constituted as we 
discover what it does and does not make sense to say of 
various aspects of the world. It must also be remembered 
that the question of what it makes sense to say is not 
only to do with the nature of the world, there is also 
the matter of how we use language. The Hopis have different 
concepts of time and space to us and therefore see things 
differently, there are also primitive tribes who don't 
divorce dreams from reality in the way we do and so have 
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a different approach to life and the world. 
One of the central problems to be looked at in this 
section is that of whether the element of choice in 
language use makes it impossible for us to justify 
a claim that we have knowledge of the world other 
than in the sense that we know it because we constructed 
it through agreement in the use of language. This latter 
is an extreme relativist position of a sort that some 
sociologists of knowledge (Berger and Luckman in 'The. 
Social Construction of Reality', for example) and some 
philosophers of science (notably Feyerabend in 'Against 
Method') have moved towards. Opposed to a relativist 
position is that of the absolutist. Absolutism is the 
view that there is an external world which we can know 
'sub speci~ aeternitatis'. On this view we can always 
discover whether what we say is absolutely true of an 
independent reality - the pursuit of knowledge is seen 
as a matter of discovering how things really are, 
independently of human foibles. Absolutists include 
Popper and his followers, the logical positivists and 
a whole host of others who reject the relativist 
thesis. I should say that this characterisation of 
Absolutism is too brief, but this will be corrected 
later. The important element in absolutism is the 
belief that knowledge is of a reality independent of 
human conceptual habits. I would include Popper's 
account of science in a list of absolutist philosophy 
as a weak version of absolutism as he regards scientific 
statements as not being verifiable. Popper',s position 
is essentially that whilst our verification procedures 
can never give us certainty that 'this' is how things 
really are in the universe they can give us certainty 
that 'this' is ~ how things are. Thus although we can 
never be sure that our ways of ch~racterising things 
really do fit the universe we can, by finding faults 
in our way of looking. improve them and therefore get 
better and better approximations to the way things 
really are, even though we're never sure how close 
we are to really understanding how things are. 
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~he absolutist, then, is committed to the view that 
objectivity consists not only in according with 
culturally determined modes of conceiving, but also 
in str~ving ~owards a complete account of an independent 
reality. An extreme relativist, on the other hand, 
sees knowledge as being tied to language and objectivity 
as being a matter of following rules of procedure, and 
therefore sees bdth knowledge and objectivity as normative 
concepts specific to particular cultures. For the 
relativist what counts as objective truth is a cultural 
variable. I hope to steer a safe course between these 
extremes. I will try to show that whilst we do arrive 
at an understanding of an independent world, whilst we 
do discover what sort of account fits the world by 
checking theory against reality, there is still an 
element choice about what sort of account we're looking 
for. I want to keep the absolutist's view that knowledge 
is of an independent reality, but I also want to insist 
that the ways of looking which we develop aren't just 
ways of looking that fit the world, they 'fit' the 
world as we come to conceive it in engagement with 
the problems it presents us with - thus our conception 
of how things are in the world, our understanding of 
reality, is always arrived at from an essentially human 
perspective. 
What I want to adopt is a middle line, accepting 
that relativism captures many important ideas, but not 
cutting off language from an independent reality in the 
way extreme relativists tend to do. 
In my account of perception I concluded that ~e do, 
in perceptual consciousness, have access to a public 
world independent of us. But I also stressed the role 
of concepts in perception, that seeing is ,seeing-as, 
that what we see things as depends upon the concepts 
we possess, and that most of the concepts we Possess 
are acquired through language. I also suggested that the 
question of whether a conceptual framework fits the 
world is only answerable on the basis of whether 
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expectations which a particular way of looking leads 
us to have are fulfilled. In order to establish the 
view I want, a view which steers a safe course between 
the extremes of both absolutism and relativism, I must 
now attempt to expand these sketches into something 
more complete. As I do this the need for reference 
to the problem-solving purposes of people will, I hope, 
become obvious. 
I will begin by looking at the sciences. This is 
the easiest starting point as it produces a relatively 
straightforward account, one which will be expanded 
when I look at more difficult areas, like aesthetics 
and religion. In recent years the objectivity of the 
sciences has come under attack as more and more people 
have realised that a theoretically neutral observation 
language is an impossibility. Any scientific theory 
is a general account designed to fit the available 
data and which should, if successful, explain and 
predict all other relevant data (including data which 
will be obtainable at any future time). A simplistic 
view of this process is represented as follows: 
On this sort of view the theory is generated on 
the basis of the initial data and will survive for 
as long as all the other relevant data fits it. 
As soon as the data isn't what the theory predicts 
then the theory is seen as problematic and must be 
either modified or else abandoned. 
This acoount is just too simplistic. Modern physical 
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scientists, working in a tradition formulated initially 
by Galileo and Newton, still concern themselves with 
collecting quantitative data of a sort that can be 
formally represented in the language of mathematics. 
This preocupation is what has led to much of the 
success of physics, but it also is the source of a 
tendency to see physics as not being about understanding 
the nature of reality. A quote from Newton will show 
this tendency: 
"To ~tell us that every species of things 
is endowed with an occult specific quality 
by which it acts and produces manifest 
effects, is to tell us nothin~: But to 
deri ve two or three t$eneral princi Dles 
of motion frmm phenomena I and r: fterwards 
to tell us how the ro erties and actions 
of al~ corporea things ~ollow rom these 
manifest principles, would be a very great 
ste in hiloso h thou h the causes of 
princ1p es were not yet discovered: 
and therefore I scruple not to propose 
the principles of motion above mentioned, 
they being of very general extent, and 
leave their causes to be found out." 
(from Newton's principles, re-printed on 
P.230 of Morris Klines I 'f'lathematics in 
Western Culture'.) 
Newton, then, didn·t know why things move as they do 
but he did come up with a mathematical representation 
which fits twith a fair degree of accuracy) the way 
things do move - similarly Newton freely admitted that 
he didn't know what gravity was, but his mathematical 
law of eravitation wasn't improved on for over 200 years. 
The reasons for Newton's approach to physics being 
adopted are very complex, but one reason was certainly 
the fact that the older qualitative 'physics' with its 
hotch-potch of theological doctrine and metaphYSical 
speculation was (i) marking time, and tii) having a lot 
of trouble handling new data, such as that gathered 
by Galileo using a telescope to survey the night-sky. 
But what I really want to draw out here is that 
questions about what phenomena a discipline is interested 
in, what sort of account of those phenomena will be 
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regarded as adequate and what sort of data will be 
collected is a matter of choice and is not totally 
a matter of the nature of the world. Before Newton 
questions about the world were answered predominantly 
in terms of metaphysical essences. Newton explicitly 
rejects that approach in the above quote and offers 
an alternative way of characterising the nature of 
the world, Put crudely Newton's way of accounting 
for the nature of reality was to say something 
like, " The nature of the world is such that when 
'this' happens, then 'that' as a matter of contingent 
fact, also happens. I am not at all sure about the 
(causal) mechanisms linking 'this' and 'that' but 
the mathematical relationship is as follows •••••• " 
Fiy point is that although any particular characterisation 
of a phenomenon will depend upon the nature of what is 
observed to some extent, that characterisation will 
also depend on how the person making the description 
sees what he is doing. It will depend upon what he sees 
as being an adequate description. Similarly the question 
of what data will be regarded as relevant, which particular 
measurements will be made, depends very much on decisions 
made within discipline. What sort of theory will be ~ 
accepted as an adequate account of some class of phenomena 
is as much to do with the presuppositions built into 
a way of looking as with what is actually observed. 
In later discussion I will be discussing the status of 
these presuppositions and arguing that they do not 
constitute reasons for saying, for example, that science 
may not really be concerned with understanding the 
nature of reality. 
The idea that observation language has built in 
presuppositions and is not theoretically neutral is 
important. Not only are scientists selective when they 
collect data, but their selectivity is directed by 
prior assumptions they make about the nature of the 
phenomena in which they are interested. Central to 
any attempt to describe the motions of heavenly bodies 
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in mathematical terms is a presupposition that such 
motions are pre-determined, that planets and stars are not 
free agents, but move through the heavens in accordance 
with fixed principles which can be stated as mathematical 
laws. This belief is justified by the fact that 
astronomical data go back a long time and have always 
revealed regularities which astronomers have tried to 
represent geometrically for well over two thousand 
years. The presupposition that there is a large class 
of natural events in respect of which concepts like 
'consciousness' and 'free will' have no application 
is basic to physics-based science. It is not certain 
knowledge Qut it is a justified assumption insofar 
as it leads to the formulation of theories which success-
fully predict events. Insofar as theories based on 
mechanistic presuppositions lead to correct predictions 
we gain confidence that the predictable events are the 
result of mechanistic causality - in other words a basic 
assumption about the world is taken to amount to 
knowledge when the available evidence suggests that 
it's right. Of course there are problems here. We are 
happy about the use of a mechanistic model (and modern 
physics remains mechanistic even though nowadays the 
model is probability based rather than strictly 
determinist) to describe planet~ry and stellar motion, 
and this is largely because purely extensional theories 
do predict the positions of stars and planets accurately. 
But we are also quite happy about talking mechanistically 
about paper blowing in the wind even though we can't 
in fact predict what will happen. We accept that the 
problem of predicting the motions of a piece of paper 
in the wind is the same sort of problem as that of 
predicting planetary motion but that the forces involved 
are so transitory that, in fact, we cannot collect the 
necessary data. Thus we say, with some justification, 
that in principle we could predict the motion of paper 
in the wind, but that, as a matter of contingent fact, 
we can't manage it. Paper in the wind is a trivial example, 
but meteorology isn't. Meteorology is based upon the 
assumption that an account of the mechanisms 
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(i.e. purely extensional) by which our weather is 
produced is a possibility and that once such an 
account is formulated we will be able to collect 
the relevant data and predict our weather accurately. 
This is an interesting example in that meteorology 
is still in its formative stages - it just isn't 
very accurate yet. In such a case the disciplines' 
basic presuppositions, although they seem reasonable, 
have not yet been fully justified. 
In general all disciplines can be seen to favour 
particular ways of characterising the phenomena in 
which they're interested and hence to embody, within 
their ways of looking (at a particular point in time) 
certain presuppositions about the nature of these 
phenomena. The starting point for most systematic 
disciplines is, I suggest, an ordinary languaee account 
of the relevant phenomena, although theory must progress 
and in time the source of new characterisations will 
be the inspiration/ intelligent guesses/hunches of 
specialist researchers. But whatever the source of 
a discipline's initial working hypotheses it remains 
the case that it is the in-built presuppositions about 
relevant phenomena which guide the formulation of 
theory and the collection of data. It only makes sense 
to give a geometrical account of motions which are 
regular and which are plausibly explicable in 
extensional terms. Where agency is involved we are 
generally concerned more with someone's intentions 
than with accurately mapping bodily movements, except, 
of course, in special cases like time and motion studies 
where we are explicitly interested in the physical 
movements involved in carrying out a sequence of 
action. The inappropriateness of geometrical 
descriptions of physical motion in most cases involving 
agency arises, of course, from the impossibility of 
specifying actions without reference to intention -
identity of motion does not imply identity of action 
and hence a purely extensional account of someone's 
motions isn't very useful in predicting future actions 
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whereas understanding what someone is doing in terms 
of what action is being performed and why often turns 
out to be useful in predicting future actions. It must 
be noted that whereas causal chains of events do seem 
to occur in particular sequences with a high degree 
of probability that (say) event B will follow event 
A, people just aren't like that. In so~e circumstances 
people's sequences of action can be predicted, experiments 
in impersonal control techniques have demonstrated this 
clearly, as have many other experiments in social 
psychology. But the degree of predictability in such 
cases is far less than in cases where the assumption 
of mechanistic causality seems more plausible. People 
can reflect on what they should do next (even if they 
don't) and it is this ability to reflect and decide 
which can lead us to opt out of a chain of action or 
else alter its course. 
Both psychology and sociology this century have 
at times attempted to achieve scientific status by 
emulating physics and neither discipline has got very 
far. It seems to me that the problem is primarily 
that an attempt to find general principles for people 
which parallel those for inanimate objects is misguided. 
Physics deals with the world in a way that does not 
admit, because it is not interested in, the notion 
of a consoious agent. If psychology and sociology 
try to work too much on the same lines as physics 
they run the risk of importing, tacitly at least, 
certain of the mechanistic presuppositions of that 
discipline, I sug~est, then, that some of the failures 
of the human 'sciences' this century have occurred 
primarily because techniques have been imported 
from physics which are based upon Mechanistic 
presuppositions and hence are inappropriate for the 
study of conscious agents. 
My suggestion is that the sort of data which the 
presuppositions basic to physics make relevant for 
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that discipline is simply irrelevant, in many cases, 
to the endeavour of attempting to understanding a 
conscious agent's reasons for acting in particular 
ways. I hope this brief discussion has made clear 
what I mean when I say that a discipline's basic 
presuppositions, assumptions built into the discipline's 
observation language, dictate what sort of data counts 
as relevant and hence is collected. 
These assumptions built into the observation 
language also effect what we see, not just in the 
sense of directing our attention to certain things 
rather than others, but also in the sense of leading 
us to interpret what we see differently. For instance 
a confirmed mechanist sees only events. Even if he 
uses action language to describe what he sees he 
remains convinced that what he sees will ultimately 
be fully explained by a set of purely extensional 
descriptions. So the initial characterisation imposes 
itself on the endeavour in two related ways. By embodying 
presuppositions about the phenomena being observed it 
allows those phenomena to be described in sorr.e ways but 
not in others and, further, the sorts of theoretical 
account which those presuppositions allow dictate 
what sort of data should be collected, what data is 
relevant to the accuracy of the theory. The important 
point to grasp is that those initial presuppositions 
are vital. Without an initial hypothesis about the nature 
of 'this' and 'that' no systematic enquiry could begin 
and hence those presuppositions could never be modified 
and improved on - we could not increase our understanding. 
Presuppositions can be modified and justified in the 
light of experience and can be shown to lead towards 
ways of looking which fit the world. 
So the idea that scientists proceed by collecting 
neutral data about how things are in particular times 
and places and then constructing a general theory on 
that basis is just too simplistic. Scientists must 
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decide what they are interested in, and what constitutes 
an adequate explanation of the relevant phenomena. And 
data can, ultimately, only be relevant to particular 
hypotheses, thus the presuppositions built 'into the 
notion of an adequate explanation will also play a 
part in defining what constitutes relevant data. But 
this is not to say that science tells us nothing about 
the world. Rather I am concerned with rejecting a view 
of science as being based on a model of finding the 
facts and then theorising. I want to insist that there 
is a greater element of creative imagination in what 
actually takes place, that a way of looking has to 
be generated imagina~ively from casual observation 
before an explicit theory which can be checked rigorously 
against the data can be formulated. Checking a way of 
looking by seeing if its theoretical implications fit 
the facts is a way of seeing if it fits the world, but 
it is not a way of showing it to be a complete account. 
This follows from Popper's insight that evidence which 
is consistent with a theory never formally proves that 
the theory is correct whereas evidence against a theory 
formally constitutes a proof of the theory's falsity. 
Such'a'fact implies that the presuppositions basic to 
a particular approach to the world can never be shown 
conclusively to be true of the world, all we can do 
is justify them by checking to see if any relevant 
data turns up which constitutes a counter example to their 
claim that things are 'like this'. 
The creation of a hypothesis, then, involves 
imagination and the hypothesis itself, formally speaking, 
can never be proved. Thus there remains a degree of freedom 
in our choice of presuppositions which might prove 
problematic to absolutism. But, on the other hand, 
all this freedom means is that we have to give up 
absolute certainty and content ourselves with the 
statistical judgement that the relevant data a~rees 
with a hypothesis and that therefore our hypothesis 
and our way of looking (presuppositions and all) seem 
to fit the world to quite a degree. Ttis freedom, 
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however, does open up the possibility of the world 
being describable, with a fair degree of justification, 
in a number of different ways. Instead of interpreting 
'The world is like this' in a strictly absolutist way 
we might say that the nature of the world is such that" 
we can conceive 'these' aspects of it in 'these' ways. 
My point is that the acceptability of a theory is to 
do with more than the question of whether it fits the 
world, it is also to do with the interests and problems 
which people happen to have. 
Describing phenomena in purely extensional terms 
and attempting to describe physical relationships in 
mathematical terms is something that physicists after 
~ewton decided to do. The decision was not one imposed 
by the nature of reality - the nature of reality 
didn't change in the 17th century, only the nature of 
physics. One reason for physics changing direction 
with Newton was certainly the fact that Newton wes 
successful in all sorts of ways whereas the older 
approach, in terms of metaphysical 'essences', was 
staenating. And here is where specific problems appear -
we can't be successful in an activity unless we begin 
with something we want to achieve, 'success' implies 
having achieved a target. So we can see Newton as 
saying (as the earlier quote suggests) that the sorts 
of things that earlier workers were trying to do 
constituted poor solutions to the problems they were 
confronting in that success just wasn't forthcoming. 
Newton proposed a change of approach for physics -
that of attempting to discover mathematical regularities 
in events, of discovering mathematical laws. This was 
a good move for physics, accordine to Newton, because 
it eave success, as his laws of motion and gravitation 
demonstrated. It is a matter of history that the 
adoption of Newton's recommendations led to the rapid 
growth of physics. It is interesting to note though 
that the difficulty of marrying mathematical law with 
some account of the nature of things (e.g. atomic structure), 
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a difficulty which Newton fully grasped, still remains, 
particularly in the realm of sub-atomic physics where 
direct observation just isn't possible. 
In his book, 'I1yths, Models and Paradigms, 'Ian 
G. Barbour talks about models as providing the link 
between theory and the world, he writes (P. 30): 
"A theoretical model, then, is an imagined 
mechanism or process, postulated by analogy 
with familiar mechanisms or processes and 
used to construct a theory to correlate a 
set of observations." 
~arbour offers this flow-chart designed to show 
the generation of the 'billiard-ball.' model of 
gasses. This theory thinks of the pressure of a 
gas as consisting of the impact of very small elastic 
spheres (the molecules) ··on a-container. 
The double arrows in this flow chart are described 
by Barbour. as, fl ••• the formal deduction of experimental 
laws from theory together with rules of correspondence." 
The broken arrows are 'lines of creativity' the monel 
being generated imaginitively through analogy with a 
familiar situation (in this case the motion of billiard 
balls). The single unbroken arrow is the link between model 
and theory - the model suggests a theory (in mathematical 
form in this case) which can be checked against actual 
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observations on gasses (the theory's mathematical form 
is what allows the theory to be checked precisely against 
quantitative data). 
Barbour's use of the notion of a model is essentially 
the same as my use of the notion of presuppositions 
basic to a particular approach to explaining some phenomenon 
except that his account is rather more subtle than mine 
so far which is why I want to make use of it. To him a 
model, as with the 'tiny elastic spheres' model in the 
flow chart can be as limited as we like. Its job is 
to give us an idea of whatiNe are dealing with so that 
we can see what sort of theory might work. But the 
model has another, equally important, job - that of 
linking theory with the world. Initially a model is taken 
as neither true nor false, it is simply an idea to be 
tried out, There is no easy way to explain where monels 
come from - they are imaginative creations, hunches to be 
followed up, models are not cenerated by any algorithm. 
The model, through analogies (however vague) with other, 
familiar, situations suggests a theory and once we have 
a theory we can check it against relevant data. As a theory 
is shown to fit the world we become more and more confident 
that the model which underpins the theory captures the 
nature of reality to some degree, although it is quite 
obvious that the relationship between model and world 
is not one that gives anything like absolute certainty. 
It is also the case that adjustments to a theory can lead 
to a model's changing - for instance the 'tiny elastic 
spheres' presupposed by the Kin~sthetic theory of gases 
are nowadays thought of as having a mutual attraction. 
Barbour also distinguishes between ordinary models 
and paradigms. He uses 'paradigm' to denote a research 
tradition, for instance the Newtonian paradigm in physics. 
A paradigm also involves a monel, but one of ereat 
generality and suggestiveness, so Newton's vision of the 
universe as a vast system of physical objects moving 
in accordance with fixed laws was a model which grasped 
the imaginations of scientists and directed the 
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development of physics for more than two centuries. 
Paradigms are important as they provide a basic 
approach to the world which gives concensus within the 
community based on that paradigm. Paradigms, then, are 
like the basic presuppositions constitutive of a 
language game at a particular point in time. But such 
presuppositions can change through1time, and paradigms 
come and go in the sciences. 
Paradigm changes in the sciences are not an easy 
matter and there are always some oddities involved -
for instance the break from a eeocentric to a ~eliocentric 
view of the universe was helped by the inability of 
ptolomeic theories to explain the facts about the 
movements of the planet~. Tycho Brahe did produce a 
system which had the planets going round the sun and 
the sun going round the earth which fitted the available 
data as well as Galileo's ~eliocentric system ( and 
neither was perfect). but Galileo won the day. Of 
course later observations supported Galileo more and 
more, but this later support doesn't explain why Galileo 
won through. On the other hand, though, it could be 
argued that the geocentric model had led to so many 
problems and had beert patched up to such a degree that 
astronomers might reasonably have decided that a totally 
new approach, which predicted movements with reasonable 
accuracy even in a relatively undeveloped state, might 
prove more fruitful in the long run than Tycho Brahe's 
imaginative patching up of the old system. This, however, 
is speculative, the social climate of the times, 
particularly the grip of the church on intellectual 
life which more and more people were coming to see as 
undesirable,might have made the adoption of Galileo's 
system a symbolic defiance of the church. And, of course, 
Feyerabend, in 'Against Method'. concludes that Galileo 
cheated, that at the time of his victory over geocentric 
models there was no justification for accepting his 
heliocentric theory. I don't know the answer - and this, 
after all, is not an essay in the history of ideas. 
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It seems fairly clear from history, though, that 
although evidence counts for or against a paradigm 
(and I will continue to use the word in Barbour's 
sense) there is no clear cut way in which a particular 
piece of evidence can finally deal a death blow to 
an established paradigm. It just isn't true that Galileo 
solved all the ptolomeic system's problems in one go, 
he kept circular orbits (for metaphysical/theological 
reasons inherited from the Greeks) and therefore still 
wasn't totally accurate, and on correspondence with 
the facts Galileo wasn't significantly more accurate 
than Tycho Brahe. Similarly Newton's mathematicisation 
of physics wasn't totally free of problems. His 
predictions of planetary mo~ions still weren't qUite 
right, his laws of motion didn't take air resistance 
into account and the calculus, developed at the same 
time by Newton, Liebnitz and Fermat (following after 
many others), which underpinned such notions as 
instantaneous speed (speed at a particular point of time -
on essential notion for the laws of motion) had no 
basis in logic until 200 years later when (in 1821) 
Cauchy published 'Cours d' Analyse'. This lack of a 
rigorous basis led Voltaire to describe calculus 
as, "the art of numbering and measuring exactly a 
Thing whose Existence cannot be conceived." 
What appears to be the case is that a paradigm is 
adhered to and patched up for quite some time whilst 
a more attractive alternative is awaited. At t~e 
present time physics is getting towards this state. 
Einstein's laws can't deal with events inside a black 
hole (a collapsed star which has a gravitated 'pull' 
so strong that even light can't escape from it). On 
a recent television programme 'Einstein's Universe', 
celebrating the centenary of his birth, physicists 
were to be heard talking of 'twisters', entities more 
fundamental than matter and space, which are being 
worked on in an attempt to render black holes more 
comprehensible. Thus just as Newton's notions of ti~e 
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and space as absolutes were replaced by Einstein's 
notions of time and space being warpable by mass, so, 
it appears, we can expect at some future time, the emergence 
of a new paradigm in physics which will embody new 
conceptions of time, space and matter. 
A paradigD\ then, is basically a way of looking at 
the world, a way of conceiving reality which leads to 
the generation of theories. For as long as those theories 
do fit the world (i.e. accord with the relevant data) 
we remain confident that our basic model is a reasonable 
approximation of the way things are in the world. When 
problems appear we make adjustments to our basic model, 
but if, at some point, the problems start piling up 
and the theories begin to look too patchy, we begin to 
wonder whether our basic model, our basic way of 
looking/conceiving, isn't at fault. It is at this 
point that a new paradigm can gain acceptance. It is 
important to realise that science always has anomalies, 
odd little phenomena that don't fit within the paradigm, 
and usually these are put to one side so long as the 
paradigm is leading to success in other fields. Only 
when the paradigm has been all but 'wrung dry', when 
the anomalies become too frequent and the rate of progress 
drops off, do we start looking for alternatives. There 
is nothing necessarily irrational in this, if we want 
to increase our understanding we've got to follow up 
likely ideas - if we wait for absolute certainty we 
may never understand anything. And anyway following up 
a paradigm to the point at which it breaks down is the 
only sure way to find out what its shortcomings are, and 
this is important information. New paradigms are generated 
within the scientific community - only someone who knows 
the mistakes of the past can be sure of avoiding them, so 
the generation of new paradigms is done 'on the backs' 
of previous paradigms, a discipline progresses by avoiding 
earlier mistakes. 
The links between a scientific community using a 
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particular paradigm and a language eame based on 
particular presuppositions should by now be obvious, 
and hence it should be clear that it is proper to 
talk about specialist disciplines using specialist 
langua~e games, modes of language based on particular 
paradigms. We now come up against a problem which I 
left hanging in the previous section. I said then 
that a language eame would, at any particular point in 
time, be based on certain presuppositions about the 
nature of the phenomena it is used to talk about. 
But I also asserted that these basic presuppositions 
can change through time without requiring us to say 
that we had a different language game before the change 
to that which we have after the change. I think that 
I am correct in making this assertion. Language games 
are not logically distinct, there is no easy formulation 
for deciding whether two language games are the sa~e. 
We can decide to group language games together i~ terms 
of the presuppositions underlyimg them, but this could 
involve making arbitrary decisions about which language 
games to put together and which to keep apart, and 
dividing up areas of language (and hence knowledge) 
in too quick a way would seem likely to obscure the 
complex relationship between them. I will, in fact, 
be doing something of this sort in later sections, 
but will be making the classifications in terms of 
problem-domains in an effort to avoid representing 
different areas as being totally disjoint in terms 
of concepts and procedures. 
If we look at various language games at a point 
in time we can make distinctions, for instance 
between the language games of physical objects and 
aesthetics. But if we start looking for sharp logical 
boundaries between areas of thought we can't find any. 
A work of art is a physical object and, when producing 
a work of art, an artist must, to some extent, reGard 
his problem as one of manipulating materials which 
have certain physical properties. Similarly a language 
game like that o.f phYSics can still embody notions 
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of elegance which are aesthetic. Attempts to package 
various language games/ways of looking into distinct 
areas always involve a degree of arbitrariness as 
formal logical distinctions rarely serve to distinguish 
between naturally occu~ing areas of language. There 
may be ways of arriving at agreement on such matters, 
arbitrary decisions sometimes have to be made and 
arbitrary distinctions observed - in morals, for 
instance, it can be arQled that the question of what rules 
should be accorded with is a matter for decision within 
a community rather than an imperative with independent 
validity. Put although I will re-introduce the idea 
of a classification of ways of looking in later 
discussion For now I want to draw attention to the 
links between ways of looking. 
In educational theory distinctions between ways 
of looking have too often (Hirst, Phenix and White 
are examples) been seen as distinctions between areas 
of knowledge which just are logically disjoint. The 
idea that there are logically distinct areas of cognition 
persists even in the face of counter evidence and it 
is this idea I wish to ,attack. That some useful 
distinctions can be made between ways of looking is 
something I can accept so long as such a classification 
is argued for from the point of view of different 
problems requiring different solutions or on the basis 
of empirical evidence about generalisation of learning 
or something of that sort. But I cannot accept that 
there just are different sorts of knowledge, different 
forms of cognition, as a matter of logic. I wish to 
represent the distinctions between laneuaee eames, 
as matters of historical fact and similarly for the 
organisation of subjects in educational institutions. 
I wish to suggest that questions about such organisation 
cannot be answered merely by reference to the logical 
nature of language. 
If we look at language games through time we begin 
to realise why the arbitrariness of 'lo~ical' 
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classifications of language/cognition/knowledge is 
dangerously misleading. Language games, even specialist 
language games, change through time, new language 
games 'split-off' from older ones, as both psychology 
and sociology have grown out of philosophy, and often 
vestigial links remain even after radical changes. We 
no longer believe (in the 'developed' world) that 
natural events Are 'willed' by spirits, but we still, 
for example, say things like, "Come on, don't rain now," 
when a cricket match we're watching seems in danger 
of being stopped by rain. What once was taken seriously 
as an evocation of a 'god' or spirit is now taken not-
so-seriously, but the links are there, our language 
games retain vestiges of earlier ways of explaining 
natural events. 
With the specialist disciplines the situation is 
just as complex. To announce that physics is an empirical 
science and mathematics a formal discipline is simply 
to ignore fact. I-1ethodologically physics is as much 
a formal discipline as it is empirical - basic laws 
are based on observation, but once they are established 
physics often works by deduction, taking the laws as 
axiomatic within a deduction system. Similarly r.1athematics 
works deductively from axioms, but the question of which 
axioms to work from often has an answer that, in part 
at least, is empirically based. Euclid's axiom to the 
effect that the shortest distance between two points 
is a straight line was adopted because it was an 
e~pirical truth which no-one disagreed with. Russell, 
in his 'Introduction to the Philosophy of Mathematics', 
talks in terms of working backwards from the fact of 
our using numbers in real life to axioms which can 
give numbers as we know them a firm logical basis. 
Newton invented calculus (along with Lieb~tz) as part 
of his work on the laws of motion, the analytic basis 
of calculus was developed by Cauchy 200 years later. 
The importance of giving calculus a firm logical basis 
came mainly from the fact that astronomers found calculus 
an extremely useful tool - 1 t' s always embarrass1:n:g ':to 
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have maths that work and not to know why. Even more 
heterogeneous is the story of projective geometry, 
a branch of maths which grew out of work on perspective 
by such men as DaVinci and DUrer and was closely related 
to the problems of map making and architecture - here 
we have a strong relationship between cartography, 
painting, architecture and mathematics. A final example 
of the way in which areas interact is Probability theory, 
a very important element of statistics, which owes its 
generation to the fact that gamblers wanted to work 
out the odds for and against winning more accurately. 
Jerome Cardin, renaissance mathematician and general 
rogue, wrote a book called ' Liber De Ludo Aleae' in 
which he studied the problems of throwing sevens with 
two dice and of picking aces out of a pack of cards. 
About a century later another gambler, the Chevalier 
, , de Mere, who wasn't a mathematiciam, Asked Blaise Pascal 
to solve his probability problems. Pascal,in collaboration 
with Fermat, worked out the basis of probability theory. 
It seems to me that the importance of the ways in 
which different aspects of life interact and direct the 
ways of looking we use must make it more desirable to 
talk about language games being historically continuous 
and evolving. Attempts to parcel up knowledge or modes 
of conceptualisation into distinct areas are dangercus 
in that they don't reflect the inter-relations between 
language games and don't reflect the varied motivations 
for certain ways of looking being for~ulated. 
What I am also saying is that we shouldn't let the 
fact that mathematicians (for instance) set down their 
work in the form of elegant deductions from apparently • 
unquestionable axioms fool us into thinking that 
mathematicians proceed by first seeking out unquestionable 
axioms and then seeing where deduction takes them. 
This just isn't the case. Mathematicians, like the rest 
of humanity, do things for a wide variety of reasons; 
out of interest in Maths for its own sake, out of 
interest in problems arising elsewhere (trigonometry 
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was generated from problems with astronomy and 
navigation, calculus was needed to back up the laws 
of motion), and also out of sheer self interest 
(Cardin's interest in probability w~s directly 
concerned with wanting to win- he noted that the 
probability of drawing an ace was vastly increased 
if the ace was soaped beforehand). The erowth of 
Mathematics is inextricably connected with otr.er 
disciplines and with more general problems of human 
life. 
It seens to ~e that dividing up lAneua~e ga~es 
according to their underlying assumptions at a point 
in time has two problems. 7he first is that we are 
likely to find that our language games constitute 
not distinct areas, but a series of cases which are 
linked by family resemblance (in Wittgenstein's sense). 
Thus dividing up different areas of language would 
involve deciding when a conceptual similarity between 
areas is ~reat enough to call them the same langua~e 
games and when not - and this is to say that any 
division would be challengable as being a matter of 
hopelessly arbitrary stipulation. The second problem 
is that putting language games (and hence knowledge/ 
forms of cognition/ modes of unoerstanding) into 
separate packages is dangerous in that it invites us 
to ignore the very complex inter-relationships between 
different ways of looking and between any specialist 
way of looking and human life in a more general sense. 
In particular the identification of a research tradition 
with a neat package of information just ~ inappropriate. 
No matter hew many text books we memorise we do not 
therefore understand physics or maths or aesthetics, 
we donlt thereby grasp that Ithis' information was 
generated in the engagement of people with the world, 
or how, or why. 
There is, however, a very real problem involved in 
saying that the presuppositions basic to language ga~es 
can change over time. Such a statement involves saying 
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that the same language game can be based on different 
assumptions about the world at different times. The 
problem is that of explaining what my criteria of 
sameness are, if I can't do this then the idea of the 
'same' language game changing basic presuppositions 
or concepts (or whatever) is incoherent. 
My way round this problem is to look at language 
games as linguistic traditions. The idea that language 
games are, at a point in time, based on a particular 
set of presuppositions about the phenomena with which 
they deal is an abstraction from the fact that, at a 
point in time, there exist communities of language users 
who have corporate sets of beliefs about particular 
aspects of the world, beliefs which fragment their 
language into language games which are constituted 
within the community. 
In terms of ordinary language the historical 
continuity of the community is a matter of parents 
transmitting langUage and beliefs to their children. 
The ways of speaking, and hence ways of looking, of 
such a historically continuous community may change 
through time, but insofar as the changes are gradual 
and the evolution of beliefs about different aspects 
of the world is traceable through history, then we can 
coherently talk about the relevant language games 
evolving, i.e. being the same languaGe games but having 
different presuppositionalbases. So the notion of 
'sameness' with respect to language games comes down 
to a notion of continuity within a historically recognisable 
tradition. The question of what makes a tradition 
recognisable must immediately occur. 
There is also a related problem here, which is that 
of how we decid~ that a change is such that we really 
do have a new language game and not merely a modification 
of an older one. The transition from alchemy to chemistry 
is one example which seems to be a change between language 
games as is. that f!om astrology to astronomy. The move 
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from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics seems, on the 
other hand, to be more like a change within a single 
tradition. The distinction between cases like those, 
it seems to me, must be made in historical terms of 
whether there really is an observable discontinuity 
of a sort which suggests that, for instance, astronomy 
should be seen as something very different from astrology. 
It isn't easy to point to such a discontinuity in the 
case of the astronomy/astrology split. Kepler, for 
instance, who is an important figure in the' history 
of astronomy as the one who hit on the idea of elliptical 
orbits for the planets, once held the post of professor 
of ~athematics and Morals at the University of Graz, 
a post that required him to master the art of astrology. 
It is also the case that Kepler's third law of planetory 
motion (the square of the time of revolution of a 
planet is proportional to the cube of its average distance 
from the sun) first appeared in 1619 in a work called 
'The Harmony of the World' in which he expounded a new 
version of the ~usic of the spheres. The sun, according 
to Kepler, had a soul and enjoyed the harmonies 
resulting from the different velocities of the six 
planets. It seems clear that the astronomy for which 
Kepler is remembered today was, for him, only a part 
of a much wider endeavour which owed so~ething to 
astrology and was closely related to the Greek view 
of geometry as a way of discovering truth, the harmony 
underlying the sensible universe. This sort of mixing 
of astronomy with ideas coming from theology and 
astrology parallels the confusion found in pre-Newt6nian 
'physics', but whereas we might plausibly represent 
Newton's 'Principia' as the discontinuity which gave 
physics its autonomy as a way of looking distinct from 
metaphysical philosophy and theology there seems to be 
no clear 'break-off point' in the case of astronomy and 
astrology. Rather there seems to have been a growing 
apart of the two areas. Astronomers began to be interested 
only in the problems of finding a correct geometrical 
description of the motion of the heavenly bodies, and 
later in constructing physics-based models of the 
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universe leaving out the anthropormorphism found in the 
astrologically - influenced discussions of earlier 
astronomer/astrologers who talked about planets being 
incorruptable bodies and ascribed agency to them. 
I suggest that identification of astronomy as a tradition 
of enquiry ditinct from astrology can be done only given 
the historical fact that over the period from the 
seventeenth century to the present day the two communities 
of astrologers and astronomers, have grown apart. The . 
community of astronomers has progressively weakened its 
links with astrology and theology and strengthened its 
links with post-Newtonian physics. Astronomy undeniably 
grew out of astrology but erew apart and adopted a very 
different conception of the problems to be solved. It 
must be seen as a new tradition rather than are-vamp 
of astrology not just because there was a change of way 
of looking, and in the conception of problems but because 
it moved away from astrology, leaving that tradition 
intact (even if astrology now seems to be little more 
than a form of amusement not to be taken too seriously}. 
The change from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics 
remains a change within a tradition mainly because 
Einstein's purposes in forwarding his theories were tied 
up with trying to solve problems that were shareo with 
Newton. Whereas astronomers simply gave up on the problems 
of astrology and became concerned with problems which, 
whilst first appearinG in the context of astrology were 
not its central concern, Einstein deaJt with (sometimes 
through reformulation of the problem as with gravitation) 
problems which were of central concern to physicists 
working within the Newtonian tradition. Thus Einstein 
came to replace Newton within the historically continuous 
community of physicists, there was no split with some 
theorist's carrying on with the earlier endevour and 
others moving into new fields, the endevour, that of 
characterising natural events in extensional terms, 
was maintained if reformulated in parts and the community 
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was carried forward under a new paradigm. 
The sort of discontinuity which leads to the establish-
ment of a new movement, a research tradition which is 
sufficiently different fro~ its antecedents to be called 
a different discipline seems to be one in which the new 
approach gives up on some earlier problems making no 
attempt to reconceive them. In such a situation the 
earlier tradition survives because the new tradition 
doesn't seek to do the same job and therefore isn't a 
candidate to replace it - we get, therefore, over a 
period of time, the establishment of two communities 
where once there was one. In some cases communities 
split but their interests overlap, the boundries between 
the 'different' approaches remain unclear. This century 
there has been, and probably will continue to be, a great 
deal of discussion about the relationships which philosophy 
has to both psychology and sociology. Here, I suegest, 
we have a recent example of disciplines splitting off 
from philosophy, but the boundriee between the areas 
are ill-defined so that phenomenol~ is both philosophy 
and psychology whilst the sociology of knowledge has 
problems arising from the closeness of its interests to 
some of the traditional interests of epistemoloey (which 
itself has only become defined as a distinct part of 
philosophy over the last century or so.) 
?he recoGnition of particular traditions, I have 
suggested, is tied up with the historical continuity 
of communities of interest. If such.a co~unity maintains 
unity over changes in paradigm then we can talk of the 
specialist language game evolving. If the community splits, 
some members maintaining interest in what were established 
as problems central to the tradition and using the old 
paradiem whilst others concentrate on new problems (or 
problems that were previously only peripheral to the 
tradition), using a new paradigm, then we have the birth 
of a new tradition of enquiry. 
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In talking about historical continuity here I am trying 
to deal with a specific problem, that of when changes in 
• 
concepts/problems/ procedures etc. should be taken to 
constitute evolution within a tradition and when they 
constitute a schism resulting in the birth of a new 
tradition, a new approach to the world. 
What I have said does not rule out the possibility of 
a community of interest dying out (for whatever reasons), 
its language games/way(s) of looking only surviving in 
the form of the records members of the community have left, 
and those records arousing new interest only after a 
considerable time. In such a ca~e there would be discon-
tinuity of the community but continuity of paradigm 
(although much in the way of skills and what Polanyi 
calls personal knowledge would have to be rediscovered 
as these things cannot be written down easily.) There are 
also cases where a tradition which has died out is not 
revived but instead provides inspiration for a new paradigm 
in a related field. Thus ~;homsky, in 'Cartesian Linguistics' 
draws inspiration from the mediaeval grammarians for his 
psycho-linguistics without adopting their conceptual 
framework. Here we have a sort of link through time, but 
not, perhaps, one which could be termed the renaissance 
of a previously neglected perpective on (some aspect of) 
the world. 
These, however, aren't pressine problems, just areas 
which if left unmentioned might allow the possibility of 
confusion and, as such, need to be clarified. My main 
interest is in looking at clearly defined traditions of 
enquiry in order to show the importance of specific sorts 
of problem in definine them. It is (I believe) important 
to see that human understanding is as much to do with the 
problems (and hence the value systems) which people have 
as with the nature of the world. 
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It is a fact of life that the world and our being in it 
is a source of problems forus. The world in which we 
find ourselves becomes problematic as soon as we begin 
to exercise our agency and/or to reflect upon it. In 
many animals most action is instinctive (and, perhaps, 
not properly to be thought of as action in a sense 
involving intention ). But in human understanding we find 
an ability to construct models of the world which, when 
successful, enable us to act more purposely and to 
satisfy our more intellectual appetites. A hunter can 
learn about the animals he hunts and about the terrain 
in which they live and can become a more successful hunter 
in terms of providing food. The reflective man can, 
similarly, create a metaphysical model of the universe 
and of humanity's role in it which he finds satisfying, 
even if criteria for the model's accuracy are not as 
easily defined where the explanation offered has no 
predictive function. 
The central theme I want to stress is that the world 
becomes problematic only when we engage with it or 
find it impinging on our lives uninvited. When the 
world becomes problematic we need, in order to solve or 
overcome the problems, a characterisation of those aspects 
of the world which we find problematic. And unless we have 
some purpose which the world frustrates we have no 
problems - this remains true even if all we are after is 
a quiet life, in that case the world becomes problematic 
when it 'insists' on disrupting our peace and tranquility. 
Some might want to say that this sort of characterisation 
is reasonable when we're talking about science and 
technology, but that some areas don't fit this sort of 
model. The earliest philosophy, for instance, asked 
questions like, 'What is it to be real, to exist,' and it 
could be argued that there is no problem here which arises 
from engagement with the world. My reply to such an 
assertion is that we ourselves are in the world and that 
engagement with the world cannot be properly contrasted 
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with engagement with ourselves. 
Questions of philosophy, and religious questions, 
arise from questions asked by people on matters which 
concern them. The complexity and endurance of a wide 
variety of metaphysical and theological explanations of 
ourselves and o~r relationship to the world see~ to me 
to show one thing - that human beings have always found 
life and it often apparent futility proble~atic. No 
matter how much specialists might want to reuresent such 
questions as esoterica which can only be grasped by t~e 
more gifted amongst us I believe they are wrong. Even if 
most of us spend most of our lives protected from taking 
responsibility for our actions by settling for 
inauthenticity, by simply doing what 'one' does in 'this' 
context and by tacitly accepting the notion that 
conformity is its own justification we are Rever'saf~. 
Few people get through their lives without being confron-
ted by some event which raises the old and intractable 
questions like, 'What ought I to do?' or 'What is all this 
about?' The world, both the often cruel world of nature 
and the often nasty, vicicus and brutal social world, 
presents u~ with situations where such questions must be 
raised even by the dullest of people. It seems clear to 
me that such questions are important not because 
disinterested reflection reveals them as such, but because 
anyone livIDng in the world must, at least on so~e 
occas, ion, be faced with a war, a natural t~Gedy, or 
some less major occuncnce which nevertheless raises a 
whole host of questions of the sort under discussion. 
Trying to make sense, for example, of the death of 
someone close is something which many people find 
themselves having to do, and engagement with such problems 
~ engagement with the massive problems concerning the 
significances of our lives and our deaths. 
Problems play a central role in the generation of 
knowledge, in the activity of knowing. I am not forwarding 
a false thesis here to the effect that proble~s play a 
crucial role in every situation where someone comes to 
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know something. It's quite obvious that we can accidently 
notice that such and such is the case or else an event 
can be sufficiently spectacular, or unusual, so as to 
'grab' our attention. But the level at which such things 
occur is one where we 'already possess a way of looking 
which we use idly or accidently or which is 'switched-in' 
as our attention is held by some event. 
The level at which problems are crucial is that at which 
ways of looking are generated. Again some might raise 
moral discourse as a counter example here, asking whether 
it makes sense to suggest that there are problems which 
are constitutive (in part) of morality. It seems to me 
that an important element in moral discourse (perhaps the 
central element, although there are those who would 
disagree) is the need for rules by which social conduct 
is regulated. It seems to me that any society needs such 
rules simply in order for people to be able to live their 
lives in some sort of security. Moral discourse, it seems 
to me, is, in part at least, a way of solving the problems 
which arise when people live together, a way of deciding 
what the rules which regulate social intercourse should be. 
So moral discourse can be seen to have a probiem-solving 
basis. It is important to realise that whe~her we see 
moral discourse as a means of reaching agreement on rules, 
as a way of discovering moral imperatives or whatever, 
the sorts of questions we ask, the sort of issues that we 
see as important, are dictated not merely by the findings 
of disinterested reason - they are intimately connected 
with the problems that arise in life. 
We are all, to some extent, passive recipients of 
established ways of looking. The difference between the 
levels of passivity and activity in language is the 
difference between a passive recipient of a set of 
linguistic traditions and someone who engages with the 
world in an attempt to make sense of it. To some extent we 
must all passively receive a linguistic tradition - we 
must learn a language which has been spoken before our 
birth in order to enter fully into our linguistic community. 
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At some paint, though, we should realise that the ways of 
looking we have inherited (both specialist and non -
specialist) are not sacrosanct, they are ways of looking 
which have been built up for reasons and which do a 
particular job. This being the case we can reject or make 
changes to ways of looking, we can raise objections to 
them, point out facts which they should, but do not, 
explain and generally modify any language game in ways 
which seem reasonable. This is one way in which language 
games evolve although it should be said that not all 
changes in ways of looking are made either explicitly 
or rationally. Ordinary language ch8nges through time 
but the processess involved are not very well understood 
to date. In specialist disciplines the changes are 
usually explicit and traceable back to their origins, 
usually in the work of a particular worker or group of 
workers in the particular field. But not all changes in 
the systematic disciplines are made rationally, sometimes 
powerful institutions or individuals or ideas exercise a 
sort of tyranny on thought. Lysenko in 20th century 
Russia used his power to push a particular 
(and fallacious) view of genetics and the church held up 
scientific progress for years - Galileo's masterpiece 
'Discourses and Mathematical Demonstrations Concerning 
Two New Sciences', the first step towards a mathematical 
physics, had to be published surreptitiously in Holland 
because he was out of favour with the Catholic church 
which had banned the publication of any of his works. More 
widespread is a sort of intellectual inertia which often 
drags bACk progress. Often a paradigm change in the 
systematic disciplines will be fought tooth and nail by 
certain elements in a community, and, althoueh the 
throwing out of a whole way of looking isn't something 
to be done lightly, sometimes the defenders of the old 
way of looking will go far beyond the demands of 
rationality and can be seen as defending themselves and 
their positions against something new which they have 
difficulty in grasping. And finally intellectual 
319 
inertia can be found in researchers themselves who often 
hang on to incorrect ideas because the insecurity of 
jetti~oning them is too much too soon for them (as well 
as for others.) Galileo argued for a heliocentric universe 
but hung on to circular orbits, Newton moved further 
along the road to a physicAlist view of natural events 
but still echoed an earlier view in his evocat±on of 
God as the 'keeper' of the planets in their orbits. 
Even Einstein was unable to accept his own logic completel~ 
he modified some of his equations, admitting that the 
modifications were unjustified, in order to keep ti~e 
constant. Later in his life when it became clear that 
mass did indeed affect time, he corrected this mistake. 
But I have digressed from the attempt to show the 
centrality of problems in the generation of ways of. 
looking. The first step here must be to recall my earlier 
point that a way of looking is a way of looking at 
something. We attempt to produce specialist acco~nts 
of particular phenomena and what sort of approach will 
give a good account will depend on the phenomena in 
which we're interested. So the object ot our interest 
will dictate, to some extent, the way of looking we end" 
up with. But our interest mustcome.first '- we've got to 
begin regarding certain aspects of the world as interesting/ 
problematic before we start giving any account of them. 
The second step must be to realise that thA nat~re of 
the world isn't the only constraint upon the ways of 
looking we corne up with, we must also decide what sort of 
account we're looking for and here again our conception 
of the problem we are engaged in solving plays a part. 
If we're interested in willow trees as members of the plant 
kingdom and want to establish similarities between willow 
trees and other plants in order to fit them into a general 
classification of plants, or in a evolutionary system, 
certain ways of looking will be found more useful than 
others. If we want to make cricket bats we will find 
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ourselves using different ways of looking at willow trees. 
Another example of the way problems make ways of look-
ing appropriate or inappropriate is in the case of using 
purely extensional characterisations of people - here is a 
case where we do have a clear logical distinction, that 
between extensional and intentional characterisations. A 
purely extensional account of people will not, as I have 
argued, tell us anything about anyone's state of mind, 
but it will tell us a great deal about their physiology 
~nd about what can go wrong with the human body viewed as 
a complex mechanism. Such an account enables doctors to 
repair broken bones, cure diseases and remove diseased 
organs, so a purely extentional account of hu~an beings 
is something that it's useful to have. On the other hand 
a purely extensional psychology is just an inappropriate 
way of trying to deal with psychological problems. 
The most important areas where problems playa role, 
though, is in the case of paradigm changes within the 
systematic disciplines. In this sort of situation an 
established (and often fruitful in its day) way of 
looking is in trouble, the weight of anomalies has 
become too great to be ignored and the old paradigm is 
no longer as fruitful as it once was. The question that 
has bepn asked about such situations over the last few 
decades is that of whether the choice of a new paradigm 
to replace the old one can be made on rational grounds or 
whether the choice is inescapably tied up with irrational 
psychological trends, for instance the desire of an 
aggressive younger generation of workers to depose the 
'ruling clique' who vouch for the old paradigm. This idea 
of a paradigm being tied to an ~lite within a disciplne 
and a change of paradigm as being a sort of coup d'etat 
may well correspond to some extent to the way things do 
happen within disciplines when viewed as social institutions 
in which people make careers and seek prestige, well paid 
jobs, and research grants. Indeed this basic approach 
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has been adopted by sociologists whose purpose is to 
look at hu~an life in such terms, and such ways of look-
ing do, I would readily accept, give insights into the 
problems of life which are very valuable. 
The sociological way of looking at disciplines, 
however, can be carried too far. In particular certain 
sociologists of knowledge, for instance Berger and 
Luckmann, and Mannheirn, seem to have gone too far in 
the direction of relativism, as did Kuhn in his 'Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions' ( although Kuhn has ~odified 
his position according to Barbour). The suggestion of these 
very relativistic writers is that truth is a ~atter of 
ag~eement, within a form of life, on the use of language. 
Thus truth in a systematic discipline comes down to a 
question of which language game is being used and hence 
of which paradigm the discipline is bein~ directed by. 
There is a tendancy, especially in KUhn's initial position 
to regard language games as logically distinct so that 
words which occur in different language games have 
different meanings even if they have the same inscriptions. 
A change in paradigm on this view is sudden dislocation, 
a jumping between two logically distinct laneuage games. 
This asserted distinctness in laneuaee games, and hence 
in ~~anings of key terms, leads to the view that different 
paradigms are incommensurable, that there can be no 
com~~nication between initiates of different paradigm 
and hence that a chan~e of paradigm can only take place 
on the basis of the coup d'~tat model I outlined in ~he 
previous paragraph. This total relativisation of ways of 
looking and hence knowledGe denies that there is any 
-possibility of rationally deciding between paradigms. 
Thus any such paradigm change is, on this view, a 
revolution. Toulmin, in 'Human Understandine vol. l' ~akes 
it clear that even a radical change, like that from Newton 
to Einstein in physics, doesn't seem to have amounted to 
a revolution in the Kuhnian sense. He writes: (P.104) 
"The professional careers of many theortical 
physicists spanned the years from 1890 to 1930, 
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and these ~en lived through the changeover in 
question. If there had in fact been any breakdown 
in com~unication, 0: the sort to be expected in 
an authentic scientific revolution, we should be 
able to find it from the testimony of these physicists. 
What do we find? If there was such a revolution, 
the men directly involved were curiously unaware 
of it. After the event, many of them explained 
very articulately the considerations that prOMpted 
their decision to switch from a classical to a 
relativistic position; and they reported these 
considerations as being the reasons which justified 
their change, not merely the motives which caused 
it." 
(Toulmin gives as examples of such records Max Planck's' 
'A Scientific Autobiography' Max Born's 'Physics in my 
Generation' and Einstein's 'Albert Einstein, Philosopher -
SCientist.') 
I think that it is unnecessary for m~ to go into any 
more detailed critique of Kuhn than this. It seems clear 
that while Kahn does point out (as do others) that the 
nature of disciplines as institutions can be seen to be 
militate against rationality in some ways, his elevation 
of these facts of institutionalised life into a social 
basis for epistemology is just going too far. 
The central error built into this sort of approach, 
it seems, is the assumption that language games are 
logically distinct and hence that there can be no 
communication between specialists whose specialist modes 
of language are based on different paradigms. If this were 
the case then the coup d'~tat model would be the only way 
to explain paradiem changes, but it isn't the case. We 
must, as I have said, regard language games·as historically 
continuous traditions directed towards certain aspects of 
the world and modifying basic presuppositions about those 
phenomena through time in order to make better sense of 
the~. What changes occur is up to the community which uses 
a particular language game and changes may occur for many 
reasons, some rationally explicable, some not. 
A systematic discipline must, as I have argued, be 
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regarded as a historically continuous endeavour 
constituted by a community which, at any particular 
point in time, is united by a shared interest in certain 
sorts of problems ~ common purpose, in terms of trying 
to solve those problems. Insofar as a paradigm change 
carries the community with it this historical continuity 
can survive such changes, but schisms can occur and I have 
already discussed the problem of when we have the same 
discipline under a new paradigm and when we have the 
splitting-off of a new discipline. So long as a discipline 
survives paradigm changes intact, so long as the changes 
in concepts and problems carry the relevant community 
along and replace, rather than set up in opposition to, 
earlier ways of looking, then we have an evolutionary 
process, a process in which it is proper to speak of one 
lan~12ge game developing through time. There seems to me 
to be no reason why this process of change cannot be based 
on rational discussion (although it is a matter of fact 
that sometimes it is not - eg. the Lysenko case) and, as 
Toulmin noted, in at least one major instance of paradigm 
change, that from Newton to Einstein, the available 
evidence suggests that much careful discussion took place 
before the new paradigm was. adopted. 
Usually a particular discipline (or, in many cases,a 
particular speciality within a discipline) at a particular 
time will be based upon the presuppositions constitutive 
of a particular paradigm. The paradigm, however, is never 
wholly safe. Within a discipline coherence is strived for 
but researchers working in different areas may diverge 
so that all disciplines embody certain embarrassing 
inconsistencies at all times, and sometimes factions 
associated with such differences can become so polarised 
that they seem hardly to be members of the same community _ 
the various schools of sociology seem to be an example of 
this and the philosophy of language seems to be heading 
that way with the split between the 'anthropological' 
school (as the followers of Wittgenstein and Austin are 
sometimes designated) and the 'structuralist' school (if 
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Davidson etal really are claiming explanatory power 
for their metalinguistic theories) becoming more and 
more marked. In general, though, there is usually 
enough concensus within a discipline for the current 
paradigm to provide a basis for agreement without 
actually being made explicit. 
The paradigm always embodies assumptions about 
the world and such assumptions, although often granted 
immunity from doubt for as long as they prove fruitful 
(and this 'fruitful' can only make sense in terms 
of the problem-solving purposes of the discipline), 
are nevertheless open to questioning if they prove 
unhelpful in solving crucial problems. One question 
that can always be asked of a paradigm is, "Will this 
way of looking do the job?" - which is a way of asking 
whether the adoption of a particular way of looking 
will give an acceptable account of what the discipline 
is interested in, or, put in another way, will the 
paradigm be a better problem solver than any other 
candidate? 
If an old paradigm is falling down on the job it 
is always possible to ask this question about any new 
paradigms that are offered as replacements. There is 
no certainty that the community will.make the right 
choice, but arguments can, in principle, be put forward 
to support the contention that one paradigm will do 
a particular job better than another. 
The important thing to grasp here is that it is a 
discipline's explanatory purposes, its central problems 
that are crucial in choosing rationally between paradigms. 
In ·acase where two new paradigms are 'on offer' and 
there seems no real difference between them in terms of 
internal coherence or fitting the available data a 
discussion can still be held about which way of looking 
is likely to get the discipline further. And this sort 
of discussion ca~ take place in a mode of language not 
tied to either paradigm. Because language games are not 
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distinct we ~ discuss physics (say) from the point 
of view of philosophy or sociology, or even ordinary 
language without any great difficulty. Even more 
important is the fact that a discipline's problems 
can themselves be discussed from a standpoint not tied 
to the presuppositional basis of a particular paradigm 
in the discipline. 
One important way in which we can do this is by 
raising moral questions about a discipline. We can say, 
for instance, that whilst its' quite acceptable for 
physics to offer a purely extensional account of the 
human body we won't accept a physicalist account of 
mind. The point is that physics has maintained its 
physicalist nature through the change from Newton to 
Einstein. Physicists are slowly changing from a rigidly 
deterministic model in which all events were seen as 
being, in principle, precisely predictable, to a 
probabilistic model in which events are seen as the 
result of the patterns resulting from large numbers of 
random subatomic events. But their way of looking 
remains extensional and hence any claim by physicists 
to be able to deal adequately with mind must remain 
either reductionist or wrong in some other way. Now 
at the present state of the game a physicalist might 
still feel able to both admit that physics cannot deal 
adequat&ly with mind ~ express a faith that it will 
be able to in time (I disagree with such views for 
reasons given, but there is no doubt 'this controversy 
is one which is still very much alive). But in view of 
the fact that physics cannot now deal adequately with 
mind ~ the existence of arguments to the effect that 
it cannot do so in principle, the actual use of physicalist 
'psychology' can be regarded as suspect. The moral 
argument would come down to the observation that as the 
physicalist view of mind seems both to deny the person-
hood of people ~ to be unjustified, then those who 
insist on regarding mind as a matter only of brain 
circuitry are morally culpable. A deeper moral objection, 
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one which follows from my earlier discussion of 
mechanism, would be to the effect that as physics 
expressly excludes intentionality from its way of 
looking the decision to look at mind in a physicalist 
way just is a decision to ignore the idea that people 
are conscious agents. Thus, it could be argued, to 
adopt a physicalist view of mind is to pre-judge a 
very important issue, to decide that people just are 
not conscious, that we exercise no agency, and to 
approach people in that way must be, in the absence 
of a strong justification, morally culpable. 
Similarly the scientist who claims (and this is 
a straw man) that God doesn't exist because physics 
has no need of the hypothesis is missing the point -
physics gets on very well without evoking God, but 
physics is only one way of looking at the world, or 
perhaps I should say a way of looking at only part 
of the world. Physics cannot say anything about God, 
it can't say anything about love (except some of the 
physiological aspects) or about the beauty of a painting. 
The scientific ways of looking are important but they 
are only part of human understanding - Einstein himself 
was once asked if physics could deal with art, his 
reply was that we could, if we wanted, represent 
Beethoven's ninth as an air pressure curve, but that 
it would be, as far as he could see, a worthless activity. 
In my next two sections I will say more about the 
relation between problem-solving, the progress of 
understanding, and the sense in which our understanding 
can get better, can capture more completely how things 
are in the world. 
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Problems and Progress. 
So far I have undermined the contention that the 
disciplines are concerned simply with understanding 
the natures of various sorts of 'thing'. 'Things', 
it seems, are always describable in a number of ways 
(e.g. the box which is both beautiful and heavy), and 
there seems little justification for simply assuming 
that, for instance, the way of looking used by physics 
has ontological priority over, say, that used by 
aesthetics. In perception we have access to a world 
of 'things', but that the conceptual framework(s) built 
into the specialist language garnets) which physicists 
use has ontological primary, more nearly captures the 
way things are than any other mode of description, is 
a position which, though many seem to believe it true, 
is very difficult to support. As I pointed out earlier 
different modes of description grow up socially as 
people try to make sense of different aspects of the 
world, both the natural world and the social world. The 
important question is that of how, given the existence 
of different ways of looking, often at the same 'things', 
can we sort out those situations in which two ways of 
looking are in direct competition, thus making it 
necessary to choose between them, and those situations 
in which two ways of looking are seeking to do two 
different jobs and so can co-exist as complementary 
accounts. The most pressing problem is that of 
identifying and compa~tively evaluating competing 
paradigms. Unless we can show that, in principle, com-
peting paradigms can be rationally evaluated we cannot 
show that there is such a thing as progress, as opposed 
to mere change, in the systematic disciplines. Without 
rational criteria for what c'onsti tutes progress we 
cannot justify any claim that a succession of changes 
in a discipline, either of particular theories or of 
more basic paradigms, has in any way led to a better 
understanding of those phenomena a discipline seeks 
to explain. 
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It seems to me that the identification and comparative 
evaluation of competing theories/complexes of theories/ 
paradigms must take place by way of looking at the 
explanatory interests of those forwarding the account,. 
And this comes down to investigating what problem or 
range of problems a theory/paradigm is aimed at 
solving. The sorts of problems I'm talking about vary 
widely. At the 'basement' level there are everyday 
phenomena, such as a mirror reflecting an image, which 
are well known at an ordinary language level and which 
become specialist problems as specialist communities 
seek a satisfactory explanation-in-detail of why a 
mirror performs as it does. Basic empirical problems 
such as these can underpin an empirical discipline 
through paradigm changes although different paradigms 
may put different degrees of stress on different problems. 
Thus any theory of optics over the last three hundred 
years has had to deal with mirror images and the 
diffraction of light through prisms and the solving 
of these problems has constituted at least a part of 
the criteria for the acceptance of any new theory of 
optics. These problems are not stated in a theoretically 
neutral observation language, they are stated in ordinary 
language and presuppose the (often philosophically 
naive) ontological standpoint, the general world View, • 
built into that language. But this tacit theoretical 
basis built into the statement of the problem does not 
unavoidably taint all specialist theories. A problem only 
becomes of specialist interest insofar as ordinary 
common sense accounts are seen to be poor in, or devoid 
of, explanatory power. 
Only when we realise that our everyday, vague, 
explanations of the world ~ vague and often don't 
explain anything at all do we start uncovering areas 
where much more needs to be said. And these are the 
areas where systematic enquiry into some well known 
problem leads to the problem and the problematic 
phenomena being re-conceived. If a radical reconception 
329 
(like Einstein's explanation of gravity in terms of 
warped space) of a problem/phenomenon leads to solution 
of outstanding explanatory problems, then the new theory 
can be shown to be better than previous theories. This 
is too simplistic. On my account so far an account of 
progress seems to be that if a new paradigm/theory 
leads to the solution of all the basic empirical problems 
solved by older paradigms/theories ~ to the solutions 
of problems which older theories/paradigms couldn't 
solve, then the new paradigm/theory is better than the 
old one. But this isn't quite how things work. 
Typically progress in the disciplines involves some 
problems being rejected as non-problems, for instance 
the replacement of the phlogiston theory with a theory 
of burning-as-oxidisation involved seeing oxidisation 
theory as better than phlogiston theory as a solution 
of the problem of giving a rigorous account of what is 
involved when something burns. But oxidisation theory 
doesn't solve all the problems of phlogiston theory 
and then some more. Oxidation theory doesn't solve the 
problem of the nature of phlogiston, the nature of that 
part of matter which is consumed when something is burned. 
It gets round this problem by solving the basic empirical 
problem in terms which make questions about the nature 
of phlogiston irrelevent and inadmissable. In the 
oxidation/phlogiston theory example oxidation theory 
does, in fact, solve one problem which phlogiston theory 
never quite came to grips with, namely the problem of 
explaining why ashes weigh more than the matter they 
are ashes of. Phlogiston theory, which said that in 
combustion phlogiston is burned off, needs to postulate 
a negative weight to explain this fact, and the notion 
of a negative weight is not an attractive one - at first 
glance we might even wonder about its coherence. Oxidation 
theory, which explains burning as a chemical reaction 
in which atmospheric oxygen is combined with the matter 
being burned, has an increase in weight during burning 
as a direct implication of its basic model and this 
accordance with well known and problematic (for phlogiston 
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theories) facts undoubtably played an important part 
in the replacement of phlogiston theory with an 
oxidisation theory of burning. It should be mentioned 
that the superiority of oxidation theory over phlogiston 
theory was demonstrable only given controlled experiments-
if burning is done in the open loss of material as smoke 
leads to a net loss of weight as the smoke usually weighs 
more than the combined oxygen. 
We must distinguis~ then, between two different sorts 
of problems. First there are the basic problems, see-able 
as problems from the point of view of ordinary language. 
These basic problems remain problems for any theory which 
seeks to explain the relevant phenomena. Mirrors 
reflecting images, prisms defracting light, things 
burning, these are the basic explanatory problems 
which any acceptable theory in the relevant field 
must solve. 
But when a specialist account of something is given 
new problems are generated by the theory itself. Any 
explanation of burning must account for phenomena like 
increased weight after combustion, but a problem like 
that of the nature of phlogiston is only a problem 
for phlogliston theory. What seems to be the case in 
any discipline at a point in time is that there are 
a number of central and basic problems which any 
relevant theory must solve. Beyond this there tend to 
be certain other problems which existing theories 
have difficulties with. These problems can be of two 
sorts. They can simply be basic problems which had not 
previously seen as part of the problem-core that any 
acceptable theory should have solved but which have 
become part of that core for new theories as their 
intractability has been noted. And the problems can 
be internal to a theory, problems which are only 
problems for a particular theory or group of theories _ 
like the nature of phlogiston. 
These internal problems are not always problems just 
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for particular theories. All particular theories lean 
for support upon certain metaphysical assumptions, 
assumptions which are built into a paradigm. Paradigms 
don't themselves have directly checkable implications 
about the world, rather a paradigm dictates what sort 
of theory is acceptable in a discipline. Insofar as 
theories generated in accordance with some paradigms 
perform adequately as problem solvers in the relevant 
domain we come, as I have said, to have confidence 
that the metaphysical assumptions built into the 
paradigm capture the nature of the world to a reasonable 
degree. But conversety the existence of basic problems 
which no theory constructed under a particular paradigm 
seems able to solve will ultimately, if the problems 
come to be seen as blocking progress (i.e. as important 
enough not merely to be set on one side as anomalies), 
lead to that paradigm being called into question, 
particularly if a new paradigm is on offer. 
A paradigm has important internal problems if no 
theory constructed in accordance with it can solve 
basic problems which seem to fall within its domain. 
A body of theory can fall if, like phlogiston theory, 
it has implications which seem counterfactual or else 
if it can only solve basic problems by doubtful manoeuvres 
(like giving phlogiston a negative weight). But paradigms 
and theories also must deal with conceptual problems. 
The clearest sort of problem here is that of internal 
inconsistency, but this is a clear cut case where logical 
untenability can be shown. Less clear are cases where 
a discipline's basic model of the world is tenable in 
itself but contradicts some deeply entrenched world 
view. The tension between theology and the sciences 
from Galileo to Darwin resulted from science coming 
to be based on a mechanistic model which became slowly 
less and less compatible with the religious world view. 
which held sway in European culture. At a lower level 
two theories constructed under one paradigm can 
contradict one another, for instance Maxwell's pioneering 
wo~k on electro-~agnetic' fields resulted from his 
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noting a contradiction between Ampere's fourth law of 
electro dynamics and another law of mathematical physics, 
the equation of continuity. Since these laws were formula-
ted in tackling the problems of electric currents in 
wires an inconsistency between them seemed unacceptable 
and Maxwell added a term to Ampere's equations on 
purely mathematical grounds which secured consistency 
between the laws. Maxwell finally postulated the 
existence of electro-magnetic fields on the basis of 
interpreting what this extra term might stand for. In 
such cases, where two theories are dealing with related 
problems, inconsistencies between theories can either be 
resolved by modifying one or both theories or else we 
can try to show that one theory is, in fact, a more 
successful problem solver than the other. This situation, 
however, is one in which the paradigm is not in question 
and so the problem of choice is not so acute. 
The really accute problem occurs when the theories in 
competition are based on different paradigms, when we 
find ourselves not just examining the problem solving 
power and compatibility of two theories constructed 
under one paradigm, but instead find ourselves wondering 
which of two sets of metaphysical presuppositions about 
the world seems most justified. 
In his book, 'Progress and its Problems,' Larry Laudan 
argues that two research traditions (ie. paradigms in 
my terminology) can be compar~tively (and rationally) 
evaluated in terms of their progressiveness. Laudan talks 
about a research traditions momentary adequacy in terms 
of how good, at a point in time, the particular theories 
generated under the traditions paradigm are as problem 
solvers. He measures a tradition's progressiveness in 
two ways ( p.107): 
"1. the general progress of a research tradition -
this is determined by comparing the adequacy 
of the sets of theories which constitute the 
the oldest and those which constitute the most 
recent versions of the research tradition; 
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2. the rate of progress of a research tradition 
here, the changes in momentary adequacy of the 
research tradition during any specified time 
span are identified." 
Laudan's work is geared primarily to giving an account 
of scientific progress and so tends to assume that the 
domain of basic problems is similar for competing 
theories. But he is aware that even the basic problems 
are re-conceived as they are stated in specialist 
language and so chooses to measure different paradigms' 
progressiveness in their own terms. He also makes it clear 
that in terms of paradigm change it is likely to be the 
rate of progress rather than the general progress of a 
research tradition which is crucial. This is because 
one of the prime motivations for paradigm change is the 
belief (quite often rational) that a research tradition 
is running out of steam. The general progress . 
of classical physics from Newton to the late 19th century 
was very high, and certainly ~instein's early work had 
nothing like the proven problem solving power of 
classical theories. But what is also the case is that 
during the last few decades of the 19th century certain 
basic problems of phYSiCS, like explaining gravity, were 
proving intractable, there were significant discrepancies 
between predicted and observed events, such as the 
position of the perihelion of Mercury, and there were 
experiements, like those carried out by Michelson and 
Morley tin 1881) timing a beam of light travelling from 
source to mirror and back, which gave unexpected results. 
The expected result, under classical assumptions, was 
that if the direction of source to mirror was in the 
same direction as the earth's motion, then the actual 
time for the beam to travel from source to mirror and 
back would be greater than the time that would have 
been taken if the earth was stationary. In fact, however, 
no measurable difference was noted and this undermined 
the classical model of the earth moving through a 
stationary aether. 
334 
For classical physics such problems were anomalies 
which, for so long as the paradigm was fruitful in 
generating problem solving theories in other areas, were 
merely put to one side. But as the rate of progress of 
classical physics fell off and such anomalies remained 
intractable physicists started to see them as important 
problems that had to be brought into the disciplines 
'problem-core' - problems which any new theory had to 
solve. Einstein's early account didnit have such a 
large store of solved problems as classical physics, 
but he offered solutions to what had been intractable 
problems for the Newtonians. This means that although 
the Einsteinian paradigm/research tradition didn't 
have as good a general progress as the older Newtonian 
paradigm it did have a high ~ of progress when 
compared to the older paradigm which had become almost 
wrung dry. Laudan's point is that choosing a new and 
not-yet-fully-tried paradigm over an older, more detailed 
and proven paradigm can be the rational thing to do in 
cases where the older paradigm is over laden with 
anomalies which constitute problems for which it seems 
unable to indicate any way of solution. If a new, 
relatively undeveloped paradigm can solve the (re-conceived) 
problems which the older paradigm couldn't deal with, 
then the rational course is to give up riding the 
experienced war horse whose best years seem to have gone 
and, instead, take a risk with the promising young colt 
that still needs a lot of work on it but seems likely to 
do well in future. Of course, we're never absolutely 
certain about whether a new paradigm will turn out as we 
expect, such is the uncertainty of life. But we can at 
least see that the progressiveness of a research 
tradition/paradigm, especially its recent rate of progress, 
can be used as one way in which we can rationally decide 
whether to jettison a (worked out) paradigm and replace it 
with a more vigorous new approach. 
Laudan's approach doesn't make the mistake of regarding 
progress as necessarily cumulative, a process in which a 
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new paradigm must solve all earlier problems and then 
more. He does suggest that there is, in most disciplines, 
at any point in time, a core of basic problems which 
any theory at that time must solve to oe acceptable, 
but he also makes it clear that this core can change 
as experience reveals some core problems as not so 
important and other problems, formerly regarded as 
peripheral, become part of the core, for instance 
through anomalies persistently turning up which make 
the problem a hinderance to a number of workers. 
The important thing to be remembered is that a 
paradigm change is a change in the way specialists, 
when wearing their specialists' hats, conceive the 
world. This doesn't mean that proponents of different 
paradigms can't understand each other, they can still 
discuss the merits, as problem solvers, of the theories 
constructed under different paradigms. But it does 
mean that different paradigms designed to deal with 
the same basic problems (the same from an ordinary 
language view point) will reconceive those problems 
differently and hence will generate other, internal, 
problems, like phlogiston theory carrying with it 
the problem of saying something about the nature of 
phlogiston, a problem which oxidation theory avoided 
by declaring it a non-problem. So even at the level 
of what empirical problems are solved, the only shared 
problems are likely to be those which are the are~s 
problem-core. Internal problems, those which arise 
through implications built into a particular theory, 
won't be shared. Similarly conceptual problems won·t 
necessarily be shared. If two new paradigms are 
inseparable in terms of solving other sorts of problems 
and one is logically incompatible with a very progressive 
paradigm in a related field of study whilst the other 
isn't, then the paradigm with fewer serious conceptual 
problems is quite reasonably to be preferred. 
Competing paradigms may share conceptual problems. but 
again may not. Thus when we add up the problems, basic 
empirical problems, internal problems (including 
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conceptual problems) of competing paradigms in an 
area we are likely to fing that, apart from the discipline's 
problem core, t~e paradigms will share few problems. 
I should make clear that not all core problems in 
all disciplines will be empirical. A central problem 
for pure mathematics is the giving of a rigorous basis 
for our concept of number. This might be characterised 
as an empirical problem insofar as the mathematician 
is trying to elucidate a notion which is familiar to 
everybody through everyday involvement with such 
things as counting, deciding whether a cake has been 
divided up equally etc,. But, in fact, the mathematician 
working on the analytic base of the natural numbers, 
(positive integers), the rational numbers (fractions), 
the irrational numbers (e.g. ~) etc., is primarily 
concerned with demonstrating rigorously that the 
numbers we use in everyday life make sense. It's no 
accident that Russell's book on the analytic basis 
of maths, written just before Principia Mathematica, 
was called 'An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Mathematics'. Mathematical analysts are concerned 
with the logical foundations of their subject, their 
interest in the concept(s) of number is in making 
rigorous analytic sense of what numbers might be 
taken to be. Thus the problem core of mathematics 
includes conceptual problems - and in general it will 
depend upon what discipline we're looking at whether 
the problem core is predominantly empirical or 
conceptual. Symbolic logic and pure mathematics will 
have a core of predominantly conceptual problems. 
Philosophy also deals with predominantly conceptual 
problems, although the importance of elucidating 
the concept of a person (say) must relate to the 
empirical importance of our everyday notion of a 
person in human life. Physics is, of course, 
predominantly concerned with empirical problems. 
It is probably a good idea at this point to look 
again ~~ the disti~ctions made between different sorts 
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of problems as most of my examples so far have taken 
basic problems as empirical problems and hence distinct 
from conceptual problems in a clear cut way. My example 
of the mathematical analyst's interest in number seems 
to blur this distinction and so I must make my 
distinctions clearer. 
The basement level is that at which basic problems, 
problems we can see as problems from a non-specialist 
standpoint are picked out. These can be empirical 
problems like trying to explain what happens when some 
thing burns or conceptual problems, like trying to make 
rigorous sense of our everyday concept of number. The 
reasons why people pick on 'this or 'that' problem 
for specialist investigation vary widely, as earlier 
discussion should have made clear, from mystical 
convictions (e.g. the Pythagoreans), through practical 
interest (Cardin's gambling) to pure interest for its 
own sake (the non-Euclidean geometers). 
The important thing about basic problems is that 
they are problems before the fact of theorising, they 
are what the theory is designed to solve. Internal 
problems are problems resulting from the theory and 
again can be either empirical or conceptual. The problem 
of characterising phlogisten is an internal empirical 
problem for phlogiston theory. Important internal 
conceptual problems include problems with the internal 
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coherence of the system of theories generated under a 
paradigm (e.g. the Maxwell example). Coherence is 
aimed for and any new theory incompatible with other 
theories in the field will have a serious conceptual 
problem. Similarly a whole paradigm can be questioned 
if, as with behaviourist psychology, its entire 
conceptual basis seems incoherent. And internal 
conceptual problems can arise for a paradigm if it is 
logically incompatible with a paradigm which is already 
a proven problem solver in a related field, or if 
different areas approach a problem using conceptually 
different paradigms. (e.g. the conceptual problems 
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generated by the different approaches to the problem 
of perception adopted by psychologists, physiologists 
and computer modelers). Internal problems, as I use 
the term, does not mean simply the problems which arise 
inside a theory/paradigm viewed in isolation. These 
problems are included, but so are other problems which 
arise because of tension between ways of looking 
generated in the attempt to solve different but 
related problems. Internal problems are internal to a 
theory/paradigm only in the sense that their existence 
as problems is dependent, in part at least, on the 
form of the particular theory, they are problems 
generated by the theory - a different theory would 
have different internal problems. Basic problem~ on 
the other hand. are problems which are generated in 
everyday life, problems encountered in the world. They 
are problems which have been picked out as problems 
from a non-specialist, ordinary language point of view. 
Progress isn't cumulative in any simplistic 
'building block' way. It's not even safe to suggest 
that progress is cumulative in respect of solving basic 
problems. Basic problems are always stated in ordinary 
language and carry with them the metaphysical assumptions 
constitutive of the general world view of the culture 
in the context 'of which the prob~mis stated. Thus for 
some cultures the characterisation of the nature and 
behaviour of spirits and demons might be seen as a 
basic empirical problem and priesthoods have spent much 
intellectual effort on problems of this sort throughout 
human history. In the developed world we have rejected, 
not solved, such problems, our world view has changed 
and so have the basic problems. We see, as the ancient 
Egyptians saw, stars twinkling in the night sky, but 
when we ask questions about those stars we do so 
against the backgroung of a very different world view. 
Some problems, like saying something about the tiny 
twinkling lights we see in the night sky, are common 
to different cultures, but others, like the nature of 
spirits and demons are not. Since the selections of any 
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discipline's basic problems will be influenced by a 
culturally variable world view which will change 
through time for many reasons, including feedback 
from specialist ways of looking, progress will involve 
some 'problems' being declared non-problems. And it must 
always be remembered that the experiences of the theorists 
themselves, especially the way a problem or family of 
problems keeps on cropping up during research, will lead 
to the problem core changing. Thus a central problem 
may, in time, become a mere anomally, and vice versa. So 
progress is not simplistically cumulative at all. 
This cultural relativity of beliefs and hence basic 
problems doesn't imply relativity of specialist ways 
of looking. A discipline progresses by trying out 
promising paradigms, discovering their .strengths and 
weaknesses and rejecting them for something better. A 
discipline~ starting point must be a world view form-
ulated in a wider cultural context than that of a 
specialist community of interest and so any discipline 
must start off from a way of looking that will probably 
embody a mish-mash of vague and ill-matched notions 
but it is not trapped by that starting point - which 
is to say that paradigm changes can occur for the better. 
The next problem to be dealt with is, of course, that 
of how we can justify the claim that a more progressive 
paradigm (in Laudan's sense) is a better one in terms 
...... 
of giving us a better understanding of some aspects of 
the world. 
Laudan himself tries to avoid this sort of question. 
He writes: (P.125) 
"In arguing for this approach to SCience, I am 
deliberately driving a wedge between several issues 
that have hitherto been closely intertwined. 
Specifically, it has normally been held that any 
assessment of either rationality or scientific 
progress is inevitably bound up with the question 
of the truth of scientific theories. 
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Rationality, it is usually argued, amounts to 
accepting those statements about the world which 
we have good reason for believing to be true. 
Progress, in its turn, is usually seen as a succ-
essive attainment of the truth as a process of 
approximation and self-correction. I want to turn 
the usual view on its head by making rationality 
parasitic upon progressiveness. To make rational 
choices is, on this view, to make choices which 
are progressive. (ie. which increase the problem-
solving effectiveness of the theories we accept.) 
By this linking rationality to progressiveness, I 
am suggesting that we can have a theory of ration-
ality without presupposing anything about veracity 
or verisimilitude of the theories we judge to be 
rational or irrational." 
Laudan adopts this position on rationality in an effort 
to avoid what has become a quagmire in recent years. 
The positivist position, espoused most notably by Popper, 
which claims that progress is towards truth (ie. towards 
saying how things really are in theworl~ is in disarray. 
Also on p.125 Laudan writes of efforts to support the 
positivist position: 
"Without exception, these efforts have foundered 
because no one has been able to demonstrate that a 
system like SCience, with the methods it has at 
its disposal, can be guaranteed to reach the 'Truth' 
either in the short or in the long run. If rationalit~ 
consists in believing only what we can reasonably 
presume to be true, and if we define 'truth' in its 
classical non- ra matic sense then science is 
and wi orever remain irrational." 
The point here is that without criteria for what it is 
for something to be true-of-the-world, criteria which we 
don't possess, it is difficult to see how a claim that 
science progresses towards such truth can be supported. 
Popper's position, which seems basically to say that 
progress is towards such truth even though we can never 
know how close we've got, seems unhelpful here. Given his 
assertion that science progresses via falsifiability we 
must ask about the status of this absolutist element in 
his account. If someone was to assert that Popper is 
wrong because we cannot, in principle, acquire this final, 
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absolute truth then that pers:m would be in a position 
of denying an absolute, of saying that it is absolutely 
true that we cannot acquire absolute truth - and such 
an assertion is self contradictory. Absolutist assertions 
are logically undeniable, it doesn't make sense to deny 
them. But this doesn't guarantee the truth of such 
assertions, After all"" (Ar A) is an absolute truth in 
the sense that its denial makes no sense to us, but 
some mathematicians, logicians and sub-atomic physicists 
have found it necessary to refuse to assert it, to opt 
for modal logic as the basis for their work on certain 
problems. As Popper's assertion that progress is towar~s 
truth-about-how-things-are is unfalsifiable given that 
we haven't got criteria for this notion of truth it 
is not a scientific statement in the sense that Popper 
himself propounds. It seems, in fact, to be an ad hoc 
theory, an assertion which is alien to the rest of his 
account of scientific progress which is simply 'tagged on' 
to it, ad hoc, to solve an important problem. As Popper 
himself denounces 'ad hocness' as non-scientific and 
non-progressive he seems to have made his account 
incoherent by insisting that progress is towards truth. 
The real problem with this sort of assertion is that 
of evaluation,how can we decide whether what Popper 
lamongst others) says is true or not. Again on P.125 
Laudan writes: 
"Such an approach offers few consolations, 
however, since no one has been able even 
to say what it would mean to be "closer 
to the truth," let alone to offer criteria 
for determining how we could assess such 
proximity. Hence, if scientific progress 
consists in a series of theories which 
represent an ever closer approximation 
to the truth, then science cannot be 
shown to be progressive. a 
I am in sympathy with Lauden's position here simply 
on the grounds that if the sort of assertion that Popper 
makes cannot, even as a matter of contingent fact, be 
tested for truth itself, than it is no more than a 
protestation of faith. Whatever else rational discussion 
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consists in it must surely involve the g1v1ng of reasons, 
the support of assertions by relevant argument. An 
assertion of faith, by its nature, cannot be supported 
by argument. This being the case we must, if we want to 
maintain the systematic disciplines as rational endeavours, 
refuse to allow that assertions of faith have any 
central role in theoretical discussion. I'm not saying 
that faith, for instance the following of hunches, 
hasn't a place in the disciplines, just that we must 
conclude that a statement of faith is not at all 
compelling as support for a theoretical assertion, 
cannot be any part of the grounds on which a specialist 
community accepts theoretical assertions if that 
community wants to maintain their discipline as a 
rational endeavour. 
But Laudan's skirting of the problem of truth 
doesn't show it to be a non-problem. If science leads 
to knowledge then scientific statements must be true, 
we need some notion of truth to underpin the notion 
of scientific (or any other sort of) knowledge. In 
his book Laudan seems to want to say that it is 
rational belief not truth that the systematic 
disciplines deal in. On P.126 he writes: 
"The price we have to pay for this approach 
may be regarded by some people as too high, 
for it entails that we may find ourselves 
endorsing theories as progressive and 
rational which turn out, ultimately,to be 
false (assuming, of course, that we could 
ever definitely establish that any theory 
was false). But there is no reason for dismay 
at this conclusion. Most of the past theories 
of science are already suspected of being false; 
there is every reason to antiCipate that current 
theories of science will suffer a similar fate. 
But the presumptive falsity of scientific 
theories and research traditions does not 
render science either irrational or non-
progressive. 
The model under discussion here offers 
a means of showing how, even granting the 
fact that every theory of science may well 
be false, science may nonetheless turn out 
to be a worthy and intellectually significant 
enterprise. There will be those who will charge 
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that such an approach is patently instrumentalist 
and that it entails that science is a hollow 
set of symbols and sounds, with no bearing on 
"the real world" or on the "truth". Such an 
interpretation is very wide of the mark. There 
is nothing in this model which rules out the 
possibility that, for all we know, scientific 
theories are true; equally, it does not preclude 
the possibility that scientific knowledge through 
time has moved closer and closer to the truth. 
Indeed, there is nothing I have said which would 
rule out a full-bodied, "realistic" interpretation 
of the scientific enterprise. But what I am 
suggesting is that we apparently do not have 
any way of knowing for sure (or even with some 
confidence) that science is true, or probable, 
or that it is getting closer to the truth. Such 
aims are utopian, in the literal sense that 
we can never know whether they are being 
achieved. To set them up as goals for scientific 
enquiry may be noble and edifying to those who 
delight in the frustration of aspiring to that 
which they can never (know themselves to) attain; 
but they are not very helpful if our object 
is to explain how scientific theories are (or 
should be) evaluated." 
So, because the 'progress is towards truth' model 
leaves us unable to evaluate theories, Laudan opts 
for the course of defining progressiveness in terms 
of problen solving and he simple ignores questions 
about truth on the grounds that they are unanswerable 
and hence useless in terms of helping us to rationally 
decide which of a number of competing theories/paradigms 
is best. Again I am sympathetic, but I would suggest 
that Laud.n didn't go far enough in looking at the 
relationship between a solution to a problem and truth. 
Drawing on what I have said about language games and on 
Barbour's account of the theory-model-world relations 
I will attempt to show how a series of more progressive 
theories can be justifiably said to give better and 
better accounts of the world in terms of more completely 
capturing the phenomena described - in terms of successive 
models being truer-to-the-world than their predecessors. 
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Problems, Progress, Models and the World. 
In the last quote I gave from Laudan he stresses 
that he isn't denying that science might be moving 
towards truth (in the sense of true-to-the-world), 
he is simply saying that an assertion like, "This 
paradigm is closer to the truth than that one," is 
uncheckable. Since we have no clear criteria for 
checking its truth, Laudan argues, it is both 
unsupportable and useless as an indication of a 
way to evaluate the claim that science progressess. But 
there's a problem with Laudan's account which he never 
deals with. Any number of novel theories could be 
invented and labelled 'theories of progressiveness.' We 
might, for instance, suggest the number of workers in a 
discipline who demonstrably love the opera and Napoleon 
Brandy as a measure of progressiveness and this would be 
a useable measure. It would seem an odd thing to do as 
it is by no means clear that liking opera and brandy 
is the mark of a good researcher. But what has to be 
realised is that our choice of criteria for progressiveness 
is related to what we see the disciplines as being about. 
Choosing criteria (as Laudan does) which maximise the 
progressiveeness shown by the history of sCience, which 
makes as much as possible of what scientists have 
done appear progressive and hence (in Laudan's terms) 
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rational, doesn't guarantee that we've got the right ones -
the 'progress' of science up to now might, for instance, 
be a matter of luck or might simply be illusory. 
To define rationality in terms of progressiveness 
and to choose criteria for progressiveness which 
maximise (or optimise) the progressiveness of what 
scientists in the past have done is to make the claim, 
'Science is a rational endeavour,' tautological and hence 
uninformative - the point is that we must first have 
criteria of rationality arrived at independQntly of 
looking at the history of science and then evaluate that 
history in terms of those criteria if, 'Science is 
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rational,' is to be a significant claim, one which tells 
us about more than how Laudan uses the term 'rational'. 
Measuring progress in terms of (the rate of) problem 
solving is, I believe, the right approach, but what counts 
as a solution must surely involve a reference to 
capturing, to some extent, the nature of the phenomenon 
being described/explained. What I'm getting at is that 
Laudan's account cannot survive without some sort of 
reference to the truth he desparately tries not to rely 
on. Without some reference to truth we have no way of 
deciding what should or should not be counted as a 
solution to a problem. We can even go so far as to ask 
why we should be so enamoured of problem solving if we 
have no guarantee that the literature generated under 
this approach tells us something about the world we live 
in as opposed to a phantasy world invented laboriously 
by some specialist community. By cutting himself off 
from truth Laudan simply fails to say anything about 
the relation between scientific theory and the world we 
live in and this fails to establish that a progressive 
and rational (in his terms) discipline is anything more 
than an elaborate game. 
I believe, however, that Laudan's mistake is remediable 
and that his criterion of progressiveness can be useful 
in evaluation. When we are faced with a problematic 
phenomenon, for instance a mirror, we look for an 
explanation. In a specialist discipline the explanation 
will consist in a theory generated under a paradigm 
and the theory will have implications for the behaviour 
of mirror images which will be checkable in general. 
Theories, if believed, give us expectations about the 
world, expectations that at time t 'this' will happen 
(eg. an eclipse of the sun) or that if we do 'this' then 
'that' will happen. The case of a scientist testing a 
hypotheSiS is slightly different, he behaves 'as if' 
he believes the theory in order to see if there is 
346 
reason to believe it. But what remains constant is that 
a theoretical position has implications which are check-
able against experience. 
This checkability against experience isn't just the 
hallmark of theory in the natural sciences, sociology 
and psychology also must ultimately be checkable against 
events (past. present or future). Even history has 
checkability written in, if a historian gives an account 
of particular events at a particular time, then his 
account must fit the data provided by the relevqnt 
records and relics ~ must fit in with known facts about 
the general context of events. If, for instance, he maps 
the path of an army and it is discovered that cities 
on part of the route left no records of its passing and 
that no relics that a marching army might have left have 
been found. or if the rate of travel of the army indicates 
that it moved faster or slower or for longer periods than 
armies did at that time, and if the historian can't 
explain such anomalies, then his account will be thrown 
into doubt. And even our crude everyday 'theories' about 
people or the weather are checkable. If we judge that 
someone is reliable we will act accordingly and will 
discover our mistake if we are let down, if things don't 
turn out as we expected. And if we decide that the state 
of the clouds and breeze are such that it's not going to 
rain and leave our raincoats at home, then the accuracy 
or otherwise of our prediction will unavoidably become 
clear to us as we go through the day. 
My suggestion is that it is this checkability against 
experience which gives us confidence that a paradigm, and 
the associated model of what sort of world we live in, 
manages to capture, to some extent at least, the way things 
are. What I am saying is that theories are used in 
planning action, from the activities of scientists in 
labs, through archeologists going out looking for 
artefacts in places pinpointed by their research, to 
people deciding whether or not to take an umbrella with 
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them when they go out. Insofar as the expectations a 
theory leads us to have are fulfilled, insofar as our 
actions are successful and predictions correct, we have 
reason to believe that the theory captures the nature of 
whatever we are dealing with to some degree at least. 
And the fewer the anomalies, unfulfilled expectations, 
unsuccessful courses of action, adherence to a particular 
theory and paradigm throws up, the more confident we are 
in the adequacy of the paradigm, and of the model of the 
world which is part of it (and I use 'model' in Barbour's 
sense), as a characterisation of the relevent aspects of 
the world. 
This suggestion might be resisted by asking whether 
it makes sense to talk about the findings of philosophers, 
pure mathematicians and formal logicians having 
implications which are checkable against experience. It 
seems to me that although such findings are not always 
directly checkable the 'second order' disciplines can 
only show themselves to be more than elaborate games, 
interesting enough in themselves but having no relevence 
beyond their boundries, if the findings of workers in those 
areas have implications for the theorising and method-
ologies of workers in the 'first-order' disciplines, those 
whose findings do have direct implications for planning 
action, which are checkable against experience. The second 
order disciplines are involved with the sorting out of 
problems of coherence, in giving general guidelines for 
the solution of problems and for providing technical tools 
(especially in the case of maths) which have important 
implications for.the methodology of empirical research. 
This isn't all the second order disciplines do, they have 
their own problems (eg. the problem of number for maths 
or the problem of meaning for philosophy). But the 
identification of the second order disciplines as having 
serious purposes beyond that of providing a pleAsant 
passtime for initiates must depend on the basic problems 
they deal with being problems beyond the discipline's 
boundaries, being problems for people outside the special-
ist community, either problems of everyday life or 
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problems for other specialist 
communities. Thus I would maintain that any discipline 
must produce findings which have, directly or indirectly, 
implications that are checkable against experience, this 
checkability consisting in generating expectations which 
are fulfilled or not by subsequent experience. In saying 
this I am not ruling out retrodiction as a way of checking 
a theory. 
In prediction data gathered at time to is used to 
predict events at time t1 (t1 later than to). Usually 
the predicting is done at a time between to and t 1 , but 
this need not be the case - we could check a theory by 
using already available data, 'predicting' the events at 
t1 at a later time. There would be nothing wrong with 
such a check so long as no data unavailable at to was 
used in making the prediction. The difference between 
prediction and retrodiction is that in the former we use 
data from to to say what will(or did) happen at t1 and 
in the latter we work backwards from t1 to say what must 
have happened at to. The way of making pre-/retro-dictions 
1s by following (one way or the other) the putative chain 
of eveuts implied by a theory. If the theoretical model 
leads us to same place as experience (actual or 
recorded) often enough, then we come to believe that the 
model reflects to some degree what actually happened. 
The use of retrodiction is,then, quite proper and my 
account can take note of this by allowing that checkability 
against experience can include being checked against re-
ports of experience. The only problem introduced by thisr 
move is that of reliability of records. This is, of course, 
one of the central problems of history, but the fact that 
even agreement between independant reports doesn't 
guaranUe truth doesn't undermine history irreparably. 
No amount of checking against experience can guarantee 
certainty, there always remains the possibility of error 
through illusion, delusion or hallucination etc. But such 
uncertainty doesn't make us despair of planning action 
simply because we often do act in accordance with beliefs 
about how things are and our actions usually lead to the 
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consequences our beliefs led us to expect. So although 
historians have more problems with their work than a 
physical scientist usually has with his we should 
realise that the differenceisn't one betwe~n problems 
and no problems, rather it is a difference in degree. 
If a scientist doubts the accuracy of an experimental 
report then, funds and time permitting, it is possible 
for him to duplicate, in relevant detail, the reported 
events (ie. do the experiment again). The historian 
deals with events which are non-reprodutable and so must 
rely on corroboration between reports and also, when 
appropriate, archeological remains. But although the 
scientist has an easier task than the historian when 
it comes to supporting research conclusions there is 
still uncertainty about both sorts of accounts when we 
start to ask questions about how accurate they are as 
descriptions and explanations of how things are (or 
were). 
It seems reasonable to say that if the expectations 
some theory leads us to have are fulfilled, if the 
eclipse occurs, if the artefacts are found or if a 
course of action undertaken turns out to have the 
expected consequences (etc), then we have some 
justification for believing that the model of the world 
built into the paradigm under which the theory was 
generated captures the way things are to some extent. 
The real problem is that we can't give any firm answer 
to the question, 'To what extent?' We can't answer 
this question because it seems to require us to know 
how things really are in the world first in order to 
compare the account built into a particular paradigm 
with the truth. And, of course, if we had a way of 
knowing how things really are, a way of achieving an 
absolutely and finally true account of the world, we 
wouldn't 'waste' our time doing sCience, etc. 
So we must now ask whether a notion of progressiveness 
defined in terms of problem solving can really tell us 
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that one of two or more competing paradigms is better 
than the other(s) in a sense of better which has written 
into it the requirement that the best theory is that one 
which we are justified in judging to capture the nature 
of what is being dealt with most accurately. The first 
thing to mote is that if, by some accident, we 
happened to hit on the absolute truth about something or 
other, then anyone who knew and fully understood that 
truth would always be able to predict what was going to 
happen with respect to that something - there would never 
be any anomalies. Convers~~y, however, a lack of known 
anomalies to a theory doesn't mean we've arrived at 
absolute truth, it might equally mean that we've missed 
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something or that we're looking in the wrong place. But 
it nevertheless spems likely that the less accurate an 
account of how things are is the more intractable problems 
it will generate. 
What I am suggesting is that looking at paradigms in 
terms of their success as problem solvers is not merely 
a question of comparing numbers of problems solved or 
numbers of intractable problems left unsolved or rate of 
progress in a situation where what counts as a solution 
depends only on the demands made by adherents of that 
paradigm. Neither is what counts as a solution to be 
understood in absolutist terms, because if the only 
acceptable solution to a problem is that which reveals 
finally and irrevocably how things are in the world, 
then we have no way of knowing whether any specialist 
discipline has ever solved a proble~, and, as Laudan 
remarks, it would seem unlikely that any discipline 
has ever 'solved' a problem in this (absolutist) sense. 
In the absence of a fully specified criteria for absolute 
truth, criteria we don't possess and seem unlikely ever 
to possess, the claim to have solved any descriptive/ 
explanatory problem is strictly non-evaluable. This is 
why Laudan attempted to dispense with reliance on any 
notion of truth in 'Progress and its Problems.' 
W~~t we need is a middle course between the relativism 
- , 
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of, 'If initiates agree that 'this' is a solution to 
'that' problem, then it is a solution because that's 
what they mean by the word 'solution',' and the unhelpful 
absolutist stance of, 'If 'this' is a solution, then 
'that's' how things really and truly (and completely) 
are.' It seems to me that the middle course must involve 
an awareness of the links between understanding and action, 
an admission of the role which understanding plays in 
our lives. The fact is that the question of whether 
someone has a good understanding of people (say) isn't 
just a theoretical question within the relevant 
disciplines, it is also a question of his success in 
handling people, predicting what particular people will 
do in particular circumstances and what their responses 
to particular actions of his will be. We can justifiably 
say of someone that he understands people well on evi-
dence of his successful handling of people, we don't need 
tohear his theory. Indeed there is no problem about 
ascribing understanding or knowledge to someone whose 
consistent success in some endeavour cannot plausibly 
be put down to sheer luck but who can give no account 
at all, or only a weak, insufficient, account, of how 
he achieves what he achieves (I'll be saying more on this 
later.) 
The speCialist disciplines are concerned with estab-
lishing public modes of understanding/bodies of knowledge 
and as such must deal in explicit theory. But they are 
not closed, they are not merely elaborate games where, 
'This is true' fulfills a similar function to 
'checkmate' in chess. Any systematic discipline, if it 
claims to increase our understanding of some aspect of 
the world, must claim that adherence to its theories 
will make relevant aspects of the world more predictable 
and hence (where appropriate) more effectively 
handlable. If a discipline doesn't achieve this, either 
directly or (as in the case of some of the work done in 
the second order disciplines) indirectly, then surely 
we should begin to wonder about that discipline. If 
adherence to a theory led conSistently to unexpected 
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results we would conclude that the model of the world 
with which it was associated was wrong, that the 
researcher(s) simply hadn't arrived at an understanding 
of what they claimed to have understood. And if a theory 
had no implications for our expectations of the world 
(in a wide sense taking in the natural, the social and 
the 'inner' affectiveness of people) or else was such 
that anything that happened fitted in with the theory, 
then we simply wouldn't know whether the theory was 
symptomatic of understanding or of phantasy. In the 
latter situation it would seem more rational to assume 
that the theory was phantastic, even though it might not 
be, simply on the grounds that it is better for a 
discipline to reject the truth than to accept phantasies 
that would subvert the entire endeavour. 
The linking of the probable truth of the model built 
into a paradigm and its theories with the utility of 
particular theories in facilitating our handling of 
problematic phenomena does QQ1 leave me with a pragmatic 
theory of truth. The truth of a model is dependent on 
its accuracy in capturing relevent aspec~s of the world. 
Utility appears not as a criterion of truth, but as a 
way of supporting a contention that 'this' model is more 
true-to-the-world than 'that' one (this notion of one 
paradigm being truer-to-the-world than another will be 
looked at later). This is where Laudan's problem-based 
notion of the progressiveness of a paradigm is useful 
in evaluation. My contention is that although we cannot 
even begin to suggest a way of evaluating anyone 
paradigms degree of'trueness-to-the-world' directly 
(because we lack any detailed criteria) Laudan has given 
us the means by which, given competing paradigms A and B 
in a particular problem-domain (and I will be saying more 
about the notion of a problem-domain in a later section) 
we can reasonably make an assertion of the sort, 'There 
is reason to believe that A is truer-to-the-world than 
B.' And this comparative evaluation is carried out in 
terms of the better paradigm leading to us having 
expectations about the world which are fulfilled, of its 
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facilitating our handling relevant aspects of the 
world more successfully, of avoiding those frustrations 
of our plans/actions/expectations to which adherence 
to a less good paradigm would lead. 
In terms of the activities of initiates of the 
empirical disciplines checking a paradigm involves 
investigating all its implications, trying to produce 
theories under the paradigm which account for any 
(and every) type of occurrence which falls within 
the relevant problem-domain. For those disciplines 
a problem is solved when the problematic phenomenon 
is characterised by a theory and model which, when 
adhered to, allows successful prediction and/or 
handling. A partial solution would be an account 
which allowed successful handling/prediction in 
some areas but left other areas as anomalies. In such 
circumstances, it seems reasonable to suggest, Laudan's 
evaluation in terms of progressiveness would pin-point 
the better paradigm, allowing for the case where a new 
paradigm is adopted more because of its promise as a 
problem solver than because it has already solved more 
problems. This latter case doesn't undermine my account 
because it says no more than that we must occasionally 
take a risk if we are to improve our understanding. 
If a 'promising' paradigm suddenly turns out to be a 
basket of snakes we can always revert to the one we 
hoped it had replaced or else try a new one. The only 
difference between specialist and non-specialist 
attitudes to the relation between theory and action 
is that the non-specialist just wants a theory that 
will facilitate his activities whereas the specialist 
performs relevant action (makes observations, performs 
experiments etc.) precisely to discover whether what 
the theory implies does occur. In both cases the 
important point is that the theory has implications 
for our experience and although no finite number of 
corroborative experiences can prove a theory, anomelies, 
if they occur with respect to the relevant problem-core, 
can serve to make a paradigm unacceptable. We can accept 
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a number of peripheral anomalies simply because we 
have already accepted that, being human, our under-
standing is always uncertain to some degree. 
The second order disciplines, as I have already 
said, deal with problems that often aren't empirical. 
But, as I also said, these problems must be problems 
in other areas if the second order disciplines are 
to be more than elaborate passtimes. It should be 
clear that these 'other areas' must be either empirical 
disCiplines or everyday life as if the second order 
disciplines related only to one another then they 
would appear as nothing more than an elaborate 
compendium of inter-related games. Thus the second 
order disciplines must be at least indirectly checkable 
against experience in terms of the success or otherwise 
of first order theories constructed under the constraints 
imposed by second order findings as problem solvers 
in the relevant (empirical) problem domain. This inter-
relatedness of first and second order disciplines is, 
again, something on which I will say more later. 
I feel confident, then, in saying that a comparative 
evaluation of competing paradigms in a problem-domain 
in terms of Laudan's criterion of progressiveness is 
a way of discovering which of the paradigms best fit~ 
the phenomena being characterised. It is not absolutely 
certain, but it seems the rational course to take. I 
should once again stress that I am not advocating the 
idea that understanding is to be identified with having 
a model that facilitates prediction and (where appropriate) 
manipulation. This would be to postulate a conceptual 
link between understanding and prediction/manipulation. 
My contention is that this link is contingent, that if 
we understand something we should be able to handle it 
better than chance would allow. I am saying that the 
paradigm which allows us to predict/manipulate more 
successfully than its rivals is, as a matter of contingent 
fact, likely to capture, those phenomena of which treats 
more completely. 
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The final objection I must consider here concerns 
the status of the phrase 'truer-to-the-world'. This 
seems to admit of degrees of truth and is likely to 
be objected to by those who would argue that a sentence 
like, "The atomic weight of hydrogen is one," is either 
true or false. I don't think that this is a serious 
problem, its solution depends on grasping that there 
are two senses in which we can take a statement to be 
true. 
The first sense I wish to isolate is seen most 
easily by recalling my earlier suggestion that disciplines 
construct specialist language games. It should be noted 
that this is not a 'one discipline one language game' 
model, rather different areas in a discipline will 
establish related language games bearing a family 
resemblance with the resemblance extending to the 
language games of related disciplines. (This is why we 
must use historical criteria to do with the evolution 
of a discipline's institutions as the way to distinguish 
disciplines from one another, there just aren't any 
easy logical divides). Within a language game, 'S is 
true,' (S a sta.tement) can be analysed as something 
like, "Under the rules for the use of language operant 
in this (linguistic) context, 'true' is the correct 
appraisal of S." Here, however, 'true' appears as no 
more than a move in a game, like 'check' in chess. 
The second sense of true is one which says that, 
given someone (P) who utters S, "S is true," means, 
"Things are as P says they are." This is the sense 
of true which I denoted by use of t~e phrase, 'true-
to-the-world,' and is problematic insofar as we have 
no clear way of deciding whether any statement (other 
than analytic statements) is really true in this sense. 
It seems to me that, 'hydrogen has an atomic weight 
of one,' is true in the first sense, i.e. under the 
~ rules of the relevant language game, and that whilst 
we are not completely sure (and could, perhaps, never be) 
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that it is true in the second sense we have good reaso~ 
to think that the paradigm which gives rise to that 
statement is the best characterisation we have of the 
relevent phenomena. So we have good reason to treat it 
as if it is true of the world. 'True,' in the first 
-
sense above, tells us about how language is used, but 
tells us nothing about the world. When used in the 
second sense 'true' is always an insufficiently 
supported claim, but insofar as we are using the best 
paradigm we've been able to come up with we know that 
the statements we have made are probably somewhere 
near the mark, at least nearer than any other statements 
we could make. In fact the way we use the appraisal 
'true' suggests that we use it in the first sense, true 
under the rules of the language game, but only in cases 
where the language game is in use, Le. where the model 
of the world it embodies is recognised as the most 
accurate of those available. We no longer, for instance, 
say that the statements made under phlogiston theory 
are true simply because we now have a better model of 
burning. Thus to say that, 'The atomic weight of hydrogen 
is one,' is true is to say two things, first that this 
is the correct thing to say in terms of the relevant 
specialist language game and secondly that the model 
of relevent phenomena which that language game embodies 
is, to the best of our knowledge, the most accurate one 
available. In other words, when we assent to the truth 
of specialist statements we are not asserting 
absolutely that things are as specified, we are instead 
saying that there is better reason for accepting that 
statement/theory/paradigm complex than any other in the 
relevent domain • 
The use of the relation between understanding and 
action as a way of saying more about what should count 
as a solution to a problem and hence as a way of 
supporting a contention that 'this' is the best 
available paradigm in terms of capt~ring the nature of 
relevent phenomena more accurately than competing 
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paradigms may be questioned. In particular those who 
think that understanding is its own reward and that any 
contingent facts about the usefulness of theoretical 
understanding in action are theoretically irrelevent 
will be uneasy about my approach insofar as it leaves 
open questions about the value of the findings of 
specialist communities. What I have said so far leaves 
open the possibility that the value of specialist accounts 
accrues through the utility of such accounts in unre-
lated areas. This would be an instrumentalist view of 
systematic enquiry in the disciplines and the opponents 
of instrumentalism would want to argue that even if 
people do value, say, physics, instrumentally, they 
are wrong to do so, that physics leads to an understanding 
of the world and that this is what makes it valuable, 
not any further facts about the utility of that 
understanding. 
In the next section I will be looking at the problems 
generated both by instrumentalist views of the disciplines 
and by the view of the systematic disciplines as being 
intrinsically worthwhile. • 
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Intrinsically Worthwhile Activities. 
The necessity for a chain of extrinsic value to end 
in intrinsic value is well known. If A is of value then 
it is either intrinsically valuable or its value derives 
from its connections with some B which itself must 
either be of intrinsic value or else derive its value 
through its links with some C. Unless this chain 
arrives at something which has value in itself and 
not through connections with something else then it 
just keeps on going and nothing can be shown to be of 
value. Thus nothing can be shown to be of value unless 
something is intrinsically valuable. 
The idea that some areas of activity, notablt the 
systematic disciplines, are intrinsically worthwhile 
arises largely from the difficulties which follow if 
we take an instrumentalist view of many important areas 
of thought. The strain of instrumentalism I'm interested 
in here is that which says that the value of theoretical 
activity derives ultimately from the theory's serving 
some logically unrelated purpose. So, an instrumentalist 
might say, the value of theoretical physics derives 
from the links between this theory and the activities 
of technologists whose activities are worthwhile because 
they have a direct impact (televisions, washing machines, 
motor cars etc.) on the quality of life. People value 
the machines which technologists design on the basis 
of more abstract theoretical work, therefore people 
should also value (extrinsically) the activities of 
theoretical physicists and the various sorts of engineer. 
This sounds very plausible at first glance, but 
instrumentalism has a number of serious drawbacks. 
The most serious drawback of the view I've outlined 
is that it says, put crudely, if you want to evaluate 
a particular piece of theoretical work what you do is 
to investigate its implications for other areas - if 
there are no such implications, then the work is 
worthless. An example will show the danger of this position. 
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In Euclid's geometry there is an axiom which says 
that given a line L and a point P not on L, there 
is only one line (M) in the same plane as P and L 
which passes through P and doesn't meet L no matter 
how far the lines are extended. 
- - - -- - - -~- - - - - -M (unique by axiom under 
Euclid) 
----------------------------' L 
Euclid was never very happy about this axiom as 
it made assertions about a state of affairs which, 
in principle, could not be inspected - both lines 
(by definition) can be extended indefinitely so no 
matter how far along them we inspect there will always 
be more of them we can't get at. Euclid actually 
avoided using this axiom, even at the expense of 
complicating some of his proofs, and his disquiet 
about it was vindicated in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries when non-Euclidean geometries 
were generated. Two variations on Euclid's parallel 
line axiom turned out to give consistent geometries. 
Lobatchevsky and Bolyai worked with the idea that there 
must be at least two lines through P parallel with L 
and produced a consistent geometry which. incorporated 
a proof that the angles of a triangle add up to less 
o 
than 180 , the bigger the triangle the smaller the sum~ 
Later Riemann adopted the notion that all lines are 
finite but endless (like the equator on a globe). 
In his geometry on the surface of a sphere, where 'lines' 
are great circles (circles with the same diameter and 
centre as the sphere), Riemann produced a geometry in 
which there are no parallel lines. Now neither of these 
geometries gives results which are significantly different 
from Euclid here on earth - the distances involved aren't 
large enough. So the non-Euclidean geometries don't have 
any immediately obvious practical implications in everyday 
situations. And throughout the nineteenth century they 
were seen as having precious few theoretical implications 
either - they were regarded as being mathematical 
! ' 
360 
curiosities. Thus a nineteenth century instrumentalist 
would have had to dismiss them as being of at most 
doubtful valu.e and probably as worthless puzzles except 
in terms of their being intriguing to mathematicians 
(which is not a criterion of value under instrumentalism). 
It was not until Einstein realised that space was 
warpable -by mass and that as space varies so does the 
geodesic (shortest path between two points in the space) 
that the non-Euclidean geometries came to have a demonstrable: 
value. If space is variable, then the geometry which 
best describes it will not embody assumptions about 
what constitutes a geodesic, so Euclid's straight line 
and Riemann's endless but finite curves both were 
particular geodesics fitting particular spaces and 
neither was general enough. Einstein overcame Newton's 
problem with gravity by suggesting that (e.g.) the moon 
goes round the earth not because it is ~ied' to the 
earth by a 'string' of gravity, but because the earth's 
mass warps space in our immediate vicinity so that its 
geodesic is a closed curve around the earth. The moon, 
like all free bodies, falls along the geodesic of the 
space in which it finds itself, so the moon goes round 
the earth. In retrospect, then, we can see that the 
mathematical 'games' of the non-Euclidean geometers 
have turned out to be important elements in the 
development of modern physics even if they had to wait 
a considerable time for their importance to be seen. 
Now it might be claimed that in showing instrumentalism 
is inadequate as a way of evaluating current research 
I have not really shown its inadequacy as a theory of 
value for theoretical activity. An instrumentalist 
might reply to my objections by saying that any theory 
can be judged to be of value only if, in principle, it 
has practical implications beyond the theoretical context 
in which it is generated. This, unfortunately, errs in 
the direction of liberalism as opposed to the errors 
of extreme conservatism which strict instrumentalism 
is heir to. There can be very little theoretical work 
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that could not conceivably serve some ulterior purpose, 
so under this new conception of instrumentalism just 
about everything is of value. The new instrumentalist 
notion of value is so all-inclusive as to be useless. 
If instrumentalism has problems with the sciences 
it is incapable of saying anything plausible about 
the arts. The value of a painting Or piece of music 
can hardly be a matter of how much money the artist 
in question makes. Best sellers in all areas have a tendency ! 
to fade rapidly once popular fashion has moved on. This 
seems to have been as true for the various styles of 
dance which the Elizabethan's flirted with as for the 
victorian authors who outsold Dickens as for the music 
that gets into the hit parade today. The idea that all art 
must derive its value from fulfilling a role like (e.g.) 
that of entertainment is the idea that art is no more 
than a saleable comm9dity, the best art being that 
which sells, and this is not something that can be agreed 
with given the problems which an artist like Van Gogh 
or a musician like Beethoven had to face when they insisted 
upon producing what the modern record company executive 
would describe as 'unsaleable product'. For a great 
many artists the value of what they do seems to derive 
from a very personal commitment, from a feeling that 
there is something that needs exploring or an attitude 
to something that needs expressing. The real value of 
something like Ligettits 'Requiem for the dead of our 
Time', dedicated to the dead of Hiroshi~a and Nagasaki, 
is surely to be estimated in terms of Ligetti's personal 
success in expressing his feelings of horror at the effects 
of the atomic bomb and not in terms of cash (even though, 
as a saleable commodity, it has a cash value.) 
The important failure of instrumentalism is its 
insistence that value only accrues to activities that 
serve a logically unrelated purpose. An artist's 
expressive purposes are logically related to the 
activities which serve them. When "a jazz musician plays 
a solo the instrument is not accidental to the expressibn, 
the musician chooses the instrument and 
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explores it, develops a vocabulary which is used in 
expressing whatever the musician has to say. Similarly 
a composer chooses what instrument is to play what, not 
out of whim but out of the feeling that the sonorities 
of 'this' instrument are needed in 'this passage. People 
often learn to play musical instruments or how to paint 
in oils/carve wood/ sculpt stone because they feel that 
'this' medium will give them the expressive possibilities 
they want. The medium is not accidental to the expression, 
if it were then words would serve our purpose, there 
would be no need to spend time mastering new techniques. 
The only reason for using musical instruments or paints 
or any of the vast number of artistic media is that 
different modes of expression open up different 
possibilities, and make it possible to express different 
things. What I am driving at is that when we isolate 
the expressive purposes of an artist (and I'm not saying 
that these are artists only purposes) we cannot use a 
model which says that the artist has feelings about 
something which he then tries to express using the media 
at his command. On this model the manipulation of the 
medium could plausibly be represented as an activity 
extrinsically motivated by the desire to express some 
feeling or attitude. But this isn't how things are, an 
artist's relationship to his chosen medium are much more 
complex. He has feelings both about the world beyond his 
medium of expression and about the medium itself. 
Sometimes, particularly in music, the artist's expression 
is of his feelings about the medium itself whilst at 
the other extreme, for instance in some of Brecht's 
plays, the medium is strictly subservient to the artist's 
desire to say something about the world. It seems very 
clear that a great deal of art cannot be shown to have 
extrinsic value. The artist's manipulation of his chosen 
medium to express something often cannot be represented 
as an activity which serves any purpose beyond that 
of using the medium to express something which the 
particular artist could only express in 'this' medium _ 
if this isn't a worthwhile activity in itself then it 
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seems likely that it cannot be represented as valuable 
in any other way. 
So, if instrumentalism can't give us any useful way 
of evaluating either the activities of scientists or 
of artists it would seem that we have a choice between 
concluding that such activities are worthless (except 
where there is a clear case for extrinsic value) or 
trying to establish that they are intrinsically 
worthwhile. I believe, however, that in at least one 
major attempt to follow the latter course (that of R.S. 
Peters in 'Ethics and Education') more has been written 
into the notion of intrinsic worthwhileness than should 
have been. I will try to explain what I mean. On p.146 
of Ethics and Education Peters wrote: 
" ••• if we spend years trying to get children 
going on science, art and history and they return 
after our efforts, to bingo, billiards and 
eating bananas, do we say that this shows 
that these activities are not worthwhile. 
Don't we rather say that there is something 
wrong with our teaching methods or that the 
children have been immunised against education 
before they came to us? In other words for 
some reason or other they have not come to grasp 
what there is in these activities?" 
and later on the same page: 
" ••• if a man does not pursue or at least feel 
drawn towards what is good then he does not 
really understand it; for the activities in 
question all have some general point which 
must be sensed by their participants and they 
all have standards of correctness and style I' 
built into them which gives rise to characteristic, 
appraisals." 
Both of these quotes are persuasive, they assert 
that the systematic disciplines are worthwhile and 
that failure to grasp this fact is a failure to under-
stand them. The second quote talks about disciplines 
each having a 'general point' which is sensed by 
initiates. In the terminology I have been using Peters 
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seems to be saying here th~t the systematic disciplines 
do have basic problems, the general point of a 
discipline consisting in a committment to the solution 
of those problems, but that these problems are not the 
sort of things that can be explained to a lay man, or 
even (perhaps) explained at all. Rather the 
fundamental problem solving purposes of a discipline 
are internal to it, are sensed and grasped as the 
discipline is understood. So the worthwhileness of the 
systematic disciplines derives from each discipline 
having a general point which cannot be explained to a 
layman but which is sensed by the initiate. The only 
way to get a layman to see the value of (say) 
mathematics on this view is to teach him maths and hope 
that he manages to reach an adequate understanding 
of the discipline - adequate in terms of allowing him 
to see the value of the activity. A corollary of this 
argument (which is developed by Peters throughout 
ch.5 of Ethics and Education) is that anyone who can't 
see the value of maths thereby reveals a lack of under-
standing of the subject. This is a serious defect in 
Peters'whole argument, if you understand a theoretical 
activity you grasp both its pOint and its value, if 
you don't see its point and value, then you don't 
understand it. This sort of argument has become well 
known since the publishing of Catch-22. 
The way Peters uses the terms, extrinsic value means 
value which accrues to some activity because it is 
instrumental in bringing about some state of affairs 
which is of value. Intrinsic value, however, seems 
to end up meaning something more than valuabe-for-its-
own-sake. When Peters talks about theoretical activities 
being intrinsically worthwhile he seems to make such 
activities into arcane mysteries which have, ultimately, 
to be understood as much through intuition as through 
the exercise of the intellect. This tendency is what 
leads me away from Peters position - if there is no 
guarantee that physics is valuable beyond the collective 
. I 
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intuition of physicists then there is no guarantee. 
Intuition gives no criteria for the value of a systematic 
discipline other than that of consensus amongst initiates 
but initiates are committed, tied to their discipline 
in many ways including emotionally and economically -
can we really accept their assurances? And what if 
the national tiddly-winks society asserts the worth-
whileness of the activities they engage in and reply to 
those who doubt the intrinsic worthwhileness of the 
noble art of tiddly-winks by accusing them of failing 
to understand the game, of failing to sense the general 
point which underlies tiddly-winks and gives it its 
value? Intuitionist arguments just go too far, there's 
no reply to them because of the catch-22 implication 
that anyone who disagrees lacks understanding, they 
make an unsupported assertion and then stop people 
questioning it by what comes down to a dirty trick in 
the tradition of the worst sort of political rhetoric. 
It seems to me that the value of any systematic 
discipline, any theoretical activity, must derive from 
the importance of its basic problems. In saying this I 
am not disagreeing with Peters in very much except 
terminology - he must, I think, agree that the 'general 
point' of a theoretical activity is what gives the 
activity its general value (ie. its value beyond the 
value to the individual which may derive from that 
persons enjoyment etc. of the activit0. Where I strongly 
disagree with Peters is on the question of whether the 
basic problems of a discipline are comprehensively 
statable in ordinary language. For Peters the disciplines 
are closed, incomprehensible to any but initiates. This, 
incidentally, really does ~eave the process of 
initiation looking very mysterious. For me the language 
games of the specialist disciplines 'run into' those of 
ordinary language and basic problems constitute a nexus • 
The basic problems must be comprehensible from the po~nt 
of view of ordinary language - otherwise there would be 
no reason for the formulation of the specialist language 
games. 
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It is obvious that certain higher level problems, 
for instance that of giving calculus a basis in logic, 
cannot properly be understood by a layman. But these 
higher order problems are generated in the attempt to 
solve more basic problems (like describing and explaining 
motion) and it is these basic problems which, as I have 
argued, give the discipline direction and serve to give 
a rational basis for paradigm evaluation. It is these 
sorts of problems, basic problems central to disciplines 
at particular points in time, that must be statable in 
ordinary language - if they were not then rational 
discussion of which paradigm a discipline should adopt 
could not take place as people recommending different 
paradigms would unavoidably be thinking and talking in 
terms of different concepts and misunderstanding would 
result. This, as I have already observed, is not how 
things are, which suggests that discussion of problems 
can be carried out in terms not tied to particular 
alternative paradigms within a discipline. In other words 
as irrationality and total relativism do not rule as a 
matter of logical necessity, the basic problems of any 
discipline ~ comprehensively discussable in terms 
not tied to a particular way of looking within a 
discipline. So the general point of any theoretical 
activity must be explainable to a layman, otherwise the 
activity cannot establish that it has a point or that 
it is a rationally organised activity. 
Peters attempts to support the contention that 
theoretical activities are intrinsically worthwhile 
by suggesting that anyone who seriously asks the question 
'Why do this rather than that?' is thereby committed to 
those activities. This, Peters claims, must be so because 
theoretical activities are geared precisely to answer 
that question. Anyone who asks, 'Why do this rather than 
that?' seriously must (if he is serious) be looking for 
answers, and the theoretical activities are the ways 
to get answers, so anyone asking the question seriously 
must value those activities. 
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The central problem with this argument seems to arise 
from the fact that, 'Why do this rather than that?' can 
be interpreted in a number of ways. Within a systematic 
discipline it can be a question about which paradigm 
to adopt, what purposes the discipline should have or 
which of two competing theories does the job best. In an 
everyday context the question can be about the best way 
to do a job, 'Why this way rather then that way?' and can 
be answered by reference to theory, in this case the 
value of the theory seems to derive from its usefulness 
in allowing some job to be done more efficiently - the 
theory is seen as valuable because it indicates that 
some valued end is more likely to be achieved by doing 
'this' than by doing 'that.' I think that this must 
constitute a serious problem for the view which Peters 
forwarded in Ethics and Education although for me, 
given my emphasis on the idea that basic problems of 
a discipline must be comprehensible in ordinary 
language, a situation such as the one described can be 
used to show the intrinsic worthwhileness of the theory 
if the everyday problems being dealt with and the basic 
problems being dealt with by the relevent theory are 
logically related - I will say more about this later. 
Peters' question can also be asked as a way of asking 
what sorts of theoretical activity we should engage in 
and this is the level at which it comes closest to 
doing what he wants it to do. If it was the case that 
the 'general point' of a discipline (and hence its value) 
could only be sensed by initiates and not explained to 
laymen then, 'Why do this rather than that?' would be 
an unanswerable question - the only way to answer a 
layman asking the question of, say, a philosopher 
would be to say that if he were to become an initiate 
and acquire an understanding of the subject he would 
come to see why he should do it rather than, say, origami. 
But if this was how things are then the idea that we 
can discuss a discipline's problems/progressiveness 
rationally, or choose paradigms on a rational basis, 
i 
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would be incoherent. In order to make his argument for 
the intrinsic worthwhileness of theoretical activities 
work Peters needs the intuitionism against which I have 
already argued - thus the argument fails. 
The problem with intrinsic worthwhileness is that we 
are often unsure what we mean when we talk about it. If 
every pure mathematician engages with his subject out 
of nothing more than a love of doing pure maths, then 
all pure mathematicians are i.ntrinsically motivated. 
This means that from the point of view of pure mathemat-
icians their subject is seen as intrinsically worthwhile, 
but such a fact, (supposing it to be a fact for the sake 
of this example) does nothing to establish the contention 
that everybody should regard pure maths as intrinsically 
worthwhile. The fact is that if people in general happen 
to regard some activity as intrinsically worthwhile then, 
in one sense, it II intrinsically worthwhil'e, irrespective 
of the reasons why people see it as such. But philosophers 
want a stronger notion of intrinsic worthwhileness under 
which no activity is regarded as intrinsically 
worthwhile unless there are good reasons for saying that 
people should so regard it. It is this stronger notion 
that brings difficulties because it seems to require us 
to go beyond the empirical fact that people, just do value 
certain things for their own sakes and to start looking 
for a general theory of value, which, a priori, tells us 
what we should value. As far as I can make out we have no 
such general theory, this is why Peters used a transcen-
dental argument in chapter 5 of Ethics and Education, and 
his failure leaves us in a position where we must either 
look for a general theory of value or else accept that 
value judgements are made by people and that they can often 
be made on a piecemeal basis, people deciding rationally 
within a specific context that 'this' is valuable in 
itself. In the absence of a general theory of value such 
piecemealism, prone to error though it may be, is the only 
rational course. My belief is that just as democracy 
manages to look like a good form of government mainly 
because other forms 
.\ 
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seem to rest on questionable views of what constitutes 
the good life, the making of value judgements by a 
process of arriving at concensus through rational 
discussion is the best means we have of deciding what is 
or is not intrinsically worthwhile largely because the 
general theories of value we have really aren't very good, 
they all have serious internal problems. 
On the subject of the value of theoretical activity 
it seems to me that the value of any systematic discipline 
must derive from the relations which hold between the 
basic problems which the discipline seeks to solve and 
the everyday problems which people in general find to be 
important. What I am saying is that if there are 
everyday problems which people find important, for instance 
growing better crops so that people can be fed, and if 
there are areas of theoretical activity (genetics, soil 
mechanics etc.) which are geared to solving those 
problems, then people should regard those theoretical 
activities as being worthwhile. And if the links between 
the problems dealt with by the theoretical activity (eg 
discovering general rules for the improvement of crops) 
and the everyday problems (eg. growing better crops) are 
logical, then the theoretical activities should be 
regarded as intrinsically worthwhile. 
It may be, though, that the problem of growing better 
crops is only seen as important because of the contingent 
link between the availability of food and keeping people 
alive, and that this latter purpose is seen as 
intrinsically worthwhile, in which case the value of 
agricultural theory may derive extrinsically - this doesn't 
seem important to me, if an area of theoretical activity 
is valuable it is valuable, whether the value is 
extrinsic or intrinsic doesn't strike me as crucial. 
There are difficult~here that need to be examined. 
Firstly we must talk about problems here and not 
activities in order to achieve generality and escape from 
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a problem created by a psychological fact about human 
beings. A perfectly acceptable purpose for individuals 
in life is the achievement of a measure of enjoyment. 
Some people derive a great deal of pleasure from pottering 
about in their gardens or playing cricket or doing 
crossword puzzles. And often, for particular individuals. 
the pleasure derives from engaging in an activity even 
if they're not much good at it. In some cases it is even 
the case that people don't want to get too involved with 
theory or systematisation because a rigorous approach 
to the activity would (they believe) detract from the 
pleasure.Such people are not concerned with basic problems 
of the area of activity with which they are involved, 
they simply find the activity relaxing/enjoyable and the 
fact that the particular activities in which they 
engage aren't particularly efficient in achieving the 
ends they serve is irrelevent. I would describe such people 
as hobbyists or potterers, for them the purpose served 
by their activities are enjoyment and/or relaxation and 
any other purposes which are also carried out are of 
secondary importance. 
The observation to be made about this sort of 
attitude is that the purpose of achieving enjoyment is 
one which is served by different activities for different 
people. Different people derive pleasure from different 
activities, some from playing tiddly-winks, others from 
engaging with the problems of pure mathematics. The 
personal nature of a judgement like, 'This is an 
enjoyable activity,' makes it an unsuitable candidate 
as a criterion of general value. So the fact that 
philosophers tend to enjoy engaging in philosophical 
discussion cannot be used as a way of suggesting that 
philosophy is valuable in the sense that everyone should 
value it. Conversly, I suggest, the establishment of the 
truth of a proposition like 'philosophy is a valuable area 
of activity' does nothing to establish that everyone 
should enjoy philosophical discussion. It is, I suggest, 
an empirical fact that people tend to be better at things 
they enjoy, simply because they are more likely to spend 
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time working at it and thus to achieve a better 
understanding of it, but this isn't always the case, 
people can 'potter' in an area for years just for fun 
without ever engaging seriously with its basic problems. 
This brings up the subject of the links between emotional 
commitment and understanding. It is often said that 
no-one really understands an area of theoretical activity 
unless he is emotionally committed to it. In ch.5 of 
Ethics and Education Peters wrote: 
'Could a man really understand science, for instance 
who was unmoved for the passion for truth and 
concern about evidence and clarity. What sort of 
mathematician would a man be who cared nothing 
for neatness or elegance of proof? And could a 
man begin to understand what philosophy was if 
he welcomed contradictions, delighted in obscurity 
and thought cogency in argument a bourgeois faa?' 
Again Peters is very persuasive here, but I would 
argue that he has made the mistake of taking a contingent 
fact, that those with an emotional commi ·tment are more 
likely to do well than those who lack such motivation, 
and has elevated it to the level of conceptual fact, 
that those who lack committment don It, as a matter of 
logic, understand. We've already been over this area, 
the tying together of understanding with emotional 
committment is part of the intuitionism which is a 
keystone of ch.5 of Ethics and Education - if someone 
isn't committed emotionally his understanding is im~ugned 
Against this sort of argument I would observe that too 
much emotional commit ment can lead those with power 
within the relevent institutions to ride roughshod over 
the demands for public demonstration which maintain a 
discipline's obJectivity. It would be odd if, in general, 
philosophers or physicists weren't emotionally committed 
to their work, but this committment is personal, it is 
irrelevent to the general value of their work, it has 
no place in any argument designed to show that people 
in general should value what phlolosophers or physicists 
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do. I would further suggest that the idea of under-
standing without emotional commitment is an important 
one. When evaluating the ideas of mechanism earlier 
in this thesis I admitted that, personally, I have 
an aversion to the idea that people can be fully 
explained in purely extensional terms. But this 
psychological fact about me is irrelevant to the 
question of whether my arguments do, in fact, demonstrate 
the incompleteness of mechanistic accounts. I would 
further suggest that commitment to clarity and cogency 
in thought in philosophy is something which recommends 
itself largely because that is the only way in which 
philosophers can establish pubicly accessible ways of 
talking about issues which are of general importance 
in human life. Assertions about the state of an individual 
philosopher's emotions, or all philosophers' emotions, 
do nothing at all to establish that lucidity and rational 
argument are of value. 
What I am saying is that questions about the intrinsic 
worthwhileness of an area of theoretical activity cannot 
be answered by pointing out that many people are 
intrinsically motivated to engage with it. It seems clear 
to me that people engage in many activities simply for 
the sake of doing them but that they wouldn't want to 
say that everyone should be emotionally committed to 
them. Golfers, mUSiCians, footballers and philosophers 
will all enthuse about their areas of activity but will 
usually admit that 'this' is not everyone's cup of tea. 
Conversely, whilst accepting that many people can't be 
expected to enjoy doing philosophy, I would suggest 
that philosophy is valuable in that viewing a wide range 
of other activities from a philosophical perspective 
can cast light on problems which are real but are often 
perceived only dimly. I would expect even those who 
find philosophy tedious to admit the importance of the 
subject and suggest that even if someone was not 
intrinsically motivated to engage in philosophical 
discourse he could achieve some understanding of issues 
relevant to areas. 9£ activity he did find interesting 
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in themselves if he became aware of the links between 
philosophy and those areas. I see no reason to doubt 
that it would be logically possible for someone who 
was entirely extrinsically motivated to achieve an 
understanding of philosophy although, as I said 
earlier, I can accept that, as a matter of contingent 
fact, it is unlikely that this would happen. If something 
is intrinsically worthwhile then everyone should 
regard it as being of general value, but this is not 
to say that everyone should be intrinsically motivated 
to engage with it. It seems to me that there is a gap 
between asserting, on rational reflection, that 'this' 
is worthwhile and being intrinsically motivated. The 
difference is that someone who is intrinsically motivated 
is emotionally committed, but the emotionally 
commi tment is often a very personal thing and, as I 
have argued, is therefore irrelevant to the more 
important question of intrinsic worthwhileness in a 
general sense. 
The second problem which arises from suggesting 
that the value of theoretical activity may derive from 
the links between the problems which such activity 
is geared to solve and the problems which people regard 
as important comes from the fact that people regard all 
sorts of things as important and for a wide variety of 
reasons, many of which are questionable in the extreme. 
Thus the fact that the basic problems of a particular 
discipline are logically related to everyday problems which 
people see as important does nothing to establish intrinsic 
worthwhileness in the strong sense. The establishment 
of intrinsic worthwhileness in the sense of 'this' being 
a discipline which people should value must depend upon 
the basic problems of the discipline being logically 
related to everyday problems which not only !!! seen as 
important but which people are justified in judging to 
be important. 
This seems once again to bring us up against the 
need for that elusive entity the general theory of value. 
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B~t, I suggest, we can survive in the absence of such 
a theory by adopting a policy of rational piecemealism. 
Such a policy involves leaving aside the quest for a 
general theory of value and instead accepting what 
people do, as a matter of contingent fact, value as 
being valuable provided that there are no good arguments 
to the effect that the general consensus, on 'this' 
particular question of value, is wrong. 
Such piecemealism will be attacked by some philosophers 
as being an abrogation of a central task of philosophy. 
I, on the other hand, tend towards the belief that the 
problem of specifying a general and a priori theory 
of value is one that has been pursued fruitlessly for 
so long that the rational course is to set it aside 
and instead regard questions of value as being essentially 
questions about what sort of value system people want. 
The need for an internally consistent system of values 
is clear, but the question of which values should be 
taken as fundamental seems to me to be best interpreted 
as a question about what sorts of life people want to 
lead rather than about what is 'really' valuable in 
the light of eternity. 
I wish to argue in favour of this sort of rational 
piecemealism for theoretical activities in general. 
What I want to say is that it doesn't help at all to 
look for ways of supporting value claims which deal 
only with the internal characteristics of disciplines. 
I want to represent success in the systematic disciplines 
as consisting in getting closer than before to how 
things are, as evinced by a new theory being more useful 
than previous theories in facilitating our handling 
of relevant aspects of the world. Thus I want to 
represent the physical sciences as constructing a 
succession of ways of looking which show a progressively 
better fit to the world in terms of providing solutions 
to basic problems, both problem and solution being 
identifiable in theoretical contexts (i.e. the solution 
satisfies the formal constraints) and in non-specialist 
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contexts (i.e. the problem is 'real' beyond the specialist 
context and the solution has practical implications for 
dealing with the problem). Insofar as we regard 
protecting ourselves from the vagaries of nature as 
important, and insofar as the basic problems of the 
physical sciences are logically related to the everyday 
problems we seek to deal with, it seems to me that we 
should regard the physical sciences as intrinsically 
worthwhile. (Although, as I remarked earlier, the 
importance of intrinsic worthwhileness has been, in 
my opinion, over emphasised, due largely to the weight 
Peters put on it in 'Ethics and Education' - the intrinsic! 
extrinsic distinction is, in fact, very crude as later 
remarks will indicate). 
The problems which remain for my account lie in 
areas which might be dubbed absolutist, although not 
necessarily in the sense of absolutism (aiming to 
say how things 'really and truly' are) I have used so far. 
I include in this extended notion of absolutism the 
Kantian notion of logically necessary categories of 
cognition even though these are seen as basic to human 
understanding and not necessarily revelatory of ultimate 
truth. There is some confusion here as Kant thought of 
space as a logically necessary category and of Euclid 
as a necessarily true description of space, thus there 
seems to be a confusion here as to whether Kant was 
indeed doing descriptive metaphysics in Strawson's sense 
of, "Aiming to lay bare the most general features of our 
conceptual Structure, (on P.9 of 'Individuals') or 
whether this descriptiv~ part of Kantian metaphysics 
was seen by Kant and his followers as a way of working 
towards a basic set of ontological categories i.e. of 
finding out how things really are, not merely finding 
out how human beings say things are. 
I will be looking in my next section at a series of 
claims about constraints on theoretical activity, constraints 
said to have a priority over other demands made on theory. 
I will be looking not only at Kantian claims, but also 
376 
claims about logic and about what (in principle) does or 
does not make sense. The shared feature of all these 
claims is that they make a priori judgements about 
what conditions a theory must satisfy in order to be 
acceptable which (it is claimed) must be fulfilled 
by any theory in any area. I will, in general, be 
discussing claims to the effect that systematic enquiry 
using LaudQn's criteria of progressiveness is inadequate 
as a way of pursuing understanding. 
• 
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Absolutism. 
My account so far has represented theoretical 
understanding as consisting in the model/paradigm/ 
theory complexes generated by specialist communities 
engaging with only certain limited areas of problems. 
This piecemealism, with different disciplines or 
families of disciplines, being concerned with different 
problem-domains (a notion to be elucidated in a later 
section) is what will allow me to suggest (again later) 
that disciplines working in different problem-domains 
may well find it necessary to formulate different 
(although not necessarily logically distinct in any 
clear-cut way) specialist language games/ways of looking. 
One objection to my approach so far would be to assert 
that really there is only one problem underlying all our 
attempts at understanding, which is the problem of 
saying how things are in the world. Someone of a more 
classical outlook might be unwilling to accept the 
uncertainty which is part of the account I have given. 
My task in this section is to look at some programmes 
which have been represented as better routes to under-
standing than the route I have mapped so far. These 
'alternative routes' vary from the mystics' non-
theoretical preparation for revelation through Kant's 
logically necessary categories of cognition to related 
attempts by logicians to assert unquestionable truths 
and even to attempts to specify a logically necessary 
(and therefore existent) Absolute, a unity of which 
all particulars are merely aspects. I will argue that 
such absolutist programmes are misleading, that any 
claims they make about leading to the acquisition of 
understanding are simply not justified. 
The absolutist camp, in the all-embracing sense of 
'absolutism' I will adopt here, includes anyone who 
thinks that they have a way of discovering absolute 
truth, the w~ things really are, or else (at the formal 
level) truths which are simply unassailable and thus 
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should be accepted universally. I earlier called 
Popper an absolutist and in the sense that he sees 
science as zeroing-in, by successive approximation, 
on absolute truth, he can be called absolutist. But 
Popper's variety of absolutism explicitly denies 
that we could ever know that we'd arrived at absolute 
truth even if we had, in fact, achieved it. This is 
not the sort of absolutism I'm interested in here, 
I've already dealt with the sorts of problem Popper 
was concerned with in earlier discussion and, despite 
the fact that my account of progress differs from 
Popper's, I have agreed with him that progress is 
towards the truth. In this section I am concerned with 
claims about what the (absolute) truth is or how we 
can (knowingly) arrive at it. 
The issues to be discussed here are not concerned 
with (e.g.) questions about the status of the findings 
of the empirical disciplines, Rather they are concerned 
with questions about how we could possibly go about 
discovering absolute truth. Since the modes of enquiry 
used by the empirical disciplines result, as we have 
seen, in a measure of uncertainty they are not what 
concern me here. I am interested in this section in 
much stronger claims, claims about how certainty can 
be achieved. The question of whether there is anything 
compelling in any strongly absolutist claim about truth 
or the way of truth is not empirical, it is a philosophical 
question which must be answered by looking at the various 
sorts of claim that might be made and seeing if they are 
tenable. 
I will begin by looking at claims made by members 
of religious/mystical communities who claim to find 
truth through faith. To such communities truth is 
attainable only through personal experience and the 
search for truth is a matter of each person preparing 
himself for revelation. I can't spend too much time 
discussing the revelatory claims of mystics. That the 
accounts given are related to actual experience I do 
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not doubt, but that those experiences are more than 
illusion/delusion is something which, because of the nature 
of mysticism, seems publicly undemonstrable. It seems 
clear that religious statements are properly to be seen 
as assertions of faith and that much religious activity 
is expression of faith. But that such faith is based on 
anything more than can be explained in terms of 
sociology and/or psychology is a difficult proposition 
to support. 
Nevertheless I find it difficult to dismiss religious 
forms of life as being nothing more than expressive. 
Consider the example of a research scientist who has 
a hunch, follows it up, discovers that it was right 
and publishes his work to international acclaim. Now 
it is tempting to represent the hunch as nothing more 
than the creation of an informed imagination, properly 
to be regarded as a working hypothesis, neither believed 
nor disbelieved, until such time as it had been subjected 
to the appropriate tests for truth. And even if a 
particular scientist seemed always to get the right 
hunches we might insist on saying that until he tested 
his hunch he only had a hypothesis and, perhaps, a 
belief which (again perhaps) only arises out of self 
confidence, but certainly not knowledge. 
What I want to suggest is that we may be wrong about 
this. A researcher may actually know something before 
he gives a publicly acceptable demonstration of his 
knowledge. If, for instance, we accept a causal theory 
of knowledge in which 'P knows that S' ( P a person, S 
a statement) is said to be true if, and only if, there 
is a state of affairs Q, specified by S, which stands 
in a causal (in some sense) relationship to P such that 
pts tendency to assert or acquiesce to S or some logi~ally 
related statement is the result of the causal relation 
which obtains between P and Q, then we have a possibility 
of P knowing that S not only before he demonstrates the 
truth of S, but even if he cannot give such a publicly 
acceptable demonstration. 
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There are a great many problems here I cannot deal 
with, but I think that it is at least clear that we 
cannot assert categorically that a knowledge claim which 
isn't backed up by public demonstration cannot still 
result from knowledge. What is the case is that there 
are good reasons for refusing to accept unsupported 
knowledge claims. This is why I believe that we should 
not accept the revelatory claims of mystics as true 
~ that we should nevertheless hold back from 
asserting them to be the product of feverish imagination. 
Mystics may know, but they cannot demonstrate the 
truth of their knowledge claims in any way that can 
give us a rational basis for accepting them - perhaps 
this realisation is what leads the Zen masters to talk 
in riddles, seeking to challenge the novice into 
achievl~g knowledge for himself rather than attempting 
to pass on what they cannot justify passing on. It should 
also be noted that the mystics'inability to publicly 
support his knowledge claims means also that whilst he 
may in fact know 'this' or 'that' he cannot know that he 
knows, cannot be sure that what he believes is 
knowledge rather than the product of self delusion. 
So perhaps it would be proper to suggest that the silent 
mystic is the wisest of all. 
Given that the mystical path to enlightenment seems 
of little use to those who are interested in 
establishing public bodies of knowledge an absolutist 
might adopt an alternative course, that of trying to 
specify an Absolute through metaphysical argument. The' 
theistic absolutists tend to suffer greatly at the hands 
of those metaphysicians to whom the gulf between creator 
and created makes the idea of a personalized God appear 
as a rather poor kind of Absolute. This is because some 
metaphysician-abso1utists see an Absolute as a unity, a 
whole of which the particulars of everyday life are only 
parts. There can be nothing apart from this sort of 
Absolute, nothing that is other, because, by definition, 
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it subsumes everything. So a personalised God who is 
distinct from Wis creation doesn't qualify as an 
Absolute from at least one metaphysical standpoint. 
The question that must arise at this point concerns 
the status of this sort of Absolute - is it anything 
more than a metaphysicians dream? The answer is that we 
don't know. What is the case (metaphysicians tell us) 
is that if we managed to specify an Absolute which is 
logically necessary and complete, then it necessarily 
exists and hence we would have specified how things are 
'in the light of eternity'. All particulars, all values, 
everything (including ourselves) would be shown to be aspects 
of the one-ness, the Absolute, which we had specified. 
What is also the case is that we have no such specification. 
!his being the case the next question must be about 
why the idea of specifying an Absolute seems so 
compelling to some people. 
Apart from the undeniable fact that a full 
specification of an Absolute (assuming that things are 
as unified as some absolutists claim) would be very 
nice to have, the central bastion of absolutism is 
the fact that it makes no sense to deny an absolute, for 
to do so amounts to asserting an absolute. The assertion 
that it is absolutely true that there are no absolutes is 
self contradictory. On p.20 of his book 'Ascent to the 
Absolute' J.N. Findlay writes: 
'To be content to do the immediate thought-task 
on hand, and to limit one's analysis to what is 
immediately a part of it, may be said to be the 
intellectual policy of non-absolutism, I shall not 
call it anti-absolutism. It is certainly a def-
ensible stance, and one that· one will have to fall 
back on if all one's absolutist ventures prove 
abortive •••• (But) There is in such piecemealism 
often a faith, sometimes messianically 
promulgated, in a pluralism of disjecta membra 
thrown together in defiance of sense and order, 
in a flat disconnection of our hermeneutic 
demands and the material standing before us for 
interpretation, in an ill-ordered infinity of 
supposedly logical possibilities. All these 
doctrines are not humble confessions of ignorance 
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and impotence to prove: they are arrogant 
assertions of knowledge and of boundless power to 
liquidate the efforts of constructive understanding. 
They are absolutist assertions which show their 
absolutist character by their unwillingness to 
be considered alongside of other better constructed 
less self-destroying, more arguable absolutisms.' 
So the denial of the possibility of specifying an 
Absolute can become nothing more than the assertion 
of a very poor candidate for Absolute-ship. But there 
is no problem in choosing to assert no absolute, in 
deciding, in the face of the absolutis~s continuing 
failure to specify an Absolute to follow a course 
of what might be called rational piecemealism. The 
important fact about an Absolute is that 11 it is a 
possibility then it makes no sense to deny it. But we 
........... 
cannot merely assert its possibility - Findlay writes: 
(p.24): 
'The only way, in fact, to see its possibility 
is to see its necessity, and this excludes the 
tempting argumentative coup de tonnerre from 
its mere conceivability to its full reality ••• 
An Absolute must be given an essential content, 
other than its mere necessity of eXistence, 
before we can determine whether it makes sense, 
and whether it alone can make sense, to conceive 
of 11 as necessarily existent.' 
So in the absence of a full specification of an 
Absolute it still makes sense to doubt whether such a 
specification will ever be achieved and hence to opt 
for what Findlay calls 'non-absolutism' which is the 
same policy I have designated 'rational piecemealism.' 
Thus a question mark remains over the sort of project 
Findlay talks about in 'Ascent to the Absolute'. There 
is no strong reason to take up this 'path to understand-
ing' simply because we don't know whether dOing this 
sort of metaphysics is likely to get us anywhere or 
not. Findlay himself recognises this and makes it clear 
that failure is a possibility (and a very real one) in 
this sort of endeavour. In his book Findlay doesn't 
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claim to have got any~here near s~ecifying an kosolute 
in adequate detail; he concerns himself ~ith the 
problem of what sort of demands must be ~made on any 
account which claims to specify an Absolute, and in 
this he would certainly claim to have done little more 
than open the investigation. I have little quarrel 
with absolutism of the kind with which Findlay engages, 
except to say that I doubt whether it will prove 
fruitful. The history of this sort of endeavour is very 
long and has a strong smell of failure about it. I 
wouldn't even attempt to say that, in principle, 
attempts like Findlay's are doomed to a Quixotic fate, 
bound to end in failure despite the noble intentions 
which motivate them (to do this would be to deny an 
absolute). But I must say that even a superficial 
comparison of this sort of approach with a more 
empirical approach, in terms of problem solving, practical 
utility or any other criteria, makes me believe that 
the rational course is to continue with empirical 
research and to leave the more grandoise but less 
promising metaphysical programme to one side. 
This, nevertheless, leaves plenty of scope for 
those who want to shift ground somewhat and make claims 
not so much about the nature of the world in general, 
but rather about human nature and in particular about 
human cognition. This strain of absolutism claims not 
that 'this' is how the world is, but that 'this' is 
how the human mind is. The programme here is to use 
descriptive metaphysics to 'dig out' logically 
primitive concepts (like 'cause', 'person' etc.) in 
an attempt to discover which aspects of our understanding 
we just couldn't do without. This is the Kantian 
tradition and, as I remarked earlier, it seems unclear 
(to me at least) how Kant himself saw the relationship 
between logically necessary categories of cognition 
and ontological categories, the relationship between 
how we say things are and how they really are (although 
my earlier example of space makes it seem likely that 
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the distinction was a little blurred in places). I 
will look more closely at the notion that time and 
space are logically necessary categories of cognition. 
One way to deal with the assertion that time and 
space are in some sense absolutes would be to evoke 
Findlay's point that we cannot merely assert this, 
that we must specify what we mean by time and space and show 
that 'these' specific concepts of time and space ~ 
logically necessary categories of cognition. The 
problem here is that our concepts of time and space 
are still in a state of flux. Kant saw time as a 
constant and space as Euclidean. That space isn't 
necessarily Euclidean has been known for around two 
hundred years now, and since Einstein we have known 
that time is a variable. It is further the case that 
the discovery of black holes in the universe has led 
physicists to start questioning the distinctness of 
time, space and matter. The gravitational forces in a 
black hole are so great that light cannot escape from 
it, matter is compressed to infinite-simal volume 
... 
and time is at a standstill. This compression of the 
space/time continuum is so great that some physicists 
are beginning to wonder whether an explanation of what 
happens in a black hole can be given in terms of space 
time and matter if these are viewed as distinct. This 
is why some theoretical physicists are considering the 
possibility of a new idea, that of a twister, which is 
more fundamental than notions like time, space or 
matter. Such a change in the basic concepts of physics 
would herald a new physics as different from Einsteina 
as his was from Newton~. It seems to me that given the 
way physics seems to keep moving on the desire of 
some philosophers to assert that 'this' or 'that' 
concept of space or time is an absolute seems to 
smack of extreme imprudence. I would further suggest 
that the fact that some physicists seem to be working 
towards a notion which is logically more primitive 
than notions of time, space and matter should warn us 
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not to assert them as absolutes even though, as a 
matter of contingent fact, they do happen, at this 
point in time, to be basic to our way of looking. The 
fact that we do lean very heavily on the notions of 
space, time and matter in our modes of understanding 
does nothing to establish that things could not be 
otherwise. If the theoretical physicists who are 
investigating the notion of a 'twister' are on the 
right track, then,for physics at least, things will 
become otherwise in a few years time. 
In general I want to suggest that equating logically 
necessary categories of cognition with absolute 
categories, with concepts that necessarily reveal 
reality truly, must be wrong. The only way to establish 
'this' or 'that' notion as logically necessary is to 
show that it is a logical 'keystone' of at least some 
of our ways of looking. And the method by which we 
could show some notion to occupy this sort of position 
with respect to our ways of looking is, as I have said, 
that of descriptive metaphysics. This involves taking 
statements which seem undeniably true (for instance 
that babies are born without linguistic skills and 
acquire them later, or that a person has both physical 
and mental attributes) and working backwards to deduce 
what else we should say given that we acquieseato the 
statements from which we started. But this approach 
could be seen as a way of sorting out the inconsistencies 
in - our ways of looking rather than as a means of 
revealing absolutes, and would, I suggest, be better 
seen that way. My point is that the fact that any 
particular concept is one which ~ can not do without 
does not say anything about the nature of reality in an 
absolutist sense, it tells us only about ourselves and 
the ways of looking we use. And, further, to simply 
identify the logically primitive concepts which we 
currently, as a matter of contingent fact, cannot do 
without doesn't establish anything about whether (in 
principle) thing could be otherwise or not. What we can 
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make sense of or not doesn't seem amenable to a 
priori demarcation. 
If we see the establishment of different ways of 
looking as non-absolutist endeavours, then discovering 
which concepts are logically fundamental to them will 
still be an important task, one concerned with 
maintaining the coherence of our modes of cognition. 
But even if we did ever manage to sort out all 
inconsistencies, even if no anomalies turned up for a 
thousand years, we couldn't be sure we had arrived at 
absolute knowledge, we might have, but how could we be 
sure that there was nothing we missed? 
The Kantian approach to the endeavour of discovering 
absolute truth really founder~ irrevocably once non-
Euclidean geometries were shown to be coherent. Up to 
that time it had seemed very plausible to suggest that 
Euclid had provided a necessarily true account of space, 
but once it was shown that other equally consistent 
geometries could be constructed which fit the empirical 
data at least as well as Euclid the idea that any 
particular geometry is absolutely true became undermined. 
And this fact, that formal systems based on different 
axioms can fit reality equally well, undermines any 
attempt to suggest that mathematics or symbolic logic 
can reveal the true nature of things in the light of 
eternity. 
Discovering our current fundamental categories of 
cognition is very much like generating an axiomatic 
basis for geometry. The belief that geometrical axioms 
reveal necessary truths about the world foundered once 
it was realised that any number of incompatible sets of 
axioms could generate consistent geometries. We must 
surely conclude tha.t we should judge our fundamental 
categories of cognition similarly and doubt any claims 
to the effect that identifying such categories 
necessarily reveals truth about the world. We should 
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also doubt, I believe, that any particular concepts, 
even those which are logically primitive in our current 
ways of looking, are, in principle, unalterable. Just 
because ~ can't conceive of doing without certain 
concepts, doesn't mean that no-one will ever come up 
with a better way of looking. The switch from a 'physics' 
which talked in terms of metaphysical essences to a 
purely extensional physics was a massive conceptual 
change which altered fundamental categories, not just 
peripheral ones. Similarly, Einsteinian physics struck 
at the foundations of classical physics, not just the 
superstructure, My point is that what we, at any point in 
time, can or cannot make sense of in no_way' establishes 
that no-one will ever come up with a way of looking 
that makes sense of ideas which, in terms of earlier 
ways of looking, just didn't make sense. In other words, 
philosophers who insist on asserting that we could 
never jettison 'this' or 'that' concept simply fail to 
acknowledge the sheer ingenuity of people's 
imaginations, an ingenuity which the history of ideas 
clearly exhibits. 
Some logicians, however, still seem to want to claim 
that there are statements which are absolutely true. One 
example that might be offered is N(A. ,..., A), and the 
claim that this axiom is an absolute truth might be 
supported by pOinting out that it makes no sense to deny 
it, this amounting to a formal criterion. This is, in 
one sense true, although difficulties arise for those 
logicians when intuitive mathematicians refuse to assert 
this law and still get results which they find 
significant. But the real problem with -(A. -A) is 
that, as it stands, its undeniability is analytic, it 
is absolutely true because it is so defined and this 
sort of truth, like the truth of 'all unmarried men are 
batchelors' is unilluminating in the extreme - it tells 
u~ about how the symbol system in question works and-reveals 
nothing about the reality beyond that symbol system. 
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Before a statement like N(A .NA) can tell us anything 
about the non-symbolic world we must quantify the 
variable A, but this quantification is itself problematic. 
Consider,., (this is a particle. "" this is a particle). 
Now in one sense this might also tell us about nothing 
more than the way we use language. We can read~(this is 
a particle. this is not a particle) in two ways. If 
we take it as stating a rule constitutive of a 
particular mode of language then it is trivially true 
because it is read as saying something like, 'In this 
language game we are not allowed to say any of 'this' 
that 'this' is both a particle and 'this' is not a 
particle. But to interpret"'(this is a particle ....... this is 
not a particle) in this way tells us nothing about the 
world beyond the language game. In order to make our 
statement usefully informative we must read it as saying 
something like, 'look where you may in the universe you 
will never find anything of which it is true to say that 
this is both a particle and not a particle'. This must be 
re-interpreted as saying that if there is anything which 
our concept of a particle fits, then it is not true of that 
'thing' (or class of things) that our concept of a 
particle does not fit it. This is a conditional 
statement and a problematic one because the notion 
of a concept fitting some aspect of reality isn't an 
all or nothing aff!ir. Before N(this is a particle .• 
• this is not a particle) can be shown to be an 
absolute truth we must establish that the concept of 
a particle is, in fact, an absolute concept, a concept 
that captures totally the nature of some aspect of 
reality and this task is separate from questions 
about the undeniability of the formal statement ~(A .NA). 
In other words substituting the referring expression 
'this is a particle' for the formal variable 'A' in 
~(A .~A) leads to absolute truth only if the substitution 
is proper. And the substitution is proper only if our 
concept of a particle is an absolute concept only if our 
concept of a particle really does capture the nature of 
some aspect of reality 'in the light of eternity'. 
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Now I chose the concept of a particle here precisely 
because of the problems it holds for sub-atomic physicsts. 
Sub-atomic 'particles' from electrons down to quarks, 
show some characteristics which allow them to be 
described as particles, but they also show some 
characteristics which require them to be described as 
wave forms. In other words, whilst our concept of a 
particle seems to fit the world well enough in some 
respects, in others it is lacking, and similarly for 
our concept of a wave form. Thus the substitution of 
'this is a particle' for the 'A' in N(A.-A) does not 
reveal absolute truth because it is an improper 
substitution and it is improper because our notion 
of a particle, whilst it fits reality to some degree 
(a -.degree which is adequate to make the concept useful 
to scientists) is not an absolute concept, it fails 
to capture the 'absolute' nature of reality. 
It seems to me that this shows that formal absolutes 
are of little use in revealing the nature of things 
'sub specie aeternitatis'. As soon as we try to make 
such absolutes informative, by quantifying the formal 
variables, we come up against the problem of whether 
'this' concept can properly be used as a value of the 
formal variable - and when we're looking for absolutes 
the only concepts that can properly be used as such 
values are absolute concepts. In order to show that 
a substitution of a referring concept for a formal 
variable in an undeniable (by definition) formal statement 
will lead to absolute truth we need to establish independantl 
that the referring concept captures the nature of some 
aspect of reality not merely to an adequate degree, but 
absolutely. It seems to me that this is something we 
cannot be sure about and hence that logic alone can 
never give us empirical certainty. 
Now such considerations make me doubtful about 
endeavours like that which Findlay pursues in 'Ascent 
to the Absolute' in which the problem is that of giving 
an a~count of reality which is logically necessary, has 
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complete internal consistency and is, of logical 
necessity, complete. Findlay admits freely that he 
has not produces such an account, has not succeeded 
in specifying a necessarily existent Absolute, and 
hence (which he also admits) doesn't know whether 
he is pursuing truth or merely a pipe-dream. In 
'Ascent to the Absolute' he is concerned primarily 
with discussing not the nature of the Absolute, but 
with the prior task of deciding what sort of demands 
would have to be made on a specification of an Absolute, 
with what would or would not count as such a specification-
and in this he would not, I think, claim more than partial 
success. 
I myself am very much troubled by the question of 
how, even if we produced an account of reality which 
subsumed all other modes of understanding, was consistent, 
and, formally speaking, was closed (i.e. did not generate 
statements which were meaningless according to the criterion 
of meaning operant within the system), we could be 
confident of its completeness. The main source of my 
disquiet is the thought that we might produce the 
necessary closure artificially and prematurely - that 
there might be something we missed. This possibility 
is made more disturbing by the fact that, as Godel has 
shown, at least one of our formal systems (that of pure 
mathematics) is not closed. I am not, however, a good 
enough formal logician to pursue such problems, and for 
my purposes here I don't need to be. 
All I need to observe here is something which I 
believe I have already established - that as things 
stand we have no way of supporting any claim for absolute 
knowledge of how things are in the universe - excepting 
of course the fact that Formal systems are governed 
by certain rules, and we know that for absolute fact 
because we decided what those rules should be, this sort 
of trivial knowledge of absolute fact is not, as I 
have said, either very illuminating or relevant to more 
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important issues like empirical knowledge of anything 
that exists independant1y of the decisions we make 
about the use of symbol systems. 
My primary objective in this section has been with 
establishing that strongly absolutist claims about 
how to achieve understanding just aren't justified. 
I cannot coherently claim, a priori, that absolutism of 
the sort that Findlay is interested in is doomed to 
failure. But I can say that the problem solving power 
of the sorts of absolutist endeavours I have discussed 
is demonstrably less than that of the more piecemeal 
approach of the empirical disciplines. Thus I can 
coherently claim that the rational course for anyone 
who wants to understand how things are in the world 
is to abandon metaphysics and to turn to the less 
certain but more productive approach which I have 
designated rational piecemealism. 
I believe that this is the rational course even though 
the nature of the piecemeal approach means that there 
is an inescapable possibility that it is the wrong course. 
All the solutions offered under the programme of rational 
piecemealism are partial insofar as all the paradigm/ 
theory complexes generated have anomalies. But the 
models of relevant aspects of the world generated by this 
method of enquiry often, if my earlier arguments have 
any validity, give us a reasonable idea of how the 
world is. The absolutist approach defined by Findlay 
can never approximate in the same way as rational 
piecemealism can - it is an all-or-nothing affair. So 
far it has given us nothing and so appears as best left 
alone, but if it is ever. successful it will make the 
piecemeal approach totally redundant. I don't expect 
this to happen, but the possibility that it might is 
logically undeniable. Thus I must rest on my doubts and 
say that whilst an absolutism which approaches the quest 
for truth by investigating the possib.11ity of specifying 
an Absolute (in Findlay's case) is coherent, it is also 
an approach which has been pursued long and fruitlessly. 
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This being the case I conclude that the rational 
course is to set it to one side and adopt a more 
piecemeal approach, based on the problem-solving 
model of systematic enquiry I have already outlined. 
There is one final sort of assertion that might 
be claimed to be absolutely true in the sense of 
saying how things are in the world. An ordinary 
language assertion like, "The heart is a pump," it might 
be said, is just true beyond all question. This is 
misleading. A statement like, "The heart is a pump," 
is likely to be appraised as true for evermore, but it 
may not always have the same meaning. In order to 
understand such a statement more fully we must look 
at its 'conceptual context', the language game which 
surrounds it, and ultimately this investigation must 
lead us tCL·the theoretical assumptions (crude though 
they may be) which underpin it. In terms of a pre-
Newtonian understanding of the world a statement like, 
"The heart is a pump," (I am ignoring the fact that 
people before Newton knew little about the circulation. 
of the blood) might well have meant something like, 
"The nature of the heart is such that it gains pleasure 
from the passage of blood through its chambers. In 
pursuit of continuing pleasure the heart produces those 
motions requisite for the conducting of blood through 
it." Today, "The heart is a pump," is seen against a 
functionalist/evolutionary account of physiology and 
is true insofar as this is the correct way of looking 
at living organisms. It seems very likely that any 
change in paradigm would preserve the truth of such 
a low-level statement as, "The heart is a pump," since 
its vagueness would allow it to be reinterpreted so as 
to fit neatly into any perspective, but to call it an 
absolute truth really does seem to be going too far, 
Its unassailability is more a result of its vagueness 
and hence its Ire-interpretability' than of its 
revealing the nature of the heart. 
After my next section, in which I will discuss the 
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role of interest in systematic enquiry, I will return 
to discussion of problem solving and to the idea of 
there being different problem-domains in which 
different ways of looking are appropriate. 
• 
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The role of interest in systematic enquiry • 
Although I have said much that is relevant to 
the subject of interest in what I have written so far 
my preoccupation with the role of problems means that 
what I've said has been largely negative. In this 
section I want to draw my past remarks together and 
to say something positive on the role which interest 
plays in theoretical activity. 
The first sense of interest I want to isolate is 
that of 'taking an interest' in which someone takes 
note of/pays attention to something or other. This, 
I think it is fairly clear, is a very basic notion 
of interest which Simply observes a tendency, whether 
it is a tendency of a teenage boy to seek out the 
company of the girl next door, of a lexicographer 
to note unusual turns of phrase in conversation or 
the tendency of a philosopher to watch for new papers 
on subjects which non-philosophers would regard as 
esoteric. What this notion of interest picks out is 
just a behavioural tendency, it is a 'thin' notion 
in that it says nothing about why this or that person 
pays attention to/takes note of the object of their 
interest. 
When we begin to talk about the reasons why 
someone takes an interest in something we encounter 
the familiar intrinsic/extrinsic dichotomy, except 
that in the case of interest the two terms have 
different significances to those encountered in 
discussing worthwhileness, or rather this is an 
implication of what I have said so far - I will explain. 
Intrinsic interest is interest in something for 
its own sake, someone who is intrinSically interes'ted 
engages with the object of his interest (i.e. takes an 
interest) for reasons of emotion, he is spurred by his 
paSSions, from the carnal passions as with adolescents 
and their initial sexual encounters to the more rational 
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passions which may motivate researchers in the 
systematic disciplines - I am thinking here of things 
like the passion for truth etc. which Peters talks about. 
The important thing to note here is that whereas some 
people with a passion for, say, topology may also 
be able to justify a claim for the importance of their 
subject, this ability to justify their taking an interest 
in topology is unrelated to their intrinsic interest. 
This follows from my critique of Peter~ positicn in 
chapter 5 of 'Ethics and Education' where I noted that 
we can only get from a statement like 'All topologists 
are intrinsically interested in/motivated to engage with 
topology' to 'And this shows topology to be an 
intrinsically worthwhile endeavour' on the basis of 
an unjustifiable intuitionism. Topologists, or members 
of other communities of intrinsic interest, may all 
'feel' or 'intuit' the importance of the endeavour in 
which they are engaged, but the establishment of this 
collective 'intuition' as reflecting the true value 
of their endeavour as opposed to being nothing more 
than a collective prejudice in its favour depends 
upon giving objective reasons why it is valuable. 
This giving of objective argument in support of a claim 
for general value is precisely the giving of reasons 
why people in general should take an interest in a 
discipline even if it doesn't 'grab' them, even if 
they don't feel drawn to it/it doesn't arouse their 
(rational) passions. This leads us on to extrinsic 
interest. The person who is extrinsically interested 
in something(and has no intrinsic interest in it) isn't 
drawn to it emotionally, his reasons for taking an 
interest are the links between what he takes an interest 
in and something which he finds intrinsically interesting 
(with interest, as with wo;thwhileness the intrinsic 
must have logical priority simply because if someone 
found nothing at all intrinsically interesting there 
could, in principle, be no basis for extrinsic interest). 
Giving objective argument for the value of some theoretical 
endeavour 11 giving reasons as to why people should be 
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interested in it, irrespective of their 
emotive response to the subject (or lack of it). 
The gap between intrinsic worthwhileness and intrinsic 
interest is to be found in the psychology of human beings. 
I have argued that if there are logical links between 
everyday problems which people with justification 
judge to be important and the basic problems of a 
specialist area of discourse, then it is proper to say that 
the area of discourse is intrinsically worthwhile. But 
we cannot go beyond this to say that therefore people 
should be intrinsically interested. Even though there 
may be a case for saying that emotions can be educated 
to some extent we must, I believe, acknowledge an 
element of passivity in our emotional responses. 
Whatever may be said about the rightness or wrongness 
of some emotional responses it remains the case that 
often we just do respond - a man might fall in love 
with the wrong sort of woman (and vice versa), but there 
is no use in saying that he/she should have done s~me­
thing about it - we can refuse to act on the basis of 
love (like the young nobleman in 'Seven Samurai' who 
denies his love for the peasant girl because she is 
not of his class), or we can feign love, but there is 
an element of passivity about it which we can't aVOid, 
we can't turn love on and off at will. It seems to ne 
that intrinsic interest is like this - someone can 
objectively argue for the intrinsic worthwhileness 
of a subject and still, without contradicting himself, 
say, "But it doesn't fascinate/grab me at all as a study.n 
There is also the fact that even if there are logical 
links between the problems which someone does engage 
with out of intrinsic interest and some more theoretical 
problems, that individuals may not be equally drawn to 
the more theoretical endeavour. A musician, for instance, 
may be drawn to the sounds made possible through the use 
of electronics, and may realise that he can't hope to 
gain full eont~ol of those sounds without understanding 
the electronics to some extent, but he still may regard 
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acquiring that understanding as a necessary evil. The 
sounds he finds interesting are electronic sounds, 
sounds unobtainable except through electronics, so he 
must, logically, regard knowing how the electronics 
works, as valuable if he regards being able to manipulate 
the sounds as important, but at the same time as 
acknowledging the logical links between the two 
activities (manipulating electronic sounds and 
manipulating the electronics) he might still coherently 
maintain the position of asserting that his interest 
in the sounds is intrinsic whereas his interest in the 
electronics is extrinsic. By analogy with the phenomenon 
of the opacity of the imagination we might term this 
the opacity of the emotions - our emotional responses 
just don't generalise along the lines of logical 
connections. 
All this is moving towards a reiteration of what 
I have already argued - that pure reflective interest, 
a passionate drive towards/an intrinsic interest in 
discovering the way things are, cannot play any decisive 
role in establishing systematic enquiry as having 
general value. f1any people do feel that the unreflective 
life is not worth living and sheer curiosity is 
undoubtedly an important motivation for many researchers, 
but many others simply don't reflect much and aren't 
interested in anything theoretical. If such an attitude 
to theory is inconsistent with an individual's other 
interests then we can properly criticize him, but if 
this isn't the case then we need some other way to 
establish that he should take an interest, or at least 
admit the value of that which he ignores. I suggest 
that this can be done by showing the links between 
theoretical problems and everyday problems which anybody 
living in the world simply cannot avoid. But it should 
be clear by now that intrinsic interest just cannot 
feature in criteria tor the general value of theoretical 
ac11vity of any sort. 
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This rejection of intrinsic interest as evidence 
of intrinsic worthwhileness follows immediately we 
recognise that the jump from, "N-thousand people value 
'this' activity," to, "So 'this' activity is intrinsically 
worthwhile," cannot be supported ~zcept by intuitionism. I 
don't want to deny that the value of an activity for 
an individual can be related to his intrinsic interest 
in it and I don't want to claim that those people who 
breed budgerigars or play chess are engaged in empty, 
totally worthless, activities. But what I do want to 
say is that no general claim to value, designed to support 
(e.g.) a claim for special funding or for the inclusion 
of something in the compulsory curriculum of educational 
institutions can be supported by recourse to intrinsic 
interest. Intrinsic interest is a fact about (some) 
people's emotional responses to (some) thing(s). It is 
~ a criterion of understanding or value. 
It seems to me that there is a big difference between, 
say, breeding budgies and doing physics, but that the 
difference isn't a matter of the committment of those 
who engage in these activities. Rather the difference 
consists in the basic problems of physics being problems 
which are of much greater general importance in life 
than the problem of breeding bigger and better formed/ 
marked budgerigars. Physics deals with basic problems 
about the world which everybody comes face to face with. 
Insofar as we value the ability to predict and deal 
with the vagaries of nature, and insofar as the basic 
problems with which physics deals are related to at 
least some of the important problems we encounter in 
living in the world, we should value physics. Physics 
gives us an understanding of certain aspects of the 
world which are problematic for us and that understanding 
allows us to anticipate and hence avoid/deal with the 
problems that arise. Even if we aren't drawn to physics 
for its own sake we must, insofar as the world poses 
problems for us which are related to the problems with 
which physics deals, value physics. Problems remain with 
the question of what sort of problem the model of the 
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world that physics has arrived at solves and, more 
importantly, with the question of what sorts of 
unsolved problems should properly be included in 
the problem-domain of physics. These problems will 
be dealt with when I discuss problem-domains in 
subsequent sections. 
The central point I want to make is that insofar 
as life presents us with problems, insofar as we are 
justified in judging those problems to be important, 
and insofar as some areas of systematic enquiry deals 
with basic problems which are related to those 
important everyday problems, we should regard that 
area of enquiry as valuable. The understanding that 
a discipline arrives at consists in the model/paradigm/ 
theory complexes it generates capturing the world to 
the best degree that can be managed. The value of that 
understanding (beyond the value that any activity has 
in terms of giving enjoyment to those who enjoy it or 
satisfying the curiosity of the curious) must, it seems 
to me, consist in the relevance of the theory to problems 
that people justifiably regard as important. And in the 
absence of any tenable theory which can tell us, a priori, 
what is important it seems reasonable to me to suggest 
that if people generally judge some problem to be 
important we should, in the absence of good reasons as 
to why they are wrong, accept that it ~ important. 
Having digressed a little and having once more been 
mostly negative in my account of intrinsic interest I 
will now make the apparently paradoxical statement that 
it is of vital importance that the researchers within a 
discipline should constitute a community of intrinsic 
interest. This is ~ because only those who are 
intrinsically interested can, of logical necessity 
achieve 'true' understanding - I have already argued 
that this isn't so. Nor is it because only intrinsic 
interest could constitute a reason for engaging with 
theoretical enquiry - I've already noted that someone 
might engage w~th theo~y as ~ ~ecessary evil because 
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he sees the objective links between something which 
he finds intrinsically interesting and the theoretical 
endeavour. There's no theoretical limit to'the 
understanding someone might acquire through extrinsic 
interest. 
The reasons why intrinsic interest is crucial in the 
development of the systematic disciplines are two. The 
first reason is that when someone is engaged with 
difficult ideas at the frontier of our understanding 
it's not merely genius or inspiration or sheer luck 
that's needed for success. A more important ingredient 
is speer effort, a single minded drive towards solution, 
Sometimes this might be something noble, someone might 
selflessly drive himself on for the betterment of 
humanity. But at least as often the drive comes from 
what might be better described as an almost psychopathic 
compulsion. It's not just researchers who get compulsions. 
In cricket abatsman who consistently gets out playing one 
stroke badly will often practise to get it right, sometimes 
out of professional integrity, at other times because 
it annoys him/ nags at him/preys on his mind 'til he 
puts his technique right. Similarly a researcher working 
un a problem often couldn't give up even if he wanted 
to - the problem nags at him, almost driving him round 
the bend 'til he gets rid of it. It's like a massive 
build up of pressure that demands to be released and 
that pressure can only be relieved, the problem can 
only be got out of mind, by finding a solution. It 
seems to me that this sort of emotional drive towards 
solving a problem is often crucial in makine someone 
put in the necessary hours. It is not a matter of logical 
necessity that this must be the case, but in many cases 
it is clearly an important contingent factor. Without 
the inner spur of an overwhelming intrinsic interest 
much valuable research would never be done. 
The second reason why intrinsic interest is important 
in systematic enquiry is that people whose 'interest is 
extrinsic are likely, as a matter of contingent rather 
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than necessary fact, to stop once a theory is good enough 
to deal with the particular problem which is their prime 
concern. Such an approach is likely to lead to theory 
being produced which is not general enough or which 
has not been pushed to its limits. A discipline without 
people involved in it whose interest was intrinsic would 
be likely to end up as a hotch-potch of mis-matched 
theories which would be little more than glorified 
context-specific rules of thumb. In such a situation 
there would be no real attempt to work out a paradigm 
for the discipline as a whole, no attempt to sort out 
inconsistencies and, of prime importance, no attempt 
to push a paradigm to its limits to find out what was 
wrong with it and hence get an idea of what might 
consti tute a better para.digm. Again this is not a matter 
of logic, but rather an observation that people who 
are intrinsically interested in pursuing only very 
limited purposes are likely to make do with a theory 
that is good enough for the limited context even if 
they see clearly that it has problems with lack of 
generality. 
So it seems to be a contingent fact that often only 
intrinsic interest will lead a worker to investigate 
the nooks and crannies of a paradigm where, despite 
their having few obvious direct implications for everyday 
practice, theoretical issues are raised which can have. 
important implications for a whole discipline. 
Intrinsic interest, then, is very important in 
systematic enquiry not as a giver of general value 
for specific endeavours, but as the motivating force 
which, as a matter of contingent fact, keeps our under-
standing expanding. Without intrinsic interest in theory 
for its own sake it seems likely that the theoretical 
endeavours would become impoverished. People who regarded 
theory only as extrinSically interesting would be likely 
to treat each particular theory instrumentally and 
would be likely to disregard the need to follow up even 
those theories that ha'\e no immediate 'ca9h value'. 
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Such an approach would, it seems to me, be likely, 
as a matter of contingent fact, to leave the systematic 
disciplines in a very sorry state indeed. I may, of course, 
be wrong about this, but the alternatives seem to be either 
instrumentalism or else scholasticism. I have discussed 
the risks of instrumentalism and, I believe, shown them 
not to be worth taking. The scholastic alternative would 
seem to amount to adopting some variety of strong 
absolutism, for instance Findlay's approach, and here 
again I believe the risks to be too great and have given 
my reasons. 
My position on intrinsic interest, then, is not that 
it is, of logical necessity, the only way to acquire 
true understanding, but that, as a matter of contingent 
fact, those who are intrinsically interested in theoretical 
enquiry are more likely to pursue theory to its limits, 
thus giving us a better, less 'bitty', understanding of 
a particular area. Nevertheless I think that we must 
resist the temptation to do what Peters, influenced by 
Kant, did in 'Ethics and Education'. Elevating intrinsic 
interest to a supreme logical position in the pursuit 
of understanding is dangerous in that it tempts us 
towards an unjustifiable attempt to justify specialists' 
value claims through an appeal to intuitionism. The 
problem here is that if we cannot support intuitionist 
claims with objective argument we are left in a position 
where we cannot separate veridical intuition from the 
collective predjudices of communities of intrinsic 
interest. This means that going along with the 
intuitionist line opens up the possibility that 
communities may go off the rails, that they may end up 
as forms of life in which 'achieving understanding' 
really amounts to little more than learning to play 
the game according to the rules. 
The only way to avoid this danger is to opt for 
the policy of rational piecemealism in which ways of 
looking are consciously deSigned to solve specific 
sorts.Qf problem and logical incompatibilities between 
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ways of looking designed to solve different sorts of 
problem are discounted because the difference in problems 
make the different modes of language incommensurable 
not in a Kuhnian sense in which initiates of one 
paradigm can't understand another, but in a more 
rational sense in which we see different ways of looking 
as suitable for particular purposes and not interchangeable. 
Absolutists are likely to object here on the grounds 
that on this approach incompatible statements like, 
for instance, "Reality is a complex system completely 
describable in extensional terms," and "Some aspects 
of reality, notable people, must be described in 
intentional terms," will be regarded as true. But I 
don't think this is a problem once we realise that all 
we are giving up is the unjustifiable assertion of 
completeness of ways of looking. What I am arguing is that 
we cannot, for reasons already given, justify saying 
"Reality is completely and exclusively described by 
'this' way of looking, " (whatever 'this'way of looking 
is). Instead we must say that using 'this' way of 
looking allows us to solve 'these' problems and hence 
that it seems reasonable to say that 'this' way of 
looking captures the nature of the relevant aspects of 
reality better than any other currently available way 
of looking. That different ways of looking may use 
different concepts and hence give different sorts of 
true statement is no problem so long as we regard truth 
as a relationship between language games which we are 
justified in using and the world, accepting that the truth 
criteria we use almost certainly fall short of revealing 
absolute truth. That we must use this sort of notion 
of truth as opposed to the notion that 'this statement 
is true' must mean 'this statement captures how things 
are in the light of eternity' seems obvious to me given 
that the failure of absolutism to give us criteria of 
absolute truth means that to adopt the absolutist notion 
of truth would leave us without any means of evaluating 
any empirical statement for. truth. 
404 
Problem, Domains: -
I wish to ,define the problem domain of a discipline 
at a point in time as the range of basic problems, those 
which are also problems beyond the particular specialist 
community,!or which the discipline's paradigm can 
properly be said to be appropriate at that time, and 
also those problems with which the paradigm cannot 
deal but which the community constitutive of the 
discipline regards as ones which they should be able 
to handle. Two things should be obvious here, first 
that as a discipline evolves its problem domain will 
alter and second that there will be much debate on 
demarcation. An example of the change through evolution 
of a problem domain would be the way geometry, since 
the generation of non-Euclidean geometries, has ceased 
to be seen as a way of deducing the underlying 'form' 
of space. A still very much alive demarcation dispute 
is that concerning the problem domain of physics, notably 
questions about the propriety of physicalist accounts 
of mind. 
In defining a discipline's problem domain I have not 
mentioned the internal problems of particular theories 
and paradigms because these are problems which, although 
they must playa part in assessments of progressiveness, 
are theory-generated. The notion of a problem domain 
I want to use here is to do with the basic problem-
solving purposes of systematic enquiry, the reasons 
why we have different disciplines at all. I think it is 
quite evident that internal problems are not what 
systematic enquiry is primarily concerned with, Such 
problems turn up in the course of theory construction 
and must be dealt with, but the general raison d'etre 
of systematic enquiry must be to do not with the 
internal problems any theory gene~ates,but with basic ' 
problems. 
What I want to do is to attempt to distinguish 
different areas of problems, different general problem 
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domains in which different ways of looking will have 
to be adopted in order to arrive at adequate solutions. 
It is very important to remember that a basic problem 
is one that is see-able as a problem from an ordinary 
language point of view ~ that ordinary language 
changes through time, in part because of feed-back 
from specialist ways of looking (and schools must play 
a part in the feed-back process as we become acquainted, 
to some extent, with specialist ways of looking whilst 
at school). Thus I am not suggesting, a priori, that 
there just are certain distinct problem domains. What 
I want to say is that in our evolving engagement with 
basic problems we have found it necessary to redefine 
and to approach different problems in different ways 
at the theoretical level. This division of labour in 
the general theoretical problem-solving endeavour has 
led to different disciplines, and even different 
specialities within disciplines, generating their 
own language games/ways of looking which, although 
they may differ in some respects, nevertheless form 
families (in a Wittgensteinian sense). One well 
defined 'family' is that which is centred on physics, 
including chemistry, the engineering sciences, some 
areas of geography (notably geology) and, questionably, 
some areas of the life SCiences, such as molecular 
biology. In this 'family' it is generally accepted 
that (at least most) key concepts are reducible to 
those of phYSiCS, though the family's edges are 
blurred, for instance in the life SCiences. 
My approach to the differentiation of problem 
domains will be to look at the differences between 
the sorts of problem families of disciplines, as they 
are now, deal with and to show that there are limits 
to the range of problems with which any of our current 
(families of) specialist ways of looking can deal. 
This, in effect, is what I did much earlier when I 
tried to demonstrate the incompleteness of mechanistic 
accounts of mind. I argued that a purely extensional 
conceptual framework, such as that still used by phYSiCS, 
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could not say anything about the consciousness we 
all possess, in, for instance, our perceptual 
awareness of an external reality. Thus I argued 
that the problem domain of the family of disciplines 
centred on physics did not cover all the basic problems 
we find facing us in life, in particular this way of 
looking/family of ways of looking simply cannot deal 
with personal problems, the problems which arise for 
us because we are conscious agents. 
The problem domains I will distinguish will be 
those we have now, a2! those which were always there 
(even if we didn't realise it) or those we will always 
have. The existence of problem domains based on different 
paradigms would suggest (but not prove) that we were 
dealing with different sorts of thing (ontological1y 
different) if not for the further fact that the problem 
domains have no sharp borders. I will show later that 
some problems seem to fall between domains, in 'grey 
areas' where we're not sure about how to solve them. 
And this will suggest that a more subtle understanding 
of some problems might define a new problem domain, 
either taking some problem from other domains whilst 
leaving them intact, or else subsuming older domains 
as the new way of looking reconciles the tensions 
between the older paradigms. The failure of the 
pre-Galilean unified approach, mixing what we now 
regard as distinct sorts of problem, for instance those 
of physics and theology, led to a fragmentation of 
approaches, but there is some evidence, particularly 
in the physical sciences, of re-unification. I do not 
believe that we are now in a new age of reason because 
I don't believe that the distinctions I will make 
between problem domains have anything more than 
descriptive validity - I fully expect that in time 
things will change. Nevertheless I believe that the 
account I will give will constitute a reasonable 
appraisal of the current 'state of the game', and 
sinc~ it is this we wish school pupils to become 
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acquainted with (both what the state of the game is 
and that it is the state of the game and not God-given 
- -
'TRUTH') I believe that it is proper to organise a 
school's curriculum along the lines I will indicate. 
I don't believe that every discipline's problem 
domain will fall clearly within one or another of 
the more general problem domains I will distinguish, 
there are the grey areas and there are disciplines 
which, of necessity, must try to deal with the poorly-
understood relations/correlations between different sorts 
of problems. But the central point I want to argue for 
is that to the best of our knowledge (and understanding) 
there are different sorts of problem. These might be 
different in some ontological respect, but it is more 
likely that they are different with respect to our 
current modes of problem solving. Whichever is the 
case it remains crucial to be aware of the differences 
when approaching a problem theoretically - an attempt 
at solving a problem which uses a clearly inappropriate 
way of looking is no more than a waste of effort. 
This awareness is specially important in disciplines 
which deal with more than one sort of problem. 
I will also be concerned in subsequent sections 
with establishing the value of systematic enquiry in 
different domains by showing each domain's problems 
to be of general importance. This being so I should 
make a few remarks about the way of establishing 
systematic enquiry as valuable I have adopted. Some 
people might object to my approach by accusing me of 
confusing the statements, 'people think x is important,' 
and 'x is important,' and pointing out that if I take 
these statements to be logically equivalent I 
stipulatively rule out the possibility that people 
might be wrong. The point is correct, but I'm not 
confusing the two statements, rather I am trying to 
deal with, 'x is important (valuable),' in the absence 
of a compelling a priori theory of value. It seems 
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essential to me that we deal with, 'x is important,' 
in a way that doesn't presuppose that we are looking 
for a final, absolute, evaluation of its truth. I take 
this course to follow from the decision I argued for 
earlier to adopt a piecemeal approach to understanding 
on the grounds that it is demonstrably more progressive 
than any more strongly absolutist approach. I~ we 
accept a strongly absolutist interpretation of, 'x is 
important,' we can't justify claiming that anything 
is important, we just don't have the necessary truth 
criteria. 
If, however, we follow a policy of rational 
piecemealism we can, I believe, justify particular 
value judgements by means of what is, in effect, a 
Popperian procedure in which we accept that whilst 
we cannot demonstrate a generally held belief in the 
value of something to be absolutely right, we can 
usually give reasons why some such beliefs shouldn't 
be held. Of course the parallel with Popper should 
not be taken to imply a reification of values. I don't 
want, and I don't need, to discuss whether there really 
are such things as absolute values or whether all talk 
of value is about a community trying to sort out a value 
system which has consensus approval.All I am saying 
is that in the absence of an a priori theory of value 
we should accept that what people value ~ valuable 
provided that no good reasons can be given as to why 
they are wrong in the specific context. This accepts 
that we may be wrong, that experience might lead us to 
change our priorities, but this is no problem for my 
account, it simple accepts the degree of uncertainty 
to which the whole policy of rational piecemealism 
is prone and always has been. This uncertainty is what 
makes understanding a matter of degree and hence allows 
us to talk about our understanding progressing. I also 
freely admit that the appearance of a correct a priori 
theory of value would make my approach look very weak 
indeed, but again this is always a possibility for 
rational piecemeallsm and I have already given my reasons 
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for discounting it. 
I do not accept that the possibility of different 
cultures justifiably holding different values, which 
my account allows, in any way undermines it. If 
different cultures hold different values, values 
appropriate for the particular way of life/environment 
in which the cultures developed, then that must be taken 
as part of the richness of life. If a clash of values 
becomes dangerous then compromise will be necessary 
(assuming that neither culture, in the context of the 
clash, can be shown to be wrong). Failure to compromise 
would seem odd from the standpoint of rational piecemealism, 
for surely most people prefer compromise to possible 
conflict. Of course sometimes people fail to compromise 
through a faith in the absolute truth of their value 
system. Since such beliefs cannot be justified any 
refusal to compromise in the face of possible conflict 
which results from adhering to them uncritically must 
be regarded as irrational - hence diplomacy. 
Thus, I believe, showing disciplines to be valuable 
by showing them to be concerned with problems which 
are justifiably seen to be important in non-specialist 
contexts is the rational way to go about things given 
the rationality of putting more strongly absolutist 
accounts to one side( on the grounds of their non-
progressiveness/stagnation)and opting for rational 
piecemealism. I will now move on to a detailed attempt 
to distinguish five general problem domains. I will 
call them the inanimate, the animate, the interpersonal, 
the personal and, finally the absolutist. I will deal 
with each sepqrately before going on to talk about the 
relationships between these more general domains and 
specific disciplines and their domains. 
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The Inanimate. 
There is a considerable body of problems which 
have been solved by the physical sciences over the 
last few hundred years on the presupposition that 
what is being looked at is a mechanical system in which 
chains of-events are linked causally (in the same sense 
of causality in which a moving bi.lliard ball causes a 
statioD4ry one to move by striking it). The model used 
has evolved over this time from one in which mechanisms 
were seen as governed by strictly deterministic laws 
to a probablistic model in which the laws discovered 
by physical scientists are seen as describing patterns 
which emerge from large numbers of random events; just 
as we get Pascal's triangle, or a close approximation 
from large numbers of trials in which different 
numbers of coins are tossed and the numbers of heads 
or tails recorded. The basic events (like whether we 
get heads or tails when a single coin is tossed) are 
random, but statistical patterns emerge for large 
numbers of events. The probablistic model has emerged , 
this century largely from particle physics where, for 
instance, the position of an electron at a point in 
time cannot be predicted precisely. Instead the 
probability of finding an electron at a particular 
time and place is calculated using a probability density 
function - the Schrodinger equation. This change has, 
in part, been made necessary by the observation of 
a-causal events - events which 'just happen' apparently 
with no causally antecedent event. 
Over successive paradigm changes the physical sciences 
have remained mechanistic in the sense that they have 
maintained a purely extensional conceptual framework 
for the purpose of describing problematic phenomena. 
Insofar as this strategy has led to our being able to 
predict things like the motion of celestial bodies and 
the behaviour of sub-atomic particles with reasonable 
(E&! total) accuracy we are justified in judging that 
for, some aspects of the world, a mechanistic model 
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captures the way things are to a reasonable degree. 
Thus there is a large aentral area of phenomena which 
seems quite properly describable in the ways physical 
science describes them, which is to say that the family 
of ways of looking used by physical scientists does 
give us a pretty good understanding of some things. 
There are, however, problems, for instance those 
of consciousness and agency, the physical sciences 
can't deal with, simply because the adoption of a 
purely extensional mode of description constitutes 
a decision (at least a tacit decision) to ignore the 
possibility that what is being described possess 
consciousness and agency. I argued that this was so 
in my discussion of the incompleteness of mechanistic 
accounts. 
This, however, doesn't explain or justify my 
distinguishing problems with the inanimate world from 
those which arise with the animate world. This is 
my task here. When physiologists or molecular biologists 
'dissect' a living organism, describing what they find 
in terms of (mechanistic) ways of looking derived from 
physics, or else in functional terms, they describe 
everything there is to see. There is nothing left over 
which they can't describe and, if we take seriously 
objections to Cartesian dualism of the sort that Strawson 
(for example) raised in 'Individuals', we cannot postulate 
an entity (the mind) which is substantially different 
from physical bodies so that we can't see it and hence 
miss it out when we 'pull things apart' as physical 
scientists tend to do. Such considerations lead me to 
see the distinction between different ways of looking 
as being between our modes of description rather than 
between ontologically different 'things'. In other words 
I maintain that phYSiologists don't see the mind anywhere 
simply because their way of looking isn't geared to 
deal with the problems of mind. A similar situation 
exists with respect to works of art. A physical scientist 
can analyse a painting completely in the sense that when 
he has finished there will be no visible 'thing'that he 
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has not dealt with. But he will have said nothing 
at all about the painting's beauty because his way 
of looking just isn't appropriate for dealing with 
that sort of problem. 
It seems to me that the ways of looking currently 
used by physical scientists have similar problems 
with the phenomenon of life. The living/not living 
distinction is currently a major problem both for 
medical science (especially in the case of transplant 
donors) and for molecular biologists (especially when 
studying viruses). There seems to be a gap between 
describing something as a complex physical structure 
(at the molecular level) and as a living organism. 
Life seems clearly to be absent in a crystal of salt 
or in certain complex 'organic' molecules such as those 
described in organic chemistry (roughly the chemistry 
of carbon compounds ) and clearly to be present in, 
say, Amoeba, but the status of viruses is unclear. 
To attempt to obliterate the animate/inanimate 
distinction by saying that we ascribe life to physical 
mechanisms of a certain level of complexity, a level 
which we have not yet adequately defined, seems 
unacceptable. This sort of physicalist reductionism 
involving an assertion of faith that the physicalist 
endeavour will deliver the goods one day, is familiar 
from physicalist accounts of mind. It is, I believe, 
unacceptable because, like physicalist accounts of 
mind, it treats what seems to be a logical distinction 
as a matter of degree rather than kind. I will elaborate. 
At the'quiet centre' of the domain of the inanimate, 
the problems with which the physical sciences seem to 
deal quite adequately, are phenomena like a moving 
billiard ball striking a stationary one, causing it 
to move. Now billiard balls seem, in terms of our 
non-specialist understanding of the world, to be 
paradigm-examples of inanimate objects (whatever they're 
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made of they're just not alive). On the other hand a 
dog, again from an ordinary language point of view, 
~ alive. However unclear the animate/inanimate 
distinction is in the case of viruses it seems very 
clear that it holds between dogs and billiard balls. 
There are two possibilities here. The first is that 
the common-sense distinction between animate and 
inanimate is correct. In this case we should not be 
surprised that the physical sciences can cast no light 
on the problem of saying what it is to be alive. The 
conceptual framework(s) of the physical sciences should 
be seen (in this case) as appropriate for inanimate objects ' 
but inappropriate for the animate, and this is due to the 
fact that those ways of looking were generated in dealing 
with problems for which the question of whether the 'things' 
involved were alive or not was irrelevant (a cat and a 
lead weight dropped from a tower in a vacuum still fall 
at the same rate). Historically we can see that this is 
the case with physics since Newton and this fact makes 
me lean towards saying that the physical sciences can say 
nothing about life Simply because physical scientists 
in the past haven't seen this as a problem that concerns 
them. 
There is however, a second possibility. This is that 
the living/not living distinction ~ a matter of degree, 
that our common-sense distinction doesn't really work on 
close examination. What I want to say here is that this 
might possibly be the case, but that to take this as 
implying that the life-sciences can be subsumed under the 
physical-sciences-as-they-are-now would be wrong. I say 
this because the physical SCiences, historically, have been 
primarily interested in problems, like the description 
of the motion of celestial bodies, the fine structure 
of matter etc, in which life has not been seen as a 
relevant factor. To use a way of looking generated in the 
context of problems of this sort to try and clear up 
the question of life seems to me to be at least imprudent. 
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My point is that if the animate/inanimate distinction 
is one of degree, then there must be some property which 
matter possess which leads to sufficiently complex 
concatenations of the basic elements (and I mean 
sub-atomic particles and the like, not the elements 
of the periodic table) exhibiting the characteristics 
of life. But this property is not one which physics 
has elucidated. The problem here is comparable with 
that of consciousness. It might be possible to elucidate 
a notion of awareness that would make talk of the 
awareness of (e.g.) an electron coherent and hence 
enable us to give an acceptable 'physicalist' account 
of mind. This 'physicalist' account of mind, however, 
would be very different from accounts given so far 
in that the new notion of a fundamental particle which 
would be given, with particles properly describable 
as aware (in a sense on which I could not even begin 
to speculate), would constitute a greater paradigm 
change than has happened in physics since Galileo 
and Newton. I couldn't say whether such a change 
will occur - physicists, after all, are full of surprises. 
But no such change has occurred yet. 
In a similar way, it seems to me, it might be possible 
to characterise matter in a way which would make the 
animate/inanimate distinction appear as one of degree 
rather than kind. But as things stand, it appears reasonable 
to say, physics has not dealt with the problem of life 
and cannot deal with it (as the current problems of 
medicine and molecular biology evince). Again I 
wouldn't attempt to legislate about what might happen. 
But the paradigm change that would allow us to talk 
meaningfully about life-potential being a property of 
matter, which becomes outwardly manifest only when it 
is structured in certain ways, has not yet been formulated. 
Thus I feel confident in maintaining that there is a 
central problem-domain properly to be called the 
inanimate in which the physical sciences operate 
successfully and that there is another central area of 
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problems, the animate, in which the ways of looking 
which currently operate in the inanimate are simply 
inappropriate as an approach to solving important problems. 
The existence of grey areas between the animate and 
inanimate is no problem for my account. That there are 
problems with the characterisation of viruses (for 
instance) seems to me to be symptomatic of the 
incompleteness of our current ways of understanding, 
an indication that we still have a long way to go, 
that much work has to be done before we can claim 
to understand the phenomenon of life in relation to the 
structure of matter. 
I think that the value of these areas of theoretical 
activity (disciplines and sub-disciplines) that give us 
an understanding of those phenomena .invol ved in the 
problem-domain of the inanimate (i.e. problems where 
questions about whether the 'things' involved are alive 
or not, or are conscious agents, are irrelevant) should 
be quite clear. We all live in the world where such 
problems arise arld many of the problems which confront 
us in everyday life are merely specific instances of 
more general problems which the theoretical activity 
of specialists in this area is geared to solving. 
Insofar as we find related every-day problems to be 
important we should judge the theoretical avtivity, 
which generates the understanding that enables us to 
solve those problems, to be of value - and this 'should' 
has the force of 'as a matter of logical necessity'. 
That people might not value such understanding in terms 
of being intrinsically interested in the physical sciences 
is, as I observed earlier, a psychologi~al fact about us. 
But insofar as everybody must find themselves confronted, 
at some time, with problems with the inanimate world 
with which they must deal, they must, if they are not 
to be inconsistent, acquiesce to the value of the 
physical SCiences and other disciplines concerned with 
the inanimate. 
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There are, and have been, those who would say that 
problems which arise through our living in the inanimate 
world are unimportant. These would include mystics who 
regard preparation for an after life or for becoming 
'one with the universe' as the central problem in life. 
Such positions are absolutist in the strong sense which 
I have already discussed. They involve the making of 
unsupportable assertions about how things are and as such 
are not at all compelling - although individuals might 
feel drawn to such arguments on a psychlogical level. 
My contention is that the everyday problems which fall 
within the domain of the inanimate are problems which 
people have always found important, even when they were 
not seen as problems with inanimate objects. Magical 
ways of looking, in which dealing with floods or volcanoes, 
were (and in places, e.g. Bali, still are) seen as 
problems about placating/controlling spirits, still saw 
handling what we now see as problems with the inanimate 
as important. Insofar as there are no compelling arguments 
to show that dealing with such problems isn't important 
I suggest that we must see those disciplines which deal 
with the problems of what we now see as the inanimate 
world as being of value. 
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The Animate. 
This is the domain of the life sciences. These 
disciplines are not logically distinct from those 
concerned with the inanimate in terms of using disjoint 
conceptual framework: molecular biology and physiology 
both draw on the concepts of physics. This is 
unobjectionable so long as workers on this area do not 
forget that such concepts as physics currently uses are 
unlikely to give an adequate solution to one central 
problem in the domain of the animate - that of saying 
what it is to be alive. The central feature of problems 
in this domain is that they are problems which we have 
with living things because they are alive, from 
classificatory problems in botany and zoology, through 
problems about the origins of species to medical problems, 
agricultural problems (including the selective breeding 
of varieties of plants and animals, but not tractor 
mechanics). the study of animal behaviour, food chains 
and much more. It must be stressed again here that the 
distinctness of the animate from the inanimate is 
a matter of (currently) contingent fact, not of logical 
necessity. This is how things are, not how things, in 
principle, will always be. 
Just as the 'border' between the animate and the 
inanimate is blurred because we are not sure about how 
physicalist descriptions of organisms in terms of the 
way physiCS describes the fine structure of matter relate 
to functionalist accounts of animal physiology, evolution 
and behaviour, the 'border' between the animate and the 
interpersonal is problematic (as is that between these 
areas and the domain of the personal). In the case of 
Amoeba all behaviour seems to be 'built-in', there seems 
to be little room for talk of learning, all Amoebas react 
in similar ways in similar contexts, a mechanistic 
stimulus/response model seems adequate to describe the 
behaviour of these non-cellular animals except insofar 
as they do seem to be alive, a notion which, as we have 
seen, physics seems incapable, so far, of elucidating. 
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As we go 'up' the evolutionary scale the role of instinct, 
or genetic pre-wiring, diminishes. In even a simple animal 
like planarium, which has a crude nervous system with a 
'brain' consisting of swollen ganglia, learning of a 
simple kind, like learning a maze or to avoid electric 
shocks, does occur. In pigeons and rats, the behaviourists· 
favourite pets, learning can be of quite complex skills 
(like the ability to distinguish between photographs of 
cars and trucks which Rachlin describes his pigeons as 
acquiring in the quote I gave when I discussed stimulus 
-response accounts). The difficulty of describing such 
skill acquisition in stimulus/response terminology has 
led some people (e.g. Hamlyn in his paper 'Conditioning 
and Behaviour' in 'Explanation in the Behavioural Sciences' 
eds: Borger and Cioff~,C.U.P '70) to doubt whether the 
notion of operant conditioning is coherent. 
Still higher in the animal kingdom we find behaviour 
which is so adaptable that animal behaviourists describe 
it as social. Wolves hunt cooperatively, one group chasing 
a herd of caribou towards other members of the pack who 
do the killing. Food is carried back to feed nursing 
mothers and other pack members who didn't go hunting but 
stayed behind to guard the mothers and cubs. In wolves 
and most other social animals the same social behaviour 
is replicated batween different groups of the same species 
which leads to the conclusion that the observed behavioural 
'adaptability' is, at best, strictly limited by instinct. 
But when we get to the primates things get more complex. 
In one recent Open University television programme 
I had occasion to watch an account was given of an 
experiment done with two closely related varieties of 
baboon. In one variety tribes are organised in 'paternalistic 
groups, the males keeping a close watch on their females 
and chastiSing any female who strays too far from the 
family group. In the other variety females have much more 
freedom, being allowed to stray far from the family group 
in the course ot foraging for food etc. One part of the 
project involved capturing females from the latter, less 
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'paternalistic', group and with suitable safeguards 
(i.e. in initial contact between male and female the 
female was protected by a cage) released in the territory 
of the former group. The 'paternalistic' male attempted 
to 'round up' the new female using all the usual (within 
that variety of baboon) strategies, resorting ultimately 
to force. The female soon adapted to her new 'home society', 
quickly learning not to stray too far from the family 
group. 
This is a poor recollection of what was a much more 
careful experiment than my account indicates. But it 
serves as an illustration that the ability to acquire 
habits of social behaviour, as opposed to those habits 
being genetically pre-wired, occurs in species other than 
homo sapiens. It doesn't demonstrate that the 'social rules' 
of baboons are arrived at in a predominantly conventional 
or • cultural , manner (i.e. through social learning) as 
opposed to being predominantly instinctive. What it does 
demonstrate is that the instinctive behaviour/learned 
behaviour distinction is not such that an animal's 
behavioural habits must be arrived at entirely in one 
way or the other. Instinct and learning interact. Even in 
human beings, where social. behaviour seems much more a 
result of socialisation than of genetic pre-wiring, there 
must be some sort of instinctual basis for learning to 
build on (this is a theme I have discussed twice already, 
though not in quite these terms). 
A final example of the instinct /convention distinction 
being one which is a matter of degree with respect to 
particular species (perhaps even individuals) must be 
the recent work done on teaching sign-language to 
chimpanzees and gorillas. In a recent television 
programme the gorilla Koko was seen using sign language 
to get her keeper to stand under a window so that she 
(Koko) could climb up and look through the window at 
another gorilla doing his lessons. In the context of the 
initial signings Koko could not see the other gorilla, 
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that's why she had to get her keeper to stand under 
the window - so Koko could stand on her shoulders. It 
seems to me that whether or not Koko's grasp of the signs 
she uses is of a sort that would make it proper to speak 
of her knowing a language we have here a clear case of 
purposive use of conventional signs (i.e. symbols). 
Koko couldn't see the other gorilla, so the use of signs 
couldn't plausibly be explained on any sort of stimulus/ 
response model. We can only explain what happened by 
saying that Koko wanted to see the other gorilla and got 
her wish by means of a strategy which involved the use of 
symbols, signs which have no natural significance for 
gorillas, which are useful in communication only insofar 
as both participants grasp what might be called the signs' 
'communicative act potential' in the context. 
The point of all this is to establish that the problem 
domain of the animate, which must include the problems 
of instinctual behaviour, and the problem domain of the 
interpersonal, which must include the problems of what 
H.P. Grice called 'non-natural meaning', cannot safely 
be taken to be distinct in a clear cut way. Talk of instinct 
or genetic pre-wiring is talk about significance which 
things have for an organism because of its (biological/ 
genetic) nature, without learning being involved. Talk of 
natural meaning or associative/indexical significance 
is talk about an organism learning about the world through 
associating events which frequently (for whatever reason) 
occur in conjunction. Talk of non-natural meaning, or 
symbolic significance is talk about signs which possess 
whatever significance they do possess only by virtue of 
intersubjective agreement on their 'usability' for doing 
certain things. 
It is part of the arrogance of western culture to 
believe that we are distinct from the rest of nature. We 
used to claim that only we have souls, now we say that only 
we have the potential to use language. What I want to say 
is that establishing our uniqueness by giving a syntactic 
description of human languages and then refusing to 
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acknowledge any being that doesn't use a symbol system 
of that sort as a subject of experience seems to me to 
be a dubious strategy. It seems to me that the central role 
of language in giving human beings an advantage over other 
animals is in allowing us to communicate information about 
what is not immediately present in the context of 
communication, what is physically remote, what is past 
and what might be in the future. In Koko's signings this 
seems to be present to some degree, even as far as telling 
lies about who broke a toy. Language makes it possible" 
for us to possess abstract knowledge, and in the limited 
sense of possessing and being able to communicate 
information about what is not immediately present. Koko 
seems to be a knower of this sort. She is not a sophis-
ticated language user, but, I suggest, she is a user of 
symbols and, in a more limited way than most human beings, 
a knower. Thus, I believe, she constitutes evidence for 
the assertion that we are different from other animals 
in degree rather than in kind. 
What I'm getting at here is the idea that we should be 
careful about the distinction between instinctual behaviour 
and conventional behaviour. The anecdotal evidence I've 
given so far in this section is illustrative of the 
difficulties that arise in describing the origins of 
social behaviour. My earlier discussion of language 
acquisition is much stronger evidence. There I, in effect, 
argued that as a matter of logical necessity we could 
not acquire language unless some things are naturally 
significant for us. This amounts to saying that there must 
be something about human nature that facilitates language 
acquisition. And only terminology separates this last 
assertion from one to the effect that there must be some 
instinctual/genetically pre-wired basis for the human 
ability to generate (conventionally defined) symbol systems, 
including language. It is only a short and unproblematic 
step from this point to saying that human conventions 
and hence human social institutions cannot be totally 
independent of human nature. 
Thus, although the formal distinction between instinctual 
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(i.e. 'built-in to the organism rather than learned) and 
conventional (arrived at through intersubjective 
agreement) modes of behaviour clearly holds, there 
are simple no animals in which behaviour is defined 
completely by convention. The domain of the animate 
clearly includes the problems of instinct whilst that 
of the interpersonal clearly includes problems of 
conventionality. But the 'grey area' between the animate 
and the interpersonal includes problems about the inter-
relatedness of instinct and convention. There is no 
rigid divide between talk of social behaviour in animals 
and human social behaviour, so the two problem domains 
and the disciplines that work in them must inter-relate. 
In particular I hope that even the anecdotal evidence 
I have quoted here, on wolves, baboons and on Koko the 
gorilla, serves to indicate that we should be very 
careful about simplY presupposing a rigid distinction 
between human social behaviour and animal social behaviour 
in terms of the former being governed by convention and 
the latter by instinct. The difference is not as clearly 
understood as all that, as the nature vs. nurture issue 
in psychology demonstrates. And this is to suggest that 
a sociology (of humanity) which is not augmented by/based 
on a theory of human nature is likely to go wrong. In 
the developed world we already suffer because many aspects 
of our way of life, food, housing conditions (especially 
in the larger cities), work pressures, economic pressures 
etc. are more than many people can adapt to - hence the 
growing incidence of ulcers, heart disease and psychiatric 
disorder. To talk about our social institutions without 
talking about human nature is to ignore very important 
questions not about the morality of what we do, but 
about the wisdom of putting ourselves into situations 
which human beings, by our nature, have trouble adapting 
to. Such questions are, I suggest, closely related to 
questions about natural environments and degrees of 
adaptibility which zoologists raise about other species. 
We of the species homo sapiens are, outside of viruses 
and bacteria, the most adaptable species on the planet, 
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but there are limits to our adaptability (outer space being 
one environment we have difficulty adapting to both 
physically and mentally). It seems to me that it is by' 
no means clear that we have nothing to learn about 
ourselves as animals. The problems of the animate don't 
go away when we start looking at human beings, we just 
bury them beneath a mass of convention. 
The value of the modes of understanding generated 
in engagement with the problems of the animate should 
be clear, We are living beings and have problems which 
arise from that fact - problems about food, medical 
problems, ecological problems etc. Many of the problems 
of the animate can be, sometimes immediately (medical 
problems), sometimes in the long run (ecological problems), 
matters of life and death. Other problems, like how to 
grow better roses or to keep a lawn moss-free, are not 
so pressing. But in general I can think of no argument, 
other than total nihilism (which should entail the holder 
of the nihilistic beliefs sitting quietly waiting for 
death as for a nihilist to eat or act purposively would 
be inconsistent) that could undermine the contention 
that many of the everyday problems which fa"ll in the domain 
of the animate are (justifiably seen to be) important, 
and hence that theoretical a~tlvity in this area is of 
value. 
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The Interpersonal. 
The domain of the interpersonal covers all problems 
arising from the conventionality of our social institutions. 
Included are problems of anthropology and sociology and 
of linguistics (language being a social institution i.e. 
governed by rules arrived at through intersubjective 
agreement). I would also include some areas of psychology 
and the whole of moral discourse for reasons to be given 
later. Also included are a whole host of everyday problems 
which arise through our living in a conventionally 
constituted social world. 
The problems of the interpersonal are problems with 
social phenomena, and, as such, must be approached from 
a perspective which sees social institutions as 
constituted by intersubjective agreement within the 
relevant community. Social institutions exert control 
on a community onlY for so long as there is general 
agreement, tacit or overt, on how things should be done 
within that community. Once there is no con'ensus on, no 
general acquiesence to, the rules constitutive of a 
particular way of life, then that way of life must change. 
The interpersonal, then, is concerned with phenomena 
which have no reality over and above that conferred on 
them by intersubjective agreement on the rules which 
constitute themas social phenomena. 
This defines the central area of the domain of the 
interpersonal where laws, rules of etiquette etc. are a 
matter of convention. But this area is not clearly cut off 
from the domain of the animate. Certain fundamental social 
principles, such as the wrongness of lying, seem to be 
on a much less culturally-variable footing than, for 
instance, rules about when it's appropriate to say 'please' 
and 'thank-you'. In the case of lying, for example, it 
seems not merely that lying complicates things in ways 
some cultures have taken a dislike to. Rather lying 
undermines the possibility of language. Earlier I 
remarked that a notion of 'speech-act appropriateness' 
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for statements, must depend for its usefulness on a presupp-
osition thAt any statement would be appropriate for 
telling a lie. Quine has made similar observations 
about translation, pointing out that without a 
presupposition of truth it would become impossible for 
an anthropologist even to begin compiling a dictionary' 
for a new language. So, it appears, lying isn't just 
something we dislike. Instead lying is something we must 
judge to be wrong simply because the notion of a 
community of language users where lying is the norm is 
incoherent. In other words our concern for telling the 
truth is an essential element in our being language users. 
If we didn't normally tell the truth language would lose 
its usefulness as a means of communication or, to be 
more preCise, we could not possess a language at all as 
we could never reach the necessary intersubjective 
agreement on the speech act potential of words. 
Now insofar as our ability to generate language, as 
my earlier arguments about the innate basis for language 
acquisition suggested,is a part of an unlearned human 
nature, certain elements of our social organisation seem 
natural as opposed to conventional. Problems with those 
aspects of our social organisation would seem, as I 
suggested earlier, to fall in the domain of the animate 
rather than that of the interpersonal - here again is 
a grey area, the problem of the relationship between 
human nature (our 'instincts') and human social institutions 
(our conventions). But whatever the nature of the 
interdependance of 'instinct' and convention the two 
are distinct. When we ask about human nature we are 
asking about things that people just tend to do because 
of the way they are (as a matter of contingent 'biological' 
fact). In such a context we are talking about matters 
of fact which are seen as morally neutral, we are not 
concerned with the moral acceptability of those basic 
drives/tendencies (or whatever) constitutive of our 
humanity, the task of describing human beings from the 
perspective of the animate, a task which belongs in part 
to psychology, involves an attempt simply to specify 
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human nature, what is built into us, the unlearned, 
innate basis on which further learning builds. 
Only when we get to the problems of the interpersonal 
proper can we raise moral questions, because only with 
respect to our (conventionally constituted) social 
institutions have our communal decisions any real force 
in terms of changing how things are. The natural world 
(animate and inanimate) is independent of us - no amount 
of (our) discussion can possibly stop gravity doing 
what it does, or alter the social organisation of a 
wolf-pack. But we can alter human conventions by discussion, 
we can change the rules of cricket or rugby or the laws 
of the land, thus changing the social world. This is 
why it makes sense to question the S.African apartheid 
laws or the British anti-terrorist laws on moral grounds 
whilst the idea of a moral condemnation of the laws of 
gravity is a joke. Morality presupposes choice - it 
. 
makes no sense to raise moral questions on issues where 
we have no option but}to be passive observers. Moral 
questions arise when, through either commission or 
ommission, someone could have made things other than 
they ¥ere. So an astronomer watching a super-nova doesn't 
raise moral questions Simply because such things happen 
and there's no way to do anything about it. An ecologist 
watching the destruction of a forest for profit, however, 
must raise moral questions (amongst others) precisely 
because there we could do something, there we have a 
choice and if the pulp-company is making profits by 
destroying huge areas of land, a region's ecological 
balance and hence the livelihood and way of life of 
people who have traditionally lived in that place, then 
moral and political questions occur immediately. 
The key to the interpersonal proper is that these 
are problems of interpersonal interaction where, all 
things being equal, it is assumed that people are 
responsible for the (foreseeable) consequences of their 
acts. The basic feature of the social world is that 
, 
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almost everything about it is 'up for grabs', is open 
to being changed (whether change occurs on a rational 
basis being a further question.) The interpersonal 
covers problems with rule governed systems for which 
the possibilty of changing the rules is ever-present. 
When a being is admitted to the community of moral 
discourse, seen as ~ responsible person, to be given 
the rights and duties that status carries with it,an 
assumption of rationality is made which amounts to 
assuming that the being is capable of acting in 'this' 
way or 'that' for reasons. This carries with it 
presuppositions that the being in question can chanee 
its behaviour as rules change, can see social life as 
rule governed, can grasp the reasons behind the rules 
and can take part in discussion which leads to 
intersubjective agreement on rules. This further 
presupposes that that being can rationally overcome its 
nature. Thus a man of violent disposition is expected 
to control his tendency towards violence insofar as 
this is regarded as necessary within his home society. 
The social world, then, to some extent at least, is 
against nature. We assume that human reason is able to 
climb 'above' instinct or natural tendency and establish 
modes of conduct on a basis of rational interpersonal 
agreement. That things don't always turn out that way 
is a matter of (contingent) fact, but the idea which 
informs our present understanding of social institutions 
is that, in principle, social change could always be 
rationally planned even though it often isn't. Whether 
or not this belief is correct depends on how much of 
the irrationality we see, for instance in politics, 
mirrors human nature as opposed to resulting from lack 
of understanding. This problem, the giving of an account 
of the role of human nature in determining human social 
organisation, is so tied up with political beliefs 
(ie. party political) that it seems unlikely that an 
adequate solution will be forthcoming in the near furture. 
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The whole right/left debate can be seen to rest on 
different accounts of human nature, the agressive, 
competitive individual out to make his own way v. 
the co-operative member of a community out for the 
good of all. That each stereotype is a caricature 
and that each political extreme seems uninterested in 
this fact might, to a sociologist, for example, suggest 
that politics is not to be approached on the assumption 
that what is said constitutes the reason for what is 
done by politicians. In the irrationality of politics 
we might, perhaps, find out more about human nature 
than about reason. We might, given sufficient study, 
be forced to conclude that the interpersonal isn't as 
important a problem-domain as we usually think, that 
the areas of choice about social institutions are 
severely restricted by other factors. Such restrictions 
might include natural economic factors (of the sort 
that go, 'It is impossible to keep three people alive 
on enough food for two,' but not facts about exchange 
rates insofar as these are not fully constrained by 
natural fact) and human nature (the will to power in 
individuals, perhaps, or acquiesence to existing 
convention being shown to be more a matter of 'running 
with the pack' than of rational reflection.) 
Here again we have come up against a 'grey area', 
problems we're not sure about, the seemingly intractable 
nature v nurture issue. Psychology spans this issue 
and it is a major concern for psychologists. Develop-
mental psychology is concerned with human nature in 
relation to human social institutions, with the 
unlearned 'processes' that underpin our ability to be 
initiated into conventionally defined communities, 
most notably the community of language users. Social 
psychology, where researchers observe and try to make 
sense of what happens in (eg.) seminars or committee 
meetings or juries, attempts to explain what happens 
not merely in terms of the rationality or otherwise of 
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the arguments forwarded, but in terms of the relative 
status of the participants and how this is established. 
Here again the question of the origin of the 'rules' 
observed can be raised. Are they entirely conventional 
or do they relate to a more primitive 'pecking order' 
of the sort that animal behaviourists have described 
(eg. Lorenz's wor0. 
The notion of conventionality itself becomes problema-
tic here. We cannot equate 'conventional' with 'logic-
ally arbitrary' as many of the laws of physics are 
matters of contingent fact, logically they could be 
otherwise, it just happens that they're not. When we 
talk about convention we mean more than just, 'things 
could logically, be otherwise,' we also mean that we 
could make them so. But although the rules of a game 
like football are changeable (and I'm ignoring problems 
about how far the rules can change before we're 
playing something other than football) in ways that 
make football a paradigm example of a conventionally 
defined activity, it seems at least possible that some 
aspects of human social activity are constrained by 
human nature to a degree which makes change impossible 
in the sense that different rules, although a logical 
possibility, would simply be unworkable given the way 
people (by their nature) just are. 
All this doesn't undermine completely the idea that 
that there is a separate domain of the interpersonal 
constituted by the problems which arise from the 
conventionality of many of our social institutions. 
What my remarks so far £2 show is that we must be careful 
about identifying problems as interpersonal as opposed 
to animate in certain areas. These two problem domains 
inter-relate in ways we understand poorly as yet and to 
assume that culture (in the sense of what is established 
conventionally)separates man from the rest of the animal 
kingdom in a way which makes problems with the animate 
easily distinguishable from the problems of the 
Ii 
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interpersonal is a mistake. We simply cannot ignore the 
possibility that human nature exerts much greater 
influence on human social organisation than we currently 
allow in our theories. 
• However elusive the 'boun~y' between the animate 
and the interpersonal may be there are clearly areas 
where the nature of social institutions is conventional 
in the sense that people could logically and as a matter 
of contingent fact, choose to do thin~differently. 
Cultural differences in things ranging from interpersonal 
etiquette, to political organisation and language, 
demonstrate this. In the central area of the domain of 
the interpersonal it is:clearly intersubjective 
agreement on rules that constitutes social institutions 
and which serves to distinguish (in terms of central 
areas) the natural from the social in its full sense, 
where 'social' is taken to imply conventionally defined 
and hence changeable. 
Sociology would seem to be the discipline primarily 
concerned with the problems in this area, but sociologists 
seem to have adopted an approach to the social world 
that fails to acknowledge that social institutions 
are defined only through intersubjective agree~ent, 
agreement that ~ be reached through rational discussion 
whether or not this is how it is reached in particular 
instances. Sociologists, particularly, though not 
exclusively, those with Marxist inclinations, seem to 
write people out of social institutions. These workers 
seem to have adopted a model in which the evolution 
of social institutions is seen as the same sort of 
problem which paleontologists have in mapping out the 
evolution of the species. On such a model the evolution 
of institutions is seen as having inertia of its own, 
with people being dragged along in the wake of change. 
Although such an approach may cast light on some problems 
it fails to show people as constitutmg through (tacit or 
overt) acquiesence to rules, the social institutions in 
lli I 
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which they participate. As such sociology of the sort 
under discussion fails to deal with important problems. 
It takes an over-view of society from a 'height' so 
great that people are missed out. Not all sociology 
fails to put people into their proper place, social 
psychologists don't, and theories like 'role-play' do 
talk about people although here the emphasis is on the 
role the individual finds forced on him by his position 
within an institutional hierarchy. What sociology seems to 
ignore far too often is the other side of the 'role-play' 
coin, the impact on institutions of people who take part 
in the institutionalized activities because they must, 
but who simply don't regard the rules they follow as 
anything more than empty ritual. It is such people who, 
ultimately, will change the institution in one way or 
another and it is such people who simply don't get 
mentioned in much sociology, except as 'deviants' (I 
will say more on this in my discussion of the domain of 
the personal.) 
The problems of the interpersonal are inter-personal 
problems, problems which arise in deciding how to organize 
interpersonal interaction within a community. As this is 
the case any attempt to solve such problems must cast 
light on the relations between people and the 
institutions they constitute through intersubjective 
agreement. It is in this endeavour, it seems to me, that 
much recent sociology fails, and fails through ommission. 
Sociologists just don't seem to (want to) put the 
necessary effort into specifying the people/social 
institutions relationship fully. Too many sociologists 
seem to regard social institutions in much the same way 
as, say, astronomers regard the behaviour of celestial 
phenomena. But, insofar as the constitutive role of " 
people with respect to social institutions serves to 
distinguish them from natural phenomena in a clear-cut 
way (even allowing for the grey area around the nature v 
nurture issue) this move by sociologists seems to rob 
their theory of much explanatory power with respect to 
the problems of the interpersonal. 
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The sociologists' reluctance to look more closely at 
the relations of people to social institutions quite 
possibly results from the belief, often held tacitly, 
that it is society, through the transmission from generat-
ion to generation of the often unreflective]y adhered-to 
values, attitudes and beliefs which constitute each 
individual's cutural inheritance, that determines 
consciousness rather than vice versa. This essentially 
Marxist dictum, though it is believed by many who are not 
Marxists, simply discounts the possibility that a 
rational and critical awareness of his home culture can 
lead an individual to reject or modify what is passed on 
to him. It undermines completely the idea that social 
change could be planned through rational discussion, 
It is undeniable that socie~y does determine 
consciousness to the extent that perception is mediated 
by intersubjectively defined conceptual frameworks, 
and that many socially transmitted values, attitudes and 
beliefs are held unreflectively by the majority of people 
in a society. But the progress of understanding 
unavoidably involves the rejection and/or modification 
. 
of 'received' ways of looking, and the fact that many 
people are ~nreflective about their values, attitudes and 
beliefs does nothing to establish that things could not 
be otherwise - the whole point of education is surely 
tied up with an attempt to make people more critically 
aware, both of themselves and others. Society may exercise 
some sort of hegemony over the consciousness of the 
unreflective, but it seems far from contentious to suggest 
that in rational reflection we have a way of 'digging 
out' the hidden presuppositions built into our everyday 
ways of looking through socialisation and submitting them 
to scrutiny. In my next section I will argue that there 
are phenomena which are not fully explicable in terms of 
the social. If my remarks on the personal are not 
entirely vac'l1O.B my next section will demonst~ate that 
people cannot be safely regarded as mere social constructs 
and hence that sociology's failure to put people in their 
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proper position with respect to the social institutions 
which they constitute (and sociology seeks to describe) 
is a serious ommission. 
In what I have said I have included much of psychology 
and all of moral discourse in the domain of the inter-
personal. In the case of psychology this inclusion might 
be questioned by those who wonder why I don't include 
it in the personal. After all, it might be argued, at 
least some of the problems with which psychologists 
engage are problems about the relation between subjects 
of experience and the world. It is the case, however, 
that most areas of psychology, particularly the 
Anglo-American schools, are concerned with problems 
which occur in, or between, the domains of the animate 
and the interpersonal. They are concerned with what is 
common to us all (albeit to different degrees) rather 
then with what is unique about particular individuals. 
Learning theory (from behaviourism to studies of 
language acquisition) is concerned with common traits, 
~ith those aspects of human nature which provide the 
basis for initiation into social institutions end with 
the process of initiation itself. Similarly the study of 
individual differences, especially in intelligence, is 
concerned with human nature, even if the notion of 
intelligence as an innate and invariant trait has been 
questioned by many who take the cultural variance which 
I.Q. test results show as evidence that intelligence 
is a normative notion. No matter what the outcome of the 
debate the study of individual differences is seen to be 
an endeavour primarily concerned with problems which 
occur in (or somewhere between) the domain's of the 
animate and the interpersonal. 
In the realm of moral discourse opposition to my 
views is likely to arise from those who see moral questions 
as essentially absolutist. Religious groups are always 
likely to make specific moral assertions and take them 
to be non-negotiable on the grounds that they are 
434 
divine law revealed through priests and/or prophets. 
Such assertions must be rejected as moral imperatives 
on the ground that their claim to absolute truth is, 
as a matter of contingent fact, unjustified (they may 
be right but we can't demonstrate their correctness 
publicly) I covered the arguments here in my section 
on absolutism. 
More rationally some philosophers might want to say 
that there remains a possibility that a tenable absolut-
ist account of value might be given. This is something 
I fully accept, although I would be dishonest if I 
didn't go on to say that I regard it as a theoretical 
possibility with little probability of occurence. This is 
why I put absolutism to one side, opting for rational 
piecemealism. Until I see an account of moral value 
which establishes once and for all that, a priori, 
there are certain things that each person really should 
do (or not), I will continue to argue that the rational 
course is to interpret moral questions as being t. 
essentially about what one should or should not be 
allowed to do in a particular social context (and why). 
If absolutism delivers the goods then this policy will 
be shown to be in error, but as things stand I suggest 
that the rational course is to locate moral problems 
in the domain of the interpersonal, as this is the 
only way we have of solving them. 
The value of the interpersonal mode of understanding 
must derive, as far as I can see, from the fact that 
people do live in society and from the fact that 
understanding the social world better should allow us 
to regulate both our lives as individuals and the society 
in which we live more efficiently. Understanding our 
relationships to others and to the various social 
institutions with which we come in to contact during 
our lives must be regarded valuable insofar as we 
regard knowing what to expect from others as important. 
People do generally seem to regard knowing what to 
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expect from others in social interaction as being 
important and I know of no argument to the effect that 
people are wrong to value such knowledge. Thus, on a 
non-absolutist policy of accepting that people are 
justified in holding the values they hold in the absence 
of good arguments as to why they are wrong, we must 
regard ourselves as being justified in regarding the 
interpersonal as a valuable mode of understanding. 
It also seems clear that the interpersonal stands 
justified in terms of its being concerned with 
establishing a mode of language in which problems 
about which of the rules governing a particular society 
are 'Wrong (and, again, why) can be discussed usefully. 
Some people, it is true, seem to regard the social 
world not as something they playa part in constituting 
but as a given, a game with rules which are sancrosanct. 
For such individuals the most pressing interest is in 
how to win the game and they simply don't raise questions 
about whether the rules are the right ones. But most 
people, no matter how unreflective, at some time find 
themselves questioning the rules. It might be something 
relatively trivial like a motorist getting upset because 
his insurance company settled for 'tit for tat' on 
an accident where he felt the other driver was to blame. 
More significantly it might be the case of a black man 
embittered by the difficulty he has in getting a job 
when similarly qualified white men seem to have few 
problems - here the hidden, unspoken conventions of 
racism are seen and resented. Whatever the particular 
incident, however, the vast majority of people do, on 
occasion, find themselves thinking that 'this' is 
wrong or that things would be better if 'that' rule 
were implemented. I think it is fair to say that such 
problems are widely recognised as important, even if 
people often seem to shy from them. And this recognition 
of the importance of problems which fall within the 
domain of the interpersonal is also the recognition 
of the value of the specialist theory generated in 
engagement with the basic problems of the domain. 
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The interpersonal is also shown to be important 
because it covers problems related to the processes 
of initiation, through those disciplines dealing with 
the way we, as individuals, become part of society. 
Bringing up and educating children is widel~ recognised 
as an important matter, and this seems to be an area 
in which there seems little room for suggestinG that we 
are makinr, a mountain out of a molehill. Since this 
is so, and there are areas spanning the interpersonal 
and animate which seem primarily interested in acquiring 
an understanding of the processes of initiation which 
(as a matter of contingent fact) help us in facilitating 
it, we can conclude that this is one more way in which 
claims that an interpersonal understanding is of gen-
eral value can be justified. We may not have got very 
far in producing a unified account of ourselves as 
social beings, but the task of constructing such an 
account (and of relating it to an account of human 
nature which in turn must relate both to problems of 
the animate and the personal) can be shown to be important 
in many different ways, can be shown to relate 
to so many everyday problems which we are justified 
in judging to be important, that we cannot doubt that 
work in different areas of sociology and psychology, 
and in ethics also, that may in time lead to a 
production of a unified interpersonal account must be 
seen as worthwhile. The theoretical activity is concerned 
with solving problems which are logically related to 
everyday problems which we are justified in regarding , 
as important and which constitute the basis of a claim 
for the general value of the theoretical activities 
engaged in by those concerned with the interpersonal. 
There are still problems remaining, particularly 
with the relationship between the personal and the 
interpersonal - these will be dealt with in the next 
section. 
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The Per'sonal. 
The domain of the personal includes all the problems 
which arise from our inner lives, from the feelings and 
emotions (and aeethetic experiences) which we all have. 
The only area of psychology which sets out to give a 
theoretical description of mind that is designed to 
make our inner lives more comprehensible, and hence 
handlable, is psychoanalysis, and this seems to be the 
only theory generating systematic discipline in the 
area, as yet. Psychoanalysis ('though perhaps with 
limited success as yet) seems to be engaged in attempt-
ing to specify the specialist way of looking in an 
explicit for~. I suggest, however, that recent work 
on psi-phenomena, where researchers find it necessary 
to talk of correlations between e.e.g. readings of 
brain-states and experimental subjects' reports of 
their states of mind (accounts are given in Ostrander 
and Schroeder: 'Psychic discoveries behind the Iron 
Curtain') may lead to fresh insights into this area as 
serious enquiry into such phenomena as telepathy and 
telekinesis seems to require researchers to work with 
the mediums' subjective reports of their states of 
mind as opposed to merely correlating more 'objectively' 
measurable events (like e.e.g. readings and external 
events). 
I also want to suggest that engagement in artistic 
creativity, from drama to the visual arts and music, 
is a way of achieving a degree of self-awareness 
which amounts to an increased knowledge of the sort 
of person one is in terms of likes and dislikes, 
motivation etc. Engagement in artistic activity, I 
want to say, can become a voyage of self discovery, 
an artist reflecting on his art must, if it is ~ls 
art and not merely a pastiche of 'received' techniques 
and ideas put together in accordance with established 
rules, find in his work elements of his self-hood 
which were previously not seen or else perceived only 
dimly. Although the arts do not attempt to formulate 
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explicit theories of mind (even if particular artists 
might be full of theories - for instance Bernstein's 
attempt to relate Chomsky's psycho-linguistics to 
music in his Hal.Var d lectures) art reveals the artist~ 
makes the inner person more accessible, particularly 
to himself, The 'acquaintance' knowledge acquired has 
no explicit theoretical basis to support it', it cannot 
easily be put into propositional form and tested for 
truth. Its existence is manifest only in the person, 
only in the artist's growing maturity and control of 
his chosen medium, only in the sense of fulfillment 
and satisfaction which results from the artist's sense 
of 'that's right' when faced with a finished work. I 
will argue later that a personal notion of rightness, 
something likely to be objected to by many, is an 
essential notion if we want to talk about artistic 
progress. In the domain of the personal, I will 
suggest, the acquisition of (self)understanding is 
often more a matter of reflective engagement with the 
self than of learning to use an explicitly formulated 
way of looking - I will say more about direct under-
standing of this sort in a later section. 
The distinctness of the personal from the inanimate 
is relatively clear. Much earlier I argued that 
mechanistic accounts of the sort that are adequate as 
problem solvers in the domain of the inanimate are 
simply incapable, because they use only extensional 
concepts of coming to grips with very simple facts 
about people for instance, that in our perceptual 
consciousness we are aware, not of neuro-electrical 
impulses, but of an external reality. The personal 
includes only problems that arise from our being subjects of 
experience,. ~d of 'inner' experience. Since the personal 
is concerned with problems arising out of the workings 
of our minds, the influence those workings have on our 
lives, and since the sort of understanding appropriate 
for the problems of the personal is one that brings 
awareness of the influences of our inner lives (including 
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the sub-conscious etc.), so that we can understand and 
handle ourselves better, a physicalist account is seen 
to be straightforwardly innappropriate as a way of 
solving those problems. 
There are, nevertheless, correlations between 
physical states and mental states which must raise the 
question of whether this distinction is between different 
ways of talking about the same thing (ontologically 
speaking), each mode of description complementing the 
incompleteness of the other, as opposed to brain states 
and states of mind being ontologically distinct. This 
seems to be a possibility, but I would point out again 
that a way of looking that explained how the fine structure 
of a matter related to the phenomenon of consciousness 
would be very different from any paradigm physics has 
used yet and would constitute a very ambitious attempt 
to extend the problem domain of physics. Thus we 
wouldn't have a reduction of the personal to the 
physical as the physical sciences are now, rather we 
would have a new perspective which subsumed both the 
personal and the inanimate (and it would need to link up the 
animate and interpersonal too - a very tall order)." 
The distinctness of the personal from the animate 
is not so clear cut. This is largely because we are 
unsure about what should be written into the concept of 
a person. I am free, having rejected the possibility 
of a purely extensional account of mind, to reject 
accounts which equate 'person' with' a body of a 
certain sort'. But that doesn't rule out making 'possess 
a body of a certain sort,' (eg. human) a necessary 
condition for 'person-hood'. We can rule out this sort 
of move, perhaps, by asking about what we would think 
if a being whose body showed more plant characteristics 
than animal (eg. cells with cellulose cell walls) 
landed a space ship on Clapham Common. Would we want to 
dissect the body to see if we had a person here or 
would we instead assume that the beings 'movements' 
needed to be interpreted as purposive action and act 
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towards it accordingly - 8S to a (very important) person? 
I think, perhaps, the latter. It might be that a person 
must be, or have been, embodied (as Strawson argues 
in 'Individuals'), but specification of what sort of 
body is surely to be written out of the concept. It 
is not long since white Europeans 'solved' the problem 
of the Tasmanian aborigines by hunting then to 
extinction - after all they were black and if you 
write 'has a white skin' or 'has a caucasian body' into 
your concept of a person shootine non-caucasian 
hu~an beings comes under the heading of 'hunting animals'. 
Perhaps this sort of , reasoning' was what enabled 
commanders of Nazi concentration camps to live perfectly 
normal family lives when off duty whilst supervising the 
slaughter of Jews and other 'non persons' when on duty. 
One necessary condition for being a person seems to 
be that of being a subject of experience, of being aware 
of things and acting because of the way things are 
rather than simply reacting as the world impinges on the 
mechanism. The problem here is that of deciding when it 
is appropriate to ascribe 'person-hood' to an entity 
~nd when not. We have to take human beings to be persons 
because the only way to make sense of much of human 
verbal behaviour, notably our use of intentional 
constructions in language, is to assume that 'this' body 
is that of a person. However the only animalS we know 
about that demonstrably do possess language and to which 
we must (hence) ascribe states of mind are ourselves -
human beings. 
Here again we have the temptation to postulate a rigid 
break between humanity and the rest of the animal 
kingdom, a break which would separate both the interper-
sonal and the personal from the animate in a clear cut way. 
But the examples I gave earlier to show how the animate 
and the interpersonal overlap work just as well 
(especially the 'signing' primates like Ioko ) as 
indications that we should be careful about stipulating 
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that human beings are the only true subjects of 
experience, as distinct from 'reacting mechanisms~ on 
this planet. 
It is by no means obvious that talk of animals 
showing affection, being grumpy etc., is always 
unjustifiable anthropomorphism. Although little old 
ladies talking about their cats do, typically, fall into 
this trap, it cannot be taken for granted that talk of 
" bonds of affection, for instance, between a mah,out and 
~ 
his elephant is only metaphor1cal We're not sure, in the 
absence of language, whether it would be correct or no~ 
to ascribe awareness and mental activity to an animal, 
but that doesn't mean that an animal that doesn't use 
language is not a subject of experience - it just means 
that we can't tell whether it is or not. 
My suggestion is that we can formally separate the 
personal from the animate by saying that the special 
problems of the personal are recognisable only given 
the prior assumption that what we are looking at is a 
subject of experience. The problems of the animate on 
the other hand can be handled adequately on the 
assumption that what is being looked at is a reacting 
organism (where 'organism' is meant to imply 'possessing 
life '). We should, however, remember that this distinction 
doesn't necessarily separate humanity from the rest. 
We are simply distinguishing attempts to account for the 
behaviour of reacting organisms (Amoeba being a paradigm 
here) and attempts to explain (by reference to the 
workings of the mind) the activities of subjects of 
experience (Homosapiens being our paradigm here). This 
doesn't identify a cuttine off pOint where all on one side 
are reacting organisms whilst on the other side ate the 
subjects of experience. A more likely interpretation 
is that many animals (including ourselves) are in some 
respects reacting organisms and in others subjects of 
experience who make judgements and act. What I am 
saying is that the problems of the animate and the 
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personal, like the probJems of the animate and the 
interpersonal, are distinct but not separate. By 
'distinct' I mean we can give formal,criteria for 
sorting the different sorts of problems out (at least 
in central areas). By 'not separate' I mean that 
because of the overlap between areas, because there are 
some phenomena (like Koko's. signing) that we're not sure 
how to interpret, we should avoid the temptation to 
regard the different sorts of problems as mutually 
irrelev«nt. In particular I would suggest that just as it 
seems likely that to regard human social organizations as 
entirely conventional is to unjustifiably discount the 
influence of human nature, it also seems likely that 
regarding all a person~ activities as resulting from 
(rational) jud~ements made about experience is likely 
to leave out things like fear and bizarre-ness reactions 
which may have some origin not in rational cognition, 
but in animal reaction. 
The whole question is fraught with difficulties. The 
animate, interpersonal and personal are inter-related in 
ways we simply don't understand very well. The animate 
deals with problems of the nature of living things, 
ignoring matters arising out of conventionality and 
consciousness. The interpersonal centres on the problems 
of convention, but cannot safely go on its way behaving 
as if human nature is irrelevent to human social 
organisation. The personal deals with problems of people, 
as subjects of experience with complex inner lives. It 
is separate from the animate insofar as it deals with 
problems involving consciousness which the animate doesn't 
deal with, but it is intimately intertwined with the 
animate simply because it makes no sense to talk about 
sexual love (for instance) merely in intellectual terms 
without relating the more cerebral aspects of the 
experience to the more 'instinctual' aspects, to human 
nature. Similarly the personal and interpersonal are 
intertwined. Many of our feelings, emotions, aesthetic 
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experiences ~ socially conditioned - people the world 
over feel sad when they listen to sad music, but try 
playing a sad piece from Northern India to the average 
Western European and he just won't 'perceive' the 
sadness. Given this fact, that an individual's inner life 
is, to some extent at least, socially structured, the 
question arises of whether there is a workable distinction 
to be made between the interpersonal and the personal. 
The fundamental problem-solving purpose of the personal, 
as I conceive of it, is to find a way to help people to come 
to terms with their inner life, to acquire a degree of 
self knowledge which will allow them to plan their lives 
as far as possible in a way that will allow them to achieve 
a measure of contentment, to avoid the anxieties which 
an inappropriate life style can lead to. Many people 
seem to be able to go along with the expectations of 
others to a very great degree without any problems, 
but for some people going along with such expectations 
leads to problems. There are significant numbers of 
people who achieve success in some field (in a socially 
defined sense of success) just to realise that it's 
not enough. As an illustration of what I mean I offer 
the case of a mature student who obtained his teaching 
certificate on the same course as myself. He had been 
the head of an art department in an advertising agency, 
had achieved a degree of material comfort, and had 
reared children who by then had left home. He had 
given up his job in order to become an art teacher in 
the hope that teaching would give him a job which he 
felt to be worthwhile. Whether or not teaching is 
currently giving him what he was looking for is 
irrelevant to the basic point I'm trying to get at. 
The fact is that this 'successful' man found that his 
'success' was hollow, that he just didn't feel right 
in his job. He was lucky in that he arrived at a point 
in his life at which social and economic pressures 
were sufficiently relaxed so that he could take a drop 
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in income in order to try to find some area of work 
that would give him his fulfillment his work in 
advertising just didn't give him. A number of mature 
students in colleges of education seem to be looking 
for something to do which will be more meaningful to 
them than the jobs they have been doing. And many 
such students choose teaching knowing very well that it 
will never give them the material rewards which our 
society values so highly to the same degree as the jobs 
they have left behind. They believe that they will 
find teaching more meaningful, that it will give them 
more job satisfaction, more of a sense of fulfillment. 
Whether they are right or not is debatable, but, it 
seems to me, the fact that these people have come to 
question the material definition of success (biGger homes 
bigger cars, more money) which our society seems to be 
based on shows that something in their inner lives, 
in the way they as individuals feel about their life 
style, has led them to question convention and to look 
around for some employment which will both allow them to 
survive within society and to find fulfillment on a 
personal level. 
There are other examples of people who find themselves 
dissatisfied with life styles which, in terms of their 
home societies, are successful, and look around for 
something better. The growth of California-land, the 
eastward looking subculture which has appeared in 
California, is seen very much by those involved as a 
questioning of the American dream. People who have 
achieved the material success which American society 
holds in such high esteem have turned towards eastern 
mysticism in an endeavour to find something to fill the 
'inner void' which all their material success did 
nothing to fill. 
It seems to me that such resources could not have come 
about if there wasn't something about people which is 
uniquely personal in the sense of not being socially 
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determined. If all our affective lives were a product 
of our social environment we would be at a loss to 
explain why even a small minority of 'successful' 
people come to question socially defined criteria for 
success in life. If all affective responses were learned 
then feelings of achievement, of fulfillment, would 
follow logically from achieving success in socially 
defined ways. We would learn that feelings of fulfillment 
are appropriate when one achieves success, we would 
learn what constitutes success within our home 
community and once we had achieved success we would feel 
fulfillment - this would be true as a matter of logic 
if people were entirely social constructs, entirely 
products of their social environment. On such a view any 
deviance from the social norm would appear as a mal-
function, a mental disorder. Any dissent from establisned 
convention would not be seen as a point of view to be 
looked at to see if it constituted a reason for social 
change, it would simply be an abberation to be treated -
such reasoning might well be behind the Soviet tendancy 
to put dissidents into mental hospital for treatment, 
although the more cynical observer might simply suggest 
that this is simply an easy way for power hungry polit-
icians to maintain the system in which they hold power. 
This tendency to see deviance as illness requiring 
treatment has been seen clearly in the Western European 
attitude to homosexuality, an attitude which now seems 
to be changing. There still are people who regard homo-
sexuality as a disorder to be treated, but we are slowly 
arriving at the realisation that the only problems 
which the majority of homosexuals have arise from the 
social unacceptability of their sexual preferences and 
from the need to live a lie, which is often the 
homosexual~ only alternative to finding hi~self or 
herself denied employment and, in general being 
ostracized from 'straight' society. Homosexuality, I 
suggest, is a paradigm example of an area where someon~s 
inner life, his uniquely personal feelings, lead him 
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into conflict with society. In our society the norm 
is heterosexuality and deviance from this norm is (still) 
discouraeed in many ways, from employers reluctance to 
employ homosexuals to the feeling in some quarters that 
'queer-bashing' is an acceptable passtime. But some 
people still are homosexual and many feel that 'coming 
out' is a necessity given the inner turmoil that being 
a 'closet queen' leads to. 
Althoueh we can explain homosexuality in 
physiological terms, in terms of hormone'imbalance' for 
instance, all this demonstrates is that some people's 
physiological make up deviates quite some way from what 
is the norm, from the mid-range as determined empirically. 
That such deviation from the physiological norm is 
something to be treated is an assertion which raises 
further issues. We don't think of treating tall or small 
people just because they deviate from the mean height 
of the population. It might be true that there is a 
close correlation between homosexuals, people whose 
sexual and emotional preferences is for people of their 
own sex, and people whose hormonal make up deviates from 
the norm in certain ways. But this in no way entails 
that homosexuality should be regarded as a disease to 
be treated. BefD~e that step is taken argument needs to 
• 
be formulated to show that homosexuality s'hould be 
judged SOCially unacceptable and, if h~manely p~ssible, 
eradicated. 
We are slowly arriving at the point, however, of 
realising that the traditional dislike of homosexuality 
which some cultures exhibit is not really justifiable, 
that whatever the reasons for a ho~osexual's preferences 
there is no good reason for taking sanctions against 
someone merely because of their homosexuality. What is 
being realised is that the image of the 'dirty pervert 
skulking in the shadows' is a myth, that the majority 
of homosexuals are perfectly normal,are within the 
acceptable norms, in virtually all respects except that 
I: 
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of sexual preference. The 'gay' community, . in other 
words, constitutes no real threat to society which 
arises purely out of their homosexuality and so no 
action to eradicate homosexuality is appropriate. 
Rather than try to 'cure' homosexuals we should be 
attempting to eradicate fear which heterosexuals 
often have of homosexuality and try to get it seen 
as a matter of personal preference on which there is 
no pressing need for legislation. 
In the campaign to change attitudes to homosexuality 
in our society, I suggest, we have an example of a 
group of people who, because their inner feelings on 
life lead them to go against convention, and because 
they believe that it is convention rather than them-
selves that is wrong, have managed to achieve very 
real objectives in terms of changing the law and, 
although as yet only partially, in terms of changing 
their public image. Homosexuals are still thought of 
by many as 'dirty perverts skulking in the shadows', 
but slowly, as homosexuals 'come out' more and more, 
people are beginning to see them as predominantly 
normal people, with hopes, fears and ambitions which 
most other people can recognise, who simply prefer 
sexual relations with their own, rather than with 
the opposite sex. 
This account is probably too simplistic, a 
sociologist or psychologist would undoubtedly point 
out that many more factors are involved than I have 
mentioned. But this doesn'~ undermine my main 
contention which is that the existence of homosexuals 
and the fact that they have campaigned for their rights 
as citizens against established convention, arguing 
that homosexuality is best seen as a difference in 
preference rather than a disease, requires us to take 
seriously the idea that in peoples' inner lives there 
are factors which are ~ not to be seen as a matter 
of social conditioning and not to be seen as mental 
-
aberrations. In short there ~ something about people 
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which is personal as opposed to social which is important 
in our lives and which needs to be taken heed of. 
Homosexuality is a dramatic example of how the personal 
can conflict with the social but the rest of us may 
find ourselves in conflict with convention in less 
obvious ways. My earlier example of people who find that 
achieving a successful life-style (in socially defined 
terms) does not lead to fulfilment and set about 
finding something more meaningful to do are instances 
of this. 
I should make a point of saying that in the tensions 
which arise between peopl~s inner feelings about things 
and established convention there is no easy formula 
for deciding who is right. Homosexuality seems to be 
an issue where we should conclude that it is society's 
dislike of homosexuality which has no real rational 
basis. But we would surely want to say that someone 
with a tendency to take recourse to violence whenever 
frustrated should control himself for the social good. 
Thus I am not suggesting that the personal should always 
take precedence over the interpersonal. What I would say 
is that the social should take precedence over the 
personal in cases where a person 'doing his own thing' 
can be shown to be socially unacceptable and that social 
unacceptability can be shown to be based on sound 
reasoning. This amount to saying that where someone's 
personal proclivaties have no (rationally) unacceptable 
social consequences we have no justification for 
interfering with his activities. 
An important area where, I believe, we need to admit 
that there is something uniquely personal about our 
affective responses if we are to understand the endeavour, 
is in artistic expression.~n particular I want to say 
that there is a notion of 'rightness' in art which is, 
in part, a matter of the artist producing something 
which just does 'feel' right to him in terms of eliciting 
from him certain feelings which were what he intended to 
express, and which is not entirely achieved through 
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accordance with convention. It is difficult for me to 
deal adequately here with all the specialist aesthetic 
issues that are relevant - I am not an aesthetic ian. 
But although I admit that paintings, poems and pieces 
of music have a very rich symbolic meaning built up 
within historically recognisable and distinguishable 
traditions (so that the conventions of northern Indian 
music are different from those observed in western Europe) 
I want to argue here that there is also a strong personal 
element in art. This 'personal meaning', part of what 
I called earlier 'affective force' is what, I want to 
argue, establishes artistic expression as something more 
than just making feelings public by displaying inscriptions 
of symbols which (through interpersonal agreement within 
a form of life) are appropriate for expressing them. I 
am not trying to de-value the importance of the symbolic 
or the connotative (i.e. indexical) in art. I am suggesting 
that there is something more, some 'gut feeling' which 
involves an artist not only understanding relevant 
convention but also feeling that 'this' is the right 
area/medium in which to work. I want to say that it is 
something about some artists' 'gut feelings', their very 
personal affective responses to the world, that can give 
a unity, an integrity, to their work even when they have 
gone beyond convention. I cannot attempt to deal with 
problems about how far an artist can leave convention 
behind before his work becomes meaningless for the 
spectator relying on convention as a 'way-in' to something 
new, although it seems to me that in some cases at least 
it may be possible for someone without knowledge of relevant 
convention nevertheless to be drawn towards some area 
and that such basic and very personal responses can 
constitute someone's reasons for wanting to learn more 
about an area. 
What I want to say is that art can be understood from 
two perspectives. From the point of view of the interpersonal 
art is a social phenomenon, the established rules of music 
in western Europe, for instance, are to be seen as 
delineating and formal ising a whole area of musical ideas 
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which the relevant community has found suitable for 
its purposes. But, I want to say, there is something more 
in art. I want to say that the idea of a community of 
problem-solvers in the arts is a proper one, but that 
the problems are not fully stateable in interpersonal 
terms. It seems to me that one of the problems of the 
artist (as artist and not as commercial 'artist') must 
be that of self-expression, of producing not merely a 
work which, conventionally speaking, embodies no errors, 
but of producing somethind which really does 'feel' right. 
It should also be remembered that conventions in art do 
not constitute an algorithm for the production of works 
of art. A piece of music may accord with so~e set of 
conventions, but even if the accordance is total the 
composer's choice of notes still involves something 
personal - the rules don't tell him precisely what motifs, 
what voicings etc. to use where. 
I believe that we must take some notion of things 
having the right 'feel' to them seriously if we are to 
make any sense of art advancing as opposed to its being 
wafted hither and thither on the capricious breezes of 
fashion and chance. r~ point is that every so often artists 
come along who do things 'wrong'. Now everyone who breaks 
convention has detractors, people who shout loudly about 
'that' not being art. But a few of those who break the rules 
manage, in the course of doing so, to produce something 
that, whilst it terrifies the more conservative amongst 
their peers (and the critics), arouses such interest 
amongst the rest of their peers that, in time, the rules 
come to be re-written to include what was when it first 
appeared, dismissed as wrong by many. 
I am arguing that unless we can give some account of 
what it is for something to feel right to an individual 
which does not make reference to conventions which define 
(publicly) correctness, then innovation in art cannot be 
represented as anything more than luck. If correctness is 
only a matter of following convention, then anyone beyond 
, , 
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convention is floundering, his finding something 
interesting to others is a matter of luck and his feelings 
that 'that's' right is empty, mere self-delusion. But it 
seems clear that some artists don't flounder, there are 
good examples from the field of jazz. Charlie Parker, the 
alto-saxophonist who established be-bop, with its 
incredibly tortuous chord progressions, unison themes 
and break-neck tempos, as part of the jazz mainstream, 
was greeted with disdain by many musicians and critics 
when he first appeared. Parker's tunes weren't tunes in the 
normal sense of tunes that people can whistle, their 
structure is very eccentric in terms of earlier jazz 
convention. His harmo~swere based on popular songs, 
but the chords were altered to a point where the original 
tune would have sounded wrong over them. The technical 
skill and knowledge required to playa solo over the altered 
chords was so great that even now, forty years on, many 
musicians are happy to be able to just get round the chords 
of 'Donna Lee' without coming a cropper, and the thought 
of managing to improvise a solo with any extra quality 
over the chords seems to be a pipe-dream - Parker could 
do it but most others recognise themselves as also-rans 
and, when they play his tunes, handle them very much as 
he did (where sheer mechanical skill makes it possible). 
Parker broke revered rules, he played too fast, he 'resolved' 
his improvisation to odd notes (sometimes to the 11th 
degree of a chord where previous practice had for the most 
part regarded resolution to the fifth as adventurous 
enough) - he was widely accused of playing 'chinese music' 
by swing era musicians, but in the end it was be-bop that 
won the day. 
How in Parker's case convention undoubtedly played 
a role in his innovations. A famous story tells of how, 
the spring of 1937, at the Reno Club, Kansas, Parker got 
through the chords of 'I Got Rythm'· the first time round 
fairly straight and then started getting ambitions. After 
making one chord substitution and ending up in a different 
key, Parker's knowledge failed him and he faltered and 
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stopped, Jo Jones, the famous Count Easie drummer, 
stopped playing and 'gonged him off' by throwing his 
top hi-hat symbol onto the stage in disgust. Over the 
next few years Parker made himself into a walking 
harmony text book until he never made mistakes about 
how to get back to his home base, but he used the text 
book information in his own way, as did a great many 
other be-boppers, notably the piano players. 
Bud Powell and The10nious Monk are two examples of 
pianists well versed in harmonic theory whose voicings 
of chords (particularly in Monk'~ case) are just wrong 
in terms of classical convention. Honk in particular 
suffered greatly fro~ critical abuse and worked little 
in the early 50's although nowadays he is acknowledged 
as an important figure in the jazz tradition's 
movement away from dependance on classical harmony, 
with his 'wrong' notes and decidedly imaginative 
approach to voicing and altering chords (for instance 
including both the major and the minor third in 'blues' 
chords - this wasn't uncommon in earlier jazz, but 
whereas his predecessors played the 'correct' third in 
the first octave and the 'blues' third a major seventh 
higher, Monk often plays the two notes a semi-tone 
apart, producing a strong dischord). 
What I want to say, particularly about Honk who 
found himself out on a limb for quite a while just 
because of his 'wrongness', is that we can't just 
explain innovative music in terms of random floundering. 
If a jazz fan listens to Mon~s early recordings 
today it requires an effort of the imagination to ~et 
anywhere near understanding why he was reviled by so 
ma,ny for so long. The music has a recognisable 'Monkish' 
style (a style which many others have drawn on but which 
Monk created and only he has mastered), there are no 
'flounderings', in fact the early recordings are, if 
anything, tighter, more intense than his later music. 
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Here we have two men, Parker and Monk, who broke 
rules and were critically abused, but whose music is 
now accepted as part of jazz's historical development. 
And in neither case, and this is especially true for 
Monk whose transgressions against convention were always 
greater than Parker's, is there any sign that what they 
played had any less unity or integrity about it for 
all that it was not played in accordance with 
generally accepted rules. 
It is true that in Parker's case there is some 
justification for suggesting that he worked from 
established theory, gradually altering it until he 
defined an area of music in which he wanted to operate. 
But even this doesn't undermine my contention that there 
must have been some personal, as opposed to interpersonal 
notion of 'rightness' being used. Even if Parker was 
experimenting by constructing alternative theories 
(and he almost certainly wasn't approaching the problem 
~ systematically - he was a professional saxophone 
player and still in his late teens at the time) this 
couldn't explain how he ended up where he did. All of 
his alternative theories would, from the point of view 
of convention be of equal status - insofar as they 
disagreed with established convention they would be 
wrong. Which theory to adopt, which innovations to 
introduce must, ultimately, have been decided on the basis 
of what sounded right to Parker. Once be-bop was est~b­
lished the question of what constituted be-bop playing 
was decided by reference to conventions which were 
derived largely by describing how Parker played (people 
still learn to play be-bop by learning to play, and 
analysing,Parker's recorded solos). But Parkets 
decisions couldn't be made by reference to convention, 
he had to look within himself and decide what sounded 
right to him. 
• 
Since the late 1950's and the move away from chord 
progressions as a basis for jazz improvisation this 
:j 
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idea of playing what is personal and relying on 
convention as little as possible has led to the 
development of what, in England, is called 'the new 
music'. To what degree convention can be jettisoned in 
musical improvisation is, as I have said, a question I 
cannot deal with, but I think it must be admitted that, 
in some cases at least, people can operate outside 
convention but still have a sense of rightness in their 
art. This sense of 'rightness' cannot, it should be clear, 
be at all conventional. I contend that it is in feel 
-tngs of rightness, in the emotional passivities 
of our inner lives, in the ways in which we just do 
respond to the world because of who we are, that we 
can explain how some people can find their way alone, 
without convention, to new modes of expression. 
If there was no substance to this idea of personal 
responses which can establish the rightness of something 
for a particular person, then we would have to concluse 
that all innovations were the chance results of random 
floundering and the innovators who get their ideas 
accepted after years of effort would be seen as irration 
-al social deviants who were lucky in that the results. 
of their flounderings just happened to catch on. There 
would be no room for taking seriously accounts such as 
jazz musicians often sive of the massive inpact which 
someone playing outside established rules can have in 
terms of the listener suddenly realising that 'this is 
it' so that he goes off and applies himself to mastering 
the new idiom. It seems clear to me that a refusal to 
acknowledge the importance of very personal feelings 
and emotions in art is simply an insistence on viewing 
art as a social phenomenon and ignoring the fact that 
artistic endeavour can have a significance for the person 
engaged in it which is not to be explained in terms of 
the interpersonal. 
By now there will be those who are confident that I 
have been demonstrating the fallaCiousness of my own 
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position. In talking about a personal notion of rightness 
that doesn't depend on publicly established criteria' 
I might seem to have put myself in an extremely vulnerable 
position. The objection which comes to mind appears in 
paragraph 258 of Philosophical Investigations. At the 
end of the private language argument Wittgenstein wrote: 
"But in the present case I have no criterion 
of correctness. One would like to say: whatever 
is going to seem right to me is right. And that 
only means that here we can't talk about'right'." 
Now I've already dis~ussed the private language 
argument at length so I will leave out the detail here. 
My main contention is that criteria of rightness need 
not be a matter of accordance with interpersonally 
constituted rules. Very early in this thesis I argued 
that unless some things had natural (i.e. unlearned) 
significance for us it would be logically impossible for 
a baby born without linguistic skills to acquire them. 
This natural significance must consist in some things-
in-the-world eliciting, as a matter of contingent fact, 
certain responses from us. For instance if hunger and 
its satisfaction are naturally Significant, are ways 
for other things to acquire significance (e.g. food 
gaining significance as that-which-satisfies-hunger), 
then what is the case is that we naturally respond. 
to hunger being satisfied, we just do find such events 
significant. What I argued was that these natural responses 
to the world give us a very basic notion of rightness, 
a natural basis on which to make sameness judeements. 
Such a natural basis, I argued, is a logical prerequisite 
for initiation into the more sophisticated world of 
socially defined notions of correctness. It seems to me, 
then, that the private language argument cannot be a 
way of attacking my account of a very personal notion 
of rightness in the arts. The private language argument 
did not invalidate my suggestion that some things must 
be naturally significant for us. That some things have 
a natural significance in terms of eliciting affective 
responses from us cannot, therefore, be shown to be not 
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the case by invocation of Wittgenstein's argument. 
Just before his statement of the private language 
argument Wittgenstain was concerned to show that 
sensation language is not acquired by learning to 
(for instance) label a clear and distinguishable 
sensation of pain with the word 'pain'. He wanted 
instead to say that 'pain language' is learnt by 
replacing natural pain bahaviour, like crying, with 
linguistic behaviour, like saying, "It hurts.1I The 
main purpose of the private language is as a way of 
establishing that 'pain' cannot be regarded as a referring 
word in the same sense as 'hat' is a referring word. It 
seems to me, as I make clear in earlier discussion, that 
Wittgenstein was right about this, and it also seems 
to me that aesthetic language. must be dealt with in a 
aimilar way to sensati on language. 
Just as we couldn't in principle, acquire sensation 
language unless we had natural sensation-behaviour, unless 
we naturally responded to (e.g.) pain in certain 
characteristic ways, I want to suggest that the existence 
of aesthetic language is only possible because there are 
certain natural aesthetic responses which are replaced 
by appropriate linguistic behaviour. I contend that we 
can only talk about aesthetic experience, about being 
moved emotionally by a work of art, because we can 
recognise the behavioural 'symptoms' of such experience. 
We recognise that in some contexts people just 'aren't 
there' - when theY're 'lost' in a painting, or a book 
or a musical performance. The 'symptoms' are well known, 
it's hard to get their attention, they tend to be 
resentful towards, to snap at, the person who breaks 
their concentration. 
The main difference between sensation and aesthetic 
experience is that for a sensation like pain we can give 
a specification of at least some of its causes - in normal 
circumstances (i.e. no local anaesthetics, no hypnotic 
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suggestions etc.) a pin prick, or putting a hand on some 
thing hot, leads to pain. But aesthetic experience doesn't 
seem to be like that - one person can be totally fascinated 
by a work of art which another just 'sees' nothing in. 
But this isn't a serious problem, we are all aware that 
one man's meat is another man's poison, aesthetic 
experience isn't essentially private, almost everybody 
knows what it is, it's just that what elicits an 
aesthetic response from one person may leave another 
cold. 
I hope that I have at least established that the idea 
of a uniquely personal notion of rightness in art is both 
coherent ~ has a place in discussion of artistic 
innovation. I must admit that my discussion here has 
failed to deal with much that is important, for instance 
the relationship between art seen as a very personal 
endeavour in which the artist is con~erned with self 
expression and art seen as a social phenomenon where 
a work of art uses convention (to some extent at least) 
and is a saleable commodity. I will be saying a little 
about this in later discussion, but not enough to satisfy 
an aesthetician. I cannot remedy this, I have no room 
here for such a discussion, my concern is only to 
establish that there is a domain of the personal which 
is not subsumable under the interpersonal and I believe 
that I have said enough to do this, thus further 
discussion of aesthetics would be inappropriate to my 
purposes here besides taking me into an area in which 
others have much more competence than I can claim. 
I have, I believe, established the distinctness of 
the personal from the interpersonal (as well as from the 
inanimate). But once again I must emphasise that the 
distinctness of the four problem-domains is more formal 
than actual in the sense that although we can formally 
distinguish the different approaches and although we can 
isolate 'central areas' of problems which seem clearly 
to be of one sort or another we also have grey areas where 
i 
I 
i 
" 
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problems seem to fall between domains. The personal 
cannot be just held apart from the animate and the 
interpersonal.Problems with our inner lives are not 
dealt with by the approach(es) which the life sciences 
have adopted as these ways of looking are geared to deal 
with problems of the animate where the subject of experience/ . 
reacting mechanism distinction plays no crucial role. 
But it might be that, as Jung's 'I1an and his Symbols' might 
be taken to suggest, human nature includes certain 
'aesthetic dispositions'. Thus the personal might, partly, 
involve giving an account of the nature of human 
consciousness and, if we begin to take the idea that some 
non-human animals are subjects of experience seriously, 
the personal might begin to appear closer to the ani~ate 
than to the interpersonal in that we might conclude that 
both the animate and the personal deal primarily with what 
is natural (i.e. non-conventional) but that the animate 
deals only with organisms as reacting mechanisms whereas 
the personal makes the further assumption that the 
organism is also a subject of experience. All this is 
speculative, but the speculation is far from idle. What 
I am really trying to show is that the grey areas where 
problems seem to be related to more than one domain (seem 
to share characteristics with problems that clearly fall 
within different domains) constitute evidence that the 
different ways of looking which have grown up historically 
are all incomplete. Each domain has a central area of problems 
which we have come, through trial and error, to tackle 
differently. But the problem-solving techniques which 
seem appropriate in central areas, where the presuppositions 
built into a paradigm seem unobjectionable, themselves 
become problematic in the grey areas. 
We can characterise human beings from the point of 
view of physics, a discipline which e.alved in dealing with 
problems of the inanimate, and not say anything about 
life, social relatione or our inner lives. The animate 
says more about human beings as living organisms with 
certain natural tendencies, but misses out the· conventiDna11 ty 
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of our social life and our being subjects of experience 
in any full sense. The interpersonal sees us as cogs 
in the social machine but fails, so far, to relate 
what it describes to human nature. Finally the personal 
relates to us as subjects of experience, experience 
mediated through our socially acquired ways of 
looking, through our shared human nature as subjects 
of experience and through each individual's personal 
quirks. But the domain of the personal is very much 
underpopulated by theorists and our theoretical 
understanding of the problems of this area, and their 
relations with other sorts of problem are poorly 
understood. 
My contention is that there are four basic sets of 
presuppositions we currently make about the 'things' 
we find in the world, presuppositions built into 
different families of ways of looking which are designed 
to function as problem solvers in particular areas. 
The four 'classes of thing' presupposed by our current 
modes of understanding are (roughly), physical objects, 
living things, conscious agents and social beings. These 
are not mutually exclusive classes. Everything can be 
described as a physical object, if incompletely in many 
cases. Similarly all social beings are living things, 
but not all living things are social (in a sense of 
social which implies 'conventionally defined') beings. 
And again conscious agents are a sub-set of living 
things, but we're unsure about how big a sub-set. 
Sorting out the problems we have trouble with given our 
present level of understanding may quite possibly 
require a more subtle approach, a different set of 
paradigms, and those paradigms might re-define problems 
in a way which obliterate the distinctions I have drawn 
up between the different problem-domains. 
Nevertheless it seems to me that as things stand we 
have four areas of problems, the animate, the inanimate, 
the interpersonal and the personal which, as far as we 
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can see, need different sorts of solutions. Of the 
four the domain of the personal has been most neglected. 
The physical sciences, the life sciences and the social 
sciences (and, as I have said, I would locate the 
majority of psychology this century somewhere between 
the animate and the interpersonal) have all received 
much attention. Except for artists who have always 
been aware of something non-social in their art, and 
psychoanalysts who have serious technical problems with 
their theory, little effort has been really put into 
tackling the problems of the personal. 
The failure of psychology to engage with the problems 
of the personal is particularly surprising. It might be 
thought that giving an account of our inner lives 
which would allow us to handle the problems of the 
personal would be a task which psychology would see as 
central. But psychologists, especially in England and 
the United States, have shied away from this task, 
concerning themselves with an attempt to produce a 
species of psychology which apes, as far as possible, 
the concepts and procedures of physics. This has given 
us two movements the status of which are still being 
debated - behaviourism has flourished despite its 
theoretical basis having been shown to be incoherent 
and I.Q. testing is still a rich industry even though 
an answer to 'What do I.Q. tests measure?' almost 
certainly wouldn't be able to justify mentioning anything 
like 'an innate and invariant characteristic,' except 
indirectly. 
The one area in which psychologists (and there are 
those who would with hold that label) have actually 
tackled the inner lives of people in a way designed to 
help us corne to grips with our emotions and irrational 
impulses is in psychoanalysis. I should quickly pOint 
out that this suggestion that psychoanalysis is the only 
branch of psychology which has seriously set out to help 
make our inner lives more comprehensible to us in no 
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way commits me to asserting that any particular psycho-
analytic theory is correct in terms of giving us true 
descriptions of the state of mind of a patient under 
analysis. A number of problems exist with current theory, 
not the least of which is the built-in irrefutability 
which Popper objected to. There is also the suspicion 
that, because the analyst is usually a person who first 
voice's the patients 'unconscious beliefs' what really 
goes on is a process whereby the analyst releases stress 
by offering the patient an explicit account of putative 
'unconscious beliefs' which the patient identifies with 
and then rejects, or else a process in which the analyst 
indoctrinates the patient with a set of beliefs which, 
because they enable him to function more effectively, 
the patient clutches at like a drowning man. Psycho-
analysts would violently reject such descriptions of 
what analysis involves, but the fact re~ains that they 
cannot establish convincingly that their own account is 
more correct. This is a problem for psychoanalysts, but 
not one for me to attempt to deal with here. My only 
point is that psychoanalysis seems to be the one area 
of psychology that is attempting seriously to engage 
with the basic problems of the personal. If the current 
concepts and theories in psycho-analysis aren't up to 
the job then new account$will have to be devised - after 
all changes of paradigm are an important way in which 
traditions of enquiry work towards solution of their 
chosen problems, and psychoanalysis is a very young 
tradition. 
The other areas of study which deal with people seem 
more concerned with what is common between human beings 
rather than what is personal. Learning theory is 
preoccupied with specifying what it is about hu~an beings 
which enables us to become initiated into the various 
modes of life within society, rather than with what 
makes people hav~ different preferences in life - and 
learning theory isn't to be blamed for this, such 
questions are important. Aesthetics which seemed for a 
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long time to be primarily concerned with giving criteria 
on what did or did not constitute good art now seems 
to be moving more towards an account of the personal 
in art with the recent growth in interest in the idea that 
what is central in the arts is aesthetic experience. 
Even though the personal mode- of understanding is 
far less developed th8n then others it is, I believe, 
of very great importance. In recent years we in Great 
Britain have come to be very wary of planners and 
architects who, soon after World War 2, began to bring 
new ideas,backed up with elaborate aesthetic, engineer-
ing and economic arguments, to the field of public 
building. These new 'master builders' gave us high rise 
flats which won international awards and in which people 
just couldn't live and they, incidentally, produced a 
multitude of new design features which people not only 
didn't like, they were also health hazards. But I'm not 
really interested in the architec~s design faults. I'm 
really interested in the evidence that even without 
the admitted design faults people would still have hated 
high-rise flats. It seems that what was really wrong 
with the high-rise flats wasn't anything to do with 
designers errors that could have been put right, but 
the fact that a whole dimension was missing from the 
design effort. That this is so is held by some archtects 
now. 
Nowadays many architects of housing schemes begin 
with consumer research, by discovering what sort of 
accomodation people really want. In other words it has 
been realised that houses are not just parts of eleBant 
show estates that look good as we pass by, houses are 
where people live and a good house is one in which people 
like living - the question of 'What sort of house?' is 
being looked at more and more from the perspective of 
the personal. 
In general, I suggest, we must accept that the personal 
• 463 
is much more important in life than many of our ways 
of going about things would suggest. A great many firms, 
notably 'Phillips' in Holland, have discovered that 
although, in terms of measurements like time and motion 
studies, a conveyor belt style of production line would 
appear to be more efficient, in fact production is higher, 
through wastage and absenteeism being lower, when one 
worker, or a small group, assembles an item from start 
to finish. Partly this improvement can be explained in 
terms of faulty items being easily traced back to source, 
but there seems to be a case for saying that the 
improvement in attendance arises from the fact that the 
employees get more job satisfaction out of doing something 
that is a visible achievement, like putting together a 
complete tape recorder, than out of just putting one 
component on a machine which is finished as it reaches 
the end of the line. At any rate this seems to be one 
instance where a consideration of the feelings of people 
has led to a re-appraisal of the notion of efficiency as 
it is interpreted in the light of final production. 
Saab in Sweden have successfully adopted this approach 
with motor cars, perhaps B.L. and Ford should consider 
that such a change might improve overall productivity 
not by increasing the number of cars per hour produced 
but by reducing the number of hours lost due to disputes 
which may have, as part of the root cause, the tension 
which builds up in the frustrated production line worker. 
Such ideas are new and as yet not held to be proven, but 
the idea that we can have happier industrial relations 
by simple adapting work to give the worker some sort of 
personal fulfilment must be taken seriously. 
In education we tend too much to negate the personal. 
In the growth of use of behaviour modification we have, 
I believe, a tendency for teachers to regard themselves 
as technicians manipulating children into adopting the 
'right' attitudes, into using correct procedures. There 
is also a tendency for education to be seen more and 
more as an agency of man-power planning, training pupils 
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in skills required for the available jobs. The pursuit 
of excellence is so often identified with the production 
of tomorrow's, scientists and leaders that we rarely bother 
to stop and wonder whether, for instance, 'this' pupil, who's 
good at maths and physics, really wants to be a physicist. A 
large number of undergraduates 'drop out' of courses that 
just don't interest them, and quite a lot more plod 
through, get a degree, and spend_ a lot of years doing 
a job they're not interested in. 
My suggestion is that in this respect the 'manpower 
planning' lobby is asking teachers to ignore their pupils 
as people and instead regard them as potential 'cogs' of 
various sorts, to be shaped into the right specification 
and then passed on for insertion into the industrial 
machine. It seems to me, however, that teachers have a 
duty to engage with their pupils as people if for no 
other reason than that teachers take on a job which is 
about passing on knowledge and fostering understanding 
and that there are many things that a teacher must know 
about his pupils as people if he is to get anywhere in 
that job. Who ex:udes confidence as a mask to hide inability? 
Who has ability but no confidence? Who needs threatening 
with dire happenings before anything will get done? Who's 
timid and must be handled gently? If a teacher doesn't 
know these things a million things can go wrong. A personal 
understanding of his pupils must be one of a teacher's 
main tools as he seeks to get work done, to propagate 
understanding. This personal engagement with pupils is 
not easy, it can create problems - what do you tell a 
pupil who's aspirations outstrip his abilities? But the 
main problem it creates in the face of manpower planning 
is that if pupils are given a deeper understanding of 
themselves and what they feel about life, then maybe 
they won't like the idea of taking up the n1ches in life 
offered them. It is interesting to speculate on whether 
the current higher education cuts are, in part, a 
consequence of higher education 'failing to deliver 
the goods' in terms of turning out the required streams 
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of technologists and managers. Thinking young people 
of the late sixties and early seventies, it seems, 
weren't so interested in questions about how to get 
a well paid job as they were in more fundamental 
questions like, "Why should the system work like this?" 
We may believe, even given some of the excesses which 
students committed in those days, that the committment. 
and the debate which went on around the world's universities 
turned out a generation of people who thought about 
difficult problems for themselves. This, to SOMe education-
alists, would seem like the sort of thing education is 
about. But more than one politician has looked askance 
at the growth of the humanities whilst the physical 
science and engineering faculties f~red leas well • 
... 
It does seem at least plausible to suggest that it is 
in the acknowledgement of people as having a uniquely 
personal aspect which is important, as opposed to viewing 
people as so much potential manpower, that distinguishes 
educators from trainers. The trainer looks at his pupil 
from the point of view of which of a range of stereotypes 
it will be possible to transform that pupil into. The 
educator, on the other hand, looks at the pupil as a 
person who is to be helped to engage with the world in 
all its aspects, to acquire some understanding of it and 
to take responsibility for his own actions in it. On 
this view it can be no part of an educator's job to 
guarantee a certain composition of output - the pupil 
must be given the relevant information and, where possible, 
understanding and then must make up his own mind. 
Available jobs must undoubtedly be one factor in 
anyone's decision about his life style and schools must 
provide such information, but the pupil, not the teacher 
must choose jobs ~ the school must surely inculcate in 
the pupil an understanding that he might find that there 
are things other than social status, money and material 
possessions that matter. I will return to this subject 
in later discussion. 
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In arts education, in drama classes, in sex 
education there could be and sometimes are elements of 
education in the personal mode, pupils being encouraged 
to examine their own feelings. Pupils can also be 
encouraged to examine conflicts between personal 
feelings and the demands made by society. A straight 
forward example here is the kid who wants to hold a 
conversation when the teacher wants to teach - my 
solution was usually to ask the pupil if he thought it 
was reasonable for him to stop 20-odd others learning 
just because he wanted to talk, and it usually worked. 
~~ point is that understanding the personal is important 
in that we all have to live with ourselves and live 
in society, we have to know when to withdraw and quieten 
down, or when to seek out others. We have to corne to 
grips with compromise between the selfish fulfilment 
of our own desires and fitting in with others and, it 
seems to me, such compromise which has to be made in 
so many spheres, from work to marriage, is likely to 
be more successfully achieved if done out of knowledge 
instead of being reached uneasily after a career has 
been embarked on or a wedding held. 
The value of understanding the personal, then derives 
from the fact that, for many people, their inner lives 
are closed books, and yet the effects that hopes and 
fears, loves and hates, etc., have on our lives is 
undeniable. Only by knowing ourselves can we do anything 
~bout avoiding the problems that can arise. Only by 
understanding others as subjects of experience with 
complex inner lives can we handle our interactions 
with them successfully - the impersonal manipulator is 
in trouble once the manipulatee realises what's been 
going on. The personal is concerned with such knowledge 
but it is not merely by learning a theoretical language 
that systematically describes mind that we can acquire 
it. Engagement with the arts as a mode of expression, 
of self exploration,is another way which many have 
found both compelling and fruitful. 
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I am not claiming here to have given any definitive. 
account of our inner lives, of alienation, of 
homosexuality or of artistic creativity. All I have 
attempted to show is that we cannot deal with all the 
problems we have with these phenomenon solely by using 
the approaches generated in engagement with problems 
in the domain of the inanimate, animate and interpersonal. 
I believe that I have achieved this objective and have 
shown that there is a distinct and important area of 
problems properly to be called the domain of the personal. 
It is fairly clear that our theoretical understanding 
of the personal is not very well developed at the 
present time, but, for reasons already given, it seems 
to me that this only shows that we have neglected an 
important area of study. 
It should be remembered that the distinctness of 
the inanimate, animate, interpersonal and personal 
is more a matter of the way families of disciplines 
have grown apart in terms of slowly coming to adopt 
paradigms based on different presuppositions about 
how the world 1s as they engage with the problems that 
interest them. The distinctness of the domains consists 
in the fact that in engagement with a wide variety of 
basic problems disciplines have formed different 'families' 
each family loosely based on different ontological 
presuppositions, the different families seeing 
their problems differently - as problems of different 
sorts. Of the four domains the personal has less 
theoretical activity in it than the others, and very 
few problems have been given acceptable theoretical 
solutions. The distinctness of the personal, however, 
is demonstrated Simply by showing that there are 
problems with which paradigms/theories generated in 
the other domains cannot deal with adequately. 
That the models associated with the problems of 
the different domains do tell us about how things are 
in the world to some degree is demonstrated by the 
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fact that the model/paradiem/theory complexes generated 
in each area do function well in the case of a large 
central area of problems (the personal being something 
of an odd-man-out here, suggesting that we have very 
little theoretical understanding of mind). That these 
models are incomplete is demonstrated by the difficulties 
of the grey areas, of problems that seem not to be 
adequately dealt with by any of our current ways of 
looking. 
The main problem that remains for me now is that of 
relating the problem domains of different (historically 
distinct) disciplines to my four domains. Whilst some 
disciplines fall definitively in one problem domain 
(eg. physics and the inanimate), others seem to have 
to deal with problems from more than one area. Geography, 
for instance, attempts to deal with problems involving 
relations between entities normally dealt with in 
different ways - geology falls into the inanimate, 
economic geography draws on the inanimate, animate and 
interpersonal, and physical geography, insofar as it 
includes reference to land use, must talk in terms of 
the animate and the interpersonal although primarily 
concerned with problems of the inanimate. 
I will deal with such problems after my next section. 
There I will say a little more about the position 
of those areas of thought which have traditionally 
claimed absolute status. 
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Absolutism? 
The question mark here is unavoidable. We simply 
don't know whether absolutist 'solutions' to life's 
problems, such as those offered by the various 
religions, are right or not, and the metaphysical 
absolutists cannot claim to have come up with any 
solutions at all until they establish criteria for 
absolute truth, a possibility with (as I suggested 
earlier) little probability of occurrence. Nevertheless 
we must maintain absolutism·asa very differp-nt approach 
to understanding how things are, one which is concerned 
with the problem of how things are from a perspective 
which demands certainty in its solutions. We must hold 
on to absolutism for two reasons: first it makes no 
sense to deny the possibility of an absolute, and 
second, the endeavours of metaphysicians like Findlay 
simply ~ absolutist and cannot be reconceived from 
the perspective of rational piecemea1ism without serious 
misrepresentation. A third reason, relating to religous 
claims, might be that although such claims are 
unsupportable publicly, and are therefore uncompelling 
to anyone who wishes to believe only what he has good 
reasons to believe (i.e. reasons for believing 'that S' 
which are also reasons why S is likely to be true) to 
refuse to accord absolute status to such claims (whether we 
believe them or not) would be to rob them of a very 
important part of their significance. I will deal with 
the two cases separately, first the absolutist metaph-
ysicians and then the claims of the religous absolutists. 
The case of the metaphYSiCians is relatively easy to 
deal with. If a metaphYSician asserts that it ~ possible 
to acquire absolute knowledge, then he is simply 
incapable of justifying his assertion - this follows 
from Findlays pOint that the only way to demonstrate 
that possibility is to specify such knowledge. 
Insofar as we have no such specification at present 
the appropriate attitude for a metaphysiCian interested 
in_absolutism is that of saying something like • I'm 
not sure that we can, or cannot acquire 
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absolute knowledge - I am concerned, however, with 
investigating the possibility whilst fully accepting 
that whilst I might be on the right track I equally 
might be wrong and wasting my time. In other words 
such a metaphysician would be in a position of 
uncertainty about whether his search for absolute 
certainty might prove fruitful. Such an endeavour might 
properly be called absolutist, (in a strong sense) 
and can exist side by side with the endeavours which 
have adopted a more piecemeal approach. It cannot, 
however, claim any special status for itself until such 
time as it specifies criteria for absolute truth- only 
then would it be able to assert that a 'true' 
understanding of things-in-themselves is possible and 
that a more piecemeal understanding, such as we get 
from the inanimate, animate, interpersonal and personal, 
is a second rate sort of understanding. Thus it is 
coherent to assert that there is a separate tradition 
of enquiry, properly to be called absolutism, the 
fundamental concern of which is to investigate the 
possibility of our acquiring absolute knowledge. It 
is ~ justifiable to claim that absolutism is concerned 
with the discovery of absolute truth as this assumes 
the possibility and that, as Findlay points out, is 
an improper assumption. I personally would suggest, 
for reasons given earlier, that we should value the 
non-absolutist modes of understanding, ways of looking 
which do enable us to deal with problems, above absolutiS~ 
which, despite its grandl~se promises and long his-
tory, has little proven power as regards problem solving. 
But absolutism might, after all, come through, and give 
us a better understanding (in some sense of better to 
be elucidated by the absolutists), and so it would be 
wrong to ignore absolutism completely, we must simply 
demote it until such times as it 'delivers the goods.' 
The case of religion is both more complex and more 
emotive. It is obvious that it is perfectly proper to 
view religion from the non-absolutists etandpoints 
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of both the interpersonal and the personal. 
Organized religions are social institutions and are 
properly to be described as such. An organization like' 
the Catholic church (for instance) wields political 
power and has a history which might lead it to be 
characterised in ways which emphasise such things as 
the fact that for a long time mediaeval Popes were 
people after the secular power the church w'~lded as 
opposed to being religious men, or the political nature 
of the Inquisitions, or the silence of Pi-us 13 in the 
~ 
face of Nazi atrocities having political origins, or 
the current Pope's decision not to back left wing priests 
in South America as being more a matter of safeguarding 
the churches political position in that part of the 
world rather than a religUmsdecision. Catholicism is 
not alone in being embarrassed by a grubby political 
history - in general religimsbelief ha~ been used as 
a source of political,power by most major religions, 
If we ignore the social role of organised religion 
and instead look at such things as acts of ~aith and 
religious experience we have switched from the inter-
personal to the personal. Someone's being a believer 
is a fact about that person, a fact which embodies a 
reference to an emotional c~mmittment which that person 
has to certain beliefs, such as belief in the existence 
of God as a spiritual principle if not as a divine 
person, or else a belief in the sanctity, the absolute 
status, of certamn principles (Buddhism lacks the former 
but embodies the latter). It is interesting to note that 
in the B.B.C. series 'The Long Search' it was the aspect 
of personal commitment that was emphasised both by the 
presenter, Ronald Ayres, and most of the priests/monks 
interviewed, although in many cases the personal 
commitment leads to the recognition of social duties -
one can cite sister Theresa's work in India and the 
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Salvation Army as examples of comittment to 
Christianity leading to involvement with social problems. 
It is fairly obvious that an explanation of at least 
some people's adoption of religious beliefs is possible, 
in terms of socialization (which,of course, takes us 
back to the interpersonal and raises once again problems 
about the relationships between the personal and the 
interpersonal), and, in terms of the personal, religion 
as a psychological 'crutch.' Many people would dismiss 
religion as either a social phenomena or as expressive, 
but equally a religkus person, whilst he might admit 
that some elements in religion, religious belief and 
religious practice are properly to be characterised in 
such terms, would claim that the really important 
elements in religion cannot be so dealt with. 
Again I am here faced with very complex issues which 
I cannot deal with adequately. What I can do is to 
acknowledge that many religious people stress the .: 
absolutist content of their beliefs, a content 
supposedly derived through revelation and/or intuition. 
I have already made the crucial observation here which 
is that although the intuitions of mystics may be 
veridical neither we nor the mystics can justify any 
claim to know that they are. A putative intuition which 
cannot be independently shown to be true, and religious 
intuitions/revelations which seem incapable of being 
independantly supported, must remain objects of 
faith rather than knowledge (as Kierkegaard argued God 
must in 'Philosophical Pragments') and this faith is 
something that seems to have to be explained in non-
absolutist terms, otherwise the faith would be claimed 
to be elicited or caused by an existent God and would 
simply lead back to the knowledge claim that was the 
original source of the problem. Nevertheless it might 
be that I am wrong here, that to deny that religious 
faith involves more than can be explained in terms of 
the personal (and/or the interpersonal) would be to 
deny an absolute. In 'Ascent to the Absolute' Findlay 
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questions the coherence of the notion of a personalized 
God such as Islam and Christianity use, but he does this 
because he is attempting to specify an Absolute which 
is a unity of which all particulars are merely aspects, 
or rather he is investigating the possibility of 
specifying such an Absolute. If Findlay was successful 
in his endeavour he would undermine the notion of a 
personalised God, but not the wider notion of some sort 
of 'God-Hood' which is found in Hinduism and 
Buddhism. So even the absolutist~metaphysicians do not, 
in principle, undermine the possibility that religious 
beliefs (of some sort) may be true. 
Faced with this situation it seems to me that we 
must not attempt to dpny anyone's religious beliefs, but 
what we must deny is the often claimed 'right' of 
religious groups to follow their beliefs even when 
those beliefs are in conflict with justified non-
absolutist social principles. If some relieious group . 
can justify its beliefs in non-absolutist terms then a 
debate can take place about whether the social rules 
with which they conflict should be changed. If some 
religious group could show, by metaphysical argument, 
that their beliefs were absolutely true, then any 
conflicting non-absolutist rules would be shown to be 
wrong, but, of course, we don't even know, until they 
do it, if this is even possible. Thus, it seems to me, 
we must allow people their relieious beliefs for so long 
as they don't lead to conflict with interpersonally 
constituted rules, but must deny them the right to 
flout such rules unless they can, in some way, (either 
absolutist or non-a"bsolutist ), show the rules to be 
wrong. The reason for this is that it seems prudent to 
allow people the maximum freedom of choice possible in 
organising their lives, but imprudent to allow them to 
disrupt society on the basis of assertions about what 
is right or wrong which they simply cannot (as a matter 
of fact, not in principle,) justify publicly. 
474 
My position on absolutism, then, is that it is 
perfectly coherent to regard absolutism as an 
endeavour that is concerned with investigating the 
possibility of acquiring absolute knowledge. What is 
also the case, however, is that we cannot accept any 
particular claim to absolute truth - as things stand 
such a claim cannot be justified. So we must allow 
religious people the right to have faith that 'this or 
'that' is absolutely true on the grounds that they might 
be right, but we must deny them the right to act in 
accordance with their beliefs in situations where this 
brings them in conflict with socially constituted and 
justified non-absolutist rules on the grounds that 
they might be wrong. Only if the religious beliefs can 
be justified publicly and non-absolutis.t social rules 
shown not to be justified can we reasonably allow 
religion to win the day. 
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The Genere1 Domains and the Disciplines. 
The physical sciences clearly handle a great many 
problems which fall in the domain of the inanimate, 
but, when dealing with the problems of (e.g.) molecular 
biology, fail to say anything useful about consciousness 
or the living/not living distinction. The life sciences, 
from molecular biology and physiology to studies of 
animal and plant populations and habitats and studies of 
animal behaviour, deal with problems in the domain of 
the animate whilst ignoring problems involving 
conventionality and consciousness. The social sciences, 
political science and moral discourse (etc.), deal 
with problems arising out of the conventionality of our 
social institutions, those which constitute the domain 
of the interpersonal. but fail to eneage with the 
problems of our inner lives. Psycho-analysis has engaged 
with these 'inner' problems which constitute the domain 
of the personal, though its success so far is limited, 
as is that of the wider field of psychiatric theory. 
But there seems to be something in the suggestion that 
engagement in artistic endeavour can, if approached 
correctly, become a voyage of self discovery in which 
the production of a work can be a way of making accessible 
(to himself and others) the formerly poorly perceived 
workings of the artist's inner life. Aesthetics, as it 
engages with the problems of aesthetic experience, might 
well :cast some light on such problems. 
Aesthetics, however, is an example of a discipline 
that must attempt to relate problems from more than one 
of the more general domains. In talking about aesthetic 
experience and artistic creativity, aesthetics is 
looking at problems which seem to require us to talk 
about people's inner lives. Thus here aesthetics is 
working in the domain of the personal. But works of 
art are also s~mbolic to at least some extent, artists 
draw on established convention even when innovating _ 
innovation isn't a matter of producing something totally 
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disjoint from all that has gone before. When approaching 
art from this point of view aesthetics is looking 
at problems from the domain of the interpersonal. 
Finally, recurrent symbols appearing in the art of cultures 
between which there has been little or no contact might 
lead us to think in terms of an aesthetic element in 
human nature, and such problems, as I have already 
remarked, seem to fall somewhere between the personal 
and the animate given our present lack of understanding 
of such issues, 
The question which must arise, given the existence 
of disciplines whose problem-domains cut across my 
four main domains, is whether my classification has 
anything really compelling about it, or whether it's 
one amongst many possible arbitrary classifications. 
In other words, could we produce some other set of 
distinctions by choosing different disciplines as 
central cases, so that aesthetics and psychology, say, 
would define the more fundamental domains and physics 
and biology would span domains. I can't imagine what 
an alternative classification might look like (I don't 
think Hirst's Forms of Knowledge/Modes of Experience 
would do), but this isn't an acceptable response to 
the question. The central question is not about whether 
my classification is coherent (which, formally speaking, 
I believe it is) but about why my classification should 
be taken as a more accurate reflection of the state 
of our understanding than any number of other equally 
coherent but completely arbitrary classifications. 
My reply is that the distinctions I have drawn 
between the inanimate, animate, interpersonal and 
personal do, in fact, reflect the general state of our 
understanding as it is now. There do seem to be problems 
which fall centrally into different domains. And these 
problems seem to be formally distinguishable in terms 
of the different presuppositions that, as our under-
standing has evolved, we have built into the paradigms 
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used by disciplines as they try to solve the particular 
(limited) area of problems each discipline has 
historically come to focus on. 
Physics, as I showed earlier, uses an approach 
to the world that presupposes that the things it deals 
with are inanimate objects 'linked' by mechanistic 
causality, it generally ignores problems arising from 
life, consciousness and conventionality. 
The special problems of the life sciences are simply 
unspecifiable without life being assumed. Life scientists, 
even when using concepts from physics, must also relate 
particular features of the organism (its reproductive 
method, its limbs) to the organisms 'life-style' and 
environment in terms of their function and degree of 
adaptivity to environment, feeding etc. This functionalist 
part of the life sciences is appropriate only because 
what are being dealt with are living things. In 
describing a living organism we are not merely describing 
inanimate things which, through simple mechanistic 
causality, have come to have certain physical 
characteristics or properties, we are describing living 
and reproducing organisms which, over long evolution, 
have become adapted to certain modes of life. 
The life SCiences, however, fail to deal with problems 
of conventionality, of the interpersonal, problems which 
are the concern of sociology, of law and moral discourse 
and of politics. The presupposition basic to seeing the 
distinctness of the problems of the interpersonal is 
that some of the rules of (at least) human social 
organisation are neither physical law (in the sense used 
in physics), nor 'natural law' in the sense of being 
dictated by instinct, but are, instead, arrived at 
through inter-subjective agreement and, as such, are 
open to being changed. Whatever the weakness of a 
purely extensional sociology as an approach to the 
problem of social change, and however unclear the 
inter-relations between instinct and convention 
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(the nature/nurture issue) it is clear that some 
problems just are interpersonal in this sense. 
Finally there are the problems which are only 
distinguishable on the presupposition that what is 
being looked at is a subject of experience, a conscious 
agent whose observable behaviour can only be properly 
dealt with by reference to states of mind, desires, 
feelings etc. Again here we have problems arising 
from the inter-relatedness of human nature/human 
social instituiions and mind, but this doesn't 
alter the fact that there are some problems, such as 
neuroses and the problems of artistic creativity, which 
seem clearly to fall within the domain of the personal 
as defined. 
So there are clearly areas of problems which fall 
within the domains of the inanimate, animate, interpersonal 
and personal as defined and there are disciplines which, 
over their histories, have come to focus centrally on 
problems from one domain. And these disciplines, which 
keep to problems in their 'home' domain, have things 
easier than disciplines which span domains, simply 
because they deal with homogeneous bodies of problems, 
problems which are all amenable to solution under closely 
related paradigms. Thus a discipline like physics, working 
almost exclusively in the domain of the animate (with 
odd aberrations like physicalist accounts of mind), finds 
it relatively easy to maintain concensus on a basic 
paradigm amongst practitioners in its various fields. 
Aesthetics, on the other hand, has massive problems due 
to the ambiguity of art which is ~ personal expression 
~ part of an interpersonally constituted cultural 
tradition. As different aestheticians put more stress 
on first the social nature of the forms of art and then 
the more personal aspects of art, like aesthetic 
experience, aesthetics tends to 'see-saw' between 
formalism and the more elusive, yet somehow richer, 
approach of the phenomenologists. It is the way disciplines 
within my general domains seem to encounter less problems 
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in arriving at appropriate paradigms than those that 
span domains that leads to me to claim that my 
classification of problem domains has descriptive as 
well as formal validity. My contention is that every 
discipline that spans domains either splits into sub-
disciplines which operate within different domains or 
else encounter3special problems which arise as the 
discipline attempts to relate problems (and solutions) 
from different domains. 
There are, of course, disciplines which have 
conceptual problems which result from other influences. 
The persistence of extensional sociology and psychology 
is an example of how disciplines dealing with problems 
from other domains still hope to emulate the success 
of physics by adopting as far as possible the concepts 
and techniques which physics has found appropriate for 
dealing with problems from the domain of the inanimate. 
I think that it is fairly obvious that both sociology 
and psychology, in most areas at least, engage with 
problems involving people, as constitutive of social 
institutions and as conscious agents. And this would 
suggest that a purely extensional way of looking is 
likely to miss out important features of such problems. 
As to why sociologists and (some) psychologists insist 
on imitating the physical sCiences to an 
unjustifiable degree, managing to give severely distorted 
pictures of human life in the process, I suggest that 
the question is more a question for SOCiology than for 
philosophy. One bit of speculation I cannot reSist, 
though, is to the effect that the urge to look 'scientific' 
is tied to social and political prestige and that looking 
'scientific' is a way of attracting funds for research. 
A good example here is the way that behaviourism, with 
an incoherent body of theory which can hardly have been 
said to improve our understanding of learning (other than 
negatively), nevertheless did a lot of good for pyschology 
by dressing it up as almost a physical science and 
putting it in a laboratory. This required, and got, 
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research funds and improved the image and prestige 
of psychology as a whole, even if it is by no means 
obvious that behaviouristic laboratory experiments, 
as opposed to the less rigidly controlled experiments 
done by Piaget,and Bruner (who video-taped the 
behaviour of children in their own homes in recent 
work on languase acqisition), are the way to really 
find what's going on. 
Psychology is a good example of a discipline which 
embodies so many mutually antagonistic 'schools' that 
it is almost a cluster of mini-disciplines, each with . 
a different paradigm. Behaviourism, particularly the 
more extreme versions such as Skinner's, falls almost 
completely in the domain of the animate. A hard line 
behaviourist aims not to refer to an experimental 
subject's inner life or to its neurophysiology. Although 
this stance is logically untenable many (e.g. Rachlin) 
still claim to hold it, an d those who refer to something 
'inner' tend to talk about brain circuitry rather than 
mind, The idea behind behaviourism seems to be something 
akin to 'in. situ' studies of animal behaviour, but using 
a more controlled environment so that the environment/ 
organism interaction can be carefully tested and described. 
There is nothing of the personal in the basic behaviourist 
'programme' and the links of behaviourist learning 
theory to those areas of psychology concerned more with 
initiation into interpersonally defined forms of life are 
obscure to say the least. 
The psychology of perception is an area in which some 
key problems are showing signs of intractability. 
Empirical studies of perception come from three directions 
these days. Physiologists have shown how the visual cortex 
of the brain reacts differently to different sorts of 
images on the retina, some nerves registering vertical 
lines, some horizontals etc. But as the physiological 
work has continued it has become apparent that information 
about relations between retinal images and the 'firing' of 
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cells in the visual cortext simply don't tell us how we 
perceive the world. The firing of the cortical cells seems 
to be a necessary condition for perception, but our 
perceptual awareness of the world just can't be explained 
in terms of a ghost-in-the-machine deciphering brain-
writing. Similar problems are encountered by computer 
modellers who attempt to encode pictures and movement 
in an attempt to discover how we 'process' visual cues 
in building up a model of the world from our visual 
input. The problem here is again that of perceptual 
awareness. If our brains were simply biological computers 
which buila up, digitally, or analogically,a 'picture' 
of the world coded as neural impulses, then we would again 
need a ghost-in-the-machine to give us awareness of the 
mental 'picture'. 
The psychology of perception proper is concerned, 
still, with the organism/world relation, but seems to 
be reaching the point where, as the physiological and 
computer-modelling accounts are clearly seen not to be 
explaining anything about perceptual awareness/experience, 
psychologists are beginning to try to relate action to 
(usually visual) experience by seeing what people can 
do in terms of visual tasks and visual memory tasks 
(i.e. running a simple maze blindfold - apparently this 
is easy if done entirely inside of 7 seconds of the 
blindfolding, after that we make mistakes). This is 
still not psychology in the personal, but once the 
psychology of perception really engages with the problems 
involved in relating experience and action it will, I 
believe, find it necessary to move into both the personal 
and the interpersonal as it engages with the social elements 
in our interpretation of perceptual experience. 
Learning theory, as I have already remarked, is 
engaged with problems of the organism/world/social world 
relations. Here learning processes are described, but 
by far the most energy, particularly from the 
developmental psychologists, goes into descriptions of 
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language acquisition and the learning of specialist 
ways of looking (e.g. Bruner's work on the teaching 
of Maths). The learning theorists tend not to look 
at their subjects from the perspective of the personal, 
they tend to look at the problems of initiation into 
interpersonally defined institutions. 
Educational psychology draws on learning theory 
of the more interpersonal sort, but, in dealing with 
the problems of individual children, must move towards 
the personal in explaining why (e.g.) little Brian's 
emotional problems prevent him functioning as a learner 
much of the time he's in school. 
Finally psycho-analysis, in engaging with problems 
which simply cease to be distinguishable without a 
presupposition that what are being dealt with are 
problems which arise from a subject of experience's 
inner life, finds itself in the middle of the personal, 
though it must also relate to the social in that many 
problems of the personal are related (in ways we under-
stand hardly at all as yet) to problems of the inter-
personal (from the stresses of social life to questions 
about whether 'sanity' is a normative concept). 
Psychology, then, in its myriad forms (and I haven't 
mentioned them all, there are social psychologists and 
there are phenomenological psycho1oeists too), spans 
the animate, interpersonal and personal, and only my 
earlier rejection of physicalist accounts of mind rules 
out the inanimate, even though there are physicalists 
(like Quine) who would simply include all problems 
about mind in the domain of the inanimate. 
What is undoubtedly the case, as a matter of empirical 
fact, is that the different areas of psychology use 
different concepts in dealing with different problems. 
Behaviourism tells us quite a lot about schedules of 
reinforcement in rats. Development psychology tells us 
much about infant learning in humans, particularly about 
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language acquisition. Social psycholcgy tells us about 
how groups of people organise themselves into hierarchies. 
My suggestion is that the diversity of approaches to 
be found in the different areas of psychology reflects 
not so much the confusion of psychologists about what 
they're doing, but rather the fact that different areas 
of psychology are concerned with different problems. 
Thus it is to be expected that areas tackling problems 
from different general domains should adopt different 
approaches to those problems. 
The problems of psychology fall into different 
domains, ~, as a matter of empirical fact, areas 
concerned with different domains (from my point of 
view) use different approaches. Further, an area, 
like the psychology of perception, which seeks to 
relate problems (and solutions) from different domains, 
turns out to be an area where a degree of confusion 
is being generated as psycholagists come to realise 
that the accounts of 'perception' given by physiologists 
and computer-modellers are largely irrelevent to 
crucial problems about our perceptual experience. Thus, 
like aesthetics, the psychology of perception has 
conceptual problems which arise from trying to deal 
with basic problems which seem to sit between domains. 
Art is both a personal expression and cultural artefact. 
Perception is of an external world, not of neuro-
physiological impulses, but certain physiological 
conditions, describable extensionally, must be fulfilled 
before perception can occur. In both cases problems 
occur because the same problem seems to have aspects 
which invite comments from different perpectives. 
Relevent theoretical statements can be made which draw 
on different paradigms, paradigms which embody 
different presuppositions about the nature of what is 
being explained. The real problem occurs when it is 
realised that the personal and interpersonal elements 
in art or the physiological and conceptual elements in 
perception are, though formally distinguishable, not 
separate. They effect each other in some sort of 
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dynamic relationship which, because of the different 
concepts used by different approaches, we have difficulty 
in deciding how even to begin describing. (It should 
be noted that merely showing that there are correlations 
between the different sorts of statement is in no way 
even to begin describing what the relations consist in). 
That these sorts of problems, which occur in real 
theoretical activity (as I have shown), fall in the 
grey areas between my general domains, is what gives 
me confidence that my domains are not merely a possible 
classification, but, more, one that really does capture 
the present state of our upderstanding. 
So I am suggesting that my general domains do 
distinguish the different sorts of problem that 
systematic enquiry has separated out to date. That the 
classification of problems into the inanimate, animate; 
interpersonal and personal is incomplete is demonstrated 
by the existence of grey areas, like that around the 
problems of perception where different approaches all 
seem appropriate to a. limited extent, and where the 
inter-relations between the findings of the workers 
from different 'home' domains are unclear. Although 
correlations clearly exist between brain-states and 
states of mind the terminologies in which the 
different findings are put simply don't 'marry', con-
ceptual differences make it difficult to show how the 
different theoretical statements, generated under 
paradigms arrive at in different domains, relate. 
It shOuld be remembered that the distinctness of 
the domains of the inanimate, animate, persmnal and 
interpersonal is between different sorts of problem, 
problems which, given our present level of understanding 
seem to be adequately solvable only under different 
paradigms. But although this means that different 
concepts will be needed in different domain~ this does 
not mean total logical disjointness between domains. 
The language games of speCialist enquiry constitute 
'families' within which some agreement on basic 
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presuppositions can be reached, but this agreement 
isn't total. The links between different specialities' 
ways of looking are of a 'family resemblance' sort, not 
formal identity in key areas. And similarly for the 
techniques and procedures used· in doing research. 
Thus my distinctions are not between areas which 
are so different that workers in different areas will 
have nothing useful to say to each other. A physicist 
could attempt to give an extensional description of 
a number of violins judged by violinists to be instruments 
of the highest quality in the hope of discovering what 
features of a violin's construction are relevant in 
producing an instrument which, when judged aesthetically, 
will be found to have a good tone. This is only one instance 
of the relation which holds so often between artistic 
creati vi ty and understandin g the inanimate. Whenever art 
involves manipulating a physical medium (paint, stone, 
wood, fibre-glass etc.) a certain level of understanding 
of the medium as inanimate object is appropriate. How 
could a sculptor hope to produce a statue without quite 
a lot of mundane knowledge about the grain and other 
physical characteristics of the lump of stone he confronts, 
hammer and chisel in hand? The body of knowledge which 
an artist acquires to facilitate his activities must 
include information about the various available media, 
viewed from the perspective of the inanimate, as well as 
knowledge of established convention and of himself, viewed 
from the perspective of the personal, as being engaged in 
the artistic expression that must be what is prior in art 
(the rest being viewed instrumentally in the context of 
artistic creativity). 
Similar observations can be made about scientific 
method, in the crude sense of involving careful observation/ 
the formulation of testable hypotheses/ careful testing 
of the hypothesis against observation, being generalisable 
in ways appropriate to disciplines working on problems 
outside the inanimate. Something akin to scientific 
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method seems appropriate in many contexts. For instance 
Frederick Forsyth researches all his novels in very 
great detail not only through reference books, but 
also by interviewing people and visiting important 
locations himself. Now insofar as Mr. Forsyth adopts 
a careful and systematlc procedure for unearthing the 
empirical information he requires it seems reasonable 
to say that he is following the example of physical 
scientists one of whose contributions to the growth 
of our understanding has been an emphasis on accurate 
observation - he uses an approach which, if it isn't 
full-blooded scientific method, is derived from the 
activities of scientists. 
But the adoption of scientific method in this (extended) 
sense isn't to be confused with becoming physics. To 
attempt to control and systematise the collection and 
analysis of data is something which any empirical 
discipline must do, and in making the attempt disciplines 
like sociology and psychology are quite properly 
following the example of the physical sciences and the 
life sciences (where close observation and description 
of plants and animals has long been common practice). 
The danger is that the social sciences, adopting a 
systematic approach to data collection and analysis 
in imitation of the natural sciences, also seem to have 
a tendency to adopt physics-based analyses of data ~ 
and so have failed to engage adequately with the 
special features of problems from domains other than 
the inanimate. 
So disciplines working in different domains will 
nevertheless share features at particular points in 
time. Concepts will be shared, as when an artist is 
dealing with the physical probrems involved in 
producing a work of art, and techniques will be shared, 
for instance the use of statistical analysis in the 
methodologies of sociology and physics. Kevertheless 
the domains are distinct and there will be conceptual 
differences between the basic paradigms appropriate 
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for adequately dealing with problems which clearly 
fall into different domains, The 'picture' which 
emerges is one of a series of related ways of looking 
which form a continuous and overlapping set of 
conceptual frameworks. The domains are distinguished 
'symptomologically', by there being areas of problems 
where the appropriate ways of looking exhibit different 
conceptual 'symptoms' in terms of the presuppositions 
they embody about how things are in the world. ~he 
symptom of the inanimate is the presupposition that 
physical objects (life, consciousness and convention 
being irrelevant to the problems) are being dealt 
with. When confronted with theory that presupposes that 
what is being dealt with is a living organism we are 
looking at work in the domain of the animate. The 
presupposition of conventionality is symptomatic of 
the interpersonal, and consciousness and agency are 
presuppositional symptoms of the domain of the personal. 
Grey areas are simply areas of problems which just don't 
respond to beine looked at in terms of one or another 
of our usual presuppositional-perspectives or else 
problems which are to do with the relation between 
findings generated under different paradigms, paradigms 
generated in dealing with problems that did respond to 
a theoretical analysis b~ilt on one of our usual 
presuppositions about the sorts of 'thing' that confront 
us in the world. Disciplinesworking in the grey areas 
between domains tend to encounter conceptual problems 
when attempting to achieve concensus on a basic paradigm 
because different specialities within the discipline 
often turn out to use modes of language which exhibit 
the 'conceptual symptoms' of different approaches. 
Myr~maining· problems are with the placing of philosophy, 
pure mathematics and symbolic logic in relation to the 
domains of the inanimate, the animate, the interpersonal 
and the personal. There are similarities between the 
case of philosophy and that of the formal disciplines, 
but there are also differences, so I'll tackle philosophy 
first. 
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The essential thing to bear in mind when thinking 
about the relationship of philosophy to my modes of 
understanding is that philosophy has changed greatly 
over the last few hundred years. In that short quote 
from Newton I gave earlier it should be noted that he 
represented his laws of motion as a contribution not 
to mathematics, nor to physics, but to philosophy. To 
Newton, as to generations before him, anything that 
increased human understanding was seen as a branch of 
philosophy - it is largely due to Newton's work that 
physics came to be seen as distinct from philosophy. 
Thus the division of labour which has led to the 
establishment of distinct traditions of enquiry is a 
relatively recent phenomena. Philosophy, it seems to 
me, has itself fragmented as the traditions have separated. 
In its role as a way of criticizing theory, philosophy 
becomes an integrated part of each and every area. Any 
theoretical endeavour has problems about (eg.) how to 
explain the data it collects, problems which in part 
are ·about what sort of explanation is appropriate 
or whether a theory is coherent, makes sense. These 
questions about theory are philosophical so it is 
quite natural that we should have the philosophy of 
sCience, philosophy of mind and social philosophy(etc.' 
emerging to deal with the specific problems in and 
between different areas. 
But, of course, philosophy is more than a way of 
criticizing theory. Philosophers also investigate 
questions about what sorts of theory should be 
appropriate for the disciplines, we also investigate 
our notions of knowledge and understanding in an effort 
to clarify what it is we're talking about. So we must 
assert that philosophy isn't just a 'service industry' 
helping others to sort out their theories. Philosophy 
is a second order endeavour, a way of looking at ways 
of looking in order to both elucidate the status of 
current ways of looking and to make suggestimns about 
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what conceptual frameworks are appropriate for 
tackling problems. Philosophy is also a way of indicating 
areas of importance which current theoretical activity 
casts little light on and, again, suggesting what 
might constitute appropriate or inappropriate ways of 
casting light on them. And, of course, in the work of 
some metaphysicians, philosophy maintains an interest 
in absolutism, in the possibility of transcending the 
views of reality which we have derived through 
empirical enquiry and arriving at an explicit and 
demonstrably true account of 'things-in-themselves.' 
I feel, however, that it is wrong to separate 
philosophy as a special mode of understanding in its 
own right. Without close links with the world of 
empirical fact philosophy can become nothing more 
than the spinning of elaborate and rigorously 
constructed fairy talea.This wasn't so obvious in the 
days when it seemed reasonable to assume that there 
was, in principle, one and only one completely coherent 
account of how things are in the universe. But the non-
Euclidean geometries were only the first nails in the 
coffin for that belief. 
Modal logic has even thrown the traditionally 
assumed to be unquestionable (on the grounds that 
denial doesn't make sense) axioms of two-valued logic 
into question so that the best we can say is that 
two-valued logic seems to be the natural basis for 
human modes of conception, not that it reflects the 
ultimate nature of reality (although logicians are 
still debating the issueL 
So we now have to accept that many of the endeavours 
which philosophers have traditionally seen as absolutist 
were misconceived - in particular we must conclude that 
the most elegant, internally consistent and complete 
a priori theory we can imagine is not thereby identified 
as ultimate truth. It seems to me, then, that 
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philosophy must be intimately linked with the 
empirical disciplines if it is to establish that it 
has any general value beyond that which any game 
has for those who enjoy playing it. That value must 
derive from the fact that any empirical discipline 
must have problems about the status and internal 
coherence of its theories and those problems are 
problems for philosophers as well as for physicists, 
psychologists or initiates of any other discipline. 
These links between the problems of philosophy and 
the problems of other specialists are what bind 
philosophy to first order disciplines. The different 
theoretical issues which many empirical researchers 
find tedious and frequently incomprehensible are, from 
the philosophical point of view, particular instances 
of general philosophical problems, sone well known 
(like Ryle's 'Ghost in the Machine' which still seems 
to come to mind whenever I hear people talking about 
the 'physiological basis of perception'), others being 
defined only as the philosopher examines a current 
theory (as with the way interest in the concept of 
development was aroused by the work o~ Piaget, 
Kohlberg and Bruner.) 
It seems to me that anyone who reflects upon the 
precise status of the statements he makes, who seeks 
a deeper understanding of what he said, to pin dow~ 
which of a range of subtly different interpretations 
is correct, is beginning to engage with a basic problem 
of philosophy. A trained philosopher learns a great deal 
about the sorts of problems that can ariRe with theory 
but his value must derive from his ability not merely 
to solve or sort out problems at the level of 
philosophical discourse, it must derive :rom the fact 
that his philosophical points are not just moves in 
an academic game, they must also be of relevance to 
the problems of the first order disciplines. If the 
first order disCipline is of no such general value then 
logically, philosophy can derive no such general value 
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from its relation with that discipline. And if I am 
right to maintain that a demonstration of general 
value, given the failure sa far of absolutism is only 
possible if a discipline can be shown to deal with a 
basic area of problems which is justifiably judeed to 
be important, then philosophy without ties to first 
order activity in the problem domains is not demonstrably 
of value. This does not disvalue attempts to 
understand the modes of understanding, nor attempts to 
unify different modes, or to philosophically 
specify the problems involved. Insofar as the 'grey 
areas' between areas which clearly fall within the 
modes cover problems which can be shown to be important 
work which is designed to illuminate those areas must 
be regarded as valuable. 
The one area of philosophy which might be disvalued 
on my account is that area of metaphysics concerned 
with the possibilty of specifying absolute truth. 
Without denying the possibility of specifying absolute 
truth we might reasonably decide that the long record 
of failure in this endeavour constitutes a good reason 
to opt for rational-piecemealism, to simply discount 
the theoretical possibility (the possibility that it 
might be possible to acquire absolute truth) as one 
with little practical relevence. It is fairly obvious 
that within the British Analytic tradition philosophers 
have been 'votine with their feet' on the issue for 
quite some time - the sort of metaphysics to be found 
in Findlay's 'Ascent to the Absolute' is rare within 
this tradition although it is more prevalent with the 
traditions of continental Europe, notable amonget the 
existential school. 
For my part I must suggest that whilst such philosophy 
has inspirational force it cannot give us any good 
reasons for valuing it. Absolutism, as a systematic 
enquiry is far less common than the phenomenon of 
people incapable of questioning basic presuppositions, 
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people whose psychological dependance on certain 
presuppositions is so great that even the idea that 
they might not be absolutely true creates massive 
anxiety. Such pecple are all too common and constitute 
barriers against the advance of understanding. 
There is, I believe, a case for arguing that to 
discount absolutism would rob these individuals of 
the very shaky crutch they cling to and force them to 
abandon their questionable faiths and intuitions and 
engage in rational discourse. Making everyone face up 
to the problems of life as problems to be solved by 
human effort rather than divine intervention, making 
s people approach the world from a human pe~pective 
rather than trying to achieve a completely neutral 
standpoint, might help us deal with important problems 
by removing the obstacles which dogmatic adherence 
to putative absolute principles (religious and political 
being the prime offenders) put in the way of rational 
planning and action. 
Of course this view ignores too much the fact that 
people aren't all that rational in a great many matters 
and that we don't want to be. Falling in love is 
essentially nothing to do (for most people) with 
objectively assessing the person one loves as a 
potential life partner, it's a much richer experience 
than that and not to be avoided for all its irrationality. 
In the religious especially it seems reasonable to suggest 
that religious people should regard their religious 
activities as expressive of faith and should refrain 
from efforts to press their beliefs on others, In 
politics it seems reasonable to insist that dogma is 
inappropriate and diplomacy appropriate, but of course 
I am here assuming that politics is about organiSing 
society whereas if ~iet~he was right about the will to 
power it's possible that politicians interpret their 
activities in very different ways. 
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However, none of this undermines my basic contention 
which is that philosophy is a way of increasine the 
depth of our understanding, a second order activity 
whose findings are part of, not distinct from, the 
different 'world views' which work in the inanimate, 
animate, personal and interpersonal has given us. In 
its role of investigating the nature and status of 
theory philosophy must arrive at an awareness that 
different demands must be made on theories designed 
for problem solving in different domains, and that 
our present ways of lookine at the world have weaknesses 
and will be replaced if something turns up that can 
solve some of the problems which are currently 
unsolvable. So philosophy must not stress its absolut-
ist history, it must acknowledge that philosophy as 
a way of arriving at absolute truth is an old and not 
very healthy view and acknowledge the i~portance of an 
'evolutionary' model of theoretical understanding. 
Philosophy must adjust to the real problems of 
understanding, the status of our paradigms, the 
taxonomy of problems and the problems of elucidating 
the grey areas between domains where our present ways 
of looking seem inadequate. 
The remaining problem to be dealt with here concerns 
the placing of mathematics and formal loeic within my 
schema. I would suggest that, like philosophy, these 
endeavours can only derive general value from their 
links wi th the first order disciplines. ~'!athematical 
modelling, (not modelling in the same sense as the 
models that serve as the link between theory and the 
world), the construction of systems in which the 
formal (ie. axiom-Governed) relations between variables 
parallel the contingent relations between things-in _ 
the -world has been a central part of the methodology 
of physics since Newton formulated his laws of motion. 
Davidson's approach to meaning can similarly be seen as 
a formal description, in terms of a formal notion of 
truth (Tarski's convention T), of the structure of 
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language, a sort of logic-based model of the extensional 
part of language. Pure mathematics and formal logic are 
both concerned with the elaboration of sets of axioms 
which, as work in both areas over the last century has 
shown, are logically arbitrary in the sense that large 
numbers of axiomatic systems can be constructed on bases 
which are mutually irreducible. This being the case the 
generation of such systems would appear as a very elaborate 
game with no relevance beyond its own boundaries were 
it not for the fact that the formal systems can be 
designed so as to provide formal models of natural and 
social systems. So our knowledge of pure mathematics 
and formal logic derives general value (value which 
consists in more than the fact that those who engage 
with these endeavours enjoy doing maths or logic) only 
from the fact that the formal disciplines can be put to 
work in the first order disciplines. In the case of 
formal logic we might suggest that 2-valued logic derives 
its value from being a model of human reason - it 
certainly doesn't completely model the world as recent 
work in sub-atomic physiCS, where modal logic seems to 
apply, has shown. 
I should re-iterate here that this is not an 
instrumentalist account of the formal disciplines. As 
I observed earlier in this discussion of understanding 
mathematics is E2! a discipline which grew through 
unsullied pure interest and just happened to prove 
useful to the empirical disciplines. The Greeks chose 
the axioms which became the basis of Euclid's geometry 
because they appeared to be true of the world and there 
are many examples (projective geometry, statistics, 
calculus) of the impetus for doing pure maths deriving 
from the pure mathematicians attempting to give a 
rigorous account of techniques which had been arrived 
at in other comtexts. Similarly the growth of formal 
logic seems inextricably linked to the desire to 
rigorously account for what should or should not be 
admissable in rational argument. There is even some 
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justification for suggesting that the real source of 
recent interest in modal logic is not so much the 
intrinsic interest which logicians have for their 
subject, but rather the fact that intuitionist 
mathematicians and sub-atomic physicists have found 
it useful to refuse to assert the law of the excluded 
middle. Just as Cauchy's work on the logical basis of 
calculus was made necessary bY the fact that physicists 
after Newton presented pure mathematicians with a fait 
accompli by simply using notions like speed at a point, 
so the logicians have been pushed into investigating 
modal logic by some mathematicians and physicists 
abandoning the law of the excluded middle. 
My account of the formal disciplines is not 
instrumentalist because the relations between the problems 
of logicians and mathematicians and those of initiates 
of the empirical disciplines are logical. The empirical 
workers find it useful to use certain ideas or to discard 
others and the workers in the formal disciplines find 
themselves confronted with new ideas to make sense of 
or to reveal as incoherent. Alternatively the formal 
workers may come up with ideas (e.g. the non-Euclidean 
geometries) which empirical researchers find appropriate 
as problem-solvers. As I emphasised earlier this does 
not mean that individual formal theories should be 
evaluated in terms of their relevance to work being 
done by particular empirical researchers. Rather the 
whole formal endeavour gains general value only from 
the logical links of its problems to the sorts of 
problems engaged with by those working in the first 
• 
order disciplines. Any more strict demands would, owing 
to the different rates of progress in the different areas 
(physics lagging behind maths and logic ~ vice versa 
depending on the examples taken), be likely to be 
counter-productive in terms of increasing our under-
standing. As to the relationship between logic and 
absolutism I can say little, I have already pointed out 
that the relation assumed by Kant has been shown not 
to hold but to say that logic cannot help in the 
1 \ . j. 
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endeavour would be to pre-judge what the future might 
bring - in view of what has happened over the last 
century in all areas of understanding this would be 
a foolish thing to do. 
Thus I regard the formal disciplines as being, like 
philosophy, inextricably linked to the first order 
disciplines. This doesn't mean that pure mathematicians 
or formal logicians should be discouraged from research 
which has no immediate cash-value in terms of relevance 
to the first order disciplines - to take that line would 
be likely to stifle progress. Rather we must take care 
that the formal disciplines don't sever their links 
with the first order disciplines and become nothing 
more than esoteric games (as the learning of Greek and 
Latin became once those languages had ceased to be the 
languages of European academia). The link that must be 
preserved must be in terms of pure mathematics being 
concerned, in principle, with the analytic basis of 
the applied mathematics (mechanics, numerical analysis, 
statistics, geometry etc.) which the first order 
disciplines find useful as part of their methodology, 
and similarly for the relationship between formal logic 
and such things as philosophical analysis, 'linguistics 
(e.g. the importance of Chomsky as the impetus for 
Davidson's work on language) and (again) maths and 
physics (as in modal logic). 
The only disciplin~s I haven't dealt with are those 
like theology and (some) metaphysics that seem to lose 
their character if not acknowledged as absolutist. There 
are difficulties for theology because of the undeniably 
social nature of religion and because of the expressive 
element in religion. It is impossible to judge religious 
world-views as true or false and although we might want 
to describe them as non-progressive problem solvers, 
because the absolutist presuppositions they embody 
preclude change. we cannot simply dismiss them. All we 
can do with the religious (as with absolutist metaphysics) 
is to keep an open mind whilst allowing believers to 
\ 
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follow their beliefs for so long as the resulting 
activities are within rationally established social 
norms - I covered this in more detail earlier. In 
general endeavours which are strongly absolutist, 
in the sense of being concerned with the possibility 
of knowingly discovering absolute truth, are open to 
a charge of being spectacularly non-progressive. The 
endeavours of a metaphysician like Findlay rest on a 
hypothetical presupposition to the effect that the 
acquisition of absolute knowledge is a possibility 
for us. I call this presupposition 'hypothetical' 
because as things stand it is no more than one possible 
presupposition. Given the failure of absolutist 
metaphysics as a problem solver there is no justification 
for taking this presupposition as anything more than a 
theoretical possibility, a hypothesis for which there is 
no support, but which can be worked under in an attempt 
to give it support (by demonstrating its problem-solving 
potential). So absolutism is a possible, but decidedly 
non-progressive, approach to constructing a publicly 
accessible understanding of the world. 
I think I have now dealt adequately with the relations 
between the disciplines and the problem-domains of the 
inanimate, animate, interpersonal and personal. All that 
I want to do before becoming more explicitly educational 
in outlook and discussing curriculum issues is to look 
again at the relationship between knowledge and under-
standing in an attempt to remove confusion arising from 
different sensse revealed. in our uses of the verb 
'to know'. 
f 
I , 
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Knowledge and Understanding (ii). 
In my earlier discussion of knowledge and under-
standing I said that to understand something involves 
possession of the relevant conceptual framework/ 
conceptual skills whereas knowing involves the exercising 
of understanding with respect to some state of affairs. 
In other words understanding what it is for it to be 
raining involves possession of the relevant concepts 
whilst knowing that it is raining implies that those 
concepts have been used in characterising a particular 
state of affairs, at least in cases where the knowledge 
is acquired through direct perception. We can also 
acquire knowledge via others who are in a position to 
know if they transmit their knowledge to us via 
symbolic communication and by reading indexioal signs. 
If someone comes in out of the rain and tells us "It's 
raining", then. provided that what he says is true, and 
provided that he knows that it's raining, then we can ' 
be said to know - and more significantly we can also 
acquire indirect knowledge via books, television 
programmes etc. We can acquire knowledge indexically 
by, for instance, noting that someone who just came 
in the house is wet. There are all sorts of possibilities 
for error here, authors, journalists and people who just 
tell us things may be mistaken or liars, and it is 
possible that someone might wear a raincoat under a 
lawn sprinkler on a dry day and mislead us. But it must 
be clear that we can acquire knowledge indirectly 
provided that certain conditions are satisfied, primarily 
that what we deduce from what we see or hear is true, but 
also that the chain of circumstances from the original 
state of affairs to our formulation of the relevant 
proposition/belief is such that the truth of the latter 
is arrived at because the original state of affairs was 
as it was rather than by accident. The precise 
specification of the conditions to be satisfied can't 
be discussed here due to lack of space. 
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My primary interest for now, though, is in two 
questions, which are whether it is possible to know 
without understanding and whether it is possible to 
understand without knowing. The first question will 
be dealt with first. 
There is one important sense in which it is 
possible to know 'that S' without understanding the 
significance of the statement S. It is possible to 
learn an inscription of a symbolic representation 
without understanding it at all, or at least without 
understanding it very well. If I walked into a class 
of 15 year olds, handed out duplicated copies of the 
private language argument, and told those assembled 
that when I came back next week I would give £10 to 
everyone who could write it out in full, there would 
be a good chance (provided I was believed) that when 
I arrived back with a full wallet I would be faced 
with a group of pupils most of whom knew the private 
language argument. This is not a silly example, a great 
many students learn theory for exams in this way, they 
recognise the questions and spew forth the required 
answers without any real understanding of what they 
are writing. The real test of this is when we investigate 
what happens when a question is asked in an unfamiliar 
form - all too frequently, students simply are unable 
to answer, they have learned 'recipes' for passing 
exams but have acquired very little understanding of 
the theory. This is certainly true of a great many 
school kids' approach to mathematics and,I would 
suggest, of quite a few student teachers amongst others 
who can write convincing exam answers in education but 
who, as a few minutes conversation reveals all too 
often, simply don't understand the theory they 'know' 
in terms of its embodying a theoretical conceptual 
framework which relates to everyday practice in a 
classroom. 
This 1s the main source of my dissatisfaction with 
language-bound accounts of concept possession where what 
..... 
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is stressed is the ability to give a verbal account 
of what the concept word means. Understanding, it seems 
to me, must involve the possession of conceptual skills, 
the ability to use the concepts acquired from books and 
lectures in 'reading' the world, the ability to acquire 
knowledge by relating theory to the world as encountered 
in personal experience. This sort of understanding is 
precisely what written examinations so often fail to 
test, Too often teachers propagate knowledge only in the 
sense of training pupils to 'parrot' answers or else 
to follow 'recipes' ritualistically. Too infrequently 
do we actually manage to propagate a full understanding, 
the conceptual skills which would make our pupils into 
knowers, people who can subsume their own experience 
under theoretical conceptual frameworks and hence 
derive specialist knowledge for themselves. 
I suggest that this tendency in schooling comes 
from an emphasis on knowledge to be learned rather than 
on understanding to be acquired. The sense of knowing 
in which someone who can recite a poem knows it is a 
proper sense, but a weak one, someone who knows theory 
in this sense may simply not understand what he knows 
as a way of looking, and someone who lacks that under-
standing might reasonably be expected to regard school 
learning as an empty ritual without any real importance 
outside school. It seems to me that although we have 
moved away from the old emphasis on rote learning 
we have not moved far enough. Our techniques of 
assessment are still such blunt instruments that we 
find ourselves testing our pupils' memory for facts/ 
mechanical procedures rather than their understanding. 
This, I suggest, is particularly the case in maths and. 
the sciences where there is still (especially in maths) 
a tendency to teach facts and theories in isolation 
without stressing the relationship between the evolution 
of the theory and the historical changes in our way 
of life. We don't leave enough space in our syllabuses 
for drawing in the links between different areas of 
theory and everyday life , thus we represent knowledge 
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thinly and rarely manage to get its importance across. 
We end up cramming a mass of 'dead' information into 
our pupils minds which most of them seem to forget, 
either immediately or as soon as the relevant exam 
has been passed. What we fail to do is to propagate 
the understanding that would make the theory we transmit 
'alive', make it seem vital, a way of 'getting hold of' 
the world in all its aspects, making sense of it and 
enabling us to handle it more confidently and efficiently. 
Even if we manage to inculcate in our pupils a grasp 
of the concepts, procedures and language of some area 
so that besides giving a verbal account of their'under-
standing'they also make it manifest in terms of using 
it in relevant circumstances, thus demonstrating that 
they have 'inertnalised' the theory and can use it to 
make sense of the world of their own everyday experience, 
there may be something missing from their understanding. 
If I am right (and I believe I am) in rejecting Peters' 
characterisation of the point of a discipline as being 
something that must be sensed by an initiate and cannot 
be stated, then a proper grasp of physics or art or maths 
must include seeing the discipline as purposive, as 
addressing certain fundamental sorts of problems. And it 
is further the case that, if a discipline is to support 
a claim to be rationally organised and/or of general value, 
its basic problems (and why they are important) must be 
stateable. Thus it must be possible to give pupils of 
school age (particularly in the later years of secondary 
schooling) some idea of what a discipline's point is. It 
will probably remain impossible to state the basic 
problems of a discipline, and the various solutions 
offered, with full rigour, just as, at school level, 
it is impossible to prove that 2 + 2 • 4 with full 
mathematical ~igour, or to fully explain what goes 
on in a chemical reaction. But it should (to misquote 
Bruner's famous assertion),with intellectual honesty, 
be possible to accurately represent, to pupils of school 
age, any discipline as being a purposive endeavour and 
to give some idea of what sorts of problems are being 
502 
looked at, and why. Where this is not possible because 
the discipline lacks the conSens.us which is needed to 
justify a claim to rational organisation and/or general 
value, its inclusion on a school curriculum would seem 
decidedly odd. The importance of this sort of under-
standing, of a discipline as purposive, is important 
in that someone who mastered the concepts, procedures 
and language of a discipline without understanding them as 
being used because they are appropriate for the 
discip1in~s explanatory pruposes would fail to grasp 
what he was doing when he engaged with the discipline. 
His activities, from his point of view, would appear 
to be ritualistic (whether he enjoyed the ritual or not), 
he would fail to see his activities as purposive even 
though they would serve the discip1inds problem-solving 
purposes. In other words such a person wouldn't, in an 
important sense, know what he was doing. 
It is then, in a sense, possible to know without 
understanding, and it is possible to know and to 
understand what is known inadequately. The next question 
to be answered is that of whether it is possible to 
understand something without knowing about it. This is 
not a question that makes much sense in terms of my 
analysis of understanding with the stress I have put 
on the possession of the conceptual skills which make 
someone a knower, a person whose understanding is 
constitutive of an ability to read the world in a way 
that makes the detail of everyday experience more 
significant, more informative, but there are issues here 
which must be dealt with. Understanding is not an all-
or-nothing affair, it is possible for someone to have 
an understanding of theory which consists entirely in 
an ability to discuss it in a theoretical context but 
which has no impact on his perception of the world, or 
his view of his own role in the world. In such cases 
the theory is 'understood' as a game with no relevance 
beyond its boundaries. It seems to me that someone who 
'understands' a diSCipline in this way has, in fact, 
failed to grasp the central point of the discipline _ 
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we could say here either that he has misunderstood it 
or has a thin and inadequate understanding of it. But 
this would not constitute understanding without 
knowledge, such a person would know how to play the 
theoretical game and would possess much theoretical 
knowledge. What would be the case, however, would be 
that the possessed understanding would fail to make 
the person in question a knower, someone whose under-
standing enables him to read significance into the 
world of everyday exper~ence. 
A second issue here involves a question about what 
is involved in knowing. What is ~ involved in knowing 
is knowing or being aware of possessing the knowledge. 
At the level of theory we must demand that knowledge 
is made public and knowledge claims justified publicly 
if we failed to do this we could never establish public 
modes of understanding. It seems reasonable to say, 
however, that 1n some areas understanding 1s made 
manifest by success in some endeavour even when it 
cannot be made public by writing it down. 
The understanding which allows some people to handle 
others successfully, which constitutes part of the skill 
of a gifted administrator is not very well understood 
in theoretical terms, yet it is undeniable that some of 
us do understand how to handle people better than others. 
A good stockman will breed better dogs/cows/horses etc, 
than someone with less understanding, but biologists 
still can't explain theoretically how to achieve this. 
In the same vein some footballers seem to be better 
than others not in terms of faster running or better 
ball-handling, but in terms of being able to 'read' a 
game better so that they turn up in the right place 
at the right time more consistently than others even 
though they can't say why. And in the systematic 
disciplines some researchers' hunches seem to turn out 
to be right far more often than others', and we can't 
explain that either. All these are examples of 
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intellectual skills which people do possess and which 
cannot, as things stand, be acquired by learning and 
applying theory. Nevertheless, I suggest, we must 
ascribe understanding to such people even though they 
can't explain their abilities. It is theoretically 
possible that their success is a matter of sheer blind 
luck, but the probability of consistent success-by-
accident is so small that we must surely discount this 
possibility and accept that some people in some areas 
have, by trial and error, by good luck, or by being 
naturally gifted, arrived at a way of conceiving the 
world which enables them to handle certain aspects of 
it with a sensitivity that explicit theory so far 
cannot parallel. 
The question that now arises is that of whether 
such understanding leads to knowledge. I think we must 
say that it does even if that knowledge is not, as a 
matter of contingent fact, expressable publicly. In 
his book 'Personal Knowledge' Michael Po1anyi introduces 
the notions of focal and subsidiary awareness. Usually 
when we acquire knowledge we begin by being focally 
aware of it, by consciously rehearsing the theory and 
applying it to some state of affairs. Thus when someone 
learns to play arpeggios on a musical ir.strument he 
will usually begin by actually naming the notes and 
consciously recalling how to finger them or (on a key 
board) where they are. But after a while this is no 
longer necessary, the notes of a C chord (or Bp'~) 
are just played. Jazz musicians often know the chord 
progressions of tunes they play all the time so well 
that it takes a real effort to write the chords down, 
they can play the progression perfectly but without an 
instrument to hand they find it hard to remember it. 
This ~ phenomenon is familiar to all drivers 
who start by learning (focally) what all the levers 
and pedals do but soon come to a pOint where they just 
drive. The knowledge has passed from the level of 
focal awareness to that of subsidiary awareness in 
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which we are not aware of it, and in extreme cases the 
ability to recall what is known to focal awareness 
can be lost - the case of someone who has forgotten 
more than most of us are ever likely to know. 
Polanyi also suggests that there are some areas of 
knowledge which are both generated and trapped at the 
subsidiary level, he talks about the need to learn 
the sCiences, in part, through serving a sort of 
apprenticeship, working under' an accomplished 
scientist in order to 'catch' the understanding which 
is manifest in his skilled performance (both intellectual 
and physical) but which, because it is irretrievably 
part of his subsidiary conceptual repertoire, he is 
incapable of summoning to focal awareness and hence 
cannot express verbally. 
I cannot accept that, in principle, someone's 
understanding cannot be expressed verbally as this 
would involve that person possessing a private under-
standing in the extreme sense which Wittgenstein's 
private language argument rules out. But it is 
undeniable that much knowledge and understanding can 
become part of our subsidia~y repertoires in the sense 
that, as a matter of contingent fact, we demonstrably 
possess such understanding (ie. we possess the conceptual 
skills which allow us to 'read' some aspect of the 
world and handle it more successfully) but we cannot 
express that understanding linguistically (or, more 
generally,in publicly accessible symbolic form). 
There is little problem with extending Polanyi's idea 
by suggesting that the 'flow' of understanding can go 
both ways. The 'flow' from focal to subsidiary awareness 
, 
obviously happens, but my suggestion 1s that the flow can 
also be from subsidiary to focal awareness. My idea 
is that we can come to understand the world, in some 
cases, by Simply 'standing under' it, by being 
confronted with something we find problematic or 
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interesting and attending to it or 'fiddling' about with 
it until, ultimately, we just 'see' how to handle it, 
the realisation of what it's about just dawns on us, 
something 'clicks' and we're off running where formally 
we shuffled about uneasily. This clearly happens in the 
learning of theory, any teacher must, at some point, 
have 'seen the light dawn' for at least a few pupils 
when someone who up to that time had just followed an 
explicit set of rules suddenly 'gets the idea' and 
from then on possesses the ability to solve simple 
equations or write down the formulae for chemical 
reactions. What I want to add to this uncontentious 
suggestion is that the conceptual 'accomodation', which 
seems to be what this shift from focally following explicit 
rules to the possession of a subsidiary Oonceptual skill 
consists in, can be achieved independantly of explicit 
rules (ie the formally stated theory). 
As well as following rules until the idea clicks and we 
have acquired the conceptual skill which rules parallel, 
I want to suggest that we can acquire conceptual skills 
by engaging with the world directly. Instead of 
subjecting ourselves to the constraint of theory in an 
attempt to 'train' ourselves to conceive things in a 
particular theoretical way we can (in some cases) 
simply subject ourselves to the world and in being sub-
jected to its constraints can directly acquire the concep-
tual skills which constitute an understanding of it. 
This, I have argued at length in earlier discussion, is 
what happens in language acquisition. In engagement with 
other people and in attempted verbal interaction a 
baby is involved in 'banging his head' against the 
conventionally defined world of language. As this 
interaction proceeds the child gradually realises 
(with help from language users) how to achieve his 
desires verbally - the child~ conceptual accomodation 
with respect to language is achieved not via the focal 
awareness of explicit theory but directly through 
engagement with a significant-to-him world. 
Similarly, I suggest many possessed skills, such as 
507 
those mentioned earlier which theory cannot parallel 
must be acquired directly through engagement with 
aspects of the world which the individuabconcerned, 
find problematic/interesting. I am not suggesting that 
this sort of understanding is superior to the under-
standing that can be achieved through focal awareness 
of explicit theory. Indeed the public nature of theory 
makes it likely that understanding-via-theory will be 
more free from internal logical problems and will fit 
the world better simply because an explicit theory 
is subjected to systematic analysis in a way which the 
everyday understandings acquired directly are not. But 
we must not devalue these everyday unspoken under-
standings. If theory is to be more than a technical 
game it must relate to them, must improve on them, 
and in some cases it must emulate them, must try to 
make explicit in theoretical form understanding we 
all possess (such as our understanding of language). 
And further it seems undeniable that involved in the 
formulation of new theory there is often an element not 
merely of systematic plodding forward, but of making 
intelligent guesses and trying to substantiate the end 
point of the 'leap' by working out a ~heoretical path' 
to it - this is how the intuitive mathematicians work. 
It seems at least plausible to suggest that this is a 
process where the subsidiary conceptual accomodation 
comes first and its expression as explicit theory comes 
second. Thus intuition can be seen as a working of our 
sub-conscious mind trying to accomodate experience which 
is anomalous with respect to our current conceptual 
framework in some areas, the hunch as the 'realisation' 
the 'click' of the anomaly suddenly falling into place 
and the expression of public theory as both a way of 
making the new understanding available to others and as 
a way of making it accessible to a public checking 
process so that we can vouch for the knowledge, so we 
can reasonably claim to possess knowledge, that we have 
actually acquired good understanding and not merely 
508 
arrived at a 'thin' understanding, a false model 
which accords with certain limited aspects of the 
world but doesn't generalise at all. The making public 
of understanding by constructing explicit theories 
also enables us to separate out prejudice and 
innaccurate models which we acquire through 
socialisation from true understanding. Thus following 
up hunches and intuitions is only part of the methodology 
of research - simply stating intuitions has no part 
to play in the justification of a claim to understanding. 
It seems to me then that we cannot, in general, have 
understanding without knowledge, although it is clearly 
possible to possess both whilst lacking the ability 
to express them in theoretical form. It also must be 
possible (because knowing does not imply being aware 
of knowing) to understand (and know) without having 
the slightest inclination to make a knowledge claim. 
The important distinction to make is between someone 
possessing knowledge and understanding and the rest of 
society being willing to ascribe knowledge and 
understanding to him. What must be the case, if we are 
to maintain the systematic disciplines on a rational 
rather than authoritarian basis (religions usually 
involving accepting the assertions of Popes, lamas etc. 
unquestioningly), is that we must refuse to admit 
unsupported knowledge claims. We may reject true state~ 
ments on this approach because they have not been 
adequately supported, but unless we make public demands 
on theory we will be unable to distinguish theory 
which reflects understanding from theory which reflects 
prejudice, and surely it is better to err on the side 
of caution than to adopt a course which would leave 
the systematic disciplines unable to claim a rational 
basis. 
Finally I should look at one area where it might be 
thought that understanding is present without knowledge. 
When I discussed language acquisition I concluded that 
unless some 'things' were naturally significant for us 
we could never acquire language, for without some basiC 
classification to work from the learning of new 
'settings' would be impossible, each 'thing' of 
experience would be a unique and novel entity, distinct 
from all others and thus incapable of being classed 
together with other 'things'. Now this natural 
significance almost certainly has to do with natural 
biological responses, but here aga1n simply responding 
differently to different ~hings is not enough, we must 
be aware of the response as being different if they 
are to provide a basis on which we can build more complex 
classificatory (ie. conceptual) skills. This I am 
committed, as I have already admitted, to talking in 
terms of innate concepts, although since I have 
explicitly rejected the idea of a logically necessary 
link between concepts and language the commi-tment is 
~ 
not fatal - it does not commit me to talk of innate 
knowledge of language. 
This fact might be held to imply that at some time 
after conception (and maybe before birth) a baby 
possesses concepts, but has no experience to apply 
those concepts to - thus at some time the baby possesses 
understanding but not knowledge (under my account). In a 
sense this must be accepted but not without 
qualification. Insofar as we all can recognise hunger 
we understand what it is to be hungry, but, as 
Wlttgenstein pOinted out, it is philosophically 
dangerous to talk of people knowing that 'this' sensation 
they are feeling is one of hunger, this leads, through 
confusion arising from grammatical form, to mistakes 
like saying 'you can't, in principle, have my hunger 
(pain etc.". What we know, what we are aware of is 
not that we have a distinct experience which is correctly 
identified as one of hunger, but rather that we are 
hungry, in a state of hunger - I have alreadY deal~ 
with this in my discussion of the private language 
argument. This 'knowing' we are hungry, like 'knowing' 
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we know, is best translated as 'being aware that' we 
are hungry when doing philosophy as otherwise 
we get into serious difficulties through giving an 
account of being hungry/in pain etc. on the same 
model as we account for knowing eg. that it's cold 
outside, and to do this (as I showed in earlier 
discussion) is to make a serious mistake. Thus we, as 
adults and as babies, can be said to have understanding 
of what it is to experience feelings and sensations 
(or what it is to feel, to sensate,) but we might feel 
it necessary to refuse to talk of knowledge of feelings 
and sensations given the confusion this can lead to. It 
we do this then we must conclude that in some areas, 
insofar as experience is being classified in terms of 
shared significance, we can talk about understanding 
but not knowledge - this I believe is unproblematic 
although it mig~t be thought to be a bit pedantic and 
not really important in terms of suggesting that 
ordinary language usage is wrong - it is a specialist 
philosophical point, but an important one. 
The case of a baby is, I suggest, in a similar 
position. The baby is born with the potential to read the 
world in certain ways( actually being able to do it involves 
a certain amount of maturation ). It is philosophically 
dangerous to speak about the baby (eg.) knowing what 
it is for something to be food or knowing what it is 
to be hungry for precisely the reasons just given -
so here again we have a case of understanding without 
knowledge, although, again, it would be sheer pedantry 
to insist that babies shouldn't be described as knowing 
that they're hungry in any but a specialist philosoph-
ical context (although perhaps psychologists might 
need to observe the distinction between knowledge 
of the external world and awareness of sensations and 
feelings}. 
It is important to grasp that here we are not talking 
about theoretical knowledge. A psychologist researching 
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on hunger would be trying to understand hunger and if 
successful would have an objective account of what it 
is to be hungry - he would then know, at the level of 
theory, what it is to be hungry. The level at which the 
need to talk about understanding what it is to be 
hungry',:but at which we should avoid talking about 
knowing is that of someone who understands hunger 
in terms of having the capacity to be aware of his own • 
hunger. In such contexts 'I know I am hungry' says no 
more than 'I am hungry'. The '1 know' might be used in 
emphasis but it adds nothing to the informative 
significance of the sentence. Thus it is only in awareness 
of our own inner states (sensations, feelings, emotions), 
where we can talk about understanding without 
knowledge. 
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Understanding and the Emotions. 
My account of understanding so far has emphasised 
the cognitive at the expense of the affective. I have 
said that, in a case like that of understanding 
behavi~urist psychology, we cannot write emotional 
commitment into understanding as to do so would be to 
make anyone who failed to exhibit such commitment 
open to a charge of not having a sufficiently full 
understanding. The question I asked was whether it is 
possible to adequately understand behaviourist 
psychology and, as a result of that understanding, find 
it objectionable. I believe it is. If someone studied 
and fully grasped the findings and theory of behaviourist 
psychology he would understand behaviourist psychology 
in a cognitive sense of understanding. He would have 
grasped the theoretical perpective of behaviourism 
and would be able to try to subsume his experience of 
the world under it even if, for reasons of internal 
inconsistency etc., he instead rejected the 
behaviourist approach as inadequate as a way of (cogni-
tively) understanding the phenomenon of learning. In 
this cognitive sense of understanding the question 
of what emotional response someone has to something 
he understands is irrelevent - understanding in this 
sense involves no more than possessing the conceptual 
skills constitutive of an ability to see to some 
degree, how things are, whether the object of 
understanding is a natural phenomenon, a body of theory 
or whatever. 
In discussing the role of intrinsic interest in 
systematiC enquiry, I once again stressed the 
cognitive nature of understanding. I suggested that 
whilst it seems likely that those who are intrinsically 
motivated to engage with some area will acquire a 
greater understanding of it (depending, of course, on 
the individuats intellectual capacities) than those 
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whose interest is extrinsic, there is nevertheless no 
theoretical limit to the understanding that someone 
might acquire whose only motivation is extrinsic. 
Again here I think I am correct to say this given 
that I have been focussing on understanding seen as 
cognitive. 
In this section I want to look at what might be 
thought of as a central weakness in my account of 
understanding. The suggestion might be made that I'm 
quite correct to write emotion out of the purely 
cognitive aspects of understanding, but that I'm 
nevertheless in error-by-omission simply because I've 
assumed without argument that understanding is entirely 
a cognitive matter, and that assumption is wrong. This 
line of argument would depend on choosing very different 
examples of understanding from things like understanding 
a body of theory or theoretically understanding the 
behaviour of gasres. The examples would be things like 
~ 
understanding a work of art or understanding how 
someone feels. Such understanding, it would be maintained, 
is simply not expressable in statements, not merely 
for the technical reason that an infinite number of 
true statements of different meaning (i.e. sense and 
reference) could be made about any experience, but be-
cause there is something about this sort of understanding 
which is more akin to an empathic sharing than to a 
theoretical description. 
There seems to be something in this line of 
argument, intuitively at least. It seems right to say 
that really understanding how someone feels involves 
more than identifying the state, its antecedents and 
its consequences, correctly. I might know that 
someone's house has been burgled and I may have read a 
great many books and articles on the psychological 
reactions of victims of such crimes. But, in a sense, it 
would seem quite reasonable for someone who had been 
burgled to say to me, "You can't know or understand 
what. it's like to be burgled 'til it happens to you." 
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What is being said is that we can possess as much 
second-hand theoretical knowledge (knowledge gained 
through anything other than personal experience) as 
is available about some things but that no amount of 
this sort of understanding could ever allow us to 
grasp what it's like to go through the experience. And 
this is so simply because statements communicate 
only factual information, not the affective aspects 
of the whole experience. For now I'll accept this 
contention, although later I will return and examine 
claims of this sort more carefully. 
The first thing to note here is that these sorts of 
examples seem only to occur in two areas. The first 
of these areas is in our understanding of other people 
where we may feel, for instance, that someone who has 
never loved could never really understand what it is 
to be in love. The second area is in art where, it may 
be felt, whilst knowing (ag.) the historical context 
of an artist and knowing what to look for in his work 
can enhance our aesthetic experience, it could never 
replace it as this would be to miss out the fundamental 
raison d'@tre of the whole artistic enterprise. Whilst 
true statements merely tell us that 'this' or 'that' 
is, or was, the case, it might be said, a poem can 
create a mood, can give us an inSight, both 
cognitive ~ affective, into what it is like to fight 
a disorganized trench war or to take pleasure in a 
lake-land spring. 
The idea that true understanding involves feelings 
and emotions can be seen to be most compelling when 
we are engaged in trying, directly or indirectly, to 
understand people. This is clearly the case of something 
like understanding feelings and emotions themselves 
or in understanding not (eg.) behaviourist psychology 
as a body of theory but what it's like to be a 
behaviourist psychologist, an initiate of the 'form of 
life' which generated the body of theory. Here we are not 
I 
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simply interested in someone's cognitive understanding, 
we are also asking whether he has some grasp of how 
someone might come to be doing behaviourist 
psychology, why he might choose that approach. That 
in engaging with a work of art we are seeking, indirect-
ly, to understand a person is a less obvious claim, 
but I nevertheless believe it to be the case, and will 
attempt to demonstrate my contention. 
Understanding bricks in a cognitive sense might 
consist in the possession of a great deal of 
theoretical knowledge about bricks, about the impact 
of the furnace-fired clay brick on the history of 
building etc. What more than this sort of thing we 
would write into understanding bricks I cannot imagine. 
Understanding what a brick is is something anybody 
might achieve, the idea of understanding what it is 
to be a brick smacks of unjustifiable anthropomorphism 
(except in a metaphorical sense). We might try to 
understand the feelings of men of different cultures 
as the idea of bricks opened up the possibility of 
bigger and better buildings, but then we are 
indirectly engaging in trying to understand an 
experience which other people have had. In the case 
of a mountain one could be over-awed, or frightened or 
impressed by its sheer physical presence, but surely we 
would still say that these feelings are not part of 
understanding mountains even if without reference 
to such feelings we could not begin to understand 
mountain climbers. 
With a work of art, it could be said, emotion is 
necessary to understanding in that aesthetic experience 
isn't merely a matter of a percipient's affective 
reactions to a physical object like a brick or a 
mountain. Rather it is a matter of the percipient 
interpreting a symbol (an iconic symbol to some extent -
though things get difficult with literature) and 
thereby cODlillg to 'share' the artist's feelings and 
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emotions. True statements do appear in art, and can 
undoubtedly contribute to the aesthetic force of the 
work. But the central role of the true statement in 
literature must be to aid in the creation of a mood, 
to communicate the feelings and emotions of the artist. 
If something along these lines was not the case, then 
it would be difficult to see why a purely cognitive 
approach to a work of art missed anything out. If, in 
some sense, a work of art did not embody and thereby 
reveal the artist, then the work would be a physical 
object amongst others. We could say that feelings and 
emotions were necessary for understanding people's 
aesthetic reactions to the work, but not for understand-
ing the work itself as we would not distinguish between 
art as conveying feelings and emotions and nature as 
eliciting them, Again there is much to be said, 
aesthetically speaking, about the relation between 
nature and art, and agmn I will beg such questions 
on the grounds that such problems are outside my terms 
of reference here. 
All I want to establish here, and I believe it to 
be done, is that feelings and emotions can only 
plausibly be said to play a part in our understanding 
when they are a part of the object of our understanding 
in some sense. And this is to say when we are trying 
to understand people and their inner lives directly 
or else when we are trying to understand what someone 
has done (including artistic works and other actions) 
as a manifestation of his inner life, as conveying 
and/or embodying the affective state of its'perpetrator.' 
Only in such cases, it seems to me, does it seem 
reasonable to say that understanding involves the 
understander having feelings and emotions. 
But so far all I've said is that it seems reasonable 
to say that understanding involves an affective element 
in cases where feelings and emotions are, in some sense, 
a part of what is being understood. When affective 
states are in some sense (partially) constitutive of 
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the object of our understanding, then it seems to be 
the case that our own experience of those affective 
states plays some part in our understanding. What I 
want to discuss is the question of how my affective 
states, affective responses elicited from me by my 
experiences, can contribute to my understanding. 
Take the case of someone whose husband has died. This 
woman, let us suppose, has had a happy marriage to a 
man she loved. The death of her husband had an emotional 
impact on her which depended for its magnitude upon 
her life history and the importance in it (affectively 
and otherwise) of the man who has died. Now since I 
am a man myself and have not been married, and since I 
have never had the experience of having someone very 
close to me die, 1 am a very poor candidate for 
understanding how this woman might feel. Further,her 
feelings on the death of her husband are a result 
(in some sense I will not attempt to elucidate) of 
her life history, a life history which, in respect of 
details crucial to this example, is unique - nobody 
else had ~ life with ~ husband. So, it must be 
asked, if the sequence of events which led her to her 
'present' state of mind, is unique, how can anyone 
ever feel the way she does, how can anybody else have 
feelings which are close enough to hers to constitute 
understanding? Some sort of 'closeness of feeling' 
must be involved in any affective element in 
understanding as we surely wouldn't want to say that if 
I felt amused by, or angry at, this poor woman in her 
anguish I would, in feeling amused or angry, be 
understanding how she felt. 
The reply to this doubting must involve evocation 
of the imagination. Imagination, it must be said, isn't 
just playing with concepts, isn't just flying pigs, the 
Silver Surfer or the Incredible Hulk. Imagination is 
also sensual - when the wind crashes through trees, 
sounding like the sea breaking against the foot of a 
cliff, we can almost feel the spray on our faces and 
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taste it's saltiness. And we have an affective 
imagination - we can, in a sense, feel the sadness as 
Bergman and Bogart part at the end of 'Casablanca', or 
the sense of futility in the surviving captain, a man 
who has seen that his era is ending,at the end of 
'Seven Samurai'. This seems a plausible stance -
although we can perhaps never have the specific 
experiences of another we have 'similar' ones. If I 
know what it is to be in love I can imaginatively 
empathise with someone who is in love, and part of 
this empathy can be the evocation of my own memories 
of love. And those memories seem often to consist 
in more than 'remembering-that', more than propositional 
memory. In memory feelings, emotions and sensations 
come back to us, are imaginatively re-constructed 
(try remembering what its like to wash in cold water 
on a winter morning, or the smell of chopped onions to 
get the sense of what I mean). 
This could be used to suggest that there is no 
affective element in understanding, that what is crucial 
is cognitive understanding, the understander, through 
affective imagination, 'fleshing out' the picture. This 
argument might continue by saying that the involvment 
of the imagination demonstrates that whatever 'feelings.' 
one might have in understanding someone in anguish or 
else in understanding a work of art (as being revelatory 
of the srtist's affective states), they are not real 
fee11ngs, they are counterfeit'feeI1ngs', created in 
imagination, not elicited in any real life experience. 
Any other feelings we have, feelings of helplessness 
in the face of tragedy, or feelings about an art work 
which are not the result of imaginatively putting 
oneself in the place of the artist, would Simply be 
facts about our own responses to some state of affairs 
and should not be written in to our understanding of 
the state of affairs even though our awareness of such 
affective responses may contribute to our self 
understanding. 
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What this argument says (echoing Ryle in 'Concept 
of Mind) is that when we imagine an experience we 
do not truly have it. This seems clearly to be the 
case when eg. we imagine we see Scarborough castle 
when we're not looking at it. Here imagining we see 
Scarborough castle seems to entail that we're not 
really seeing it. But the same doesn't seem to be 
true for the affective imagination. In 'entering' a 
film imaginatively we suspend belief, we really do put 
ourselves in the position of the protagonists, 
feeling what they feel. Watching a Bruce Lee film with 
an audience of school children it becomes clear that 
the vast proportion of the audience is actually 
'in there' with Lee, wielding fists and staff, juggling 
dangerously with nun-chaku (the rice flail which 
peasants adapted as a weapon), battering baddies and 
righting wrongs, feeling righteous indignation towards 
the Villain and exhultant relief as the hero, Lee, 
inexorably vanquishes all evil-doers. These feelings 
are not mere pretence for all their dependance on 
imagination, though the feelings generated in 
entering into a Kung-fu movie are certainly less 
profound, and less disquieting, than those we 
experience in entering into a film like Ingmar Bergman's 
'Persona'. Here the merging and changing of the 
personalities of the two women (patient and nurse) in 
their isolation disturbs us deeply. In entering Loach's 
'Family Life' we are carried helplessly along the 
progression of a girl from being psychologically 
disturbed to catatonia, 'helped' along by insensitive 
family and doctors, and it is anything but enjoyable. 
In cases like these last two the director seeks to have 
us empathise imaginatively with the feelings of the 
characters in order to give us his view of some aspect 
of human life, and the success of such works has much 
to do with the way we can enter into them, the way 
we are seduced into giving up the stance of independent 
observer and, instead, to identify with the protagonists 
and, through imagination, come to feel what they might 
feel. 
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It seems reasonable to say that with respect to 
many works of art our affective responses play some 
part in our understanding of the work insofar as 
those responses are not just elicited by the work as 
physical object, but instead are generated imaginatively 
in engaging with the work as (iconic) symbol, as we 
enter in to the 'world' of the artist and feel what 
he intends us to feel. We may later reject the world-
view the artist offers us, for instance if we decide 
that it is unreal, a distorted picture of how things 
are in the world, but the feelings we have whilst our 
(cognitive) critical faculty is suspended, when we are 
'inside' the work, are nonetheless real for all that. 
The feelings generated in affective imagination are 
very real, all too real in some cases - there are always 
some works we regard as profound but avoid because 
their profundity focuses on aspects of life we find 
disquieting. Some works, it is true, seem not to work 
like this. Music and abstract painting seem to lack 
referen~e to shared experience in that they don't 
provide the overt cognitive 'cues' which can make 
literature, theatre and film more easily accessible. 
Here again there are difficulties that I cannot deal 
with. All I can do here is to observe that in some 
cases, notably understanding how people feel and, by 
extension, understanding how a character in a fictional 
work might have felt, our affective responses, generated 
in imaginatively putting ourselves in the situation 
of the person or character, seem to add to our understan-
ding. But our affective responses could only constitute 
understanding insofar as we are right, insofar as our 
feelings do approximate those of the other person 
or the intended (by the artist) feelings of a fictional 
character. 
The key notion in all this must be that of the 
imaginative transcendence of self, the ability to put 
one.'·s self in another's situation. The central problem 
in saying that this ability can result in understanding 
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(of an affective rather than a cognitive sort) arises 
over the question of accuracy. We may think that we've 
approximated another's feelings and we may have tran-
scended our selves e.g. if we like dogs but have 
managed to put ourselves in a frame of mind where we 
can see dogs as dangerous and threatening (say by 
imagining ourselves in a city destroyed by war where 
dog packs hunt anything that moves). But how can we 
be sure we're right, that we're not merely deluding 
ourselves? In some cases we can just ask the relev~nt 
person (in art, the artist), but this doesn't always 
work. People are often confused about their feelings 
and artists don't always plan works explicitly. 
Characters in art take on lives of their own in many 
cases, an artist often comes to see his creations in 
a different light as he produces his work, the character 
can come to make demands on the artist, an episode 
written into the outline of a novel can be altered 
or dropped as the artist 'realises' that 'this' charaoter 
wouldn't react like 'that', that the projected episode 
could only work if the fictitious person acted out 
of character in a way that would disturb the unity 
of the character and of the work. 
Nevertheless there do seem to be cases, espeCially 
in understanding other people, where we do seem to 
manage to understand how people feel and where this 
understanding allows us to act appropriately, in a 
way that helps the person we have understood to come to 
grips with their inner turmoil. But here we don't, as 
with some art workS, give ourselves over to the 
feelings and emotions. Rather we see what actions would 
help us if we were in this state and act towards the 
other person accordingly. It seems to me that we can 
do this, particularly with people we know well, and 
that our success in helping others in handling the 
problems of their inner lives is evidence that we 
understand their feelings and emotions correctly. But 
there is a cognitive element in such understanding. 
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It is fairly obvious that most people who try to write 
philosophy (for example) come to a point at so~e time 
when uncertainty about something makes it difficult 
to go on. Almost every philosopher must have had this 
experience and can help others in similar Situations, 
can give reassurance and encouragement. The cognitive 
element, propositional knowledge, is certainly 
present in such cases. That there is also an affective 
element seems to depend on the assertion that 
someone who had never experienced this 'angst' wouldn't 
fully understand someone going through the experience. 
Here the lack of personal experience would render the 
imagination incapable of giving an affective understanding 
which consisted in more than the capacity to know that 
such-and-such statements were true of 'this' person, 
an understanding of how someone feels. 
We are now up against the distinction, the contentious 
distinction, between theoretical knowledge and 
acquaintance knowledge. In the realm of the cognitive 
the distinction has been attacked by saying that in 
principle anything we know by acquaintance can be 
stated in propositional form even though, because an 
infinite number of true statements can be made about 
any state of affairs, we can never exhaustively 
represent knowledge by acquaintance in the form of a 
conjunction of true statements. This impossibility 
consists in the impossibility of writing down an 
infinite number of true statements, not in any 
other difference between the two sorts of knowledge. 
That there is something more than the cognitive 
involved in understanding phenomenon of which affective 
states are in some sense a part might be resisted by 
saying that what is crucial in communicating emotions 
and feelings correctly is the sign (index or symbol) 
which expresses them. Learning to read the signs 
correctly could be said to be the central element in 
understanding others and this would seem to be a matter 
I 
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of cognitive understanding, of recognising 'this'piece 
of behaviour (linguistic ot otherwise) as a behavioural 
'symptom' of the other's state. This line of argument 
could evoke Wittgenstein's 'beetle in a box' example 
by saying that questions about the identity of feelings 
are irrelevant to understanding someone's sadness (say). 
What is crucial is the public concept of sadness. If I 
imaginatively superimpose the feelings I recognise as 
sadness on my judgement that someone else is sad there is 
no way in which I can claim those feelings to be 
constitutive of a better understanding since I have no 
way of justifying the claim that there is any sort of 
similarity or correspondence between the actual 
experiences which two people have over and above the 
fact that they are both subsumable under the public 
concept of sadness. 
This line of argument presupposes the essential privacy 
of experience, but not in a way that can be ruled out as 
being dependent on an incoherent interpretation of the 
private language argument. It says that the experiences 
may well be there, but that they can play no part in an 
intersubjective understanding as the criterion of sameness 
of feeling we use in language can make no reference to 
the phenomenological nature (the subjective, rather than 
the public nature) of the experience. And any attempt 
to suggest that the actual affective experience could 
contribute to some essentially private understanding would 
fall foul of the full force of the private language 
argument. 
Even if we abandon the privacy of the actual experience 
of being (e.g.) angry or sad by accepting, for the sake 
of argument, the existence of empaths, people who truly 
experience others' feelings, we don't escape from serious 
problems. Having an experience and understanding it are 
not the same thing. This is captured by the adage, "Some 
people have a thousand experiences, others hnve the same 
experience a thousand times." Seeing an event is one thing, 
correctly assessing its significance is another. We can 
; j 
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all, surely, recall examples where we went through 
some experience in bewilderment, only later realising 
what had been going on. So even if some people are truly 
empathic (in a psychic sense yet to be explained), their 
ability to feel what others are feeling should not be 
written in to their understanding as such. Their empathy 
would only provide them with additional data, data not 
available to the rest of us, their understanding would 
still consist in the possession of appropriate conceptual 
abilities. So even though the empathic feelings of such 
people would constitute an aid to understanding others, 
those feelings would not be a part of their understanding. 
Even though an empath (in the psychic sense) would, 
because of his empathy, be likely to be better at under-
standing others' affective states, his understanding 
would still be essentially cognitive although richer 
because it would draw on direct acqaintance with its 
object as opposed to relying on 'second-hand' information 
derived from reading ths Signs (both symbols and indices) 
which are the expressions of the affective, states. 
I think that we must accept that the existence of such 
empaths is a possibility, at least I cannot think of an 
argument that would demonstxate it to be a logical 
impossibility. But this cannot help us with any affective 
component in understanding many works of art. We might make 
something of it in the context of live performance in 
music or the theatre, but not with literature, or 
recordings of mUSic, or films as in such oases there 
is no existing state of mind, at the time we engage 
with the work, to emphathise with. so we are left in 
a great many cases with 'imaginative empathy', with 
explaining any affective involvement with works in terms 
of our ability to imaginatively put ourselves in the 
position of a character in a work and/or with the artist 
as he was when producing the work. And here we have 
greater problems than arise in the case of an (assumed 
to exist) empath, because we don't know how to tell 
whether our affective imagination has got it right. In 
any case the same problem occurs here as in the case of 
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the empath. Even if, in affective imagination, we do 
arrive at the right feelings and emotions, having the 
experience is still not understanding it. The under-
standing part of the story still seems a matter of 
grasping the significance of the experience correctly, 
and this still seems a matter of conceptualis~ng it 
correctly, still seems a cognitive matter. 
Some people might want to resist this conclusion at 
least in the case of very strong and unusual feelings 
and emotions, for instance in the case of suicidal 
impulses. In such cases, it might be suggested, someone 
who claimed to understand how a would-be suicide felt 
would be admitting to having felt the same way himself. 
The first thing to note here is that •• 'having felt the 
same way' cannot be interpreted as implying some 
phenomenological identity or similarity between the 
actual experiences, the 'beetle-in-the-box' argument 
" rules this out. So, ••. having felt the same way," must 
be interpreted as something like, "having been in an 
affective state which disposed one to attempt or at least 
seriously entertain thoughts of suicide," in this case. 
So the claim that no one can understand how someone who 
is suicidal feels who has not experienced suicidal 
feelings themselves is the claim that such understanding 
is only accessible to those who themselves, at some time, 
havefelt disposed to kill themselves or, at least, to 
seriously contemplated suicide. Suicide is an extreme 
case, but such arguments might also be raised in 
discussions of alcoholism, rape and even the example I 
mentioned earlier, the problem of understanding the 
victim of a robbery. 
In all such cases I can accept the proposition that 
as a matter of contingent fact it might be easier for 
someone who had experienced similar states to understand 
people in those. states, but I must reject any attempt 
to assert that there is any logical necessity involved. 
It seems to me that it is possible for us to understand 
states which we have not ourselves experienced. We can, 
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for instance, come to understand the feelings of 
frustration of 19th century miners in France by 
imaginatively entering into a novel like Zola's 
'Germinal', or the feelings of helpless impotence of 
the defendant in Kafka's 'The Trial'. It might be so 
difficult to imaginatively empathise with would-be 
suicides as to be practically impossible for any but 
a gifted few, but I can see no reason for concluding 
that it is logically impossible. 
To decide on suicide is to decide to abandon the 
attempt to handle life. It seems to me that such a 
decision is not entirely alien to other. less dramatiC, 
decisions we all feel inclined to make from time to time. 
Most people engaged in difficult endeavours find them- • 
selves, at some pOint, feeling uncertain about whether 
they can go on and often this is connected with a certain 
weariness, a sapping of the will to continue. It doesn't 
seem impossible that someone who had never seriously 
contemplated suicide could draw on such experiences as 
a basis for imaginatively empathising with someone in a 
suicidal state. 
This may seem like an admission that feelings do have 
a r~e in understanding other people. In general we can 
consider the case of two people, A and B. A's problem 
is with understanding how B feels. B is experiencing 
an affective state (x) which disposes him to produce 
certain modes of overt behaviour (d). So B is disposed 
to d because of x. Now A' understanding of B's disposition 
to d cannot be a matter of A's acquaintance with x 
because acquaintance with x requires either that A is 
empathic (i.e. really perceives B's feelings) which, 
whilst not logically impossible, is clearly not generally 
the case or else that A has had an experience 
phenomenologically identical or similar to x, which 
mayor may not be the case (we have no way of knowing 
since such identity/similarity is irrelevant to any 
public concepts). And anyway questions about the 
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phenomenological similarity to x of any feelings A is 
having, or has had, are irrelevant to A's understanding 
simply because having an experience is not understanding 
it (or, more precisely, grasping its significance 
correctly). 
Nevertheless B's having x is an important part of 
the explanation of his disposition to d. Identification 
of x with a disposition to d would lead us to analyse 
A's understanding of B's feelings in terms of nothing 
more than A's knowledge of the fact that B is disposed 
to d and this hardly seems describable as understanding 
how B feels as it leaves out all reference to affective 
states. What seems to be the case is that to understand 
how B feels A must recognise B's d-ing (or B's preparations 
to d) as symptomatic of some affective state, though 
not necessarily of x as it is unclear how we can support 
a claim to have identified the actually state (phenomeno-
logically speaking) accurately. It would seem that A's 
understanding of how B feels must depend on his under-
standing of himself as having an affective life which 
can effect his overt behaviour and of drawing on and, 
where necessary, imaginatively augmenting and transcending 
his own experience so as to 'see' what affective states 
might dispose him to d. If A had never experienced any 
affective responses that had disposed him to behave in 
certain ways he would, it seems, be incapable of under-
standing B's feelings, for he would have no grasp of the 
way in which affective states can coloUT judgements and 
hence effect behaViour. 
The central point here is that if A had no affective 
life, experienced no feelings and emotions then he would 
understand the language of feelings etc. only as ways of 
describing overt behaViour, he would not relate the overt 
manifestations of anger to feelings of anger as he would 
lack the inner experience which, for normal people, the 
public expressions of anger (including linguistic 
expressions) are symptomatic of. Such a person would be 
able to use emotion language but would not understand it 
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fully, he would understand it only as talk about certain 
sorts of overt behaviour, not as talk about inner states. 
The public concepts would not give him an ability to 
understand certain aspects of his inner life as he would 
lack precisely those elements in his inner life that the 
rest of us use the language of feelings and emotions to 
talk about. Thus, if A had no affective life himself, he 
would not, adequately understand the language of feelings 
and emotions and hence would be incapable of understanding 
how B felt. Even if he did correctly identify B as being 
angry, he would be using 'anger' as a label for B's 
behaviour, not as a description of x, the inner state 
which disposed B to behave in an angry fashion. For A 
'anger' would describe d whereas the rest of us would say 
that x was anger and d the overt manifestation of that 
affective state. 
Thus our feelings and emotions do play a part in under-
standing other people insofar as having feelings and 
emotions plays a part in our general understanding of 
the sort of language we use for talking about such things. 
What is the case is that if we had never experienced 
feelings and emotions we would not fully understand words 
like 'fear l or 'anger' (etc.) as referring to affective 
states rather than overt behavious. This would constitute 
a failure to fully understand the relevant mode of language, 
which would lead to an inability to understand how other 
people feel. This failure would not arise from a failure 
to grasp the phenomenological nature of others' affective 
states, but from a failure to understand what an affective 
state is. The failure would be cognitive, a failure to 
understand emotion-concepts correctly and hence a failure 
to 'see' an important aspect of people's inner lives. 
Similarly, in the case of understanding someone in an 
affective state we ourselves have not experienced, we 
draw on our own experience of related states not as a way 
of having the same (in some phenomenological sense) 
experience but as an experiential ground for our cognitive 
understanding. 
In the sense that our cognitive grasp of the concepts 
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we use in talking about our affective lives is dependant 
on our having affective responses which we subsume under 
the publicly established comcepts I am happy to conclude 
that there is an affective element in our understanding, 
though the role of the affective element here is in 
giving us a proper grasp of the relevent concepts and so 
serves only to give us a proper cognitive understanding 
of what emotion-language is about. I am opposed, however 
to any talk of an affective aspect of understanding if 
it is being suggested that my affective responses to 
some 'thing' ( a book, a person or whatever) I am 
confronted with is, in the context of confrontation, 
to be seen as part of my understanding of that 'thing'. 
I can see that such feelings may facilitate my coming 
to understand, i.e. my acquisition of a conceptual frame-
work which would make me a 'knower' with respect to 
relevant phenomena, but to make them part of the under-
standing seems wrong. 
An empath might possibly feel what someone elee.feels 
or someone might imaginatively generate exactly the right 
feeling, but having the feeling is not understanding it 
and the notion of 'right feeling' needed in the case of 
imaginative empathy is, as I have shown, problematic in 
the extreme. In other cases, for instance understanding 
maths, I cannot see how having feelings is part of under-
standing. It might be suggested that feelings of 'rightness' 
can tell a mathematician (or some other specialist) that 
he's on the right track, but such feelings often mislead 
and equally often seem absent or else are unclear (as 
any researcher should know). In any case even when such 
feelings do show the way they are indicators, the under-
standing is surely a matter of whether the theory checks 
out not whether the researcher feels right about it. 
Feelings I might hive whilst trying to understand something 
undoubtedly have some bearing on the question of whether 
or not I come to understand it, similarly it seems 
reasonable to suppose that most people 'feel better' about 
what they can make sense of than about what they find 
incomprehensible. But, for reasons already given, I see 
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no general justification for arguing that, if anyone 
understands some x, then they have feelings about x which 
are not merely contingently associated with x but are 
logically necessary element in their understanding. 
The only exception to this rule is in our understanding 
of emotion language, but this necessity, that we should 
have some affective experiences if we are to properly 
understand emotion-language, in no way entails that in 
a specific case where we are using our general understanding 
to come to know how someone feels we are only acquiring 
such knowledge, only truly understanding the person we 
are engaging with, if we are having certain affective 
experiences ourselves. 
Thus I am forced to conclude that understanding is 
essentially cognitive. But although I cannot justify 
writing the having of feelings and emotions into the 
concept of understanding (except in the case of our 
general understanding of the language of feelings and 
emotions) I can say that our affective responses have 
a r~le to play in our acquisition of understanding. Even 
though understanding proper must still be analysed in 
terms of possessing an appropriate (for the object of 
understanding) conceptual framework, we must remember 
that we can acquire understanding directly through 
engagement with the world as well as through 'internalising' 
explicit theory. And in engagement with the world (and 
we can include explicit theory here) we not only make 
the conceptual accomodations constitutive of under-
standing, we also respond affectively. A favourable 
affective response is likely to lead us to take more 
interest in the aspect of the world which elicits it 
and this seems likely to lead us to acquire more under-
standing - this is what I argued in my discussion of the 
r~le of intrinsic interest in systematic enquiry. 
Conversely an unfavourable response can clearly lead us 
to 'switch-off', to disengage, and that will lead to our 
failing to acquire understanding. ThiS, again, is a 
contingent matter, We can, intellectually over-ride 
unfavourable responses in cases where we judge the 
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phenomenon to be, for instance, important though 
unpleasant. So we can concern ourselves with trying to 
understand the psychological 'mechanisms' which allowed 
concentration camp commandants to live nearly normal 
family lives when off duty whilst committing genocide 
when on duty because this ability to compartmentalise, 
to 'double-think', is an important feature of the human 
mind, though its manifestations are generally distasteful 
to those who value reason. 
We cannot ignore the emotions in education not 
because they are part of understanding, but because they 
effect our ability to acquire it. Imaginatively putting 
ourselves into the place of a character in a novel is 
not a logical pre-requisite of understanding it, but it can 
help our understanding in that 'seeing things from the 
inside' can be a way of engaging with the work more 
completely and a more complete engagements likely to 
result in a more complete understanding. There is no 
logical necessity about this except in negation-failing 
to engage with something will of necessity, lead to no 
understanding being ~cquired. Only if we engage with 
something can we hope to understand it, but engagement 
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cannot guarantee understanding. We all have limitations, 
there are always some areas where understanding eludes 
us no matter how hard we try, though it seems unlikely 
that there are many people who, if given the right help, 
would remain incapable of grasping such things as how to 
read and basic arithmatic. 
Education of the emotions and of the ima~ination must 
be important as a way of teaching people to engage 
sympathetically with others, a part of learning how 
to relate to other people and to art. And this must go 
hand-in-hand with self understanding. In learning to 
imaginatively transcend ourselves we must be both aware 
of our own feelings ~ aware that others may feel 
differently about 'this' or 'that'. In life we are Simply 
faced with such differences in affective response between 
people. To deal with the problems that arise in inter-
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personal interaction we must be able to sympathise with 
others, to disagree and not to judge, to be able to 'see' 
that others are not ourselves without constantly raising 
questions about who's right and who's wrong. I'm not 
saying that this attitude is appropriate in all things, 
but it clearly is in many areas - in preferences in art, 
in love etc •• Understanding such things is, I believe, 
essentially a cognitive matter even though an adequate 
cognitive grasp of emotion-concepts (etc.) is dependant 
on our having had relevant affective experiences. But 
acquiring such understanding in particular cases must 
involve imaginatively putting one's self in the position 
of another. In this affective imagination must playa 
role, not as a way of revealing another's affective states, 
but as a way of allowing us to see them as beings who 
have 'affective lives', who feel and have emotions. Only 
when we engage with people at this level can we really 
begin to understand them as people. Thus our feelings and 
emotions, though they are not a part of our understanding 
as such, play an essential part in our coming to under-
stand other people. The value of aesthetic education, from 
improvised drama, to playing/listening to music, to 
reading poetry must be, in part at least, derived from 
its role in educating our affective imagination and hence 
preparing the way for a more sympathetic engagement with 
others (and, hopefully, for the acquisition of a better 
understanding of other people and, by contrast, of our-
selves). 
Understanding, then, is essentially cognitive. The 
role of the understander's affective states is in giving 
him, through acquaintance with his own inner life, a 
deeper understanding of the language in which we talk 
about such things. Our affective responses, if appropriate, 
can also allow us to engage more sympathetically with 
other people (and with works of art) and, if we are 
intellectually able, to arrive at a better understanding 
of them. 
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Education and Understanding. 
Fundamental tc this whole thesis is an assumption 
that I find very difficult to question seriously, but 
which now must be examined: that education, if it is 
to be at all worthwhile, must involve the educand 
acquiring understanding. 
The first thing to say is that to some degree this 
must be correct, it would be absurd to argue that 
education had no links with understanding. But problems 
arise when we look at the central aims of education 
and ask whether the primary aim of education should 
be the propagation of understanding as opposed to, 
say, socialisation/preparation for citizenship or else 
the passing on to the young of their cultural inheritance. 
These alternative aims are not, of logical necessity, 
incompatible with the propagation of understanding; 
to an extent they presuppose it. If education is for 
citizenship then an educated man must know his place in 
society, must understand his native form of life to 
some degree. If education is about passing on a 
cultural inheritance an educated person must have 
acquired some sort of understanding of what was 
passed on. 
But in some circumstances these alternative aims 
(and there may be other possible alternatives - the 
ones I've chosen are only being used illustratively 
as yet) could come into conflict with the aim of 
propagating understanding. In early 19th. century 
England the education of the poor was clearly seen by , 
a large proportion of the aristocracy and the nouveau-
riche industrialists as potentially subversive of the 
status-quo. The opposition of these people to mass 
education was only overcome by statements like the 
following from Patrick Colquhoon, an early advocate 
of elementary education, who said in 1806: 
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"It is not proposed that the children of the poor 
should be educated in a manner to elevate their 
minds above the rank they are destined to fill 
in society •• ~Utopian schemes for an extensive 
diffusion of knowledge would be injurious and 
absurd." (quoted on p.8 of Denis Lawton's., 'Class, 
Culture and the Curriculum'). 
Here, in a rigidly stratified society, education 
of the masses was seen as a matter of preparing lower 
class children for, "the rank they are deatined to fill 
in society," a 'rank' determined by birth, not ability. 
This is education for citizenship in a harshly exploit-
ative society and in such a context this aim can 
conflict with the aim of proagating understanding. 
Education for citizenship in a context like that of 
19th. century England was seen as a matter of 
preparing people for their place in an existing social 
hierarchy, it presupposed an unchanging social order, 
regarded education as an agency for the maintenance 
of an existing status-quo. Such education must, at 
some point, conflict with the aim of propagating 
understanding. Social institutions are conventionally 
defined, existing in a particular form only for so long 
as people acquiesce, tacitly or overtly, to the rules 
which constitute them. This being so it is the case 
that if there is anything in the world properly describ-
able as a social institution (in a sense of 'social' 
which implies 'conventionally defined') then, in 
principle, that 'thing' can be changed by rational 
planning. And the 'in principle' here means that this 
is a possibility even if, in some societies, widely 
held irrational beliefs or a repressive ruling elite 
make such change difficult to achieve. An education 
for citizenship designed to maintain the existence of 
a social order would have to repress this understanding 
if the eXisting society was stratified rigidly with, 
for example, a large and poor working class living at 
subsistence level. If people with little or nothing to 
lose get the idea that things could be otherwise, be 
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they 19th century English workers or 20th century black 
South Africans, they become politically dangerous from 
the point of view of the ruling elite. In a society of 
this sort education for citizenship would involve the 
educand understanding the nature of his society to the 
extent of knowing the rules, but not to the extent of 
understanding those rules as conventionally defined 
and hence changeable. The education given might misrepresent 
society (as ordained by God or as a natural state of 
affairs) or might simply ignore social and political 
education as areas for study, teaching acquiesence to the 
existing order as part of a 'hidden curriculum', but 
leaving the educand ignorant of the essential difference 
between natural phenomena and social institutions. For 
political reasons, in a less than ideal state, education 
for citizenship might lead to at worst the propagation 
of misunderstanding and, in less bad circumstances, to 
the ignoring, in education, of large areas of important 
problems (most often social and political). 
Similarly the educational aim of passing on a cultural 
inheritance need not conflict with that of propagating 
understanding, but might. There are problems here with 
modern states as we misht doubt whether the 'society' 
consisting in all the people within the national boundary 
of, say, the United Kingdom, has enough cultural unity 
in terms of shared values, beliefs, and attitudes, to 
make 'passing on the culture of a society' an aim which can 
give a unified curriculum within the state's education 
system. But even putting such problems to one side we 
can see that passing on a cultural inheritance could 
lead to conflict with the aim of propagating understanding. 
Just because 'these' attitudes, beliefs and values have, 
traditionally, been held in our culture, we might say, 
there's no guarantee that they're correct. Any culture 
might make mistakes or, again, be ruled by an elite 
which imposes certain values etc., artificially. Taking 
the propagation of understanding as the prime concern of 
education requires us to be critically aware of our 
cultural inheritance, to evaluate what is handed 
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down to see if 'this' attitude is appropriate, 'this' 
value rationally tenable 'this' belief true. This critical 
awareness is part of understanding and must be fostered 
if the propagation of understanding is taken to be the 
prime concern of education. But if we take passing on 
a cultural inheritance to be more important we might 
regard the giving of cultural identity, getting people 
to hold 'these' values, beliefs and attitudes, as being 
more important than getting people to critically evaluate 
what is passed on to them. Thus it is possible that the 
aim of passing on a cultural inheritance could conflict 
with the aim of propagating understanding in an actual 
education system. The question which now arises is that 
of why we should regard the propagation of understanding 
as the central aim for education, an aim which has priority 
over other aims so that although other aims can be pursued 
in education they should not (for whatever reasons) be 
pursued at the expense of the propagation of understanding. 
Before I try to answer this question I shall take time 
to remove the possibility of confusion which could arise 
. 
out of the ambiguity of the concept of education and over 
the matter of whether we use 'being educated' in the sense 
of an achievement or of a process. We could say that the 
aim of being educated (in a ~rocess' sense) is to become 
educated (achievement sense). We could then distinguish 
between education and schooling ( where schooling implies 
being exposed to an institutionalised system of instruction 
of some sort) by saying that, since the notion of a self-
educated man is obviously coherent, 'education' is a 
wider notion of ' schooling' and that we should not confuse 
the two. From here we could focus on the notion of being 
educated (achievement sense) and ask what must be true of 
someone before we would describe them as educated. We 
could then suggest that we wouldn't call anyone educated 
who understood nothing at all and hence that education 
must involve the acquisition of understanding. This, 
however, isn't compelling. 
It could be accepted that the concept of education is 
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wider in scope than that of schooling whilst maintaining 
conceptual ties between the two, with 'education' 
appearing as parasitic on 'schooling'. In the context 
of a particular society, it could be said, our paradigm 
example of education is what goes on in schools. What 
the school system seeks, as a matter of contingent fact, 
to achieve constitutes the aims of education in that 
society. Education appears as a wider concept than 
schooling only in the sense that what successful schooling 
(i.e. institutionalised education under this view) would 
lead a student to achieve could be achieved in other ways. 
But this doesn't invalidate the contention that our 
notion of an educated man (achievement sense) is to be 
analysed in terms of someone who has achieved what a 
successful schooling (one in which what was intended/ 
aimed for had, to a reasonable degree, been achieved) 
would have led him to achieve. On this view what counts 
as education depends on the society/culture being looked 
at and is determined by looking at what counts as being 
successfully schooled in the specific context. 
If this indicates nothing else it indicates that 
attempts to argue from the concept of education to the 
conclusion that the primary aim of institutionalised 
education should be 'this' or 'that' must be suspect. In 
particular it is no use arguing from a concept of 
education which has the propagation of understanding 
written into it and arriving at the conclusion that a 
school system which pursues other aims. even when they 
are in conflict with the aim of propagating understanding, 
is not dealing in education. Such an argument would 
appear viciously circular. 
Whatever our concept of education it is clear that 
the crucial issue at stake here is the question of what 
school systems, institutionalised systems of instruction/ 
education (taking education in the second sense just 
elucidated), should aim to do. So questions about the 
relation between education and understanding can be 
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translated into questions about why we should (or should 
not) regard the propagation of understanding as the primary, 
the over-riding aim of school systems/institutionalised 
systems of instruction/education (again taking 'education' 
in a very thin sense descriptive of what schools seek to 
achieve and having no essential, cross-cultural content). 
I will approach this question by a.sking why someone 
might want to 'educate' in a way which did not propagate 
understanding. This approach does not beg the question, 
"Why understanding at all?" precisely because understanding 
must play some part in education whatever its fundamental 
aim is taken to be. If education is to be acquired through 
instruction (by teachers or books or computers) rather 
than just by living in the world, the educand must be able 
to understand what he is told to some extent. If instruction 
via symbolic communication can be educative, then grasping 
the significance of the symbols used, understanding what 
is said or otherwise displayed, is an essential element 
in being (in the process of being) educated. 
This move, towards focusing attention on the question 
of what schools should aim to achieve, could be resisted 
by asserting that life in itself is educative. But this 
move must be backed up by saying that in living in the 
world we learn 'this' or 'that' and that institutionalised 
learning is only one way we can learn these things. This 
would mean that learning 'these' things (whatever they are) 
is constitutive of being educated and this learning would 
itself involve the acquisition of some sort of understanding 
(that 'this' is what 'one' does in 'these' contexts at least), 
If we didn't restrict the notion to some degree, then 
education would become synonymous with living and hence 
redundant. So education must involve understanding to 
some degree. 
The idea that education might notinvolve:understandtng 
at all leads us into the realms of absurdity. Children 
come to school understanding a great deal already, an 
institution concerned w1th destroying this understanding 
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would seem absurd, an institution not concerned with 
adding anything to this understanding would seem an 
expensive and pointless thing. This only leaves the 
possibility of an institution concerned with the 
propagation of misunderstanding or one concerned only 
with the propagagtion of understanding in certain limited 
areas or one concerned with both of these things (in 
different areas). Being educated (achievement sense) 
• in the context of such an education system would consist 
in understanding some things whilst holding fallacious 
beliefs, constitutive of misunderstanding, about other 
areas. 
If we write in the holding of false beliefs about 
some things into the notion of being educated we are 
holding a view of education which still involves under-
standing, but now the understanding is not of 'these' 
states of affairs, rather it is of what 'one' says when 
confronted with 'these' states of affairs. The under-
standing being propagated is constitutive of being able 
to make the right noises in relevant contexts, it is not 
an understanding of the phenomena being confronted in 
those contexts. It is clear that 'making the right noises' 
in the context of ~ducation' in which misunderstanding 
is being propagated comes down to saying what one, under 
the relevant norms of behaviour/conventions is expected 
to say, not saying how things are (this would be 
symptomatic of understanding). So the next question to 
be asked is about the point of making false statements 
about things - what is the point of putting time and 
effort into propagating false beliefs, into systematically 
deceiving people obout how things are? In other words, 
since any aim of education presupposes that some degree 
of understanding of at least some things is involved, 
why should anyone want to give any other aim priority 
over the propagation of understanding so that when the 
two aims conflict the other aim takes priority and either 
no effort is made to propagate the relevant understanding 
or else misunderstanding is actively propagated? 
It might help us to answer these questions if we look 
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at an imaginary subject which we will call 'physics' 
but which is predominantly fallacious and hence reveals 
little or nothing about those aspects of the world of 
which it purports to treat. The question now is: what point 
could there imaginably be to learning this 'physics'? 
This subject might be richly articulated, its theories 
complex and 'covering' a wide range of 'topics', but 
since it is fallacious it is of little or no use in 
terms of giving us understanding which enables us to see 
how things are and hence to handle many of the problems 
with which the inanimate world confronts us. Why then 
might we learn it when it is cut off from those aspects 
of the world it purports to tell us about, when learning 
it gives us understanding only in the same sense as that 
in which we must understand the rules of chess in order 
to be able to play it? 
A skilled 'physicist' of the sort under discussion 
would have no special skills with respect to handling 
the problems of the inanimate, he would be able to pass 
examinations and to take part in ritual discussions of 
his subject. I say 'ritual discussion' as the nature of 
the 'physics' he has learned would preclude any rigorous 
critical analysis - that would be likely to reveal the 
'conventional wisdom' which the subject consists in as 
fallacious. The only value of such a 'physicist's' 
education would be in terms of social acceptability 
within the community of 'physicists', an incestuous clique 
where making the right noises, saying the right things 
in the right contexts, was all and where anythinG other 
than conventional 'mouthings', whether symptomatic of 
understanding or not. was de-valued, or, perhaps. even 
regarded as the mark of vulgarity and socially unacceptable. 
If we generalised this picture to all education we 
would get an education system in which the primary aim 
was socialisation, but the society for which this 
education prepared people would be a very odd one. Nobody 
in such a society would understand anything but inter-
personal etiquette and even here the understanding would 
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be shallow, consisting in a grasp of what constituted 
correct behaviour in various social contexts and nothing 
more. Anybody who managed to acquire}through their own 
experience, a more complete understanding of the nature 
of their society would have to carefully conceal the fact 
from others in order to avoid sanctions being taken 
against them. 
This imagined society would, in fact, be so completely 
cut off from an indepencent reality, so completely 
decadent, that it could hardly survive. Academics might 
be given positions of prestige, but they would be not at 
all equipped to deal with the problems the world poses. 
In the end, it seems fairly abvious, a society in which 
education came to be so completely divorced from the aim 
of propagating understanding would be destroyed by events 
which would impinge on it but which no-one would understand 
adequately, in a sense of 'adequate understanding' which 
implies that possessing it would enable someone to see how 
the problems which those events pose for the society 
might be solved. My point is that although understanding 
might not always allow us to solve problems in that our 
understanding of something may not always be adequate 
or that irrational pressures might militate against ou~ 
applying a solution which our understanding sugeests, a 
complete lack of understanding of anything but social 
'etiquette' would leave us without the ability to solve 
problems which were not problems about what 'one' should 
do/say in 'this' context. Being ignorant of the nature 
of the various aspects of the world doesn't stop the world 
posing problems for us, it only renders us incapable of 
doing anything about them. 
An education system of this sort would be socially 
disastrous no matter how much people believed in what 
was taught. The society would be rigid and unchanging 
and unable to cope with the problems the world posed for 
it. Such a society is an artificial construct, though in 
the past, and in some cases at the present time, societies 
dominated py.reliS;QuS world views have shown a tendency 
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to prefer the propagation of uncritical adherence to 
dogma over the inculcation of a deeper, more reflective 
and hence critical understanding. More prevalent is a 
situation where understanding is propagated in ideo-
logically more neutral areas whilst in more sensitive 
areas critical reflection is seen as subversive and 
adherence to dogma encouraged. In areas like maths 
and physics the propagation of understanding is seen 
as central whilst the political sensitivity of things 
like social studies and economics leads to the propa-
gation of particular ideological views. Thus ideologies 
are often views which, like those of Marxist and 
laisse~·faire economics, were originally generated by 
people in pursuit of understanding but which later 
generations have come to venerate for a variety of 
reasons so that, in specific societies, questioning them 
has come to be seen as an act of subversion rather than 
as an attempt to discover their weaknesses and (hence) 
to formulate a more accurate view, to achieve a better 
understanding. 
Insofar as attempting to propagate a more subtle 
understanding of some areas in some societies is likely 
to be reearded as subversion a teacher who insisted on 
the primacy of the propagation of understanding as an 
aim for education, even in sensitive areas, would be 
putting his head on the chopping block. More importantly, 
from a moral point of view, any teacher who encouraged 
critical awareness in his pupils on issues where anything 
but complete adherence to a dominant orthodoxy is likely 
to lead to conflict with the state would, in effect, be 
putting his pupil$~ heads on the chopping block. The 
dilemma here is whether being right, in the sense of 
standing up for the truth (or what we can rationally 
demonstrate to be a more accurate way of looking) is 
more important than social acceptability, or success in 
material terms or even, in an extreme case, personal 
survival. 
One view might be to say that to give pupils 
543 
understanding which might get them labelled as social 
deviants does them no good at all and that the teacher 
who is the root of all their troubles is morally culpable, 
the question of the truth or accuracy of the view he 
propagates being irrelevant. Against this we might raise 
the question of what sort of society we're talking about. 
Surely a teacher who taught that the mass slaughter of 
Jews or Negroes was perfectly alright, because Jews and 
Negroes are an inferior species more akin to pigs and 
cattle than 'real' people, would be morally culpable even 
if a failure to teach such things would get him into 
trouble with the state. And we might feel that in such an 
extreme situation those who say nothing in the face of 
atrocities were morally culpable just for their silence 
in the face of what they must surely have known to be a 
paradigm example of unmitigated evil-doing. Bonhoeffer 
was hung by the Nazis for asserting that the mass murder 
of Jews was wrong. We may lack his courage, we might keep 
our heads down whilst he stood up to be counted - and hung. 
But if we believe that he was right, if we regard him as 
almost a saint and his death as martyrdom, we can't just 
turn round and say, "But he was a saint, we can't all be 
saints," and then think that our inaction is justified. 
To say of someone that his actions are those of a saint 
is to say that our failure to follow his example is a 
result of our own inadequacy. In failing to stand up 
against what is wrong we are surely culpable, our lack 
of moral fibre may mitigate that culpability, but it 
doesn't make our silent acquiesence morally right. 
Of course this could be countered by saying that in 
the case of a Bonhoeffer or of a Thomas More facing death 
is not so great a trial as for others because their 
religious faith makes the choice between standing up for 
what's right and acquiescing to perverted convention appear 
as one between salvation and purgatory. For those of us 
whose faith is less sure, or even non-existent, choosing 
death or being a social outcast simply on a moral 
principle is less easy, the rewards of acquiescence are' 
likely to be tangible whilst standing on principle may be 
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seen as the path to oblivion. I cannot offer any 
solution to this moral problem, it may be that the 
question posed has no general answer, must be answered 
by each of us in confrontation with particular situations, 
with our own consciences and our own faith (or lack of it). 
In a less than ideal world compromise is often the only 
solution and how far compromise can go before we betray 
ourselves completely 1s perhaps a matter for each person 
to reflect upon. 
I would argue, however, that whatever the problems 
which arise in real societies because of adherence to ' 
irrational beliefs about the nature of things (the natural 
world or the social world etc.), dogmatic adherence to 
particular views is always unjustified. Our understanding 
of anything independent of our overt conventions is always 
uncertain and open to change - this is clear from earlier 
discussion. So dogmatic, unquestioning, adherence to any 
particular way of looking is always dangerous, even if the 
view is, at the time it is adopted (which may be the case, 
though it often isn't), the best account available of 
relevant aspects of the world. A failure to see the 
possibility of constructing a better account or a failure 
to allow such accounts to replace orthodox views, leads 
only to stagnation. Dogmatic adherence to demonstrably 
inadequate accounts leads only to an inability to cope 
with relevant aspects of the world. A society which, 
through through dogmatic adherence to inadequate views of 
the nature of social change or economics, leaves itself 
unable to cope with social and economic problems is a 
society heading for disaster. 
I cannot accept the view that attempting to propagate 
a more subtle, reflective and critical understanding of 
social and economic problems is subsersive in the sense 
of promoting strife and unrest. A desire to understand 
and solve such problems, it seems to me, is likely to 
lead to a more stable society. People who understand 
what is involved, and see a general desire to improve 
our understanding and to solve social and economic 
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problems, are less likely to be impressed by demands 
for violent revolution than those who simply react 
emotively through frustration. So, I believe, an education 
system which ignores important areas like social and 
political education, or else seeks to propagate views 
which simply don't 'marry' with people's experiences 
in life, is more subYersive in the sense of being likely 
to promote strife, than one which seeks to get people 
to understand, even if we must sometimes tell our pupils 
that our understanding is very poor as yet.' My argument 
really comes down to the suggestion that people who see 
their home society as valuing understanding, as trying 
to understand important problems and to solve them, are 
less likely to become alienated from the political 
apparatus of the state, are less likely to become wreckers. 
Thus, although irrational forces operant in real-life 
societies may militate against education being primarily 
concerned with the propagation of understanding, I think 
it is reasonable to suggest that where this occurs the 
state, to some degree, is in trouble. The ideal must be 
an education system which seeks to propagate understanding 
of all important areas. Contingent factors in different 
states/societies may require us to compromise this ideal, 
but the rational course must be to attempt to maintain 
the propagation of understanding as the central aim of 
education as far as this is possible. The propagation of 
understanding is an ideal which we should aim for even 
though contingent factors are likely to militate against 
our achieving it. It is the elusive goal towards which 
our small advances should be aimed. 
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The Curriculum. 
The central problem of curriculum design is selection: 
there is just too much knowledge, there are too many 
specialist endeavours for us ever to introduce pupils 
to them all in school. So we need principles of selection 
to enable us to choose what should appear in the curriculum 
of an institution designed to give a sound general 
education. 
It seems to me that the problem domains of the inanimate, 
animate, interpersonal, personal and absolutist give a 
general shape for a balanced curriculum insofar as these 
are areas of important problems the solution of which has 
l~d specialists in these areas to adopt different 
assumptions about what's being looked at. These different 
metaphysical assumptions lead to different 'forms' of 
knowledge being generated (through the use of different 
ways of looking). 
One source of disquiet about my account of the differen~ 
modes of understanding might come from those who see it as 
just another 'forms of knowledge'- approach to the 
curriculum. Such people might fully accept my classification 
as a general shape but would want to know how to go about 
selecting deta~led content for the curriculum. Their 
mistrust of my account would arise from their recollection 
that the forms of knowledge derived by Hirst gave a 
general shape for the curriculum too, but that he could 
say little about the more detailed selection of curriculum 
content. 
Hirst sees each form of knowledge as something like a 
way of looking and regards a liberal education as being 
a matter of initiation of pupils into the way of looking 
of each of the forms. To him the question of what precisely 
to teach appears as an empirical question about the best 
way, given the psychological facts about them, of giving 
pupils a reasonable idea of what each form is about. Thus 
Hirst's position on more detailed curriculum and syllabus 
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content is that it doesn't matter what is taught except 
insofar as the choice of subject matter must be designed 
as far as possible to facilitate initiation into the forms-
this is a matter for empirical enquiry, not for philosophy. 
Given that it is difficult, for reasons which should be 
clear from my discussion of understanding, to accept 
Hirst's assertion that each form of knowledge has a 
clearly definable set of concepts and a logical structure, 
his assertion that choice of what to teach from each form 
is not a matter on which philosophy has anything to say 
becomes suspect. The question I must answer is that of 
whether my domains are any better than Hirst's forms in 
terms of giving criteria of selection that can help 
with deciding what precisely to teach. 
I believe that my domains don't have the same problems 
as Hirst's forms because, although the different 
assumptions about the phenomena being looked at which have 
been made in the different domains do lead to different 
sorts of knowledge being generated, my account of the 
domains is linked not to the logical structure of the 
knowledge generated, but to the different sorts of problems 
which specialist enquiry in the domains attempts to deal 
with. I have further argued, in my discussion of the 
domains, that their importance is derived from the importance 
in everyday life of the basic problems (i.e. problems 
which can be seen as such from a non-specialist standpoint) 
with which they engage. In other words the domains cover 
a range of problems which confront us all in life and the 
importance of education in the domains derived from the 
fact that understanding what the problems are and, where 
we have the understanding, how to solve them makes everyday 
life more comprehensible and hence handleable. 
Thus I have done what Hirst did not, namely suggested 
an answer to the question of why people should value the 
understanding generated in my domains. I have done this 
only at a general level, designed to show the value/ 
importance of the different domains, but my general Position, 
that the value of the, understanding gained depends on the 
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importance of the problems it was generated in engagement 
with, does give criteria for a more detailed selection of 
curriculum and syllabus content: what we should teach is 
to be decided in terms of what understanding is needed 
to enable us to handle important problems. Other 
considerations must playa part, especially phychological 
findings about what it is possible to teach to pupils of 
different ages, but the primary philosophical point is 
that we should teach, as far as possible (given the 
psychological and logistic contingencies) what it is 
important to know/understand. 
I cannot, however, go on from here to derive a detailed 
account of curriculum content. This is because of my 
rejection of absolutism and my contention (in my section 
on absolutism) that, given the failure of absolutist 
metaphysics to establish establish criteria for absolute 
truth, the only rational course is to adopt the approach 
I designated rational peicemealism. This move, as I 
argued in earlier discussion, entails that I should give 
up the search for an a priori theory of value, instead 
accepting, in the absence of compelling arguments as to 
why they are wrong, that what people do in fact value/ 
regard as important is valuable/imporxant (and also 
accepting the fact that future events may require us to 
revise some values which currently are held justifiably). 
Having abandoned the search for an a priori theory of 
value which (if found) would allow me to give a more 
specific account of what should appear in the curriculum 
I am unable to give such an account simply because my 
position on value makes the question of which areas from 
each domain are of sufficient value to require their 
inclusion in the curriculum of a school system designed 
to give a general education one which is, in part, empirical. 
Given the requirement that such a curriculum must 
draw on all the domains the decision about what in any 
particular domain should be included, and what excluded, 
must be. made in a general discussion of relative importance. 
Philosophers have a role in such discussion in terms of 
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revealing inconsistencies and demonstrably untenable 
values, but the basic question of what is important 
must be one on which many different groups within a 
society have views which should be taken into consideration. 
In the context of such a discussion aims like preparation 
for citizenship or the propagation of a cultural 
inheritance may quite properly playa part insofar as 
such things are regarded as important. I am wary of 
such aims if they are given priority over the propagation 
of understanding for reasons fully discussed in the 
section 'Education and Understanding', but if the priority 
of propagating understanding is accepted these aims can 
still playa part in assessing the relative i~portance 
of work in different disciplines and sub-disciplines 
within domains. Once the selection of areas to be 
included in the curriculum has been made specialists in 
these areas will have to be asked what sorts of thing 
are of central importance to particular areas and this 
selection, modified in the light of psychological and 
logistic constraints on what is teachable' (given the 
pupils and availability of resources), will constitute 
syllabus content. Thus although I cannot give a fully 
specified account of what should be on the curriculum, 
my position on the value of understanding does give 
criterion of selection which will be of help to those 
planning a curriculum. 
The central point about judgements on importance is 
that they should be rationally tenable. To pass on what 
is seen (within a society) as important without examining 
the question of whether it should be regarded as important, 
is, for reasons given, a socially dangerous thing to do, 
But much of what is seen as important in societies ~ 
rationally supportable and if we can propagate under-
standing from the domains, give our pupils knowledge of 
their· cultural roots and prepare them for life-after-school 
in one package. that would seem an eminently sensible 
thing to do. I only become wary of aims like preparation 
for citizenship and passing on a cultural inheritance 
when the propagation of understanding is not given priority. 
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A failure to do this might make education valueless 
except in terms of social acceptability and a society 
going down that path is a society heading for disaster. 
I don't think that philosophical argument alone can 
give us a specific curriculum content, only that 
philosophy can give a basic template, can suggest criteria 
for more detailed selection (i.e. importance of basic 
problems) and can playa part in the discussion of what, 
amongst those areas seen as important, can reasonably 
be accepted as important. The discussion of what is 
important enough for inclusion in the curriculum is one 
in which non-philosophical issues must playa part. But 
an important philosophical point arises from the idea 
that understanding a discipline must involve more than 
rote learning of its concepts and procedures as 'recipes' 
for answering exam questions, that it must involve 
seeing the discipline as engaging with basic problems, 
problems which are important beyond the boundaries of 
the specialist community. A curriculum of different 
subjects in which each subject is looked at in isolation 
from other subjects and from everyday life is unlikely 
to result in an inadequate understanding. Earlier 
discussion has emphasised that disciplines inter-relate 
in many ways and that the domains themselves are not 
distinct in any clear-cut way, the structure of the 
curriculum should surely reflect such facts. 
Consideration of the nature of understanding should lead 
us to plan actual syllabuses very carefully not only to 
give pupils a grasp of such things as the language, con-
cepts and procedures current in particular disciplines, 
but also of why those concepts etc. are appropriate for 
those disciplines. This involves giving pupils a view 
of the discipline as an historically evolving endeavour 
concerned with certain sorts of problem (and not with 
others). Further, disciplines must be shown as inter-
relating. I don't take this to imply the necessity of 
a totally integrated approach where subjects disappear 
from the timet~ble. Rather I take it to require that 
what is taught to whom and when be planned so that, 
I 
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for instance, when co-ordinate geometry is done in Maths, 
map-reading is done in geography. The teachers of 
different subjects should be aware of what's going on 
in other departments and make reference to it. In this 
way a subject like maths could, as it is taught, be 
related to geography, physics, and even needlework (curve 
stitching, designs in embroidery) amongst other subjects 
in a way that would make it more alive for the pupils. 
And pupils would receive constant reminders of what 
they had done - something which might well increase 
their retention of new ideas. 
Pla~nlng such interaction would be a matter for 
individual schools and departments. Maths relates easily 
to the physical sCiences, but there are other less obvious 
things that could be done. Making and playing musical 
instruments could relate music, maths, physics, woodwork 
and metal work (both practical and design skills) and 
even the art department could get in on the act. Even 
the English department could get involved (after all 
songs have lyrics) and, in the case of folk song, history, 
geography and social studies could contribute. I'm not 
suggesting that everyone should make and learn to play 
a musical.instrument, this is just an illustration, but 
surely interdisciplinary co-operation on projects could 
work and surely teachers could devise schemes where 
different subjects, working at different times, could 
contribure to projects which would enhance pupils' under-
standing of all fields. 
In saying this I am wilfully ignoring the fact that 
to implement a co-ordinated curriculum would take up a 
great deal of time, time which teachers, in Britain 
particularly, just don't have. In a time of economic 
difficulty we can hardly expect things to improve, But 
I think it is worth asserting that preparation and 
planning are of crucial importance in education as 
without them much actual teaching time is wasted or, 
worse still, does educational damage. We have known this 
for a long time yet teachers still have to do their 
, I 
, I 
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planning preparation and marking mostly in their own 
time. The extra work co-ordinating the curriculum would 
involve would be quite large and would need the commit~ent 
which many teachers at the end of a long day and faced 
with a pile of marking to take home with them, would be 
reluctant to give. 
It seems to me that there are two possible solutions 
to this problem of how to improve schooling, one is a 
centrally planned compulsory curriculum, the other is 
to give teachers more time for planning and preparation. 
The former would be cheaper as the latter would require 
more manpower, but centralised planning bodies often 
become political arenas (the Schools' Council has often 
been attacked on these grounds), and when education gets 
buffeted by political tides nobody seems to benefit. 
More importantly what can be done in specific schools 
depends upon available resources, in terms of what 
equipment the school can afford, and also in terms of 
opportunities arising from the school's locality and 
the special skills available in the staff. These latter 
two factors are uncontrollable, not every school is a 
tube-ride away from the Tower of London and not every 
qualified teacher of technical subjects has a keen interest 
in motor bikes and a thorough knowledge of their mechanics. 
If planning is done at school level such chance 
opportunities can be exploited, if the detail of curriculum 
and syllabus content is imposed 'from above' the flexibility 
needed to exploit unique chances is likely to be lost. 
I would say, however, that if detailed planning at school 
level remains logistically impossible, or at least isn't 
done, a centralised curriculum body might.be the lesser 
ot two eVils. 
I will continue now by looking at the familiar subjects 
that get taught at schools from the pOint of view of each 
of the domains in an attempt to show that, if we approach 
the different aubjects properly, the sort of curriculum 
found in schools can give an adequate representation of 
the domains and hence form the basis of a balanced education. 
I I 
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The inanimate. 
In terms of subjects currently taught the inanimate is 
well represented in the curriculum of most existing school 
systems, even if, in this country, we have a shortage of 
qualified teachers of the physical sciences. We have 
physics and chemistry, or at least general science, on the 
curriculum of most schools as well as technical studies 
which seems to be moving away from being just woodwork 
and metalwork towards engineering studies in which the 
links between theory and practise in this domain can be 
brought out. Inclusion of geometrical and engineering 
drawing in technical studies is nothing new, nor, though 
it is not wide spread, is the inclusion of car and/or 
motorcycle mechanics. Closer co-operation with science 
departments must surely become (if it isn't already) part 
of this trend towards engineering studies. 
Technical studies, being connected with practical 
skills in rather obvious ways, has less likelihood of 
being seen by pupils as just a game played at school than 
the pure sciences. In physics and chemistry there is a 
danger of packing the syllabus with theory to the point 
where little time is left for the inculcation of a wider 
grasp of what the physical sciences are about. This, I 
suggest, is likely to leave what is taught looking,from 
the point of view of the pupil, like little more than a 
series of recipes for answering exam questions and even 
successful students are likely to end up regarding the 
point of studying, say, physics as the passing of C.S.E.I 
'0'1 'A' level exams. We do not, it seems to me, give 
enough credence to the idea that we should attempt to 
show the physical sciences as traditions of enquiry which 
are concerned with the problems of the inanimate and which 
have generated a body of theory, underpinned by specialist 
concepts, in order to solve those problems. We teach what 
might be called the form of knowledge without putting it 
in its true pe~spective, withour relating it to the 
specialist form of life which generated it and, hence, 
without relating it to the non-specialist problems which 
! 
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are the specialist form of life's raisons d'etre. 
The question of what should be taught in lessons in 
the physical sciences is one for specialists, but my 
contention is that specialists should ask themselves 
not, "What sort of theories should we select from the 
body of theory our discipline has generated?" but 
rather, "What should we teach about our subject so that 
those who learn it will have a reasonable idea of what 
our subject is about?" The answer will include not only 
a body of concepts/theory/skills to be mastered, but 
also some sort of historical perspective, a view of where 
the discipline is coming from and where it's going to, 
and why. And here, as in all subjects, a question which 
must be answered as far as possible to the satisfaction 
of pupils is that of why the subject is important. This 
can only be done by showing pupils that the specialist 
problems are !inked to problems beyond the discipline, 
that the theory has implications for (and impact on) 
everyday life_ When someone has this understanding the 
point of more esoteric work can be seen in terms of its 
importance within the specialist endeavour and hence, its 
indirect importance for our ability to operate in the 
world. Without this understanding the more esoteric 
theory gets the more pointless it appears (except, of 
course, for those whose interest is intrinsic). 
The task of breathing life into dead theory is a 
non-task from the point of view of specialists, but not 
from the point of view of pupils. The theories of the 
physical sciences are relevant to all our lives, but we 
must show this to pupils, it is not enough to 'stuff 
theory in 'til it comes out of their ears' and hope that 
they catch on to the point of it all. One idea that I 
believe to be important is that of the co-ordinated 
curriculum. If teaching in the pure sciences is unrelated 
to teaching in technical studies we are just wasting 
a chance to enrich both areas by showing pupils how they 
inter-relate. What I am arguing is not that a subject-
based curriculum should be abandoned, but that we should 
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re-appraise what is involved in teaching a subject by 
asking what sorts of thing we should include in a 
syllabus designed to inculcate an understanding of both 
the discipline as a tradition of enquiry and the 
discipline's body of theory as a way of looking at the 
world. Relating the discipline's interests to the interests 
of other discipline's (~ contrasting these) is a way 
of doing this and it is clear that the 'practical' subjects 
have a part to play. 
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The animate. 
Here we must include biology together with health 
education and sex education and with some parts of 
domestic science, where things like child development 
are taught. It seems to me, also, that P.E., besides 
involving playing games and physical training, can 
properly be seen to have a role in health education 
and in teaching about human physiology (e.g. the mechanics 
of running or throwing). P.E. teachers certainly learn 
much about such subjects before they qualify, but, I 
suggest, we don't seem to use their knowledge sufficiently 
when they get into schools. Human biology is as much an 
area to be taught by the P.E. teacher, it seems to me, 
as by the biology teacher. The link lies in the relation 
between theoretical descriptions of human physiology 
and the physical abilities we have. A runner who grasps 
the theory of the mechanics of running has both increased 
his theoretical understanding of his own body (and others' 
bodies) and arrived at a way of looking at what he does 
....-.op 
when he runs which should enable him to alter his style 
and hence run faster. 
The link between ecology and some areas of geography 
should be clear. Explaining the location of cities or the 
incidence of different sorts of agriculture or of a 
fishing industry are related to the sorts of pictures 
ecologists build up of food chains and the general 
interdependance of life-systems. In fact ecology is as 
much a part of geography as of biology. Again here I 
cannot usurp the specialists role in selecting detailed 
content for the curriculum, but again, the important idea 
to keep in mind is that mastery of concepts, procedure, 
etc. is only a part of understanding a discipline. The 
design of the syllabus must be informed by a desire to 
show pupils that the discipline is an evolving endeavour 
concerned with the problems of the animate, problems which 
arise in the world, which are more than esoteric puzzles. 
The aim must always be to achieve both mastery of a way 
of looking ~ to see that way of looking as illuminating 
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the world, as making the world more significant-for-us 
and hence as enabling us to find our way around in it/ 
to handle it more efficiently. 
I won't go through a whole host of illustrations 
here, I think the basic points made earlier generalise 
easily to any subject. In helping pupils to understand 
a discipline we should be concerned with showing them the 
discipline as a form ot life concerned with certain 
sorts of problem but not others, we should be concerned 
to inculcate a reasonable degree of mastery of the 
relevant way of looking and we should be concerned to 
show our pupils the importance of the endeavour ~by 
relating specialist problems both to the problems of 
other specialities and to problems which impinge directly 
on everyday life). It seems to me that the main problem 
we have now is that we overemphasise the second of these 
concerns at the expense of the other two. The domain 
of the animate is reasonably well populated in terms of 
subjects on the timetable, the problem is that what we 
teach tends to misrepresent the subject: too much 'dead' 
theory is taught and too little time is left for, and 
attention given to, breathing life into it by showing, 
pupils the whole point of having such theory in the 
first place. This failing, though, isn't unique to the 
disciplines in the animate. Generally in education we 
seem to emphasise the remembering of information without 
enquiring into the question of whether any real under-
standing (of the theory as something more than material 
for regurgitation in exams) has been aChieved. 
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The Interpersonal. 
The teaching of language skills, social studies, some 
areas of geography and of drama of certain sorts (like 
improvised role-play) can constitute education in the 
interpersonal and the study of both history and of 
literature have a part to play here. The main problem 
in the interpersonal is the contentiousness, from one 
point of,view or another, of virtually all theoretical 
descriptions of society and social change, including 
theories in economics. In the physical sciences and the 
life sciences we find it relatively easy to select which 
theoretical way of looking to teach school kids. This may 
not always be the best available way of looking for 
practical reasons- we still teach a predominantly Newtonian 
physics, for instance, simply because the Einsteinian 
paradigm is too far from our ordinary language ways of 
looking for 'direct entry' to be feasible. We teach 
classical physics as a fairly good way of looking and one 
which will open up the way for entry into the rather 
disquieting world (disquieting in its contradiction of 
our common-sense understanding) of relativistic physics 
where time and space are variables. But theories in the 
social sciences are so diverse and mutually contradictory 
that selecting one approach is unjustifiable. If we want 
to teach politics or sociology we must refrain from 
telling pupils, "This is how things are," and must instead 
select the main strands of theory and tell p~pils, "This 
is how some people have said how things are - what do you 
think?" Since we have no generally accepted answers we 
must introduce pupils to ~he problems, give them an 
understanding of the answers that have been offered and 
their short-comings and tell them to make up their own 
minds. If we do anything other than this we are not 
promoting understanding of the social world, rather we 
are propagating dogma, and this is dangerous as a wrong 
or an incomplete 'solution' to social problems, no matter 
how devoutly people believe it, will not overcome the 
difficulties that society poses us. If we propagate a 
dogma (whether that of Marxism or that of 'free enterprise') 
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we simply abandon the search for understanding and leave 
our society open to the rava.ges of forces we only dimly 
comprehend. 
It seems to me that the teaching of explicit theory 
is only one way of educating in the interpersonal. In 
language teaching we are concerned with inculcating mastery 
of a socially defined mode of symbolisation, one that 
varies not only between cultures which use different 
languages, but also between sub-cultures using the same 
language. Understanding that language can vary and yet 
still function perfectly well in expression and communi-
cation is a way of seeing the people-constituted nature 
of social institutions. Reading poetry could bring this 
lesson home, contrasting the romantic poets with the 
modern poetry of people like McGough or Patten, with the 
American 'beat' poets like Ginsberg and Corso, with the 
poetry of black America (LeRoy Jones for instance) and 
the dialect poetry of West Indian poets (e.g. Linton Kwesi 
Johnson), or of Robert Burns. In all these cases we would 
get different uses of language, different grammatical 
constructions (not entirely, but certainly in part), 
different words. Pupils could be got to see the diversity 
of language not in terms of correct/incorrect English 
(surely Labov's work in 'The Logic of Nonstandard English' 
has discredited that view) but in terms of differences 
which give language a richness that total adherence to 
standard English would reduce to a co~paratively dull 
uniformity. I'm not saying that all that is written in 
standard English is dull, just that much that is written 
in non-standard English should not be dismissed. Nor can 
we reasonably represent non-standard English literature 
as the product of people who have learned and transcended 
standard rules, counter examples abound - a blues song 
like, "St. James' Infirmary," seems to me to be a powerful 
poem even if its author(s) were semi-literate blacks who 
never learned to 'speak properly'. And, of course, the 
study, in translation, of a work like Wu Chi Eng Eng's 
'fwlonkey' or of Njal' s Saga or Tristan could introduce 
pupils to very different world Views, very 
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different cultural attitudes, values and beliefs. 
Understanding cultural differences in speech patterns 
and social etiquette is a way of understanding the nature 
of social institutions better, simply by making us aware 
of the element of choice, our choice, in the determination 
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of social rules. Drama lessons involving improvised role-
play can add to people's understanding of social institutions 
by getting them to imaginatively put themselves in 
unfamiliar social settings, by getting them to reflect 
on why one might do 'this' in 'this' social context. Here 
also might be brought out the tensions between personal 
feelings and the demands made on individuals by their 
home society - the relations between the interpersonal 
and the personal. Reflections on such issues can easily 
become moral education insofar as this must involve more 
than getting people to behave correctly (Where 'correct' 
is viewed normatively), insofar as discussion of a drama 
gets down to the level of reflecting on notions like 
'right' and 'wrong' more sensitively, even more philoso-
phically (and I don't think that reflecting philosophically 
necessarily means dOing ethics formally, although I believe 
that school pupils are capable of grasping philosophical 
positions if these are put simply). 
All these things are education in the interpersonal 
and all could be included in what schools teach - in fact 
many teachers do such work already. Careers education can 
play a part in teaching pupils about their home SOCiety 
as can more formal studies. History can show some of the 
reasons for particular social changes, though here again 
a balance would have to be struck between conflicting 
views. Finally political education must playa part here, 
even though the planning of a balanced syllabus in this 
area may often be frustrated by influential dogmatists 
of the right and of the left. 
Education in the interpersonal also has a role in 
enriching our pupils' understanding of all disciplines 
insofar as disciplines are interpersonally constituted 
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traditions of enquiry and understanding a discipline 
must involve some grasp of this. It seems to me that 
history has an important part to play here, not just 
the history of great men or social history, but the 
history of ideas, of art, of science, of maths etc. A 
historical approach might play a part in the actual 
teaching of maths or physics, or co-ordination between 
the history department and other departments might be 
the answer. I don't want to offer a solution which 
should be adopted by all schools, the best solution 
for any particular school will depend, after all, on 
the expertise available within its teaching staff, and 
that will vary from school to school and department to 
department within schools. 
All I want to say is that it seems odd to me that 
anyone could be regarded as having an adequate under-
standing of, say, mathe who doesn't have some historical 
perspective on the problems which led to the generation 
of calculus, of trigonometry and other areas of the 
subject. This is something of a personal confession as 
I myself learned a great deal about, for instance, Cauchy 
sequences, and passed exams requiring me to use my 
knowledge of them, before I ever became aware of the 
historical importance of Cauchy as the I1Bn who ended two 
centuries of embittered debate over the validity of the 
notion of a limit in the context of calculus and hence 
over the coherence of calculus as both a branch of 
mathematics and as part of the methodology of physics. 
It seems to me that the understanding of mathematics 
which I, a.nd many other teachers, acquired in order to 
become recognised teachers of the subject was confined 
largely to learning its technicalities and, as a result, 
was a thin sort of understanding. This problem is one 
which institutions of higher education must take note 
of as much as schools. 
Education in the interpersonal does not, it seems 
clear, demand massive changes to the subject-based 
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curriculum we now have, although it might involve a 
different selection of subject-matter in some areas 
(in poems/novels selected in literature classes for 
instance). It does, however, require that teachers 
regard education in the interpersonal as important 
and plan what they teach accordingly. Teachers must be 
sensitive to areas which they teach which carry social 
implications and we must bring out those implications 
clearly. We must not tell pupils 'how things are' in 
the social world in the sense of inculcating belief 
that one theoretical perspective is true and the rest 
false. That would be to mislead pupils by claiming a 
higher degree of certainty about the nature of society 
than we can reasonably justify claiming. The 'magnificent 
myth' of Plato's 'Republic' might seem an attractive 
ploy for achieving social stability, but the reassuring 
side of such paternalism is more than counter balanced 
by the 'big lies' of men like Adolf Hitler. Understanding 
society and social relationships must involve more than 
according with established rules, it must involve seeing 
those rules as arrived at through interpersonal agreement 
and hence binding only for so long as people acquiesce 
to them. The tacit acquiescence of a man who behaves 
properly through lack of oppmrtunity or imagination or 
else through fear of sanctions does not result from a 
proper understanding. If we seek to propagate understanding 
of the interpersonal we must aim to get people who can see 
that things might be otherwise to acquiesce overtly to 
sQcia1 rules because they see relevant reasons (reasons 
why 'this' is the right way to behave) for acquiescing. 
If it is replied that fear of as oppressive regime is good 
reason for acquiescence I simply re-state my remarks made 
when I discussed 'education and understanding', that it 
seems to me that whilst fear can mitigate our doing some-
thing we know to be wrong, it doesn't make us right. 
I should say before moving on that I do not see my 
remarks here as subsersive except from the pOint of view 
of those who see society as divided between shepherds, 
whose job it is to make the rules, and sheep, whose r~le 
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is to do as they're told. Helping pupils understand 
the possibility of social change being brought about, 
by democratic decision, by economic depression, by 
popular uprising or in any other way, is not the same thing 
as making social education a way of building a potential 
revolutionary class. Awareness of the problems of society 
and of the possibility of change is a way of making 
people socially responsible. Someone who sees what the 
problems to be solved are will also see the necessity 
of making changes that will solve those problems whilst 
not generating even bigger ones. A more subtle grasp 
of the problems of society and of the potential danger 
of jumping from the frying pan into the fire is not, I 
think, likely to convince our pupils that; "We don't 
want to understand society, we just want to change it," 
is the right approach to building a better society. Rather, 
I suggest, the vast majority, on seeing the complexity 
of the issues involved and the dangers of 'going off half 
cocked', would surely have some sympathy with these words 
of Montaigne's, written about the Reformation in France: 
"In our present quarrel, where there are a hundred 
questions to remove and reinsert, great and profound 
questions, God knows how many people there are who 
can boast of having exactly understood the reasons 
and foundations of both sides. They are so few, 
if there are any, that they would not have much 
power to trouble a.nyone. But all the others, where 
are they going? Under what banner are they 
breaking away. 
Their case is like that of weak medicines 
poorly administered; the humours that they seek 
to purge are heated, exasperated and embittered 
by the conflict, and still remain in the tody. 
Because of its weakness, the cure has not 
succeeded in healing us, and yet it has weakened 
us so that we cannot expel it either, and all 
that we have as a consequence is a long intestinal 
~ain. " 
("On Custom and Why We Should Not Easily Change 
an Accepted Law," from Book 1 (1572-74) 
reprinted in "The Essential !1ontaigne" edited 
and translated by Serge Hughes.) 
Increasing people's understanding of society, even if we 
haven't got much further than a partial understanding 
of the complexity of the problems involved, is, I suggest 
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a way of making people more socially responsible, more 
sensitive to difficulties and less open to dogma. This 
sort of understanding would make a unified society where 
there was a will for social justice more, rather than 
less, stable. It would only be subversive in contexts 
where stability depended on the oppressed failing to 
see their oppression as a yoke that might be removed. 
Such understanding in such.a society would be subversive, 
but the society itself woukd have the potential for 
instability, for social strife, built into its basic 
structure. 
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The Personal. 
Education in the domain of the personal must be 
concerned with getting pupils to understand themselves 
and others as subjects of experience with complex affective 
lives. In this area there is no adequate body of theory 
which reveals people's inner lives in a way that we can 
reasonably describe as accurate. Psycho-analytic theory 
has too many internal problems for us to accept that 
grasping such theory can be justifiably said to give us 
even a fairly good understanding of the workings of the 
human mind even though it may embody insights which will 
be of help to those engaged in trying to construct a 
more acceptable theory. But learning explicit theory 
isn't, as I argued in 'Knowledge and Understanding (ii)', 
the only way to acquire understanding. Theory is generated 
in engagement with problems, and ultimately, if the 
theory is to appear as more than a complex game, it must 
have implications which are relevant to problems which 
confront us in everyday life. Direct engagement with 
such problems can lead to the acquisition of understanding, 
even if that understanding is manifested in an improved 
ability to deal with relevant aspects of the world rather 
than as explicit theory. So, perhaps, in the absence of a 
body of explicit theory which we would feel justified in 
teaching, we should approach education in the personal 
by attempting to get our pupils to engage with the 
problems of the personal, the problems arising from the 
complexity of our inner lives, in the hope that an 
increased sensitivity to the problems will, even if we 
can offer no general answers, help our pupils to find 
their way in personal interaction more successfully. 
Literature can be of help here as well as in the 
interpersonal. Besides showing us the diversity of 
language and giving us the writer's view on some aspect 
of SOCial organisation literature shows us human relation-
ships and imaginatively empathising with characters in 
novels, plays and films can, as I suggested when I 
discussed 'Understanding and the Emotions', be a way of 
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making us more sensitive to the feelings of others and 
hence a way of understanding them better. Engagement 
in artistic creativity, for reasons I gave in my general 
discussion of the personal. can also be a way of looking 
within ourselves and we can also find out more about 
ourselves and others from the way we, and they, respond 
to different works of art. The 'dual
' 
nature of art, as 
both interpersonally constituted symbol and as intimately 
personal expression also makes the arts an area where 
tension between the personal and the interpersonal is 
a particular problem - the question must always arise of 
how far an artist can stray from convention before his 
work becomes unintelligible to his audience. 
Drama, in particular, seems to be an ideal medium 
for education in the personal. I have already suggested 
that role-play is a good way for people to become more 
sensitive to social roles that are not their own, and 
by extension any activities which involve pupils in 
pretending to be some other person, particularly if the 
acting-out is augmented by discussion of what motives 
'this' person in Ithis' context might have, or of how 
'that' person might feel in those circumstances would 
encourage pupils to greater sensitivity towards others. 
The acting is a way of engaging the imagination, of 
'getting under a character's skin' more completely than 
passive reflection can usually manage, it is a teaching 
method, but, it seems to me, a most appropriate one. 
Acting out the drama is, in itself, inadequate, but 
this is hardly likely to surprise or upset drama teachers 
most of whom see the importance of discussing things like 
motivation and feeling of characters before, during and 
after acting starts and who would regard such issues as 
important in the assessment of the success of a performance. 
It is obvious also that plays can play a part in personal-
education-through-drama and that here selection of material 
which pupils can relate to, in terms of having ideas 
about what is happening and, most importantly, why, is 
of central importance if the endeavour is to be 
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educationally successful. 
The links between the personal and other areas can 
be brought out in many ways. I have already mentioned 
the centrality of the problem of how to balance art as 
personal expression against art as interpersonal symbol 
to the whole artistic endeavour. But there are also 
problems with the inanimate which artists must handle, 
problems about what can be done in a particular medium 
and how to do it must be faced when planning a. work of 
art and here maths and physics, not to mention materia~s 
science (for sculptors experimenting with new materials) 
are relevant. And the arts also contribute to other areas, 
not just with aesthetic notions like that of an elegant 
mathematical proof, but with help in design - aesthetic 
considerations playa part in fields from architecture 
to motor-car design to the formats of books and newspapers. 
It seems clear that engagement with the arts, in 
reading literature, looking at visual art, listening to 
music ~ in active participation in artistic creativity, 
can contribute to our understanding of the personal so 
long as teachers see this as an important part of their 
task - and many quite obviously do. But to make art 
education function in this way requires that art be 
represented to quite a degree as personal expression 
and not just in formalist terms. The teacher who regards 
art as predominantly defined in terms of publicly accepted 
form is unlikely to stress personal expression sufficiently 
to make a significant contribution to his pupils under-
standing of the personal. Equally, of course, teachers 
who stress expression without introducing pupils to various 
forms which artists have found appropriate for their 
expressive purposes will leave out much that is important, 
for art is not mere expression, it is, to some degree at 
least, symbolic expression, expression which can be read 
by others. 
One other area which must involve an element of education 
in the personal is sex education. Teaching young men and 
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women about sex has got to consist in more than giving 
the facts about the physiology of the human productive 
organs or about contraception. Relationships between 
people aren't just sexual romps. they are also occasions 
when deep feelings can be elicited, in discussing 
relationships sex education must surely raise the question 
of whether, say, a man who sees himself as a 'superstud', 
taking sexual pleasure where he can with no consideration 
for his partner, is morally culpable insofar as his 
behaviour evinces a lack of respect for persons. Questions 
about how one should or should not treat other people, 
and why, and about what is proper or improper in a sexual 
liaison must surely be raised in sex education, and the 
issues involved are not only from the interpersonal, 
though these are important. In situations where relation-
ships involve feelings and emotions we can only understand 
what's going on if we see the participants as having 
complex inner lives, by engaging with them on the level 
of the personal, by engaging with 'this' person not as a 
person of a certain (socially defined) kind, but as a 
unique individual with his or her own thoughts and 
feelings which we should be sensitive to and take into 
consideration in our actions towards them. 
Again in this area of education it seems that the 
potential is there in terms of subjects taught and many 
teachers do try to educate in the personal. Improvement 
in this area seems to depend upon teachers seeing education 
in the personal as important and gearing their teaching 
methods and subject matter towards it, dealing with the 
issues explicitly instead of hoping that pupils will, 
through luck or divine providence, catch on to the idea 
which is implicit in some work being read or activity 
being pursued. 
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The Absolutist. 
Earlier remarks on the status of absolutist assertions 
should have made it clear that we have, to date, no 
justification for teaching anyone that any statement, 
other than statements which are analytically true, is 
absolutely true. This observation has implications for 
the teaching of all subjects. We know that our knowledge 
in all four of the non-absolutist domains is far from 
certain. This is obvious in the case of the personal 
and interpersonal where no-one would deny that our 
understanding is very patchy when assessed by reference 
to the adequacy of theory in these areas, but it is 
also the case that our knowledge in the animate and the 
inanimate is far less complete than many people seem to 
believe. At the moment, for instance, physics is 'in limbo' 
to quite a degree largely bacause the basic model of 
matter used in particle physics is looking less and 
less like an adequate paradigm whilst alternative accounts 
in terms of energy fields don't look any more attractive 
in their present state of development. The important 
point is that we, as teachers, must intro~uce our pupils 
to the idea that our discoveries, in the sciences and 
the human 'sciences', are uncertain, that 'this' is not 
how things are, finally and irrevocably, but that it is 
something like how things are, a way of looking which' 
functions reasonably well as a problem solver, so that 
we feel confident that it captures how things are in the 
world to a reasonable degree. The search for final and 
complete answers is a metaphysical endeavour, not one the 
empirical disciplines are involved in - we must get this 
across to our pupils. 
Nevertheless, because absolutist claims play an 
important part in human life, it seems to me that some 
sort of understanding of absolutist claims, of the 
difficulties that we have with them, and of the difference 
between a claim like, "God exists," taken in conjunction 
with a whole body of not-to-be-questioned doctrine 
spe.ci~ying tne nature of God, and, "The atomic weight 
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of hydrogen is one," which gains its significance from 
its r~le in the language game of chemistry/physics and 
which might well lose its significance or have that 
significance altered, if physics abandons a particle-
based paradigm. We have to teach our pupils the distinction 
between the claims, "This seems a good way of looking 
at the world," and "This is how things are sub speciae 
aeternitatis." 
The one subject taught in some school systems ~though 
not all) which typically requires us to come to grips 
with absolutist assertions is religious instruction/ 
education. Insofar as our aim here must be to inculcate 
an understanding of religions, both as bodies of doctrine 
and forms of life, it has been argued that to do our 
job properly we must inculcate religious belief in pupils 
as this is the only way to really understand what religion 
is all about. It seems to me that it is wrong to write 
any sort of belief in, or emotional commitment to, what 
is understood into the concept of understanding. I have 
covered the arguments here at length; the person who 
argues that we can't understand religion unless we are 
believers, and hence that we should inculcate religious 
belief into our pupils is to be listened to to the same 
extent as a murderer who claims that those who have never 
murdered cannot understand him and hence that only a 
judge and jury who are themselves murderers are competent 
to pass judgement on him. I covered these arguments when 
I discussed, 'Understanding and the Emotions'. In any 
case, since we do not know whether or not many religious 
assertions are true, an attempt to get pupils to believe 
them could not involve any reference to their truth 
conditions and would thus appear as different to distinguish 
from indoctrination and hence as conflicting with the aim 
of propagating understanding. 
Nevertheless the fact that we can't justify representing 
a statement like, "God exists," as true doesn't mean that 
we should represent it as false. This statement is 
problematic because not only do we have trouble deciding 
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what might count as evidence for the existence of a 
God conceived of in a certain way, we also have the 
problem of different notions of God, from the personalised 
God of Christianity to God as a divine essence which is 
an aspect of everything as found in some forms of 
Buddhism and Hinduism. Teaching that God exists, and 
that He is like 'this' or 'that', is unjustifiable 
whatever the dogmatists may say. Yet religion, of one 
sort or another, may embody truth (though we can't know 
for sure that it does), and is certainly important in 
life. 
It seems to me that religious education has a place 
in schools as a way of getting pupils to have some under-
standing of an important aspect of human life, an aspect 
which has taken on very different forms of different 
cultures. I would suggest also that there is no justi-
fication for claiming of any religious assertion that 
'this' is something people should believe, for such a 
'should' could only be rationally justified by reference 
to the truth of the assertions and this cannot be done. 
We must teach about religion, if at all, without prejudice 
to the question of belief. We must let our pupils look 
within themselves to see if they have faith and we must 
teach them that to be human is to be uncertain, particularly 
over questions about the existence and nature of God. We 
must say, with Kierkegaard that God is an object of faith, 
not of knowledge, and we must reply to claims that God 
is 'like this' or 'like that' by telling the Sufi story 
of the blind men faced for the first time by an elephant -
one felt a leg and concluded that an elephant was like 
a massive wrinkled pillar, another felt the trunk and 
concluded that an elephant was a sort of snake and still 
another, walking into the elephant's side, concludes that 
an elephant is like a solid wall. If we are to give 
religious education we must teach our pupils the difference 
between faith and certain knowledge and make them aware 
of the uncertainty of faith, of the fact that even when 
we believe something of this sort to be true we must 
maintain awareness of the fact that to err is human. Thus 
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teaching about absolutism is teaching the difficulty 
of claiming absolute certainty and that faith alone 
cannot guarantee truth. 
573 
The second-order disciplines. 
Philosophy does not appear on the curriculum of 
English schools, though the French do include it. It 
is the case, however, that philosophical issues arise 
in school, over discipline, in discussion of literature 
and important epistemological issues arise in the context 
of the physical sciences. It seems to me that there is 
no reason to avoid philosophical problems entirely in 
teaching other disciplines if that is taken to imply 
that teachers should encourage reflection on philosophical 
issues relevant to what they are teaching or that in 
some situations (for instance in social studies) 
intractable philosophical problems, in ethics for 
instance, should be aired and pupils shown something of 
their complexity and the difficulty of solving them. I 
would not suggest, however, that the philosophy of science, 
say, should be a part of every school physics course 
simply because understanding the issues in the philosophy 
of science seems to require quite a grounding in the 
sciences (I can't imagine what SOMeone with no under-
standing of physics could make of sOMething like 'Against 
Method'). I argued earlier that philosophy is part of 
every domain, relates to every discipline and I see no 
reason, other than the ignorance of philosophy of teachers, 
why philosophical issues should not be raised in a simple 
form in the classroom. 
The formal disciplines do appear in the curriculum. 
School mathematics often include elements of formal 
logic (truth-tables and syllogisms are taught in some 
courses). It should be clear from my earlier remarks on 
the formal disciplines that maths should be explicitly 
related to those disciplines for which it provides 
important methodological tools. Too often, in my own 
experience, maths syllabuses fail to reflect the 
requirements of other disciplines, physics teachers 
being the most frequent source of complaints to the 
maths department. This seems silly to me. It is true 
that a great many mathematicians (particularly pure 
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mathematicians) seem to be quite happy with the idea 
that maths is one big formal game, fascinating for some, 
but with at best tenuous links with other disciplines. 
But we can't expect all our pupils to become emotionally 
committed to maths-for-its-own-sake. And the justification 
of the claim that the general value of maths is such 
that everybody should have some understanding of it 
cannot rely on claims that it is intrinsically interesting-
I argued this in my earlier discussion of intrinsic 
worthwhileness. 
The general value of mathematics must derive from 
its links with other disciplines and their methodologies. 
If we are serious in trying to get our pupils to under-
stand mathematics in a wider sense than just training 
them to answer certain sorts of mathematical questions 
correctly we must stress these links. The best way of 
doing this, it seems to me, is through co-ordination 
of what is taught in maths lessons with what is taught 
in other subjects. 
It seems almost absurd that a maths syllabus should 
not be co-ordinated with the syllabuses of other subjects, 
particularly the SCiences, but it is too often the case 
that it is not. In view of the fact that in most cases 
such co-ordination would require only a re-shuffling of 
'what's taught when', together with relatively minor 
alterations to overall content, it seems to me that here 
a great opportunity to improve pupils' understanding 
of both mathematics and other subjects is being lost 
largely through lack of planning. The reasons for this 
often come down to lack of time in which to do the 
detailed planning needed in co-ordinating the teaching 
activities of different departments - here again we see 
a lack of manpower militating against curriculum 
planning at school level. 
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The Curriculum - summing uP. 
We have seen that in terms of subjects taught the 
sort of curriculum we have has the potential, at least, 
to give pupils in schools an introduction to the diffe~ent 
modes of understanding which have grown up with the 
domains of the inanimate, animate, interpersonal, personal 
and absolutist. The important thing to note is that to 
achieve a proper grasp of the domains pupils must be 
given an understanding of both the differences between 
the problems different domains engage with and the 
relations between the findings of different areas. The 
existence of subjects which like geography, language 
studies, literature etc., engage with issues from different 
domains means that, in principle, we could show pupils 
that different areas do inter-relate even if we often 
fail to bring out such problems clearly. The crucial point 
to make is that improvement in education (seen as concerned 
primarily with the propagation of understanding) can only 
be achieved if teachers see what they are doing in terms 
of the domains and actively seek to inculcate understanding 
of the differences between the work done in different 
areas. 
Also important is the realisation that understanding 
a discipline involves more than grasping a way of looking. 
Disciplines are historically evolving traditions of 
enquiry concerned with solving certain sorts of problems, 
and the language/concepts etc. used by any disciplines 
do not constitute a way of looking which reveals the 
world absolutely, they constitute (ideally) the most 
progressive (in terms of problem solving) way of looking 
at relevant problems, and hence relevant aspects of the 
world, the discipline has so far devised. As such the 
way of looking can be said to capture how things are to 
a reasonable degree, but not absolutely. 
Understanding a way of looking must involve it being 
seen as more than a way of answering exam questions. 
Insofar as disciplines must deal with basic (as opposed 
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to internal) problems, problems which can be seen as 
problems beyond the boundaries of particular disciplines 
which seek to solve them, mastery of a way of looking 
must involve acquiring the ability to deal with any 
relevant problems, and this means that it must involve 
the way of looking giving someone who has mastered it 
an ability to pick out relevant detail and read it 
correctly, wherever in the world it is encountered. Such 
mastery is, of course, a matter of degree. 
But mastery of a discipline's way of looking as a 
way of reading the world is only part of understanding it. 
Teachers must also attempt to inculcate awareness of the 
status of the ways of looking we seek to initiate pupils 
into. We must show how the relevant theories/paradigm 
came to be generated, what sorts of problems were crucial 
in the development of the way of looking ~ why the 
discovery of solutions to those problems is an important 
endeavour. So when we are trying to inculcate under-
standing of a discipline we should be concerned to 
inculcate three (related) things:-
(1) A grasp of the discipline's way(s) of looking 
which will enable each pupil to pick out relevant 
aspects of the world and attach the appropriate 
significance to them, 
(2) A view of the way(s) of looking as being 
the product of a tradition of enquiry (the 
discipline) concerned with certain sorts of 
problems rather than others, 
and (3) Awareness that disciplines relate to basic 
problems which are not just esoteric matters, 
but which are problems which confront us in 
the world, i.e. an awareness of why the 
generation and mastering of specialist ways of 
looking should be regarded as an important matter 
and not as just a complex game in which winning 
means getting qualifications and better jobs. 
All these are a part of the understanding we should, 
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as teachers, be trying to propagate. By being sensitive 
to these requirements individual teachers might well 
come to reconceive what their job involves and hence 
pay more attention to requirements (2) and (3) which, 
it seems to me, tend to be neglected, particularly in 
the education of those pupils who are regarded as more 
academically able. I hope my arguments have established 
that there are good reasons why this should not be the case. 
One query that might be raised concerns standards. 
Including the givipg of a historical perspective on, 
say, physics as part of a physics teacher's job, and 
hence relating theory to the basic problems it was 
generated in engagement with, would result in more 
subject matter being included on the syllabus if none 
of the theory currently taught was dropped. Since there 
is only a limited amount of time available for teaching 
any subject (and only about 25hrs a week, 40 weeks a 
year for 11 years for the whole of a pupil's compulsory 
education in Britain) it might be thought that my 
suggestions, if implemented, would lead to less theory 
being covered (in the hard-theory based 'academic' subjects) 
and h.ence to a fall in educational standards. 
My contention is that although less hard theory 
might be taught in an education designed to propagate 
the broader understanding of systematic enquiry I have 
argued for, this should in no way be regarded as 
symptomatic of falling standards. The purpose of physics 
teaching in school cannot be the turning out of physicists, 
it must be that of giving pupils a grounding in physics 
(or any other discipline/area) which will increase their 
understanding of both what physics is about and of those 
aspects of the world with which physics deals. Further 
this grounding must be an adequate preparation for further 
study of the discipline if that is what the individual 
student chooses. The idea of a basic schooling which is 
a cul-de-sac, which doesn't link with higher education 
would be absurd in the context of education concerned 
with propagating understanding for the acquisation of 
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understanding simply isn't something that we can come 
to the end of. 
I believe, for reasons which should be obvious from 
earlier discussion, that teaching theory alone is an 
inadequate grounding in any discipline. I contend that 
a broader understanding of a discipline as a communal 
tradition of enquiry into important problems will put 
theory into its proper perspective, will make theory 
more 'alive'. Thus,although my suggestions might lead 
to less theory being taught, what is taught will be 
better understood, its significance more thoroughly 
grasped. The approach I am recommending is, I believe, 
likely to increase pupils' understanding in ways that 
will increase retention. It will reduce the incidence 
of pupils coming to see theory as elaborate and generally 
irrelevant ritual gesturing and this should increase 
retention (it is a psychological fact so well known as 
to be almost forgotten that we remember what is significant 
to us far better than what is not). I further believe 
that giving pupils a broader perspective on theory 
and its links with the probelms of life would be to 
establish a framework into which new theory would 'slot' 
in a way that would make acquiring specialist concepts 
etc. easier. My suggestion is simply that if we see the 
problems which theory is directed to solving we are 
better able to see the point of the new theory and the 
specialist concepts and techniques we need to master will 
be seen as appropriate for tackling important problems 
not as empty ritual and meaningless mouthings. So, I 
suggest, adopting my approach, whilst it may lead to less 
theory being covered, will lead to a better understanding 
of that which is covered, better in the sense of showing 
pupils the point of a theory in a way that seems likely 
to increase their interest and motivation and in the sense 
of giving them an overview of particular traditions of 
enquiry which will constitute a better basis for the 
acquisition of new ideas, for getting further into a 
discipline if that is what they choose to do. 
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The notion of a co-ordinated curriculum is closely 
related to the idea that we should attempt to inculcate 
a broader and deeper understanding of the disciplines we 
attempt to give pupils a grounding in. A co-ordinated 
curriculum is one in which each subject teacher is aware 
of the relations of what he teaches with other subjects 
and regards the bringing out of such relations as an 
important part of his job. This I regard as yet 
another way in which the pupils general perspective on 
specialist theory, and technique/procedure can be 
expanded in a way that will give him a better under-
standing of the theory and of the disciplines the~selves. 
I have not said anything here which might demand 
that every school should organise its curriculum in 
one particular way. What I have said implies that an 
acceptable curriculum must be balanced across the domains 
and must be designed so as to inculcate (or be appropriate 
for inculcating) an understanding of the subjects taught 
of the sort I have described. Changes in curriculum design, 
I suggest, should be made in the light of the 
considerations I have raised here and in earlier discussion. 
But I don't think that curriculum innovation made under 
these considerations would automatically zero-in on one 
format. I believe that inter-subject co-ordination is an 
important idea, but even here different approaches might 
prove appropriate for different schools in different areas. 
The important point about curriculum is that it 
should be designed to inculcate as rich an understanding 
as possible of the different approaches to the world 
which have grown up with the domains. How best to do 
this in particular schools will depend upon the expertise 
available amongst the staff, on the sort of area the 
school is in and on the cultural origins and abilities 
of the pupils. Considerations like the cultural origins 
of pupils and the sort of area the school is in will 
determine what opportunities the school has for things 
like projects. An inner-London school will have 
opportunities for multi-cultural education which a 
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school in a rural community is unlikely to have. A.country 
school will have opportunities for work in the life 
sciences (botany, ecology, land use, patterns of 
agriculture) which a city school won't have, 'though 
the city school will have other opportunities (when doing 
• 
'A' level chemistry I was able to visit a plant manufac-
turing sulphuric acid by the lead chamber process simply 
because there was one 7 or 8 miles down the road}. 
I have not, then, designed the 'ideal curriculum' 
because I don't think that such an animal exists. Rather 
I would claim to have given general guide lines which 
should be observed as far as possible when designing/ 
modifying a curriculum for particular schools in particular 
places with particular resources, in terms of equipment 
available, expertise of available staff and opportunities 
available in that particular locality. Since schools 
differ in all of these respects the best possible 
curriculum, in a sense of possible which takes practica-
lities into account, is likely to vary from school to 
school. My guidelines, I suggest, also suggest ways in 
which schools might improve their curricula in terms of 
using existing resources more efficiently and in terms 
of what they might do if more resources were available. 
I have tried to point the way to better curricula, better 
education, this I take to be a worthwhile endeavour even 
if economic difficulties make the hope of maintaining 
standards look like euphoric optimism and hope of 
improvement seems, for the time being, pie in the sky. 
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On Teaching. 
My intention here is not to say what all teachers 
should do. I want to make some remarks on the teaching 
situation which will, I hope, be helpful to teachers. 
By 'teaching situation' I mean any set-up in which one 
person (the teacher) seeks to get someone else (the pupil) 
to learn something. I might be accused of having a thin 
notion of teaching here as my concentration on the person 
to person(s) teaching situation misses out reference to 
the many technological aids to teaching, from programmed 
learning texts through the various sorts of teaching 
machine to more sophisticated ideas like fully interactive 
teaching-programmes for computers where the computer can 
be made to display encouraging remarks or friendly advice 
to the pupil who 'communicates' with it through. a tele-type 
terminal. I don't think that this objection constitutes a 
serious problem for me. I can communicate (or seek to 
communicate) with someone indirectly by leaving them a 
note or sending them a letter and I, or someone else, can 
attempt to teach somebody by giving them work-cards or 
writing a programme for a computer or in any number of 
different ways. Any such aids to teaching don't alter the 
fact that the paradigm teaching situation is the person/ 
person(s) one. Technological devices may replace direct 
personal contact between teacher and pupil(s) but it is 
the teacher who intends that the pupil(s) should learn 
'this' or 'that' and sets up the devices accordingly. 
Any communication which we might be tempted to describe 
as occurring between the device and the pupil is, in 
fact, communication between teacher and pupil,. the device, 
be it book or computer or whatever, directs the pupils 
in ways intended by the teacher, author or programmer. 
Thus I don't feel that anything vital will be missed 
out if my discussion on teaching focuses on the context 
bf direct person to person(s) contact. 
Two other features of what I've said about teaching 
might disquiet some. The first is that I've stopped at 
making a conceptual link between teaching and learning 
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and haven't required that what is learned is true. I 
hope it is clear from earlier discussion that I think 
that education should be concerned with propagating 
understanding and hence that teachers in educational 
institutions should be concerned with getting pupils 
to learn what is true where this is possible. I am, 
however, wary of trying to write too much into the 
concept of teaching itself so I have settled for the 
teaching/learning link and have gone no further in the 
direction of conceptual analysis. This may leave me with 
too wide a notion of teaching, but this is unimportant 
here as I have already dealt with the question of what 
should be taught and so can safely get on with a discussion 
of the problems involved in getting pupils to learn it. 
The second problem area lies in the debate about 
whether teaching is a task or an achievment. I have 
adopted a 'task' interpretation as I am interested in 
the attempt to get a pupil to learn and in the problems 
surrounding such an attempt. It may be that teaching 
implies success, so "T taught X to P' is true i"ff 'P 
learned X from T'. In this case I should be talking 
about 'attempted teaching' here as I don't want to 
assume that the situations I'm discussing are always 
successful learning situations for the pupil. I want 
to look at the problems that can arise in the course of, 
and in some cases frustrate, intentional attempts to get 
someone to learn and I will call such attempts 'teaching' 
accepting that I should, perhaps, be calling them 'attempted 
teaching'. I choose the shorter form for reasons of economy, 
leaving open questions about whether 'to teach' is a task or 
an achievement verb, questions which are irrelevant (except 
in terms of terminology) to my interests here. 
It is also the case that not all of the actions performed 
by' the teacher which d. are directed towards improving 
pupils' acquisition of understanding are communicative 
acts. Setting up class libraries, putting posters on 
the wall, organising chess clubs or debating societies 
or school orchestras/bands are all activities which 
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teachers can engage in with the intent that an atmosphere 
conducive to study should be generated. These are not 
communicative acts in a straightforward sense as the 
teacher has no specific communicative intent with respect 
to any particular pupil(s), but they are 'teaching acts' 
insofar as it is hoped that the atmosphere generated in 
the school by the pursuit of extra-mural activities will 
help such things as teacher/pupil relationships and pupil 
motivation and will encourage pupils to get down to 
work better (amongst other things). 
It is as well to remember too that it is not only 
teaching acts from which pupils learn. Pupils learn 
a great deal from teachers which teachers do not intend 
to be learned. In driving a wedge between communicative 
acts and teaching acts (i.e. acts performed with the 
intent to generally encourage pupils to learn - some 
communicative acts are also teaching acts) and then 
pointing out that pupils learn from/about teachers 
whether or not teachers intend this I am observing that 
teachers are constantly 'on duty' whilst in school. In 
other words the teacher's example in many things, from 
saying, "Hello," to pupils he knows as he walks through 
the playground at break to his willingness to give extra 
help to any pupil who is having difficulties with some 
topic has an effect on the pupils' attitude both to that 
teacher and to school. As this is the case it is clear 
that teachers must widen their own notion of what teaching 
is and pay attention to the effects on pupils of their 
own (i.e. the teachers') activities in school but outside 
the classroom. The 'hidden curriculum', what pupils pick 
up from their teachers, often without the teachers 
intending or even realising what's happening, must be 
brought out into the open, teachers must pay attention to 
it and work towards using it constructively for educational 
purposes. 
One aspect of this need for teachers to be aware of 
and to direct their actions towards educational goals 
arises in consideration of the teacher/pupil relationship. 
Ii 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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The important issue here is that of how the teacher 
should 'see' his pupils, the question of what way of looking 
at pupils is appropriate for a teacher whose purpose in 
engaging with pupils 1s (supposed to be) educational, who 
seeks (ideally) to increase his pupils' understanding 
of important aspects of the world. 
Much earlier I rejected the notion that behaviourism 
was an adequate account of learning in that a purely 
stimulus/response theory which makes no reference to any 
'inner' component is untenable for reasons of incoherence. 
I then argued at length that augmenting a sir t~eory with 
a physicalist account of mind, in terms of brain states, 
cannot give an adequate account of at least human learning 
insofar as a purely mechanistic account, using an exten-
sional description of brain states to 'explain' mental 
events, cannot, in principle, deal with the fact that in 
perceptual consciousness, for instance, we have access 
to a world independant of us, a world in which we are 
aware and upon which we act, not merely a world which 
impinges on us and elicits responses because of our nature 
as a mechanism different from a clock only in degree rather 
than kind. 
The whole early part of this thesis was concerned 
centrally with the question of how to talk about human 
conceptual abilities and I concluded that we must regard 
people as conscious agents capable of picking out and 
attaching relevant significance to various aspects of 
the world and of recognising various objects of experience 
as objects for certain appropriate forms of behaviour. 
When I got to discussion of the general problem domains 
I added to this that not only are people members of their 
home cultures, they are also individuals with complex 
affective lives which are not entirely the product of 
socialisation. So people are at least conscious agents 
with complex inner lives who are also initiates of a home 
culture in terms of language, values, attitudes and beliefs. 
They are n2! reacting mechanisms to be operantly conditioned 
into correct patterns of behaviour where 'correct' is 
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defined purely in terms of social acceptability/ 
. 
desirability within the specific context. Thus a behaviour-
modification view of the teaching situation is inapprop-
riate for teachers as such an approach at best ignores 
important features of the pupil as a person and at worst 
just doesn't make any sense. 
Many people have argued that behaviourist theories 
of teaching aren't really pernicious as no matter how 
objectionable the theory, the practise it leads to 
amounts to good education in that the behaviour 
modificationist classroom just appears to be a very 
loving/caring learning environment. Whilst I am sure 
that teachers would be unlikely to be subverted by 
behaviourism to the extent of seeing themselves as 
technicians working out reinforcement schedules and 
planning sequences of tasks which pupils must be 
conditioned ro perform in appropriate circumstances, I 
am still wary of any move towards behaviourism. The over-
emphasis on overtly observable performance in behaviouristic 
theories cannot accomodate the idea that understanding 
maths, say. consists in more than the ability to sit down 
and solve maths problems or the ability to formalise 
relevant everyday problems into mathematical form and 
hence solve them. 
The idea that people need not only to know/understand 
theory at the level of being able to read the world from 
the perspective of the relevant way(s) of looking, but 
also need to understand the way of looking as the product 
of an evolving tradition of enquiry concerned with certain 
sorts of important (beyond the discipline's boundaries) 
problems has no place in a behaviouristic approach. 
To a behaviourist understanding 1! the ability to act 
in appropriate ways. To me understanding, seen as the 
possession of a conceptual framework which enables us to 
see how things are (to some extent), explains our ability 
to act and understanding is much richer than the ability 
to perform appropriate actions in appropriate contexts. 
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It also involves seeing why the actions are appropriate 
and, hence, leaves open the possibility that someone 
might, by reflecting on the problems at hand, come up 
with a mode of action which, whilst not the normal course, 
is more appropriate in the context than what people 
would normally judge to be appropriate. My real objection 
is that stories about acquiring behaviour through positive 
reinforcement and reinforcing negatively to take some 
behavioural disposition to extinction is just hopelessly 
~ 
crude. In particular it takes no account of the role of 
mind in reflecting upon possible means to desired ends 
and generating strategies to enable us to evaluate the 
appropriateness of different possible means. Behaviourism 
just doesn't capture the way the human mind can make 
sense of the world, can reflect before acting. Under-
standing brings with it, in many areas, the potential 
for efficient purposeful action, but it is not to be 
confused with such action - this is the behaviourists' 
mistake. 
In teaching we are engaging with conscious agents 
with complex inner lives who come to school with beliefs, 
attitudes and linguistic habits acquired in their home 
cultures which mayor may not be those which schools 
seek to inculcate through getting pupils to understand 
their appropriateness. This should be the view of his 
pupils held by any teacher insofar as this is an accurate 
(if not too specific) account of the people who are his 
pupils and a failure to be sensitive to the implications 
of these facts is likely to lead to unsuccessful (attempts 
at) teaching. 
It is important that teachers should maintain awareness 
of their pupils inner lives, particularly the affective 
aspects. Pupils learn much from and about teachers that 
teachers don't specifically intend to be learned. Pupils 
respond affectively to teachers' attitudes to them, they 
make appraisa1s,affective and cognitive, of the teacher 
as a person and also make similar appraisals of particular 
subjects, appraisals based on both the way the teacher 
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presents the subject (whether pupils find that he makes 
it interesting or boring, lucid or incomprehensible) 
and on the pupils' appraisal of the teacher (many people 
don't do well in 'this' or 'that' subject at school 
because they don't like/get on with the teacher). Pupils 
are people who evaluate teachers not as 'teaching 
technicians' but as people and a teacher who fails to 
grasp this is courting disaster. 
The attitude to pupils, to school and to his subject 
that a teacher's actions exhibit are all important in 
determining the success or otherwise of his teaching 
in that pupils respond affectively to what they see as 
his attitude to them and to school and learning. A teacher 
who just goes to work to earn money, who takes no interest 
in his pupils as people, shows no great interest in hi~ 
subject and seems unconcerned about whether or not pupils 
learn what is taught is likely to alienate pupils from 
himself and school (to lessening degrees) and is unlikely 
to inculcate in his pupils any feeling that schooling is 
important. Such a person is unlikely to teach successfully, 
Pupils' education will suffer and so will the teacher 
whose pupils w~ll probably take to 'playing him uP'. 
It is not only the pupils' affective appraisals of 
teachers, subjects and school in general that have a 
bearing on the success of teaching. Different pupils 
also have different temperaments and the wrong approach 
to a pupil can do a lot of damage. Some pupils are both 
competent and confident but are lazy and need not only 
persuasion but threats of dire consequences before they 
get down to work. In such cases it is sometimes appropriate 
for the teacher to adopt the stance of an ogre, 'though 
the pupil is likely to be alienated if the teacher adopts 
the 'heavy' approach even when the pupil isn't wasting 
time or causing unnecessary disruption. Other pupils, on 
the other hand, are competent but lack confidence. The 
appropriate response to a pupil who fails to get on with 
work through lack of self-confidence, but who does what 
he's supposed to do perfectly well when watched and 
encouraged by the teacher is not the 'hell-fire sermon' 
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appropriate in my first example. To respond in such a 
way to a pupil who lacks confidence in his abilities 
is hardly likely to improve matters, such pupils need 
encouragement and praise and a gentle but firm insistance 
that they should tryon their own first and then show 
what they have done to the teacher - in this way the 
pupil's need for reassurance can, over a time, be reduced 
to less demanding levels. 
For a teacher the appropriate response to a situation 
involving a particular pupil depends in part on who the 
pupil is, on the sort of person he is. There is no 
alternative to knowing pupils intimately as people who, 
in many respects, are unique. Teachers and pupils are 
people and there is a personal aspect to many of the 
problems which arise in engagement between teacher and 
pupil(s). A teacher who fails to see his pupils as 
having affective lives which colour interpersonal 
interaction will simply fail to see where there is 
potential for trouble and, through ignorance and/or 
insensitivity, will generate massive problems which will 
make the teaching situation more stressful for him and 
will decrease the success (in terms of propagating under-
standing) of his teaching. 
Of course it's not just in the pragmatics of successful 
teaching (or avoiding disaster) that we find the importance 
of acknowledging the uniquely personal aspects of people. 
If education is to be general it must seek to inculcate 
an understanding of the problems/possible solutions 
found in the domain of the personal, it must help people 
to come to grips with their own inner lives and to engage 
with others as persons with complex inner lives, not just 
with people as social units. Such education, if my earlier 
arguments have any force, should go on in schools and 
it is difficult to imagine how we could possibly increase 
our pupils' understanding of the personal without engaging 
with them as persons. This is particularly the case since, 
as I remarked in my discussion of the curriculum, education 
in the personal seems (for now at least) best approached 
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not through explicit theory (since we have no satisfactory 
body of theory for the purpose) but rather through direct 
discussion of the problems involved, and through imaginative 
empathy with characters in literature, films and in drama. 
It would be wrong to think that education in the 
personal can be located entirely in or between specific 
subjects. Personal conflict, between pupils and between 
teacher and pupil is a regular problem in teaching. 
There's always someone who, 'got out of bed on the wrong 
side this morning,' (and it can be the teacher), there 
are always jealousies and resentments which lead to 
problems (I once had to leave a class working whilst 
I went to talk six girls from my form into going to 
their next lesson - the problem was something about 
Man Yu, who was supposed to be Rosaline's friend, sitting 
next to Catherine, not a friend of Rosaline's, Rosaline 
was upset and affronted by this 'treachery' and felt 
unable to go to her class, the other five had 'come out' 
in support out of concern and moral indignation). The 
teacher's job in such situations isn't just a matter of 
'greasing the wheels' of the educational cart so things 
run smoothly, it can also be educational. Telling someone 
who's let down a friend or pulled a dirty trick which 
has upset a fellow pupil not to do it again isn't enough. 
Telling such a pupil that the person he's slighted has 
feelings and asking how he'd feel if someone did 'that' 
to him is part of his education ~n the personal. By 
trying to get this pupil to see others as having feeling 
which he should consider in his dealings with them we • 
are attempting to inculcate understanding of and respect 
for the principle of respect for persons. Thus engagement 
with pupils as people is a pre-requisite of getting pupils 
to understand their inner lives better, a failure to 
regard pupils as persons would lead to the neglect of 
education in the personal. Further, a failure to engage 
with pupils at the level of the personal would lead to a 
failure to introduce them properly to the prinCiple of 
respect for persons and this would constitute an o~~ission 
of an important aspect of their education in the 
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interpersonal. 
The principle of respect for persons is a moral 
principle governing interpersonal interaction but it 
gains its force not just from the facts about people 
seen as social units but predominantly from the facts 
about people as subjects of experience who appraise 
their experiences both cognitive1y and affective1y. In 
many aspects of every teacher's job, then, aspects of 
education in the personal must be dealt with as well as 
education in the interpersonal and the relations and 
tensions which arise between the two domains. We cannot 
hope to handle the problems which arise, or to help our 
pupils to handle them, unless we regard the teacher/pupil 
relation as being one between persons. This is what it is. 
To ignore the fact is to risk failure in teaching and to 
neglect an important aspect of our pupils' education. 
Another important issue in teaching is that of 
language. The first thing to note here is that in trying 
to teach specific things to pupils teachers are involved 
in attempted symbolic communication, communication which 
can break down not through the pupils' intellectual 
incapacity to grasp ideas but through their incapacity 
to decode the teacher's utterances (linguistic and 
otherwise). In my own career as a maths teacher I 
discovered this to be a source of difficulty. Consider 
these problems: 
(i) You go to the shop with a 50p piece and buy four 
apples. You give the shop keeper your 50p and get 
18p change. How much did you pay for each apple? 
(ii) Solve the simple equation: 4a + 18 = 50. 
To my surprise I discovered that a majority of first 
formers I taught could answer question (i) in the course 
of a mental arithmetic test whilst question(ii), which is 
essentially the same problem, remained difficult for some 
second and third year pupils (who could solve (i) ) even 
after much effort had been made into giving an introduction 
to Simple equations. The only difference between (i) and (ii) 
is in the mode of symbolisation: (i) is stated in 
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language the pupils use themselves in everyday life 
and which relates the underlying problem to activities 
with which they are familiar, (ii) is stated in the 
specialist language of maths. This suggests that the 
problem many pupils have with (ii) is not one with 
actually solving the problem, it is a prior problem 
of understanding what the problem is. The real problem 
is analogous with that of someone asked a question they 
know the answer to in an unfamiliar language. Failure 
to give the answer is the result not of a lack of 
knowledge of it, but of a failure to understand what is 
being asked. Similarly, it seems to me, the fact that 
far more of my pupils could answer (i) correctly then 
could answer (ii) suggests that their underlying problem 
was more a problem with understanding what (ii) was 
asking them to do than a matter of lack of a grasp of 
basic mathematical concepts. The problem is one of 
communication, the pupils failing to decode a question 
correctly. 
This is an important point. Specialist subjects often 
use specialist language and, as I argued in an earlier 
section, initiation into a specialist language game is 
a way of increasing people's understanding. But this 
initiation into a specialist mode of language can also 
cause problems, especially when use of jargon prevents 
pupils realising that 'this' specialist term denotes 
something that they've known about/been able to do for 
years. Language teaching is an important part of teaching 
about any discipline. Introduction of specialist terms, 
specialist modes of symbolisation (algebra, chemical 
formulae, musical notation) is an important part of 
teaching any discipline and must be approached as language 
teaching, new ideaS/forms being explained carefully in 
ordinary language (as far as possible). 
Also important are familiarisation exercises where 
the whole point is to get pupils used to the new way of 
saying things. The most successful strategy I worked out 
for teaching simple equations involved translating 
English into Maths, getting pupils to translate a 
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problem they could do in their heads into the form of 
an equation e.g. writing things on the blackboard like, 
"I gave him £1 to get me two ham sandwiches and he came 
back with 30p change," which the pupils would translate 
to 2h + 30 = 100. 
An equally important part of the move into specialist 
modes of expression is showing pupils the point of moving 
into the specialist mode. Pupils who could solve the above 
question 'in their heads' often questioned the point of 
the algebraic form. My reply to their questions was to 
give them questions they couldn't do in their heads and 
to show them how they could put the question into the 
form of an equation which they could then solve. Thus I 
managed to inculcate an understanding of algebraic 
equations as a more powerful problem-solving technique -
one which keeps us going long after our ability to do ' 
mental arithmetic has let us down. 
The central point I want to draw attention to here 
is one which many teachers of language try to draw the 
attention of their colleagues in other areas to: all 
teaching is language teaching and all teachers must pay 
careful attention in teaching to the problems involved 
in attempts to introduce pupils to new modes of expression, 
both linguistic and otherwise. In terms of my earlier 
remarks on meaning I would say that just as acquiring 
language in the first place is a matter of erasping the 
speech act appropriateness of different sorte of utterances 
in different contexts, so the learning of different modes 
of symbolic expression used in different disciplines must 
be seen as being essentially to do with grasping the 
appropriateness for certain specialist purposes of the 
specialist modes of symbolisation (linguistic and 
otherwise) used by different disciplines. And teachers 
must take care to initiate pupils into specialist ~odes 
of expression properly, to relate specialist expressions 
to ordinary language expressions and to show the special 
appropriateness of the specialist modes for handling the 
problems the disciplines are interested in. We must show 
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our pupils that the specialist modes of expression 
are not esoteric games but function, in the relevant 
domains, as far more powerful problem solvers than the 
ordinary language modes to which they are related. 
This aspect of language teaching, initiation into 
specialist ways of symbolically encoding, communicating 
and manipulating information, is only a part of the 
problem of language in schools. Two other aspects of this 
problem arise from the conventionality, and hance cultural 
variability, of cognitive force and from the variations 
in syntactic rules which occur between different dialects 
of the same language. I will discuss each of these 
separately. 
I argued, when discussing cognitive force, that the 
conventions governing it are separate, to some extent, 
from those governing informative significance. Support 
for this contention comes from work done on the use of 
English by both Asian and West Indian immigrants to 
England. One of the barriers to communication between 
immigrants and the native English, it appears, is the 
tendency for even immigrants who, grammatically, speak 
close-to-standard English, to use the language in 
accordance with non-standard rules of cognitive force. 
John Gumperz, interviewed in the booklet, 'Crosstalk' 
(National Centre for Industrial Language Training), 
mentions some specific problems - I will give two quotes: 
"The 'thankyou's', and the 'please's', that we 
constantly use, are not as frequent in Asian 
Languages. These forms are used for different 
purposes. They indicate pleading rather than 
politeness, and they are not used in talking 
with people of equal status. So Asians tend 
to use English politeness formul~ in ways 
that to us seem either too much or not enough." (P.44) 
and on West Indian English: 
" ••• 1 think the most important differences are 
at the level of tone of vOice, at the level of 
stress, and the level of use of loudness. Afro-
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Caribbeans tend to use loudness to indicate 
emphasis, while we tend to associate loud-
ness with exitement. Or they tend to use loud-
ness to indicate they want to stress a point 
of information, we tend to associate loudness 
with emotion. So we tend to mis-read each other 
and to think that somebody's being exited when 
he's making an important point." (F. 44) 
In the case of the Asian use of 'please' and 'thank-
you' we have an example of mastery of English in terms 
of vocabulary and syntax, but not in terms of cognitive 
force. An Asian usine near-standard English, ~ramrnatically 
speaking, and being (from his point of view) perfectly 
polite,can be misunderstood by an English person who 
reads the Asian's utterance as if he is according with 
normal English conventions of cognitive force, which he 
is not. The Crosstalk booklet gives the transcript of 
a conversation between an English bank cashier and an 
Asian customer in which through misreading the Asian's 
tone of voice and failure to use 'please' and 'thank-you', 
the cashier responds to the customer as if responding to 
unreasonable hostility and impoliteness, These problems 
arise because participants in communication often tend 
to assume accordance with a specific set of rules of 
cognitive force and this assumption is often dangerous 
in cases of cross-cultural communication. 
What seems crucial here is that teachers of children 
from other cultures must be sensitive to the possibility 
that what a pupil intends in makin~ an utterance may be 
very different from what the teacher would have intended 
had he chosen that utterance as appropriate for his 
purpose. Teachers must be careful to address their pupils' 
intentions, not the standard speech act appropriateness 
of their utterances, this requires that teachers' 
appraisals of their pupils' u.tterance s should be made 
carefully and in the light of knowledge of the possibilities 
of misinterpreting the cognitive force of utterances made 
in unfamiliar languages. 
Another important point arising from the Asian English 
example is that whilst there may be good reason to teach 
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Asian pupils the standard English uses of 'please' and 
'thank-you', for instance in order to help them handle · 
life in England more efficiently, this shouldn't be 
thought of as 'teaching them to be polite'. These pupils, 
in general, are likely to be very polite people, their 
only problem is that their way of being polite is not 
ours. The teacher's job with such pupils isn't one of 
teaching them to be polite, it is teaching them what 
counts as politeness in England. What Asian pupils need 
to know is that in 1ngland the everyday 'pleases' and 
'thank-yous' that scatter conversation are ways of 
acknowledging one's partner in conversation as an equal 
and are not seen as indicative of pleading and that a 
failure to use these bits of 6tiquette is seen as an 
assumption of superiority (i.e. one does not say 'please' 
when giving orders to an underling) or else deliberate 
rudeness. Such things should be taught as cultural 
differences, things it is useful for anyone from another 
culture to know if they are living in England. According 
with the rules of cognitive force which govern standard 
English usage is not a matter of being right or wrong in 
any absolute sense, rather it is a good idea if one has 
to communicate with the English, it is part of learning 
to communicate more felicitously with standard English 
speakers. 
The example of the West Indian use of loudness for 
stress is also an example of a possible misinterpretation 
of cognitive force, but in a different way. The Asian 
example is one in which the utterer performs a 
conventionally defined speech Act and his audience 
interprets it as such but, through ignorance of the 
conventions of force with which the utterer is according, 
misinterprets the cognitive force, infers that the 
uttere~ is intentionally doing something which, in fact, 
he is not doing. With the West Indian use of loudness 
for emphasis another possibility arises - that what is 
a perfectly controlled speech act is not seen as a speech 
act at all, but as an uncontrolled expression of anger 
or excitement. I said when I began discussing signs 
h 
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that one 'thing' can be an instance of more than one 
sign. Thus a linguistic utterance can be decoded as a 
symbol, i.e. its informative significance and cognitive 
force can be read by someone who understands the form 
of life, grasps the relevant conventions. But a linguistic 
utterance can also be read as an index, as symptomatic 
of an affective state, even if it is not an explicit 
performative. In standard English loudness is not part 
of the conventionally defined 'machinery' for emphasis, 
thus we tend to read a raised voice indexically, as an 
uncontrolled expression of excitement. West Indian 
English, on the other hand, uses loudness as an 
appropriate (within that form of life) way of (e.g.) 
stressing an important point. It is fairly obvious that 
telling a West Indian who is in complete self-control 
not to get excited could lead to his getting upset, 
after all he knows he isn't getting excited and so could 
only interpret such interruptions as spoiling tactics. 
Again, here, we have problems arising from cultural 
differences in force and again the need to accord with 
more standard English conventions is a matter of 
facilitating felicitous communication. Communication 
between a teacher and his pupils is essential for 
teaching to be successful. The teacher, having received 
an education already, should be a more sophisticated user 
of language. Thus it is the teacher who we should expect 
to be more sensitive to the possibility of communication 
failing through different conventions of cognitive force 
being accorded with than his pupils. Indeed we can see 
that teaching about language, about how one might go 
about performing different sorts of speech-acts in 
different cultural contexts, could be said to be an 
important aspect of language teaching, and language 
teaching, as I remarked earlier, is not something that 
can be safely left to English lessons. 
The problems which arise from the cultural variability 
of conventions of cognitive force are important, but the 
problems which arise from syntactic variation between 
different forms of the same language can lead to even 
•• 
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more serious failures in communication. Reading the 
informative significance of the utterances of some 
native speakers of English from the point of view of 
a standard English speaker can result in a complete 
failure to grasp what is said. Consider the following: 
"0 i ain't no deacon baby, 
i ain't never been a praying man, 
o i ain't no deacon baby, 
i ain't never been a praying man, 
but i had to calIon someone, 
you the only one was close to hand." 
verse iv of A.B. Spetlman's 'The Joel Blues 
(after and for him ~ 
This poem is written in Black English Vernacular (B.E.V.) 
a non-standard form of English which systematically 
'violates' standard English rules. If we take the first 
line, "0 i ain't no deacon baby," we find that terrible 
'faux pas' (in standard English), the double negative, 
which, interpreted by standard rules, leads us to 
interpret Spellman as saying that he is, indeed, a deacon. 
If we ploughed on blindly in this vein we would end up 
'correcting' the above verse to something like: 
"0 I am not a deacon baby, 
I have never been one who prays, 
o I am not a deacon baby, 
I have never been one who prays. 
But I had to calIon someone, 
(and) you were the only one close to hand. 
This, we would conclude, was what Spellman wanted to say, 
and we could go on to suggest that Spellman's 'failure' 
to express himself 'correctly' might be a result of 
linguistic deprivation, from his being a native speaker 
of B.E.V., a mode of English which is conceptually 
confused, unsuited to the precise expression of information. 
We would, in following this line, have missed the power 
! . 
of the poem, but this sort of reasoning is fundamental .. 
to much educational thought on language, for instance 
Bernstein's work on elaborate and restricted codes and 
the work of Bereiter et al which led to 'Operation Head-
start' in the United States. 
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The most important philosophical objection to such 
a line of reasoning has been raised twice in this thesis. 
In my discussion of the private language argument I drew 
out and aereed with Wittgenstein's point that grammatical 
similarities between sensation language and physical 
object language should not blind us to the differences 
between sensation concepts and physical object concepts. 
In the section 'Concepts and Languaee' I mentioned 
Cooper's argument to the effect that grammatical 
differences don't automatically mean conceptual differences, 
that conceptual differences. can only be shown by showing 
that different words belong to different groups/ language 
games in different languages (as with the Hopi words 
for time and space) - I also discussed this issue in 
my account of understanding. I have, then, already 
established that grammatical similarities don't entail 
conceptual similarities ~ that grammatical differences 
don't entail conceptual differences. Thus there is no 
justification for asserting that just because a non-
standard English dialect like B.E.V. violates the syntactic 
rules of standard English people who speak it are 
conceptually disadvantaged. 
To demonstrate that to be a native B.E.V. speaker is 
to be conceptually disadvantaged as compared to being a 
native speaker of some more standard English dialect 
(e.g. Oxbridge English), we would have to demonstrate 
that the syntactic form of Oxbridge English allowed, as 
a matter of logic, the formulation of more subtle, more 
abstract propositions than that of B.E.V., only then 
would we have any justification for suggesting that the 
grammatical style of one's native dialect of English 
could, by itself, be a limiting factor on one's conceptual 
development. 
This is not an area of the philosophy of language .. 
I have dealt with in this thesis, but the issue is 
important enough and the evidence from linguists decisive 
enough that I feel justified in taking a little space to 
demonstrate the untenability of the 'linguistic 
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deprivation' thesis. I will draw on William Labov's 
paper, 'The Logic of Non-Standard English', reprinted 
in his book, 'Language in the Inner City: Studies in 
the Black English Vernacular." On P.239 he writes: 
"The notion that large numbers of children 
have no capacity for conceptual thinking 
would inevitably mean that they speak a 
primitive language, for even the simplest 
linguistic rules we discussed above would 
involve conceptual operations more complex 
than those used in the experiments Jensen 
cites." 
Labov's argument is with work which put black pupils 
into unfamiliar test situations and base their findings 
on what little response those children made to the testers. 
His own work demonstrates the difficulties involved in 
getting any coherent response out of black children in 
South-Central Harlem. With perseverance such children 
can be got to speak, and the analysis of their utterances 
reveals that B.E.V., has all the potential, in terms of 
possibilities of syntactic structure, for performing 
speech acts that standard English has. On P.238 Labov writes: 
"When linguists say that B.E.V, is a system, 
we mean that it differs from other dialects 
in regular and rule governed ways, so that 
it has equivalent ways of expressing the same 
logical content. When we say that it is a 
separate subsystem, we mean that there are 
compensating sets of rules which combine in 
different ways to preserve the distinctions 
found in other dialects." 
On the specific issue of the double negative, or neeative 
concord as Labov calls it, he simply observes that if use 
of this form of negative is symptomatic of conceptual 
confusion, then B.E.V., speakers are in the same state 
of cognitive inadequacy as native speakers of (the standard 
forms of) Russian, French, Spanish and Hungarian amongst 
others. The rest of Labov's analysis of B.E.V., suggests, 
as does the above quote, that it is one amongst many 
dialects of English and has the potential to express 
precisely (i.e. in a form which would not appear either 
I, 
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vague or ambiguous to a sufficiently sophisticated 
B.E.V. speaker) anything expressable in any other 
dialect. The inescapable conclusion is that there is little 
to say for the notion of linguistic deprivation. 
There is, however, good reason for teaching a more 
standard form of English (syntactically speaking) just 
as there is good reason for teaching people who accord 
with non-standard rules of cognitive force the standard 
way of doing things, namely the promotion of felicitous 
communication. In my discussion of corr~unication I 
concluded that a truth condition of'S (the speaker) 
communicates with A (the audience) by uttering U 
(a linguistic utterance)' was, '(3) A's interpretation 
of U must revela SiS i1 to him, "(i1: S's intent to 
perform a particular speech act, with respect to A, by 
uttering U). I also noted that this condition comes 
close to saying that the conventions under which A and S 
appraise U's speech act appropriateness in the context of 
utterance be the same ones. It doesn't quite say this as 
there is a possibility that S grasps A's intent only by 
performing a syntactic transformation on U, which becomes 
U1 , a logically equivalent assertion structured according 
to different conventions of informative significance and 
cognitive force. In this case A might appraise U's 
meaning directly whereas S could only appraise U 
syntactically, getting its meaning through his under-
standing of the translation U1• However, this is a 
technicality which should not be allowed to obscure the 
central point which is that two people, each of whom is 
ignorant of a significant proportion of the rules of 
informative significance 'and cognitive force with which 
the other is according in his use of language, are unlikely 
to communicate with each other very successfully. In an 
extreme case this situation would be like a conversation 
between initiates of completely different cultures and 
languages. In less extreme cases we get more subtle 
misunderstandings, misinterpretations so obscure that 
we believe them to be accurate, which lead to serious 
misunderstandings which are not easily corrected. 
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The need for precise communication carries with it 
the need for standardisation of mode of symbolisation. 
Mathematicians, chemists and physicists know this well, 
they spend a great deal of time on standardising the 
form of algebraic expressions, chemical equation, units 
etc., and as international communications have become 
assential to commerce the languages of business have 
become standardised (usually French and English for 
historical reasons). Standard English is in many ways 
a formal entity constructed by grammarians, but the 
English of most books (especially text books), the 
English that examiners espect answers written in and 
the Engilsh that most employers expect their employees 
to speak, is of a near-standard type, which is 
unsurprising as the grammars were derives by describing 
'good examples' of these sorts of English in the first 
place. Whatever the historical rights and wrongs of 
the coming to ascendency of what we now call standard 
English, that ascendency is a fact. It is logically 
possible to conceive of a world in which B.E.V., was the 
English dialect that gained ascendency as the language 
of business and academia but it is a contingent fact 
about the world we inhabit that standard English holds 
sway over other dialects. So the need for standardisation 
in language use in order to facilitate cOMmunication 
and the fact that one form of English is already 
predominant in literature, academia and commerce means 
that we must at least attempt to teach pupils how to 
function effectively as users of the standard form. 
I would, however, express one reservation here. I 
began this discussion of nonstandard dialects by quott"ng 
a verse from A.B. Spellman. Despite its being written in 
B.E.V. I suspect that few standard English speakers 
would have any difficulty in grasping the informative 
significance of this poem (though a grasp of the cognitive 
force might be more difficult and the deeper poetic 
meaning, the connotations, the feelings expressed, might 
be more elusive). Mutual understanding is possible 
between speakers of different dialects and this fact 
, 
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that we can understand a dialect of our language which 
we cannot speak, moves me to suggest that we are 
justified in asking for utterances of a standard form 
only in cases where we require a degree of precision 
in communication which can only be achieved if all 
participants in a discussion use (syntactically speaking) 
the same mode of language. Only when we cannot trust 
our ability to translate unfamiliar sentence structures, 
only when we need precision in communication can we 
justifiably expect others to go to the effort of 
expressing themselves in an unfamiliar mode of language. 
'Correcting' a perfectly understood, and generally 
understandable, nonstandard utterance is nothing more 
than pedantic nit-picking. 
Finally on this subject I must suggest that although 
we must teach Standard English, in order to help pupils 
read texts, pass exams or gain employment in a world 
where rationally untenable beliefs are nevertheless 
often held irrationally, we must do so with the attitude 
of teaching a socially useful skill, not with the attitude 
of correcting mistakes. It is clear that starting from 
a position of, "You speak bad English, are impolite (etc.), 
I'm gOing to teach you good English, good manners (etc.)," 
would be likely to alienate a pupil who is speaking 
perfectly correct non-standard English or who is being 
perfectly polite in the way accepted in his home culture. 
So there is good reason for saying something more akin 
to, "In the sort of English books are written in, examiners 
expect answers written in and employers like to hear 
people speak we organise things differently from the 
way you do, so it would be useful if you tried to learn 
how to say things in the standard way." This would still 
constitute an imposition on the non-standard English 
speaker, but at least we would be regarding him as 
someone possessing sophisticated cognitive and linguistic 
skills and would not run the risk of alienating him by 
treating him like a semi-imbecile whose language is little 
more than expressive gibberish. 
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Teaching is not an easy task and is unlikely to 
become one. I hope that my remarks in this section 
have made explicit some of the problems that can 
frustrate attempts to teach. In particular I hope 
that I have emphasised two crucial points. The first 
is that in teaching we must acknowledge our pupils 
as subjects of experience with complex inner lives, 
both cognitive and affective. If we fail to do this 
we court disaster as pupils do respond to teachers 
and school affectively and a failure to take this 
fact into account may well lead to pupils becoming 
alienated from a teacher, his subject and even school, 
thus failing to learn anything. The second important 
point concerns pupils use of language. All cultures 
expect children to be polite, but the conventions 
about what sort of utterances constitute politeness, 
and the conventions governing cognitive force in 
general, are cultural variables. So teachers, especially 
teachers in multi-cultural schools, must be careful 
about reading pupils' utterances as if those pupils 
were speaking in accordance with the rules governing 
the cognitive force of standard English. Often this 
is not the case and a failure to realise it can lead 
to resentment between teacher and pupil which is 
based on nothing more than misunderstanding. Teachers 
must address their pupils' intentions, not the 
'surface forms' of utterances. 
Finally, 'good grammar' is a problematic notion. 
There is no justification for regarding the particular 
syntactic rules of standard English as having any special 
appropriateness in terms of facilitating logical thought 
and abstraction -Labov's work makes this clear. Thus 
it is wrong to dlsvalue the nonstandard dialects and to 
assume that those who speak them are cognitively 
disadvantaged. Non-standard speakers are primarily 
disadvantaged by the social fact that standard English 
is the language of teachers, books and (with added 
vocabulary) of ~any of the systematic disciplines. 
They are also disadvantaged by the fact that before 
, 
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they can achieve academic success they must learn 
not only to understand the standard form, they must 
also learn to express themselves in standard for~. 
There seems little way out of this problem except 
to teach non-standard speakers standard English, 
but as this is a social requirement and is not 
justifiable on the grounds that the standard form 
has any inherent superiority we should not approach 
teaching it in terms of correcting bad grammar and 
teaching to think. We must teach the standard form 
as a new and different mode of language without the 
unjustifiable assumption that it is in any objective 
way a superior form. 
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Conclusion. 
I began my thesis by stating three basic problems 
which I have sincs offered solutions to. I have rejected 
behaviourist/physicalist accounts of learning and the 
associated model of people as responding organisms/ 
conditionable physiological mechanisms, arguing that 
to adopt such an approach involves wilfilly ignoring 
the problems of consciousness and agency. For physics 
to do this is (as my discussion of the domain of the 
inanimate suggests) unobjectionable, but in other 
areas (especially the domain of the personal) a 
failure to acknowledge people's consciousness and 
agency constitutes a failure to engage fully with 
important problems. In teaching we are attempting 
to increase persons' understanding of, and hence 
ability to handle, the world in which they live. To 
fail to acknowledge this is, for reasons I discussed 
in my section 'On Teaching', likely to frustrate our 
attempts to teach. 
In characterising the utterances (vocal and written) 
which we commonly use in teaching I have represented 
them as symbolic representations which derive their 
'communicative - act appropriateness' through inter-
subjective agreement within a form of life. The central 
problem with initiation into language, I have argued, 
is not about how we learn a corpus of grammatical 
rules, but about how we learn to do things with words. 
This carries on to the problem of what is involved 
in initiating pupils into the specialist language 
games of the systematic disciplines where mastery of 
concepts, procedures etc. must, for adequate under-
standing, be augmented by an understanding of what 
those language games/ways of looking are appropriate 
for doing and why we should want to solve the sorts 
of problems that specialist enquiry engages with. 
I have characterised understanding in terms of the 
possession of a conceptual framework which captures 
to some degree the nature of what is understood 
• 
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I have argued that justification of the claim that 
'this' paradigm/model/theory complex gives us a 
reasonable understanding of 'those' phenomena must 
involve reference to the complex's problem solving 
power, its practical utility in enabling us to handle 
relevant aspects of the world, though the theory/ 
practice link may be ·indirect. This is not to write 
usefulness into the concept of understanding, it is 
simply to note that in the absence of clear implications 
for practice we have no way of establishing any body 
of theory as revealing its authors' understanding 
as opposed to their capacity for spinning elaborate 
phantasies. I have also noted that efficient handling 
of certain areas of problems by some individual can 
properly be taken as evidence of understanding even 
in the absence of an ability to state that understanding 
explicitly. 
From my account of understanding I have derived 
a number of general problem domains, the inanimate, 
animate, interpersonal, personal and absolutist which, 
I believe, constitute a basic template for the curriculum 
of any institution concerned with giving people a basic 
general education. I have not derived these 'forms' 
transcendentally, nor have I fallen into the relativistic 
error of creating an unbridgable gap between the world 
and what we say about it. I have attempted to steer 
a middle course between absolutism and relativism which 
avoids the problems which frustrate those endeavours. 
Finally I have related my findings to the specific 
problems of curriculum design and teaching. 
I cannot deny that much of what I have argued will 
be objected to by philosophers of many persuasions. I 
have tried to argue against as many possible objections 
as I have been able to think of, but there are 
undoubtedly others I didn't foresee and some of these 
may have uncomfortable (for me) force. My hope is not 
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that all I have said is right - to even hope that when 
every philosopher since Plato has made mistakes would 
constitute an absurd conceit on my part. What I hope 
is that my work here is non-trivial, that any serious 
errors I have made are not of a sort that a competent 
philosopher should have avoided, that digging out my 
mistakes will prove a fruitful exercise for others. 
I also harbour the hope that here and there critical 
readers will find some insights on the problems 
discussed that will prove illuminating to some degree 
even if my handling of the discussion has faults. In 
short my hope is that this thesis constitutes a worth-
while contribution to the historically continuous 
and evolving discussion of the problems of education 
and particularly to the philosophical element in that 
enterprise. 
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